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i 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the interplay between country level governance and accounting systems 
considering the role of the World Bank and other donors in the development of both 
governance and accounting in Africa. The purpose of the research is threefold. The first is to 
assess the state of accounting systems on the continent using Ghana and Benin as illustrative 
cases. The second purpose is to examine the link between accounting and governance, and 
the current donors’ approach to the development of governance and accounting in Africa. The 
third purpose relates to the examination, through the lens of political economy, of the factors 
hampering the development of sound governance and accounting systems in Africa. The 
research is conducted through a case-study and cross-national design with four data collection 
methods: interview, observation, survey and documents. The study finds that accounting 
systems in Benin and Ghana are very weak despite the reform initiatives undertaken in the 
area, and that the main difference between the two systems relates to the relatively higher 
level of accounting information available to the public in Ghana compared with Benin. 
Further, the findings suggest that there is a potential causal relationship between accounting 
and governance. With regard to the World Bank and other donors’ approach, it is found that 
the approach to governance and accounting reforms in Africa suffers from a lack of 
contextual and cultural fit. The study also identifies and explains the various political and 
economic forces and interests that shape the development of governance and accounting in 
Africa. These findings complement, extend and challenge existing studies in the field. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
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1.1. Introduction and Problem Statement 
The importance of good governance for improved living standards and development has been 
widely argued (Kaufmann et al., 1999a; Knack, 2002; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2003; Khan, 
2007). However, most developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa have suffered 
from governance problems that have hindered their development (Sachs et al., 2004; United 
Nations Development Programme, 2005; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005a). Wide 
spread corruption (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Otusanya, 2010) and ineffective institutions 
(Shirley, 2008) characterise most African countries. As a consequence, a lack of 
accountability and transparency in public affairs has been reported across the continent. It is 
suggested that good governance through improved accountability, transparency and enhanced 
institution capabilities is necessary to foster African development and poverty alleviation. 
Mechanisms to improve key governance variables are therefore crucial to the development of 
good governance. 
Despite the importance of governance, its conceptualisation and measurement have remained 
debatable. There is disagreement on the elements and components of governance. For 
example, the World Bank’s governance metrics, i.e. the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
potentially the most widely used to inform policy and reform design (The World Bank, 2003; 
Kaufmann et al., 2009a, 2009b), involve six components (Kaufmann, 1999). These 
governance measures show some similarities, but also some differences with those developed 
by other organisations (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2005b; Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, 2009
1
). In addition, it is suggested that there is no uniform definition of 
governance. 
                                                          
1
 Online: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org  
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Moreover, while having good accounting systems is likely to contribute to governance 
development, the current governance framework seems to place limited emphasis on 
accounting systems. Further, the available governance metrics which are used to inform most 
lending/grant decisions (see for example Kaufmann et al., 2005) barely contain any 
accounting related information. There is no specific mention of accounting systems in the 
variables or accounting related sources in the data used to construct these governance 
indicators. Furthermore, no research has investigated directly the relationship between 
accounting systems as a whole and the governance systems of a country. 
The research argues that accounting systems have a potential role to play in governance. A 
rigorous examination of State accounting systems and governance will help gain insight into 
this potential role and conceptualise the association between accounting systems and 
governance.  
Further, having realised the importance of governance for development, the World Bank and 
other donors have been helping with various governance reforms and initiatives. However, 
very limited results have been achieved from these initiatives in terms of improvements in 
both governance (see for example Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Tayloy, 2011) and accounting 
(Durevall and Erlandsson, 2004; Moussa, 2004; Akapko, 2009; Schiavo-Campo, 2009). This 
observation calls into question the approach used by donors to push through these initiatives. 
It becomes, therefore, opportune to examine the potential of donors’ approach to the 
development of governance and accounting in order to achieve the expected results in terms 
of improvements. Also, the few studies conducted on accounting in Africa have reported 
weaknesses in these accounting systems. However, none of these studies has focused on a 
comprehensive critical examination of the accounting system as a whole encompassing both 
English and French Africa which represent over 80% of African countries. 
4 
 
The overall objective of this research is to examine the interplay between accounting systems 
and governance improvements in Africa considering the role of the World Bank and other 
donors in the development of governance and accounting systems. The specific objectives of 
the study are to: 
(i) Critically examine the accounting systems in the studied countries 
(ii) Evaluate the role of the World Bank and other donors in the development of 
governance and accounting systems in Africa. 
(iii) Examine the role of accounting systems in governance improvements, with a 
specific focus on Africa.  
(iv) Examine the factors that hamper sound governance and accounting systems in 
Africa. 
In order to meet these objectives, the following research questions are formulated: 
(i) What is the state of accounting systems in Africa when taken as a whole?  
(ii) What is the link between accounting and governance in Africa? 
(iii) What is the effectiveness, in terms of achieving results, of the World Bank and other 
donors’ approach to the development of governance and accounting in Africa?  
(iv) How is the development of accounting and governance in the studied countries 
shaped by political economy factors? 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. 
5 
 
Chapter 1, which is the introduction chapter, presents the general background to the research, 
identifies the research problems, research objectives and questions and presents the structure 
of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 reviews the country governance and accounting systems literature. The first part 
focuses on governance, starting with three main definitions that underpin the current 
governance framework and measurement. This is followed by a consideration of the World 
Bank’s and other donors’ involvement in governance in Africa. The chapter then discusses 
the current governance metrics. The second part of the literature review considers the role of 
accounting in key governance dimensions. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodological approach used to conduct the study. It covers the 
research design adopted, the methods employed to collect evidence, and the data analysis 
process, methods, techniques and software used. 
Chapter 4 explains the theoretical framework used to explain the factors that hamper or 
prevent the development of sound governance and accounting systems in Africa. The 
political economy framework was adopted following an initial discussion with officials in 
Benin and two consultants in the area of governance and accounting systems, and the review 
of the political economy literature. 
Chapter 5 analyses findings related to the examination of the extent of accounting system 
weakness in Benin and Ghana. This chapter also reports the results of the part of the survey 
related to accounting systems in these countries which allows a comparative analysis in terms 
of their impact. 
Chapter 6 analyses findings related to the link between governance and accounting systems, 
and donors’ approach to the development of governance and accounting in Africa. It reports a 
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potential causal relationship between accounting and governance. It also reports the lack of 
contextual fit in donors’ approach to the development of governance and accounting. 
Chapter 7 analyses the political economy findings. It identifies and explains three categories 
of players with various interests that interact to shape the development of governance and 
accounting. The chapter reports that the interaction between these players limits progress in 
governance and accounting in the case study countries and in Africa in general.  
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions drawn from the study, including an overview of the 
research, summary of major findings, contributions, and limitations of the study and areas for 
future research. 
Figure 1.1 below shows how the different chapters are linked 
Figure 1.1: Structure of chapters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction: 
Problem statement 
Chapter 2: Literature Review: 
Background and Gap 
Chapter 3: Methodology: 
Approach to Research 
Chapter 4: Theoretical 
Framework 
Chapter 5: State of Accounting 
in Benin & Ghana 
Chapter 6: Link Between 
Accounting & Governance 
Chapter 7: Political Economy 
of Governance & Accounting 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
The World Bank and other aid agencies have attempted to address the issue of governance at 
country level based on the argument that governance has ‘sizeable’ effects on economic 
growth and development (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The main instrument used in this regard 
has been the Structural Adjustment Programmes that were reviewed in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s following the limited results of the initial programmes (The World Bank, 2003; 
Easterly, 2005). In response to the demand for adequate tools for policy options to better 
appraise and deal with governance challenges, especially in countries where governance is 
particularly weak, various governance definitions and measures have been proposed (see 
Kaufmann et al., 1999, Rotberg, 2004; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005a, 2005b).  
The purpose of this research is to examine the interplay between governance and accounting 
systems in Africa, considering the role of the World Bank and other donors in the 
development of both governance and accounting on the continent, using Benin and Ghana as 
illustrative cases. This chapter surveys the existing literature on country governance (starting 
with the definition of governance) and accounting systems, in order to examine how 
governance has been conceptualised and the potential role of accounting in governance.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, the definition of governance is 
examined to illustrate its broad and narrow considerations. The importance of governance in 
the African context and the World Bank’s implication is also considered in this section as 
well as the discussion of the main available governance measures. The third section focuses 
on the accounting literature in key governance areas. The fourth section considers ways to 
bring accounting systems back into governance. The final section provides some concluding 
comments.  
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2.2. Conceptualising Governance  
2.2.1. Governance: The broad and narrow limit 
The literature on governance can generally be divided into two – corporate or micro level 
governance and country or macro level governance. The focus of this study is on country 
level governance, which is usually termed governance with no further specific qualifications 
(see for example, Kaufmann et al., 2009a and 2009b; Rotberg, 2004). The term ‘governance’ 
is therefore adopted throughout this study to denote country level governance.  
Corporate governance, for example, has been extensively examined with the production of 
several reports and codes, examples of which include the Committee on the Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance report in 1992, referred to as the Cadbury Report, the Rutteman 
Working Group report in 1994 and the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999. 
However, following corporate scandals involving high profile companies like Enron, 
WorldCom, Xerox, and Tyco (Coates IV, 2007), corporate governance has become a 
prominent focus in most economies across the world. This has resulted in the revision of 
existing codes such as the OECD Principle of Corporate Governance in 2004 (Jesover and 
Kirkpatrick, 2005), and the issuance of more detailed and binding codes in the form of laws 
such as  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in the US.   
The overriding objective of corporate governance is to ensure the successful conduct of 
businesses and the integrity of stock markets, thus the protection of investors. This objective 
is stressed by Abu-Tapanjeh (2009: 557) who asserts that “the corporate governance is not 
only one of the main principle[s] in running a firm successfully but also it ensures security 
confidence by monitoring and controls the operation of the firm”. Previous studies in the area 
of corporate governance underline the important contribution of accounting, and its ethical 
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underpinning (Verschoor, 1998), to corporate governance, and frame financial accounting as 
‘a key ingredient in the corporate governance process’ (Sloan, 2001). 
Country level governance, on the other hand, gained increased attention with the financial 
and economic difficulties of many governments (mostly in the developing world) in the 
1980s and 1990s. Political institutions and governance are recognised as critical to economic 
development (The World Bank, 1989, 1992; Kemal, 2006). The manner in which power is 
acquired and exercised, public resources are managed and the relations between political 
officials, public institutions and the general public have become subjects of governance 
discussion and analysis (Dallas, 2004; Rotberg, 2004). The concept of governance is wide 
and as argued by Leftwich (1992), it “refers to a looser and wider distribution of both internal 
and external political and economic power” (p.611). 
The World Bank primarily defines governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in 
the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development” (The World 
Bank, 1992: 1). This definition is particularly useful in understanding the role of the 
government in governance and development. The definition places emphasis on the expected 
outcome of governance, i.e. ‘development’, with the argument that good governments are 
those that achieve development.  Notwithstanding the fact that this definition outlines key 
points related to power and management of resources for development, it does not provide, at 
this stage, at least not explicitly, the elements that can help determine whether a specific 
country’s governance is ‘good’ or not. In fact the Bank’s lending and support are required to 
be political neutral, and this may justify the adoption of a definition that drives the focus on 
the expected outcome, i.e. ‘development’; although Weiss (2000) suggests that the Bank’s 
definition of governance implicitly involves ‘the form of political regime’. There is however 
a debate in the literature as to whether the form of governance, i.e. ‘the manner in which 
power is exercised’ matters or not. In this respect, some scholars have identified two forms of 
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governance: the market-enhancing governance and the growth-enhancing governance (see, 
for instance, Khan, 2007). According to the market-enhancing governance, if markets are 
efficient the private sector will drive economic development. The mixed results under the 
private sector-led development initiatives from some developing countries have called for the 
consideration of the growth-enhancing governance, which requires state intervention and 
critical government capacities to allocate resources, irrespective of the market.   
Returning to the political neutrality of the World Bank in its lending activities, researchers 
have argued and provided evidence that the Bank’s activities are not politically neutral as it 
claims (George and Sabelli, 1994; Harrison, 2005). For example, Harrison (2005: 240) argues 
that “it is now well established that the World Bank is not a politically-neutral institution... 
[and] it is striking that the... [Bank] has been engaged in an endeavour to bring political 
concepts into its development strategies since the early 1990s”. As such a focus on the 
Bank’s discourse/speech to understand the deep nature of its actions will be nothing other 
than a fruitless effort. One must go beyond the formal discourse of the Bank, and rather 
scrutinise its lending programmes and documents to be able to unearth the true nature of its 
strategies and actions in the developing world, and especially in Africa. This is supported by 
a study of Uganda and Tanzania where Harrison (2004) introduced the concept of ‘post-
conditionality politics’.  He argues that the relationship between the governments of these 
countries and the World Bank, specifically, has gone beyond the typical conditionality 
relationship articulated in the structural adjustment programmes. The relationship has moved 
to a post-conditionality politics where the Bank is highly involved in actual policy making at 
various levels of government structures. 
A similar stand is required for the United Nations (UN) in its Article 2 (7) regarding national 
sovereignty. However, scholars such as Weiss (2000) observe that “sovereignty and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states have come under fire” (p.796). This is further and 
12 
 
explicitly illustrated, as opposed to the World Bank whose stand remains implicit, in a report 
of the former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali who wrote that “The time of absolute and 
exclusive sovereignty [of nations], however, has passed” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992); and thus 
“providing the tools of democracy and freedom that are integral to the political and civic 
dimensions of governance” (Weiss, 2000: 804). Such a stand regarding democracy in 
particular is what Leftwich (1993) calls the new orthodoxy that ‘dominates official Western 
aid policy and development thinking’. As stated by Leftwich (1992) in the introduction to his 
essay on governance, democracy and development in the Third World, the core assertion of 
this thinking is that “'good governance' and democracy are not simply desirable but essential 
conditions for development in all societies” (p.605). As such, democratic-based governance is 
inherently ‘good’ for development and universally applicable in its standard form in all 
societies irrespective of their cultures and local context including their stage of development. 
Nevertheless, the argument that high-democracy based governance results in better growth 
has not reached a consensus among scholars. For example, in a recent study, Doucouliagos 
and Ulubasoglu (2008) find that democracy has no direct effect on growth, though it affects 
growth through indirect channels. In a earlier study Helliwell (1994) concludes that “the 
general result of the growth analysis is that it is still not possible to identify any systematic 
net effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth” (p.225). Another study by 
Przeworski et al. (2000) finds no difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes 
in terms of economic growth.  
The second definition of governance considered in this study is that of Rotberg (2004) who 
defines governance as “the term used to describe the tension-filled interaction between 
citizens and their rulers and the various means by which governments can either help or 
hinder their constituents’ ability to achieve satisfaction and material prosperity” (p.71). The 
term ‘tension-filled interaction’ makes Rotberg’s definition more complex relative to that of 
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the World Bank. The term is indicative of a relationship where governments and their citizens 
engage in certain activities and actions to influence each other with pressure from each side. 
In addition it focuses on the satisfaction and prosperity of the citizens rather than that at the 
national level. As such, governments that help their citizens achieve satisfaction and 
prosperity can implicitly be seen as ‘good’ governments. The concept of the nation or state’s 
wealth, and the balance between this and the wealth of the citizens individually need some 
considerations. 
Thirdly, Kaufmann et al. (2010: 5) are of the view that governance encompasses the 
“traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. 
Kaufmann and his colleagues placed emphasis on traditions in terms of social and cultural 
features as important determinants of the form and characteristics of governance in a country. 
These traditions together with the institutional arrangements within a country determine the 
quality of governance (see for example La Porta et al., 1999).  
Nonetheless, there is no mention of how a country’s traditions can be measured; and, despite 
being included in the definition, the representation of specific country’s traditions in the 
governance measures subsequently proposed is not clearly visible. Moreover, this definition 
is just as broad as the two discussed above. It does not cover the exercise of power – power 
meaning in this context the means by which authority is exercised. Neither does it 
“distinguish between the content of specific policy programs on the one hand and the 
governing procedures on the other” (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008: 168).  
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The problem with these definitions can at least in part be due to the personal profile of the 
individuals who put them forward and to some extent to the nature of the institutions behind 
them. Both Kaufmann and his other associates, and Rotberg are portrayed as economists. The 
World Bank, the leading institution in governance initiatives, has also long positioned itself 
as an economy driven policy institution. This makes it difficult for both the Bank and the 
various authors cited above to capture significant noneconomic factors such as social trust 
and customs associated with culture and traditions, as well as accounting system in all of their 
dimensions which at first do not appear to be economic per se in nature but which can have 
significant economic consequences. So far, these factors have not been given equal 
consideration in the various governance initiatives compared to the economic factors.  
This does not suggest that the definitions provided are not worthy of any use. They help in 
the process of identifying the main features of governance which, this study argues, are far 
from complete and should be subject to continual review and update. The observation has 
been made that the definitions lack uniformity (see Al-Marhubi, 2004). Each definition has 
its own focus. For example, while the World Bank puts the emphasis on power and 
development, Rotberg is more concerned with the tension-filled interaction between citizens 
and their governments and the extent to which the latter contribute to the prosperity and 
satisfaction of the former.  
Interestingly, there has been a growing interest in understanding the requirements of good 
governance. According to Wilson (2008: 200): “good governance involves making difficult 
trade-offs between highly desirable goals... by trying to make sure that those who make these 
trade-offs… are subject to accountability mechanisms that are sufficient to ensure that they 
make justifiable, even if contestable, choices.” Wilson recognises here the difficulty in 
choosing between alternatives on behalf of the public. The trade-offs involved in the process 
require choosing the options that satisfy, most (or best), the interests of the citizens. Here, 
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apart from proper accountability mechanisms, the notion of resource allocation appears to be 
relevant since choice requires deciding between alternative goals and how the available 
resources will be allocated between selected goals.  
The World Bank (2000: i) suggests that “good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, 
and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive 
arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.”  An important point to highlight here 
is that good governance also requires ‘transparency’ and as suggested by Dye and 
Stapenhurst (1998: 1) “good governance is accountable, participatory and transparent”. 
Furthermore “good governance is a strong antidote to ‘corruption and fraud’ (Dye, 2007: 7) 
since good governance requires the existence of mechanisms to prevent or at least reduce the 
likelihood of corruption and fraud.  
Although the above development regarding the requirements of good governance outlines 
very important areas of governance – such as resources allocation, proper accountability 
mechanisms, transparency and control of corruption and fraud – where accounting has proved 
to have strong potentials (see section 5), it is surprising that there is no mention of accounting 
or accountability in the governance definitions cited above. Furthermore, this shortcoming in 
the definition has had, as argued in this study, a knock-on effect on the available governance 
measures (see section 4), and though accountability is then included it is only considered at 
political level. There are no explicit accounting systems related measures in any of the 
governance indexes. Further the review of the available data sources (see Kaufmann et al. 
1999, 2006 and 2009b; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2011) used to construct the indexes revealed 
no significant accounting information within these sources. The only source where 
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accounting is marginally considered is the ‘CPIA 2  quality of budgetary and financial 
management’ data. However, the World Bank staff provide this data only by filling a 
questionnaire instead of conducting an in-depth examination of the various dimensions 
concerned. It is surprising that the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) 
assessment which provides a more in-depth, though limited, assessment for accounting is not 
explicitly considered in any of the governance metrics. 
 
2.2.2. Governance in the African context and the involvement of the World Bank 
The 1980s and 1990s had seen the importance of political institutions for governance and 
economic and social development (World Bank, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2003). Improvements in 
governance are suggested to foster improvements in economic and social conditions and 
poverty alleviations. In terms of citizen welfare, it has been argued that “good governance is 
a pre-requisite to sustained increases in living standards” (Knack, 2002: 1). Similarly, 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) find that an improvement of one standard deviation in governance is 
associated with an increase of between two and a half and four fold in per capita income.  
This association between governance quality and development has given impetus of the 
World Bank support to government institutions across the world (World Bank, 2003). 
Since the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Africa has been part of this 
process and has been subjected to increased institutional reforms to improve governance 
across the continent (Jaspersen and Shariff, 1990; Dollar and Svensson, 2000; World Bank, 
2003; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005b). Structural adjustment programmes led by 
the World Bank had been the primary approaches used to achieve this purpose. With these 
programmes, “it is hoped that macro and institutional reforms will produce more efficient 
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resource use and higher rates of economic growth” (Summers and Pritchett, 1993: 383). 
Hence, the central focus was on institutional improvement as emphasised by the World Bank 
(2003: 25): “we need to ensure our lending enhances institution-building (in addition to 
addressing relevant policy, physical investment, and resource transfer objectives)”. This led 
to significant growth in adjustment and investment lending. At the same time, as observed by 
Leftwich (1992), the other Western-based bilateral and multilateral development 
organisations were providing support for democracy-led good governance in number of Third 
World countries including those in Africa.   
Prior evaluations of the adjustment programmes suggest that, all in all, they failed to meet 
expectations. Having acknowledged that adjustment lending in the 1980s had somehow 
improved macroeconomic imbalances and growth, Summers and Pritchett (1993) recognise, 
however, that it did not solve the basic development problems. This is also supported by 
Easterly’s (2005: 20) assessment that “there were some successes, but also some big disasters” 
associated with the adjustment lending in the recipient countries. As a result, the adjustment 
lending approach had been amended by the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s with 
new programmes whose primary objectives are defined as being to ensure improved public 
savings and efficient use of public resources, transparency of the use of public money, and 
monitoring and controls of expenditures (World Bank, 2003; Easterly, 2005).  
Despite the renewed approach to African governance development, there is a conviction that 
the continent needs to do more on the ground in terms of effective implementation of 
governance related policies and frameworks. In support of this, Banda (2002: 95) notes that 
“in theory, most of Africa has embraced the concept of good governance. In practice, this is 
not the case.” With the same conviction, Kofi Annan – former United Nations’ Secretary 
General – addresses the Heads of African States in these terms: “without good governance – 
without the rule of law, predictable administration, legitimate power and responsive 
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regulation – no amount of funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity” 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2005a: II). 
Similarly, a recent study by Lynch and Crawford (2011) concludes on the democratic system 
being ‘pushed’ throughout Africa as follow:   
…increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional 
transfers of power, but realities of democratic rollback and hybrid regimes; democratic 
institutionalization, but ongoing presidentialism and endemic corruption; the institutionalization of 
political parties, but widespread ethnic voting and the rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) 
politics of belonging; increasingly dense civil societies, but local realities of incivility, violence 
and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and 
uneven development; and the donor community’s mixed commitment to, and at times perverse 
impact on, democracy promotion (p.275). 
While the idea of reforming government institutions is not being questioned, what is being 
questioned is whether the right approaches which take account of indigenous reality are being 
used. Most reform/policy approaches to development and governance in Africa and most 
developing countries are driven by Western orthodoxy with little emphasis on the local 
reality/context. Attempts to reform and policy that are not context-built are less likely to 
produce effective outcome. The conventional wisdom or orthodox of development and 
governance which has been exported to the developing world upon which policies and 
reforms are based to promote development and good governance has been strongly 
challenged as ineffective wisdom (see for instance, Frank, 1969). Moreover, such approach 
places limited focus on accounting, and its drive for behavioural standards (Cohen and Pant, 
1991). For example, in a study of three Chinese state owned-enterprises, Huang and Snell 
(2003: 112) argue that “failures of governance and leadership lie at the roots of poor moral 
atmosphere”. No strong stand has been taken regarding accounting systems and related 
behavioural standards; or when such stand is taken (as is well articulated in The World Bank 
(2007)) it is only well developed on paper and little is done to put it into policy and support 
its effective implementation. 
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Interestingly, following the World Bank’s governance programmes in Africa, the African 
Development Bank (ADB) (2008) has joined the initiatives with a vision to make governance 
and accountability a key priority in its lending and non-lending activities on the continent as 
aforementioned. To this purpose, the ADB has developed the Governance Strategic 
Directions and Action Plan (GAP) over the period 2008-2012 which serves as a framework 
for the Bank’s interventions in good governance in Africa. A thorough evaluation of the GAP 
at the end of its term (i.e. 2012) will provide information about the extent of the success 
achieved. 
 
2.2.3. Measurement of governance 
The second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of quantitative characteristics and measures 
of governance (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Kaufmann et al., 1999). This 
represents a shift from the qualitative characteristics to the initial quantitative features of 
governance. The purpose of the move is to enhance governance in order to boost 
development (Kaufmann, 2006; Rotberg and Gisselquist, 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2009a). 
From the early 2000s, there has been a development of more specific full indicators that focus 
exclusively on Africa. The first attempt in this regard was initiated by the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation which developed the ‘Ibrahim Index of African Governance’ (IIAG). The second 
attempt was the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 
2005 with the development of the African Governance Indicators (AGIs). UNECA has not 
produced any indicator since this initial one in 2005. 
In spite of the inherent merits of these governance indicators being the first attempts to 
quantify governance dimensions, these measures have been criticised. It has been argued that 
there is a wide variation in the main indicators and sub-measures. Furthermore, the method of 
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computing the indexes also differs considerably from one index to another. It is also argued 
that the ‘control of corruption’ indicator within the WGIs measures different levels of 
corruption across countries, and as a result this makes cross country comparison controversial 
(Apaza, 2009). Moreover, the actual measured corruption in a particular country run the risk 
of limited scope coverage (Olken, 2009). Also, although corruption and rule of law are used 
to proxy for transparency, “corruption and lack of rule of law may make it difficult to 
achieve transparency,... they do not measure transparency per se” (Vishwanath and 
Kaufmann, 2001: 48). More interestingly, in a real case of policy decision-making regarding 
the 2005 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) programme, Kaufmann et al. (2005) – the 
authors of the WGIs – admitted to some of the limitations in making such policy decision 
regarding the concerned recipient countries.  
Focusing on the technical ground of the indexes, Thomas (2010) has challenged the over 
reliance on the WGIs, in particular, in policy decisions-making by arguing that the 
methodology used in constructing the WGIs is seriously flawed. He begins by pointing out 
that Kaufmann and his associates claim to measure from 2006 perceptions rather than the 
actual dimensions being considered. On this ground, “there is substantial difference between 
measuring a thing and measuring perceptions of it... for example, perceptions of crime risk 
have been shown to be quite different from actual crime levels...; perceptions of corruption 
have been shown to differ from corruption levels...” (p.36). Surprisingly, despite the change 
in method of measurement, the authors still interpret changes in their data as reflecting 
changes in governance itself rather than changes in perceptions of it.  
There are also issues regarding the operationalisation of the construct. For instance, while 
agreeing on the definition of ‘government effectiveness’ construct, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) 
have doubt about its operationalization given the observation that certain measures included 
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in the variables were extraneous to the definition. Thomas (2010) also expresses the same 
regarding ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Control of Corruption’. 
Regarding the IIAG specifically, a recent study by Olowu (2009) notes that: 
Unfortunately, it also suffers from the same problems as the WGI. Its definition of governance is 
the deliverance of political goods (performance). But a close inspection shows that, although 
performance is supposed to be the Index’s main focus, its indicators also include processes… 
Some of the data are based on perception… and the data reliability is quite questionable. [IIAG] is 
indeed more comprehensive than [WGI], however, data for a range of issues are missing for many 
years for many countries (p.80). 
In short the constructs of these measures are flawed, and as argued by Thomas, the WGIs and 
similar measures “are admittedly based on personal and untested notions of governance” 
(p.50). This is suggested to be due, to some extent, to the profile of the developers of the 
measures.  
In the next section, this study looks at the role of accounting systems in governance areas 
from the literature and constructs the argument that accounting plays various roles in 
governance. 
 
2.3. Accounting systems 
The purpose of this section is to review the constituents of accounting systems which 
characterise accounting practices and functions that contribute to governance performance. 
Ideally, the studies to review would be accounting studies at a macro level of the social and 
development field. But, surprisingly, accounting scholars seem to show very limited interest 
in developmental issues, and accounting studies in the field are sparse. This lack of interest 
has given room for economists and policymakers to overlook accounting functions and the 
role of accounting in social and development policymaking. This is not to deny the efforts of 
few scholars that have written in the field. Notable among these are Hopper et al. (2009), Neu 
et al. (2006), Annisette and Neu (2004), Alam et al. (2004), and Rahaman and Lawrence 
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(2001). For instance, Hopper et al., (2009) used a cultural political economy framework to 
trace the development of management accounting in less developed countries. The 
framework provides “a dialectic explanation of MAS [management accounting systems] 
transformation to social, economic, and political factors in both ideational and institutional 
domains” (p.473) through three major stages. The first stage is colonialism where accounting 
was integral to subjectification, promoting slavery, enabling control from distance and 
helping imperial governments control indigenous, slave and settler populations. The second 
stage is state capitalism with accounting being accorded important roles in State-Owed 
Enterprises (SOEs) and state planning, especially for its control and accountability functions. 
In the third stage characterised by market capitalism introduced through the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes led by the World Bank and IMF, though effective accounting is 
required, development economists often ignored it with the assumption that it will flow from 
market relations. One of the main conclusions of this study is that “MAS transformations are 
contextually encircled, evolve historically, and are socially constructed (p.476); and that 
though “[a]ccounting cannot resolve all poverty, injustice, and corruption problems,… it is a 
piece in the jigsaw of effective control, regulation, accountability, and the rule of law (p.495).  
The other studies have provided case evidences to demonstrate how accounting operates in 
selected public sector organisations. The study of Annisette and Neu (2004) focused on 
accounting’s roles in the context of empire, and discusses the use of accounting as instrument 
for control and imperialism. The authors concluded that the current accounting literature 
continues to privilege the experiences of the centre (the imperialist, i.e. the West) over those 
of the periphery, mostly the Third World, with strong contemporary resonance via the 
increasing homogenisation and harmonisation of accounting practice and education. 
Particularly, the study of Neu et al. (2006) provided evidence on the role of the World Bank 
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in this context where the Bank “[i]ncreases its legitimacy with other potential borrower 
countries [i.e. the developing ones] and ensures its continuing influence” (p.635).  
The very few studies carried out in the area of macro level of government accounting systems 
support the role of accounting and its drive for strong behavioural standards in governance 
improvements.  
Conceptually, accounting: 
...is a system for measuring economic activity and therefore, in an economic world... it is an 
important and necessary social practice... Accounting impacts the lives of everyone in society, 
even (or perhaps especially) those who know very little about the subject and have never set eyes 
on a financial statement (Perry and Nolke, 2006: 560).  
Often, accounting is associated with the notion of ‘system’ given its wider scope to illustrate 
the complex nature of its roles and functions in an organisation. As such, many scholars in 
accounting research have used the term ‘accounting system’ to refer either to one of its 
components (see Haseman and Whinston, 1976; Nobes, 1998; Soobaroyen and 
Poorundersing, 2008), or to the whole system (see Yamamoto, 1999; Jones and Pendlebury, 
2010). For example, the accounting system referred to in the study of Haseman and Whinston 
(1976) is concerned with financial reporting, but the one referred to in Soobaroyen and 
Poorundersing (2008) is associated with management accounting. Yamamoto (1999) and 
Jones and Pendlebury (2010) have provided a more comprehensive description of the 
accounting system as composed of three main sub-systems of ‘management accounting’, 
‘financial accounting’ and ‘audit’: each subsystem has specific functions that it contributes to 
the overall functions of  the accounting system.  
The definition of accounting system adopted for the study elaborates on Yamamoto (1999) 
and Jones and Pendlebury (2010)’s definition. Thus, accounting system is defined as the sum 
of financial accounting, audit, management accounting and the institutions charged with 
their functioning and the related legal framework. 
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2.3.1. Accounting and Auditing in Control of Corruption and Fraud  
Fraud is distinct from corruption (Grandori, 2004). The former usually leaves some form of 
evidence. The latter however involves no or little document based evidence (Khan, 2006). 
However, corruption can induce the practice of fraudulent activities. The Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (2008),
3
 reports that 27 per cent of reported fraud involves 
corruption.  
Corruption has proved to have detrimental effects. Many studies have evidenced the social 
and economic consequences of corruption especially in developing countries (Wei, 2000; 
Khan, 2004; Rose-Ackerman, 2008; Olken, 2009). Corruption is associated with poverty, 
hunger and underdevelopment (Khan, 2004). No community can afford to sustain the social, 
economic and political costs of corruption. “Corruption erodes public confidence in political 
institutions and leads to contempt for the rule of law, it distorts the allocation of resources 
and undermines competition in the marketplace, and it has a devastating effect on investment, 
growth, and development” (Dye, 2007: 6). According to Wei (2000), an increase in a 
country’s corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same 
negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by 50 per cent.  
In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions with the highest levels of corruption in 
the world (Fombad, 1999; Bierstaker, 2009). Journal articles and newspapers are full of juicy 
and appalling stories of corruption and fraud involving various government institutions or 
agencies and various people ranging from highly ranked public officials to mere civil 
servants. A recent Nigerian study shows that the recovery of $2.3 billion from former 
President Abacha’s (1993-1998) loot (itself estimated at $4.3 billion) was reported to have 
gone missing by means of corruption and fraud (Otusanya, 2010). In 1997, the Controller and 
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Auditor General in Kenya reported questionable public expenditures and missing funds 
which amounted to 7.6 per cent of GDP; and in Tanzania, service delivery survey data 
suggests that bribes paid to officials in some public areas amounted to 62 per cent of official 
public expenditures in those areas (Shah and Schacter, 2004).   
Few scholarly studies have been conducted on the roles and functions of accounting at 
country level and its accompanying ethical standards in fighting corruption and fraud (Khan, 
2004 and 2006; Everett et al., 2007). Nevertheless, these studies highlight one common 
conclusion: that is, proper accounting systems are an antidote to rising corruption and fraud. 
Everett et al. (2007) have studied accounting, including accountants and auditors, and the 
fight against corruption and report on the role of accounting from two perspectives: the 
orthodox and the radical. From the orthodox perspective, accounting is crucial in fighting 
corruption and for this fight to be won, accounting needs to do more work. In contrast, the 
radical perspective views accounting as a field that has its own vices (accounting 
manipulations, i.e. unethical accounting), and as such, one that needs to do things differently 
if it is to play any role in fighting corruption. From these two perspectives, Everett et al. 
(2007) argue that accounting has the potential to effect economic accountability that is able to 
understand the needs of victims of corruption, and suggest three accounting practice-oriented 
recommendations. The implication of this study is that accounting associated with good 
ethical standards has a role in the fight against corruption if its functions are properly 
performed.  
It is argued that public fraud and corruption thrive when there is a lack of accountability and 
transparency. Fombad (1999) reports that increasing demand internally and externally for 
transparency and accountability on the part of the government would reduce corruption and 
improve good governance. “In cases where corruption is in the form of bribes to alter the 
normal course of government, increased transparency of government operations reduces the 
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opportunity for undetected corruption” (Huther and Shah, 2000: 4). To this purpose, “good 
financial reporting and auditing help reduce the misrepresentation that hides fraudulent 
operations...” (Dye, 2007: 8).  
Dye’s evidence also suggests that when internal audit exists in the government auditing 
system, it plays a critical role in the government accountability. In support of this, Kwanbo 
(2010) finds that there is a significant relationship between internal audit and fiscal 
transparency and accountability at local government level. Various evidence has been 
provided about the contribution of internal audit to government accountability. In Canada, for 
example, it came to light between 2002 and 2005 that internal audit work revealed instances 
of frauds of which two were particularly important. The cumulative value of these two 
instances exceeded Can$200 million involving government officials. The follow up led to 
many of the recipients of the funds being sent to jail and to the recovery of some of the 
missing funds. Similarly Dye provided another instance in China where internal auditors 
uncovered, among other things, nearly US$1.1 billion related to instances of fraud and 
corruption through embezzlement and misuse of public funds.  
Taking a slightly less strong view about the role of audit in combating corruption and fraud, 
Khan (2004, 2006) claims that corruption auditing poses a greater challenge to the auditor as 
compared with fraud auditing, and that auditors have a limited role to play in detecting 
corruption. The auditor can, however, help prevent it by pointing out areas where 
opportunities for corruption exist. He also suggests that performance auditing can help detect 
corruption. “A properly planned and executed performance audit would highlight areas of 
diseconomy, inefficiency and failure to achieve results and impact... If [a project] exceeds its 
planned costs significantly or takes much longer than envisaged or does not achieve what was 
intended, then there is a possibility that the people involved in its management may have 
indulged in corruption” (Khan, 2006: 19). Although, the existence of diseconomy, 
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inefficiency or ineffectiveness is not definitive proof that corruption has taken place, 
performance audit can, however, provide clue for further examination of corruption if it has 
occurred. 
Ramkumar and Krafchik (2007) counter Khan’s claim that auditors have a reduced role in 
detecting corruption by arguing that an auditor can contribute significantly to the reduction of 
corruption and the strengthening of accountability because “an SAI [Supreme Audit 
Institution] that retains a clear mandate, possesses independence from the other agencies of 
government, employs a skilled staff, and has access to adequate resources is uniquely placed 
within any governance framework to combat corruption” (p.25). 
Drawing particularly on developing countries, Dye (2007) reports that “... it is common for 
public sector auditors to report unauthorised expenditures, waste of public funds, abuse of 
procedures resulting in loss to public treasury, and so forth... However, audit staff often tend 
to take a clerical approach, demanding strict compliance with procedures while often missing 
the objective of the procedures. Minor aberrations and misuse of funds are highlighted, 
whereas major systematic failures resulting in large losses to the treasury go unidentified” 
(p.7). 
The problem with the limited audit performance here is not about the potential of accounting 
(which is partly highlighted in the first part of the author’s observation); it is rather concerned 
with the environment and mechanisms within which the function operates. The approaches 
used in combination with the nature of the mechanisms in place undermine the effectiveness 
of audit and more generally accounting work in Africa and other developing countries. The 
inefficiency of audit staff is only one visible part of the whole problem. Reforms undertaken 
in the area with a wider involvement of the World Bank have suffered methodological 
shortcoming and also failed to use the appropriate mechanisms (Durevall and Erlandsson, 
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2004). It is not surprising that the surge of corruption in these countries hardly gets any better 
and instead is escalating (Lynch and Crawford, 2011). The failure of accounting in curtailing 
corruption and fraud in Africa is in fact due to the manner in which accounting is approached. 
In summary, accounting – especially in its audit and controls functions – helps, at least in 
principle, to curtail corruption and fraud. As reported by Matheson and Kwon (2003), 
inadequate compliance with accounting and reporting rules and lack of accounting, reporting 
standards and compliance have a positive relationship with corruption risk. The absence of 
accounting in good governance advocacy offers therefore fertile soil for the growth of 
corruption. If control of corruption is an important governance dimension, then accounting 
and the ethical underpinning is a crucial determinant in this area. Such visible place should 
explicitly be recognised in governance framework and in the measurement of governance as 
an indicator on its own or as a direct sub-indicator.  
 
2.3.2. Accounting and Financial Reporting in Transparency 
Financial transparency is crucial to economic development. “[Without financial transparency, 
the] money that could be used to reduce poverty and jumpstart economic growth is stolen 
instead” (George Soros)4. Financial transparency helps to hold public officials accountable 
and enhance public confidence in government departments and agencies. Governments need 
“... to use transparency in revenue and financial management to allow people to hold 
government to account and build public trust” (Tony Blair)5. 
Financial reporting transparency is “the extent to which financial reports reveal an entity’s 
underlying economics in a way that is readily understandable by those using the financial 
                                                          
4
 See McMillan (2005: 161) 
5
 See McMillan (2005: 163) 
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reports” (Barth and Schipper, 2008: 173). According to Barth and Schipper, transparency of 
financial reporting rests on two characteristics: the reflection of the entity’s underlying 
economics and the understandability of the information provided in the financial reports. The 
authors also consider comparability as another attribute but they do not include this in the 
main characteristics.  
However, Barth and Schipper’s (2008) definition of financial reporting transparency misses 
some other important characteristics which are discussed by Kristiansen et al. (2008). These 
authors have identified timeliness, accessibility, reliability and quality of financial 
information as important attributes for financial reports to be transparent. In this regard, 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001: 43) assert that “a serious impediment to measuring 
transparency is poor data quality – a lack of detailed information on publicly disclosed 
information, on the various disclosure standards, and on evaluations by the independent 
auditors of the categories of information disclosed”.  
Financial transparency has been a focal subject over the last two decades. “Values for 
financial transparency in government escalated in the early 1990s with the advent of the 
Reinventing Government Movement. Accounting scandals in the following decade reinforced 
public and private anxieties regarding the full and honest disclosure of financial information” 
(Honoré et al., 2007: 121). However, the field of public accounting (via government reporting) 
and transparency has attracted very little attention in academic research. Most of the available 
literature is concerned with political transparency with a focus on policy formulation, rule of 
law, government legitimacy, citizen and civil society participation in the democratic process 
(Al-Jurf, 1999; Curtin, 1999; Johnston, 2006); and budget or fiscal transparency (Alt and 
Lassen, 2006; Benito and Bastida, 2009).  
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In the private sector, following the collapse of high profile companies, especially of 
WorldCom in 2001, Enron in 2002 and Parmalat in 2003 where unethical financial disclosure 
and earnings management were found to play a significant role, many studies have been 
carried out on accounting transparency and corporate governance, earning quality, and 
market related issues (Imhoff, 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Lara et al., 2009). 
In the public sector, accounting helps reveal more information about government activities 
that otherwise may be hidden from the public and other interested parties. In a study of 
governmental financial transparency in MERCOSUR
6
 member countries, Pérez and López-
Hernández (2009: 169) advance that “financial statements provide tangible evidence of good 
accountability and enhance transparency in government”. Proper financial information 
provides the necessary knowledge for appropriate governmental decision-making with 
respect to resource allocation in order to meet institutional objectives (Pérez and López-
Hernández, 2009). The existence of mechanism for improved financial reports can enhance 
the credibility and integrity of public finances. This in turn will contribute to effective 
management of public resources (Santiso, 2004) as decisions will be based on more reliable 
and appropriate information. As such, financial report transparency has benefits for both the 
‘external’ public as they know more about government activities, and the government itself 
for improved decision-making and allocation of resources. 
Other studies on accounting and transparency have focused on financial recording systems 
(Cain et al., 2001; McMillan, 2005). Proper financial reporting requires that the underlying 
recording systems be adequate. In this regard Cain et al. (2001: 415) argue that an “effective 
records management programme acts as a building block for other activities; in this instance 
financial management”. The authors justified the importance of financial recording systems 
                                                          
6
 MERCOSUR is the Common Market of the South (of Latin America). It comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. 
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by emphasising that disclosure and accessibility to financial information may work well 
while the source of such information may be flawed which will make the whole transparency 
system ineffective. The quality of the recording system determines the extent of the 
completeness and integrity of the disclosed information which in turn affects accountability 
(Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010).  
Cain et al. (2001) illustrate the importance of appropriate financial recording systems for 
transparency and accountability in two African countries (Gambia and Tanzania). In Gambia, 
the National Records Service Act of 1994 and the Finance and the Audit Act impose an 
obligation on government departments and ministries to ensure that records are kept, 
managed and stored in a manner that facilitates financial reporting and the audit function. In 
addition, the Accounting Manual, issued under Financial Instructions 0111, establishes the 
responsibilities and roles of Accounting Officers and the operating procedures for the 
accounting systems.  
Despite these legal and regulatory provisions..., the system has been plagued with problems of 
over-bureaucratisation and inefficiency, primarily due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, 
inadequately trained accounting and records staff... This has resulted in either the absence of 
appropriate records or the inability to retrieve the required records for audit and accounting 
purposes in a timely manner... Record keeping in The Gambia, was often deliberately chaotic in 
order to prevent anyone following a trail of fraud. Although legislation regarding financial 
instructions is clearly documented, managers have sought to override these controls in order to 
achieve their personal financial ambitions (Cain et al., 2001: 416). 
The Tanzanian case is at a more decentralised level with little consideration of financial 
records keeping in districts. 
An audit carried out by a private sector firm for the Government of Tanzania confirmed that most 
district councils are not keeping complete records of their transactions. Furthermore, poor record 
keeping is exacerbated by inadequate supervision by District Executive Directors and Treasurers 
who often are not aware of backlogs (Cain et al., 2001: 420). 
McMillan (2005) provides another case about Angola.  With growing external and internal 
pressure, the Angola government introduced a transparency policy regarding its oil revenue 
management in 2004. However, “the details of the new policy were left unstated, with no 
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indication of exactly what data would be made public or whether the accounts would be 
audited”. A commissioned report from the accounting firm KPMG “documented the opacity 
of Angola’s recordkeeping and strongly recommended greater transparency in the accounting 
of oil earnings” (McMillan, 2005: 165). 
Gambia, Tanzania and Angola, all issue financial reports which, even if made available to the 
public on a timely basis – though this is rarely the case – cannot demonstrate any reliability 
as the underlying recording systems are flawed. Moreover, the poor recording systems will 
contribute to ineffective resource allocation since the information used to inform decision-
making lacks representativeness. 
Furthermore, a system where the financial reporting accounts are defined and developed in 
isolation and in an autonomous manner from the budget is suggested by Kristiansen et al. 
(2008) not to support transparency. They find that “the lack of compatibility between budget 
and account items also hinders transparency and external control” (82). Government accounts 
and budget items should be compatible to ensure transparency and limit the discretionary 
financial space of officials. 
In summary, financial reporting transparency is essential to government transparency and 
effective management of public affairs. Evidence from various studies (Cain et al., 2001; 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001; Kristiansen et al., 2008; Barth and Schipper, 2008) support 
this argument. However, this role is not properly recognised when defining and measuring 
transparency. Moreover, transparency, in its general sense, seems to be absent and more 
apparently so in the WGIs. ‘Rule of law’ and ‘Control of corruption’ have been used as 
proxies for transparency, which may fail to capture it.  
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2.3.3. Accounting and Accountability 
Accountability is a necessary function to make judgement about government performance 
against stated objectives and their stewardship of public monies. Accountability which is a 
basic concept of good governance can be defined in terms of responsibility or answering for 
actions, particularly expenditure by people in authority such as those in government and those 
who hold public office (Moncrieffe, 1998). Accountability involves both taking and 
accepting responsibility, willingly or by obligation, and accounting for actions undertaken 
within these responsibilities.  
As argued by O'Neill et al. (2007: 3): “accountability refers to the nature of a relationship 
between two parties. A relationship may be characterised as lacking in accountability or 
highly accountable. In a relationship between two parties, A is accountable to B, if A is 
obliged to explain and justify her actions to B, and B is able to sanction A if her conduct, or 
explanation for it, is found to be unsatisfactory.” Accountability is a two-way relationship. 
First, there is the requirement placed on the person taking a defined responsibility to be 
answerable to the person or party giving the responsibility. Second, there is the possibility of 
the latter sanctioning (or rewarding) the former if he/she finds that the account or the 
explanation provided is unsatisfactory (or satisfactory). In a democratic system, this second 
dimension of the accountability relationship is fulfilled through the electoral process allowing 
the constituencies to reward (re-elect) or sanction (replace) the elected officials. 
Accountability is central to the achievement of good governance and this has been reiterated 
by Malena and McNeil (2010: 1) as: “Accountability is the cornerstone of good governance. 
Unless public officials can be held to account, critical benefits associated with good 
governance – such as social justice, poverty reduction, and development – remain elusive”  
Similarly, Kluvers (2003) notes that: 
34 
 
The concept of accountability is a fundamental underpinning in liberal democratic thought. 
Accountability forms the basis of the trust we have in society’s institutions and organisations, so 
when accountability relationships are undermined our trust in society’s institutions is damaged... 
Without adequate accountability the management of resources can at best be wasteful and 
incompetent and at worst corrupt. Where there is inadequate accountability resources may be used 
inefficiently and ineffectively (pp.57-58). 
Accountability is a fundamental principle in itself and is not only driven by the quest to fight 
corruption and fraud. Even where corruption is absent or minimal, accountability is needed to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of resource use, avoid waste, and ultimately hold 
officials answerable to their constituencies. One concept of accountability discussed in the 
literature is political accountability (Persson et al., 1997), which has been suggested to serve 
two practical purposes. As argued by Adibe (2010: 1250), “the first, which is political, is that 
political accountability gives effect to the principle of checks and balances as a bulwark 
against arbitrary government. The second, which is economic, is that it ensures efficiency in 
the operation of the business of government”. This notion of accountability emphasises both 
the requirement for a balance of power and the crucial need for efficiency in government in 
running businesses.  
It follows from this brief discussion that accountability is a two-way process: the government 
is accountable to its constituencies and they in return reward the government with re-election, 
or sanction it by replacing the ruling government and public officials. 
At the heart of the accountability concept lies the principal-agent relationship. At macro or 
country level, this relationship is (1) between the citizens and elected public officials (or 
politicians), (2) between elected public officials and public managers or non-elected officials 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003), and (3) between public managers and citizens. 
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Figure 2.1: The process of accountability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first relationship, the citizens are the principal and elected officials are the agent; and 
this is the ultimate principal-agent relationship since it is the citizens who entrust the 
management of the nation’s resources and affairs to the elected officials through elections. In 
return, elected public officials account for their actions and decisions to the citizens via 
various mechanisms such as the Parliament, audit institutions, media, etc. These institutions 
also act as control mechanisms. Most public institutions and agencies are run by individuals 
who are not usually elected, but are rather appointed by the elected officials. As a result, they 
account to the elected officials who in turn account to the public.  However, where 
institutions or agencies have special or independent status, such as the Office of the Auditor 
General or the judiciary in most countries, the public officials running these institutions 
account presumably to the public via its representative, the Parliament and/or other 
arrangements.  
In the accountability process, accounting is suggested as an important determinant. 
Accounting provides a basis for government accountability and a measure of the effects of 
government policies and organisational efficiency (Athukorala and Reid, 2003). According to 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the objectives of government accounting 
and financial reporting are, among other things, to demonstrate accountability. This is echoed 
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in a study of accounting and accountability in Nigeria where Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010) 
advance that the role of accounting in an accountability framework cannot be overstated. 
They move on to argue that, in particular, accountability of public expenditures can easily be 
realised with a sound accounting infrastructure.  
Specifically, the audit dimension of accounting strengthens this role as an independent 
function that aims to ensure stewardship, reliability of financial information, and proper use 
of resources. Public auditors serve the societal purpose of accountability in government, and 
because of this, they need to be included in the larger components of that purpose (Chelimsky, 
2007). “The public sector audit represents a crucial element within an effective accountability 
framework” (Petrică, 2008: 98). Petrică further advances that the purpose of government 
audit is to ensure proper use of public funds, good management, and the public and private 
accountability of the authorities. The Auditor General or his equivalent supported by the 
supreme audit institution (SAI) is in charge of this government audit function. Within this 
responsibility “The Auditor General (AG) has a crucial role in evaluating the use of public 
expenditures and in implementing accountability” (Durevall and Erlandsson, 2004: 34). 
Moreover,  
…[the] supreme audit institutions act as a core oversight mechanism to ensure that government is 
held to account for the manner in which it manages public finances. They are independent State 
institutions responsible for auditing government performance and public accounts and, in some 
cases, supervising the internal auditing system (Santiso, 2004: 170). 
Audit is the accounting function with a unique potential to improve accountability through 
ensuring that public resources are used in the manner and purposes for which they are 
intended. Effective independent auditing of government finances is critical to improve the 
credibility of public finances and ensure the probity of public administration. Audit activities 
contribute to anchoring financial requirements and regulations and imposing administrative 
sanctions (Santiso, 2006). Santiso argues, in concluding his study on the role of audit 
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agencies on fiscal governance, that audit agencies only enforce accountability indirectly. This 
argument fails to emphasise the particularity of systems where audit institutions have quasi-
judicial power to judge and decide sanction on administrative officials involved in 
mismanagement of public funds or other unethical actions, and therefore hold a direct 
accountability function. Even in the monocratic model such as in the UK, “there are 
exceptional examples where an Auditor General may achieve direct influence and change at 
the political level” (Hedger and Blick, 2008: 12). 
The frontline role of audit in government accountability is advocated by Anam (2005) in 
conclusion to an essay on media and audit at the 6
th
 United Nations Forum on Transparent 
Governance in these terms: “without greater control over how our resources are being spent, 
without better financial management, and without greater accountability of government 
spending, we cannot create a better society for ourselves” (p.11). 
As outlined in the first part of the above quotation, control over resources is an important 
dimension to safeguard public funds and other resources. Once controls are established, they 
must be subject to regular review, evaluation and maintenance to ensure effectiveness (Dye, 
2007). Dye further suggests that the internal evaluation and maintenance of controls are more 
the responsibility of the internal auditors. External auditors bear additional responsibility 
regarding their role. They may need to disclose the adequacy of controls, material 
weaknesses, recommendations for correction of weaknesses and in some cases management 
follow-up of recommendations (Wallace, 1981).  
In summary, accountability is an important pillar of governance. Through accountability 
elected public officials ultimately account to their constituencies by explaining their action 
and choice of policy, and in return are rewarded with re-election or punished with the 
replacement of the government. The role of accounting, especially via its audit dimension, as 
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an important element within the accountability framework has been overlooked in both the 
definition and the measurement of the concept of government accountability. It is, thus, 
argued in this study that any definition and measurement of accountability at the macro level 
of a nation without the potential of accounting will be flawed and as a result will lack 
effectiveness. Reforms in this area of governance in developing countries and in Africa in 
particular have placed little or no emphasis on accounting and usually fail to deliver 
satisfactory results (see for example Durevall and Erlandsson, 2004; Roberts and Andrews, 
2005). 
 
2.3.4. Accounting and Resources Allocation 
There are limited studies in the field of public accounting and resources allocation. The 
existing studies focus almost exclusively on the role of budget in resource allocation with 
more focus on economic considerations (see Fisher et al., 2002; Schick, 2009; Webb and 
Candreva, 2010). For example, although accounting is included as the last component in the 
Budget and Public Expenditure Management System (BPEMS) to form the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF), the focus of the actual development of the MTEF was 
more on macroeconomic modelling and economic variables (see Roberts and Andrews, 2005). 
It is not surprising that the shortcomings of the MTEF including deficiencies in accounting 
and auditing, weak monitoring and evaluation became apparent at early stage of 
implementation. The list of weaknesses resembles those existing before the MTEF reforms 
which suggests that no significant improvement was achieved (Roberts and Andrews, 2005; 
Durevall and Erlandsson, 2004; Schiavo-Campo, 2009). Effective resource estimation and 
allocation was a key component of the MTEF which “was meant to introduce a 
macroeconomic modelling step in the budget process, but evidence suggests that either this 
framework was never formally developed or the framework was as faulty as previous 
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models... [The] failure is further evident in the fact that most MDAs
7
 did not prepare 
departmental audited accounts following MTEF” (Roberts and Andrews, 2005: 296). Two 
issues are outlined here. First, accounting is absent in the estimation and allocation of 
resources in the budget process. Second, it should be expected that most MDAs do not attach 
much importance to audited accounts since audit was not adequately considered in the design 
of the framework. 
According to IFAC, one of the objectives of government or public sector financial reporting 
is to provide information useful for decision making. To achieve this, financial reporting 
provides various types of information including information about sources, allocation, and 
uses of financial resources. Moreover, financial reporting can also “have a predictive or 
prospective role, providing information useful in predicting the level of resources... (IFAC, 
2010: 33). 
With specific focus on developing countries Riahi-Belkaoui (1994) has advocated the role of 
accounting in providing relevant information for planning and development. He argues that: 
Economic development requires in large part a well-established and monitored planning process. 
The planning process relies on the provision of relevant macro and micro information for a better 
deliberation of the activities required and the necessary standards of performance. Accounting 
appears to serve an important role in the provision of this information, resulting in a crucial role in 
the promotion of economic development (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1994: 69). 
Similarly, Hoque and Moll (2001) have studied Australian public sector reform and its 
implications for accounting. They report that the introduction of new accounting standards 
such as the AAS
8
 31 ‘‘‘Financial Reporting by Governments’ is justified by the need “to 
discharge [governments] accountability and to improve the decision-making ability of 
managers and other external users [of financial reports] in the allocation of resources” (p.318). 
                                                          
7
 Ministries Departments and Agencies. 
8
 Australian Accounting Standard. 
40 
 
Furthermore, the authors claim that the modern role of accounting is more focussed on 
accountability and efficient allocation of resources. For example, full cost accounting 
improves the management of resources (Carlin, 2005). This will contribute to informed 
decision-making by the consideration of impacts and alternative options available or 
accessible. This process is complemented by cost-benefit analysis which can assist in making 
difficult decisions about the allocation of limited resources (Ghosh and Alvis, 2003).  
Although many factors may be considered in government decision-making, especially 
regarding different social groups, cost-benefit analysis is still a valuable input in the process. 
The analysis focuses on financial and economic costs relative to social and economic impacts. 
This involves the consideration of the opportunity costs of alternative courses of actions that 
should guide the choice of the options with the minimum cost and greatest social and 
economic impact. To this purpose, cost data and resource utilisation information need to be 
accurate and adequate. Performance requirements make public managers pay more attention 
to efficient assets utilisation and maintenance which in turn will result in efficient utilisation 
of public resources. 
Spathis and Ananiadis (2004) have studied the case of an accounting system reform in a 
public university and its contribution in terms of resource allocation. They conclude that the 
accounting system introduced has contributed significantly to improved monitoring of the 
university’s finances, increasing savings through a more effective distribution of funds 
according to actual needs, and better decision-making through the improved quality and 
reliability of information used in the decision-making process. Similarly, Riley et al. (2007) 
have studied the management of human and financial resources in a public health programme 
in Canada and drew the following conclusion: 
Resource allocation is a critical issue for public health decision-makers... Better accounting of 
public health investments, including monetary and in-kind investments, is needed to inform 
41 
 
decisions about the amount and duration of public health investments that will lead to effective 
program implementation (Riley et al., 2007: 24). 
Good resource management and allocation require high quality accounting and financial 
information that drives accounting system reform in public organisations (Jackson and 
Lapsley, 2003). However, evidence suggests that the importance of accounting information in 
resources management and allocation has not received much interest in the developing world 
particularly in Africa. The role ‘developers’ and the donor community play in this lack of 
interest is hard to deny when considering their role in policy formulation and reform design 
on the one hand, and in the adoption of various frameworks in financial management and 
institutions design on the other (see for example Durevall and Erlandsson, 2004). Moreover, 
the role of accounting in resources management and allocation is overlooked by the current 
governance measures sponsored by donors (with the World Bank taking a central role) which 
are used to inform policy and reform options. 
 
2.4. Putting Accounting Back into Governance 
The measurement elements of governance, the requirements of good governance, and the 
available literature on the effectiveness of current governance measures have been reviewed 
and summarised as presented in Figure 2.2. Since governance development is a dynamic 
process, this diagram is not meant to be taken as a static representation of the characteristics 
of governance universally. 
As shown in Figure 2.2 below the quality of governance is determined by a broad range of 
variables. The ‘level 1’ variables represent the main governance dimensions that can be seen 
as a condensed form of the ‘level 2’ variables. A detailed examination of these ‘level 2’ 
variables also indicates the main areas where the review of accounting literature (presented in 
Section 2.3 apart from Private Sector Development) has determined the potentials of 
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accounting systems in governance. Three of the five areas highlighted – Government 
accountability, Resources allocation, and Government transparency – are related, to some 
extent, to ‘Government and Institutional Effectiveness’. The fourth variable is related to 
‘Control of Corruption’ which is defined as a main governance dimension in most of the 
available measures. Finally, the fifth variable is about Private sector development and is 
related to the ‘Economic Effectiveness’ dimension of governance.  
This study focuses on accounting systems at country level with a direct link to the first four 
areas of governance highlighted. It is argued in the study that the current governance 
framework and measurement need to be amended to take account of accounting systems. This 
can take place in the four main areas as outlined by the plain cases and arrows in Appendix 
2.1. But before the amendment takes place both governance and dimensions/indicators of 
governance need to be redefined both on theoretical and empirical grounds. 
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Figure 2.2: Elements of Governance  
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2.5. Chapter summary 
The association between accounting and governance has been supported theoretically. The 
literature suggests that countries with better or stronger accounting systems will tend to have 
lower and improved level of corruption, greater accountability and transparency, and better 
public resources allocation compared to countries with weaker or worse accounting systems. 
The former will be able to tackle corruption more effectively and provide more reliable 
financial and non-financial information to feed government planning and project appraisals to 
allow more efficient allocation of scarce resources, and would as a result enable more 
accountability than the latter. This in turn should improve the governance performance of 
countries with better accounting systems while those with weaker accounting systems will 
have the governance performance weakened. However, the extent of the association is yet to 
be established empirically.  
Additionally, most of the financial management support provided by aid agencies and the 
donor community to enhance governance in Africa and in developing countries in general is 
undertaken through budget system reforms with the aim of improving the budget process (de 
Renzio, 2006, The World Bank, 2008). According to the World Bank (2008), public financial 
management constitutes a major component of the public sector reform projects of the Bank 
(81% in proportion) and Sub-Saharan Africa has more shares of these reform projects than 
any other region in the world, with most of the focus being on the up-stream budget process. 
Using a sample of 57 countries of which 21 are African countries, de Renzio (2008) reports a 
positive reform impact on this stream of the budget process, while the down-stream part of 
the process is deteriorating. However, although accounting, viewed as part of this down-
stream process, is deteriorating or simply weak, the extent of such weakness throughout the 
system has not been investigated in any academic research at the time of this study to the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge. 
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Also, studies such as La Porta et al (1999) find that countries that use French or civil laws 
exhibit inferior governance performance compared to countries that use English or common 
law at corporate level. Although this finding has not yet been extended to country level 
governance focusing specifically on Africa, it is likely to expect such a phenomenon at the 
macro level of these two groups of countries which constitute most of Africa.  
Further, as discussed in the second and third sections of this chapter, most of the various 
efforts to improve governance and, marginally, accounting fail to achieve the expected 
outcome. In light of this situation, while the approach of donors in respect of the reform 
initiatives has been questioned, this study argues in addition that, owing to the systematic 
nature of reform failure on the continent, it is likely that there are other constraining factors at 
work in Africa that hamper or prevent the development of sound governance and accounting 
systems. This study is therefore designed to address this gap identified in the literature.  
The methodological approached used to examine these issues is presented in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY  
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3.1. Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to examine the interplay between accounting systems and 
governance development at country level in Africa with some focus on the role of the World 
Bank in this development. This chapter discusses the research design, and the methods of 
data collection and analysis adopted in the study.  
The methodological approach adopted for the study involves a case study and cross-national 
design. The majority of the analysis was conducted within the case study. The cross-national 
analysis was used as part of the examination of the role of accounting systems in governance 
improvements, especially in order to demonstrate the statistical link between accounting and 
governance as the first step in establishing a causal relationship between them. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The evidence sought throughout the study is defined in 
the second section. In the third section the first research design employed, that is, the case 
study method is developed. This is followed by the development of the cross-national design 
as a complementary design in the fourth section. The method of analysis of the collected data 
is covered in the fourth section. The chapter ends with a summary. 
 
3.2. Evidence Sought 
The examination of the interplay between accounting and governance requires the definition 
of the nature of the evidence sought. Phelan and Reynolds (1996) define evidence as ‘ground 
for belief’. As such, evidence inspires confidence in claims. In other words, the claims made 
from the findings of the study must be backed up by plausible and credible evidence. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the existing orthodoxy in governance development and 
governance measures has put little emphasis on the role of accounting systems in the 
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construct and measurement of governance. Moreover, governance and accounting are 
portrayed as standard practices across continents and countries.  
This study challenges these orthodoxies by advancing that (1) accounting has a potential in 
governance improvements, and (2) neither governance nor accounting, though they may have 
some ‘general’ underlying principles, can be operationalised and effective if they are not 
‘built in context’ and ‘embedded’ in the local culture and reality specific to the individual 
country or continent, especially in Africa. Furthermore, (3) the lack of attention to these 
points might have contributed to the weak accounting systems and low governance 
performance observed in most Africa countries. 
With specific focus on Africa, the study, therefore, seeks to establish whether there is any 
association between accounting systems and governance. If this exists information will be 
sought from the perspective of policymakers and cadres as to how they perceive accounting 
systems and their roles, if any, in governance improvements to further establish the 
association between accounting and governance. These are, according to de Vaus (2009), two 
conditions to be satisfied regarding causal relationship evidence.  
The study also seeks from the perspective of policymakers and cadres, based on their 
respective experience and knowledge of the local reality, the extent to which local context 
reality and culture have been considered in the development of accounting and governance, 
and how the various forces and interests at play account for the current state of accounting 
and governance in Africa. The evidence thus obtained will help to gain new insights into why 
governance and accounting systems are so weak in Africa and the extent to which contextual 
and cultural factors have been accounted for. 
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3.3. Case Study Design  
A case study design has been considered as an appropriate design given the nature of the 
evidence sought. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 1994). According to de Vaus (2009) and Ryan 
et al. (2002), the case is the unit of analysis which might be a company or other forms of 
organisation, or can also be a more aggregated unit of analysis such as a particular country. A 
multiple cases approach composed of two countries (considered as a combined unit of 
analysis) was used in this design which, according to de Vaus (2009), is more compelling 
than a single case design. The adoption of this method is further justified by the consideration 
that, given the time frame of the research, if it is not possible to observe certain events in one 
country it might be possible in the other. For example, elections, which are one of the 
elements of the political economy framework, only occurred in Benin, but not in Ghana 
during the time frame of the study. 
Case studies, as research design, have become common in accounting studies and are used in 
various accounting fields (Larrinaga-Gonzalez and Bebbington, 2001; McGee, 2007; 
Kennedy and Widener, 2008). As noted by Ryan et al. (2002), case studies are gaining 
acceptance as an appropriate method in accounting research; they further argue that case 
studies offer the possibility of understanding accounting in practice in terms of techniques, 
procedures and systems which are used in certain ways. In this sense, using a case study will 
help the researcher to gain insights into how accounting is designed and practiced in a 
specific country and the impact of such design and practice in terms of governance quality.  
Case studies have been criticised for the significant amount of data gathered for analysis and 
their limited ability for generalisation beyond the scope of the case (Hodkinson and 
Hodkinson, 2001). This limitation regarding the load of data is present whenever a case study 
is conducted with a multi-method approach – interview, survey, and documentary evidence – 
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and especially where a significant number of research participants are involved. Good 
analytical skill, carefully applied, and peer review can considerably reduce this limitation. 
Concerning the generalisation ability, Ryan et al. (2002) suggest that case studies can provide 
theoretical, not numerical, generalisation beyond the actual case that was studied. Theory 
generated from the case can, thus, be supported by being tested in other settings (Humphrey 
and Lee, 2004; de Vaus, 2009) and eventually the theory may be modified (Ryan et al. 2002). 
In the course of this study, the case study design is used to describe accounting and 
governance development and practices in the case countries and to explain the determinants 
of these developments and practices on the one hand, and provide evidence as to whether 
there is a potential causal relationship between governance and accounting (partly covered in 
the cross-national method in Section 3.3) on the other.  
A particularly important advantage for adopting the case study design it that it allows the 
researcher to feel and somehow experience the reality of the issue under study in its real 
context/environment. For instance, in the context of the study, the researcher was able to see 
or observe issues occurring while waiting for an interview with a research participant or 
walking in an office. He was also able to hear or listen to real-life stories between the 
organisation members and sometimes in informal discussion with them. These examples 
provide useful insights which could not have been gained if the researcher were not present in 
the case context to carry out the study. 
 
3.3.1. Multi-method Data Collection Approach 
In the context of the case study, four evidence collection methods were considered 
appropriate for the purposes of the study 
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3.3.1.1. Interview 
The first evidence collection method employed was the semi-structured interview. Interview 
is a common research method used in qualitative research to gather evidence (Saunders et al., 
2000). It has the advantage of being insightful and focusing directly on the case study topics. 
However a potential limitation is inaccuracy due to poor recall by the interviewee, and 
reflexivity in that the interviewee gives the interviewer what he/she wants to hear (Yin, 2009).  
However, the use of different interviewees of the same or similar profile on the same topic 
will help reduce these limitations.  
Of the three interview techniques, the semi-structured interview was identified as the most 
appropriate for the conduct of this study (the other interview techniques being structured and 
unstructured interviews). “Semi-structured... interviews are used in qualitative research in 
order to conduct exploratory discussion not only to review and understand the ‘what’ and the 
‘how’ but also to place more emphasis on exploring the ‘why’” (Saunders et al., 2000). As 
such, a semi structured interview is flexible and allow the researcher to accommodate the 
circumstances of the interviewee. 
Thus, semi-structured interviews give the researcher the chance to pick on the interviewee’s 
response and follow-up in order to explore in more detail ideas or issues that were not 
initially covered or thought of by the researcher. It is practically impossible to cover all 
aspects of issues related to a particular subject matter outside of its real context. Semi-
structured interviews offer the potential for guiding the interviewee through their responses, 
and thus keeping focus on the specific scope of the subject matter. 
Confidence in the findings from the interviews is critical to the validity of the research 
findings. In order to strengthen this confidence, a triangulation approach was designed by 
collecting interview evidence from research participants of different profiles and groups 
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(officials from government institutions, NGO, and donors, and consultants). The confidence 
in the research findings from the interviews was further strengthened with supplementary and 
complementary evidence emerging from documents where possible. 
 
3.3.1.2. Observation 
A further evidence collection method was the observation of events and activities taking 
place in the case study countries and government institutions visited. This was supplemented 
by observation of informal discussions amongst officials and employees. Also, given the 
potential inherent suspicion associated with the nature of the study, the researcher, where 
possible, engaged in informal discussion with officials to obtain any additional observations 
that they were likely to provide informally. 
 
3.3.1.3.  Survey: Use of Questionnaire 
 The third evidence collection method was a small scale survey carried out via a 
questionnaire. A questionnaire is usually a research technique used to collect people’s 
opinions about a subject of study. According to Matthews and Ross (2010: 201) a 
questionnaire can be defined as “a set of questions which can be answered by the research 
participants in a set of ways... All the participants are asked the same questions, in the same 
order and using the same wording and have the same set of answers to choose from.” 
Although the use of questionnaire is not suggested as a standard data collection instrument in 
case studies (see for example: Yin, 2009; de Vaus, 2009; Swanborn, 2010), given the focus of 
the study, the collection of opinions of various population groups in the case countries using a 
questionnaire was considered. Among other advantages, the use of a questionnaire allows 
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data to be collected in a standardised format covering a wide range of respondents and 
experiences. It also allows for statistical analysis. The main disadvantage is its limited ability 
to allow for in-depth analysis and follow-up on new issues not initially covered. However, the 
use of some open questions helps mitigate this limitation. Moreover, some of the issues 
brought up by the questionnaire can subsequently be explored further in interviews with key 
informants if this is possible. 
 
3.3.1.4. Documentary Evidence 
Relevant documentation is an effective means by which to get to grips with a case study 
subject (Swanborn, 2010) and should be the objective of explicit data collection plans (Yin, 
2009). Documentary evidence is outside the influence of the researcher which might be 
somehow present in the case of interviews. Furthermore, documents do not suffer from the 
loss of memory that an interviewee may experience during the interview process. However 
documents may have deliberately been edited before being made publicly available. For this 
reason, Yin (2009) recommends that, for case studies, documents should be used to 
corroborate and augment evidence from other sources.  
 
3.3.2. Operationalisation of the Case Study  
 
3.3.2.1. Justification of the Selected Case Countries  
Benin and Ghana have been chosen as the case study countries. The choice of a Francophone 
country and an Anglophone country is due to the fact that English and French are official 
languages of most African countries. Furthermore, Africa was mostly colonised by either 
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England or France or both. About forty-three countries have or have had either English or 
French as their official language or were French or British colonies9, representing about 80% 
of Africa. As such a study covering both Francophone and Anglophone Africa will provide 
more meaningful insights for both theory building and practical considerations when 
addressing African specific issues. 
Most studies in Africa have the defect of looking at Africa from either an Anglophone or 
Francophone perspective without looking at both (see for example: Harris, 1975; Elad and 
Tumnde, 2009; Aggestam, 2009). This study looked at similarities as well as differences. 
These are important because the Anglophone and Francophone structure is misleading. In 
terms of similarities for instance the same ethnicities may be split across these two groups of 
countries. For example, there are some people who have kin in two or more countries. This is 
important because they may have similar characteristics or tendencies; they may have some 
common cultural behaviours or reactions and so forth but divided between two or more 
countries. Since the research postulates that both governance and accounting should have 
cultural and local reality underpinnings to be effective, this consideration is therefore crucial 
for the design of the study. 
In terms of politics, both Benin and Ghana are part of the African Union. They are also part 
of ECOWAS10. Furthermore, although both countries have a colonial background, they may 
experience different external political influence. Ghana is more likely to receive a great 
amount of its external influence from Britain while Benin is more exposed to French 
influence. Therefore, in the political perspective, there may be some similarities and 
                                                          
9
 CIA World Factbook, 2011 (see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html)  
10
 Economic Community of West African States. 
55 
 
differences. The differences may be extended to other domains; for instance, Benin is part of 
a regional monetary system called UEMOA11 whereas Ghana has its own monetary system. 
Moreover, studies such as La Porta et al (1999) find that countries that use French or civil 
laws exhibit inferior governance performance compared to countries that use English or 
common law at corporate level. This has not been investigated further at country level 
focusing exclusively on Africa. Thus within this study such difference are checked with an 
extended sample using secondary data although this is not the primary focus of the study. 
Finally, as access to informants and data is very important for the success of the study given 
the limited time scope available, this consideration was a key determinant of the specific 
Francophone and Anglophone countries selected. The selection of Ghana was motivated by 
the fact that the researcher’s leading supervisor originates from that country and therefore 
was able to recommend research participants and sources of data. The choice of Benin was 
due to the researcher originating from there, therefore access to research participants and 
public organisations was much easier to obtain. In addition the researcher had access to key 
consultants who had worked in or on these countries.  
Table 3.1 below provides summary information about the timelines of the political history of 
Benin and Ghana, and selected examples of recent accounting reforms in both countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine. 
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Table 3.1: Timelines of the Political History of Benin and Ghana, and Selected Recent 
Accounting Reforms 
Benin Ghana 
Political History 
Period Comment Period Comment 
From 17th to 
19th century 
This is the slavery period where Benin 
was ruled by the Kingdom of Dahomey 
whose capital was Abomey (now referred 
to as the historical capital of Benin) 
Pre-colonial 
period (up to 
19th century) 
This period was characterised by slavery but 
also by trading of gold, ivory, pepper etc. with 
many Europeans involved. Ghana was then 
called Gold Coast. 
19th to 20th 
century (1958) 
This is the colonial period where Benin 
was ruled by France who renamed the 
country as French Dahomey and governed 
by French Governors 
19th to 20th 
century  
This is the colonial period where Ghana was 
mostly ruled by British governors and gradually 
by centralised governments with delegation of 
some responsibilities to local and traditional 
authorities. Through this arrangement Britain 
attempted to maintain an indirect control over 
Ghana. The country was then called British Gold 
Coast 
1958-1960 Benin was granted autonomy by France 1957-1960 
Ghana gained full independence from Britain on 
6 March 1957 with Kwame Nkrumah as Prime 
Minister 
1960-1972 
Benin gained full independence from 
France on 1st August 1960 followed by 
the first democratic elections. This 
democratic period was characterised by 
several coup d’état. The last one was 
headed by Colonel Mathieu Kérékou who 
took the reins of the country for the next 
19 years      
1960-1966 
The First Republic with Kwame Nkrumah as 
first President who ruled the country until 
February 1966 when he was overthrown by a 
coup d’état with alleged support from the US 
CIA. 
1972-1989 
Mathieu Kérékou, through a coup d’état 
on 26 October 1972, run the country for 
17 years under the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology which ended with an 
unprecedented economic and social crisis. 
During this period, the country was also 
renamed People's Republic of Benin. 
1966-1969 
Transition period under the National Liberation 
Council composed of army and police officers. 
1989-1991 
The country entered a transition period 
with an interim government led by 
Nicéphore Dieu-Donné Soglo as Prime 
Minister. It was during this period that the 
current Beninese Constitution was written 
and enacted on 11 December 1990. 
1969-1979 
The Second Republic with first competitive 
elections that saw Kofi Busia as Prime Minister. 
With growing economic and social crisis, the 
Second Republic ended in May 1979 by a coup 
d’état. 
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From 1991 to 
date 
This is the modern democratic period 1979-1981 
The Third Republic with the election of Limann 
government. Amid continuing economic crisis 
and unpopular political decisions, especially 
regarding unions' strikes and the control of the 
army, the government was suspended by a coup 
d’état led by Jerry Rawlings in June 1979 and 
then restored again in September of the same 
year. 
    1981-1993 
In December 1981 Rawlings led a second coup 
d’état and run the country under a unique party – 
Provisional National Defence Council – until 
1992. 
    
1993 to 
present 
Following the enactment a new Constitution on 
7 January 1993, Ghana entered the current 
Fourth Republic and democratic era with the 
election Rawlings as the first President of this 
era. 
Few recent examples of accounting reforms (see Chapter 5 for more details) 
  1996 
With technical assistance and support of 
the World Bank and donors such as 
European Union (EU), Canadian 
International Development Agency 
(CIDA) and UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), 
Ghana implemented the integrated Public 
Financial Management Reform 
Programme (PUFMARP) which included 
the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) as a component. 
The MTEF reform subsequently failed 
after years of implementation.  
1998-2004 
WMONEY was the first accounting 
software and networking system 
developed with local expertise. It was 
abandoned in 2004 following the advice 
of France who suggested ASTER 
developed by a French company. For 
example, the cost of the initial programme 
was less than £15,000 compared with 
other £5 million for the French 
recommended one. 
From early 
2000s 
On-going payroll reforms with support from the 
World Bank and other development partners; but 
with limited results as still a ‘sizeable’ portion of 
the government budget goes to the payment of 
what is called ‘ghost workers’.  
2004-to date 
The French advised programme ASTER 
with support from the other donors is still 
incomplete with various network failures 
at the time of the study 
2001 
Audit Service Act 584 instituted the 
establishment of the Audit Report 
Implementation Committee (ARIC) in all 
Ministries Departments and Agencies (MDAs) 
and Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies (MMDAs). But many MDAs and 
MMDAs do not have ARIC, or where one is 
established, it is observed that they are not 
functioning. 
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  2003 
Financial Administration Act 654 (supported by 
the World Bank) instituted the establishment of 
a Financial Tribunal. The tribunal has not been 
established since nearly 10 years now. 
    
Before 2004 
The current recording system  ACCPAC as part 
of the budget information system was supported 
by the World Bank and other donors. But it 
appears that there are systematic discrepancies 
between the accounts prepared by the Controller 
and Accountant-General Department and the 
MDAs. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the timelines of the political history of Benin and Ghana. As seen from the 
table, the influence of the West over the political history of the case study countries started as 
early as in the 17th century through slavery and other trades, and colonialism. The post-
colonial influence of the West is both direct and indirect (which is covered in more details in 
Chapter 7). Particularly, some of the indirect influence is exercised via military cooperation 
and assistance (see for example Verschave and Beccaria, 2001). Some other part of the 
indirect influence, especially in terms of policy and reform, is exercised through the 
development agencies, mainly the World Bank and the IMF. The collapse of communist or 
Marxist-Leninist regimes in the 1980s and early 1990s particularly gave impetus to this 
indirect influence of the West where both Benin and Ghana and other African countries had 
been subject to the initial structural adjustment programmes. 
The table also provides examples of accounting reforms undertaken in these countries. The 
analysis provided demonstrates strong influence by the West on the accounting developments 
in these countries. In Benin, the most prominent accounting reform pushed through by France 
with the support of the World Bank and other donors is the introduction of ASTER in 2004 
with a very limited result to date. In Ghana one of the earlier reforms in the area of 
accounting goes back to 1996 with the introduction of the MTEF. A number of other 
accounting reforms were subsequently implemented, but in essence, most of these reforms 
failed or achieved very limited results or impacts. 
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3.3.2.2. The interview Process 
 
3.3.2.2.1. Interview Guide 
Given the focus of the research, a semi-structured interview guide composed of three parts 
was developed to collect information on the issues covered by the study. The dimensions and 
items covered were drawn from the literature review and informal discussions that the 
researcher had had with senior accountants, auditors, former government officials and NGO 
officers in Benin. The first part (IG1) was designed in regard to the definition and elements of 
governance; governance issues/problems in Africa; the development and quality of 
governance in both countries; accounting and its role, if any, in governance; and the role of 
donors and particularly of the World Bank in the development and reform of governance and 
accounting systems in each of the case countries.  
The second part (IG2) covered financial accounting, audit and its functions. The 
independence of the audit institutions; timeliness, reliability and accessibility of financial and 
audit reports; recording systems and coverage; audit work and follow up; and the quality of 
accountants and auditors and their development were included in these functions. 
The last part (IG3) covered the consideration of accounting systems in the governance agenda 
of the World Bank and other donors; the role and the priority of donors and the World Bank 
in accounting systems development; and their assessment of the quality of accounting 
systems in the case study countries and in Africa. A copy of the interview guide is provided 
in Appendix 3.1. 
The appropriate research participants or respondents varied according to the dimensions and 
items to discuss and the specific part of the interview guide concerned. The appropriate 
interviewees for the first part were government officials, consultants, and senior officials in 
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governance advocate NGOs (civil society organisations, unions, NGOs registered as such, 
etc.). The NGOs were identified from available lists. Once identified, a phone call was made 
to find out more about the activities of the NGOs. If the call was satisfactory, an interview 
appointment was requested. In some cases and where possible, an email was sent with 
additional information on the research project prior to the appointment date if one was 
granted. Moreover, although some NGOs were recommended by their counterparts and some 
consultants, the final selection of which NGOs to interview from was made by the researcher 
after an initial contact with the concerned NGO. In regard to the government officials 
(current and former), some were contacted directly by the researcher at ministries, 
departments and agencies; some others were recommended. Here again, the decision to 
interview the recommended officials was made by the researcher after initial contact. Access 
to consultants was initiated from the researcher’s own personal contacts, and from 
recommendation from other consultants and officials. 
Research participants for the second part of the interview were senior public accountants and 
auditors (included few internal auditors) with a minimum of five years’ experience who were 
either current or former office holders. In each of the case countries, the research made a 
request to contact these informants via the central accounting and audit departments. 
Research participants for this part were also consultants involved in consultation work 
pertaining to accounting systems. Access to them was facilitated by other senior officials in 
the central accounting department, and other consultants in both countries. Finally, research 
participants for the last part were officers of the World Bank and other donors in charge of 
African affairs and working on accounting and governance. Access to them was facilitated by 
recommendations from consultants and other donors’ officers. 
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3.3.2.2.2. Interview Piloting 
After the initial version of the interview guide was completed, it was sent to the researcher’s 
supervisor and an international consultant in public financial management with significant 
experience in financial reporting and audit in Africa. Their comments led to the review of the 
instrument which was used to carry out a pilot test. The test consisted of conducting a few 
mock interviews in real situations with one public auditor, two public accountants and two 
NGO officers in Benin. The pilot test helped to produce the final version of the interview 
guide. 
3.3.2.2.3. Conduct of the Interview  
In all cases, prior to the collection of any interview data whether access to appropriate 
interviewees was made directly by the researcher or via a third party, a consent form was 
signed by the informant where possible. Where this was not possible, the researcher gave the 
appropriate information covered in the consent form to the research participant and ensured 
that they gave their consent. A copy of the consent form is reproduced in Appendix 3.2.  
Once the consent was obtained, the remainder of the process was adjusted depending on the 
observations made by the research participant before the interview started. For instance, some 
research participants asked not to record the interview. Some others requested to be asked 
only certain types of questions.  
Each interview was expected to last between 45 minutes and one hour. However, the reality 
in the field made this length vary significantly. Some interviewees could only give an average 
of 20-30 minutes while others gave over one hour. Furthermore, the researcher shortened 
some interviews when he realised that the interviewee was not suitable to answer certain 
questions either because they did not have adequate knowledge of the issues concerned or 
because they consistently direct the interview to partial and political comments.  
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Some of the interviews were recorded using an electronic recorder coupled with some note-
takings. Some others only had manual note-taking written up in Microsoft Word, especially 
where the research participants explicitly objected to the recording. The number of interviews 
and types of informants are summarised in Table 3.2 below.  
 
Table 3.2: Number and Types of Respondent per Country 
 
Benin Ghana 
 
Targeted 
number 
Achieved 
Targeted 
number 
Achieved 
Public sector & government officials 
and MPs 
5 6 5 6 
Public Accountants 6 10 6 11 
Public Auditors 5 8 5 10 
NGOs Senior Officers 4 6 4 6 
Consultants 2 2 2 2 
World Bank and other donors Officers 5 
 Source: Computed by the researcher 
 
3.3.2.3. The Survey Process 
 
3.3.2.3.1. Questionnaire Design 
One type of questionnaire was developed to collect the perception of respondents on both the 
quality of accounting systems and that of governance in each of the two case study countries. 
The targeted respondents covered various fields of the government and non-government 
sphere. The dimensions covered were drawn from the literature reviewed in the second 
chapter. 
The questionnaire was designed to collect perceptions on governance and accounting from 
the perspective of officials and staff in the private sector and various governance advocate 
organisations including civil society organisations, NGOs, and environmental groups. Also 
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civil servants non-accountants and civil servants accountants were included. The 
questionnaire covered governance dimensions drawn from the existing governance measures 
with the explicit addition of few such as ‘culture and traditions’, and financial accountability’. 
These dimensions were added after informal discussion with a couple of officers in good 
governance advocate organisations from Benin. Perceptions on the two main governance 
measures – WGIs and IIAG – and on accounting were also covered. Responses were 
collected using seven-point Likert scales ranging from 1 to 7. It should be clarified that the 
intervals between two scale points are not meant to be equal in absolute terms (see Appendix 
3.3 for the questionnaire). The ideal time to complete this questionnaire was 15-20 minutes. 
 
3.3.2.3.2. Sampling 
The sample was drawn from four groups of population using a quota sampling technique as 
suggested by Matthews and Ross (2010): the private sector, civil servant non-accountants, 
civil servant accountants, and NGOs. The latter included NGOs registered as such, civil 
society organisations, and environmental groups. Two approaches were used for the selection 
of the individual NGOs: a random approach selecting from the available lists of NGOs, and a 
snowball approach to identify the most active NGOs among good governance advocates. The 
random approach was also used for the other groups surveyed.  
 
3.3.2.3.3. Questionnaire Piloting  
The initial version of the questionnaires was submitted to the researcher’s supervisor and the 
consultant mentioned for the interview guide discussed above. Then the questionnaires were 
reviewed. The researcher personally conducted a pilot test by administering the 
questionnaires to a small sample (4 respondents) of NGO personnel, civil servants, and staff 
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in managerial position in the private sector. The results of the test helped to rephrase certain 
questions and adjust the length of the questionnaire. 
 
3.3.2.3.4. Questionnaire Administration 
Twenty-five respondents were targeted in each group leading to 100 respondents in total per 
country. Most of these questionnaires were distributed personally by the researcher. Overall, 
117 and 108 questionnaires were distributed in Benin and Ghana respectively. From these, 64 
and 55 were returned from Benin and Ghana respectively giving a response rate of 54.7% for 
Benin and 50.9% for Ghana. Table 3.3 below gives details of the targeted and achieved 
samples. 
 
Table 3.3: Targeted and Achieved Samples for the Questionnaire 
  Benin Ghana 
  Targeted sample Sample achieved  Targeted sample Sample achieved  
  
Number 
% to 
total  
Number 
% to 
total  
Number 
% to 
total 
Number % to total  
NGOs 25 25.0%  19  29.7% 25 25.0%  17  30.9% 
Private Sector 25 25.0%  10  15.6% 25 25.0%  14  25.5% 
Civil Servants - 
non-accountants 
25 25.0%  17  26.6% 25 25.0%  11  20.0% 
Civil Servants - 
accountants 
25 25.0%  18  28.1% 25 25.0%  13  23.6% 
Total 100 100.0%  64  100% 105 100.0%  55  100% 
   Source: Computed by the researcher 
 
3.3.2.4. Documentary Evidence  
Various documents were sought in order to corroborate or augment evidence obtained from 
other sources (interviews and survey) as suggested by Matthews and Ross (2010) and to 
conduct additional statistical analysis. These documents include public sector or government 
financial reports (annual and monthly); audits reports (external and internal); budget reports; 
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reform documents; laws related to the various levels of the accounting system; and any other 
documents relevant to understand the state of the accounting systems and governance in the 
case countries.  
Unfortunately, it was not possible to access most of these documents particularly in Benin 
where access to government and public financial, audit and budget reports were 
systematically denied. Of course some officials were willing to help but for fear of those in 
political power, they could not do much. Nonetheless, the researcher managed to get hold of a 
few documents but these were not suitable for the statistical analysis initially planned. At that 
stage it was therefore decided to increase the number of interviews to compensate for the gap 
caused by the limited access to this source of evidence.   
During the fieldwork, other forms of documents were uncovered that were not considered at 
the initial planning stage. These documents were of an investigative nature containing 
interviews with French political officials (most of them former officials at various levels of 
French political system) and archive documents related to the role played by France in 
particular in its ex-colonies in Africa including Benin. The documents helped to explain the 
role of the ‘Colonial Patron12’ in the development of governance and accounting systems in 
Benin and in Africa. 
 
3.3.2.5. Ethical Considerations 
The ethical issues surrounding the research project were carefully considered and the 
necessary measures were taken to deal with them. This led to the granting of ethical approval 
by the Research and Commercial Services of the University of Birmingham prior to the start 
                                                          
12
 See Chapters 3 and 6 for more detail. 
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of the data collection process. In particular, informant consent, anonymity and data protection, 
and confidentiality were covered. 
 In terms of consent, a consent form was produced within the guidelines of the University13. 
The form was signed by research participants where possible before an interview was carried 
out. Where it was not possible to get the form physically signed, the information contained in 
the form was given to the informant by the researcher who ensured they agreed to the process 
of the interview before it started. Any amendment made by the research participant was taken 
into account and the interview was adjusted accordingly. 
Regarding anonymity and protection of data, the researcher ensured that no personal data was 
collected especially in cases where the research participant objected. Where personal data 
were collected, these were kept separately from the interview data which were analysed 
anonymously. All personal and interview data are secured and will be kept for 10 years after 
which they will be destroyed as per the University code of research practice. 
Concerning confidentiality, issues discussed with each interviewee were kept strictly 
confidential between that interviewee and the researcher and were not referred to on any 
occasion that would make it possible to identify them. Moreover, access to the notebook used 
and laptop where research data was stored was strictly restricted to the researcher. The 
notebook was always locked away and the laptop is password protected. 
 
3.4. Cross-national Design 
This design was used to answer the research question related to the link between accounting 
systems and governance in Africa. Specifically, the design was used to examine the potential 
causal relationship between governance and accounting in the African context. The approach 
                                                          
13
 Available online: see http://www.as.bham.ac.uk/legislation/docs/COP_Research.pdf  
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proposed by de Vaus (2009) was used. De Vaus (2009) identifies two pre-conditions for 
establishing a causal relationship between two random variables or phenomena. The first is 
the existence of co-variation of the causal and the outcome variables (1); and the second is 
that the assertion of causality must make sense (2).  
The co-variation between governance and accounting is examined by using covariance, 
correlation and R
2
 statistics. Cross-country data on governance (existing governance 
measures) and accounting (see below) from 22 African countries were used to carry out this 
examination. The use of the existing governance measures despite their limitations as 
discussed in Chapter 2 is explained by the fact that there are no alternative measures of 
governance as a whole, recognising that this analysis is only one step in examination process 
of the potential causal relationship.  
With regard to the second condition, i.e. that the assertion of causality must make sense, 
interview data were used from the case study design to complement the analysis. De Vaus 
(2009) suggests three levels of test. The first is the time order, that is, the causal variable 
should come first and the outcome variable next. The second test requires that the two 
variables must be capable of change which is illustrated in the governance and accounting 
measures used in the analysis. The third test is that the assertion of causality must be 
theoretically plausible. 
The starting point of the potential causal relationship is to ensure that there is no significant 
overlap information contained in the two variables. An initial review of the available data 
sources used to construct the current governance metrics revealed no significant accounting 
information in the data sources. Additional evidence is further sought using a regression 
analysis. To this purpose, it is hypothesised that the current governance metrics do not 
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capture accounting information (on the basis of the initial review of the data sources of the 
metrics). 
Further, since the study covers both Francophone and Anglophone Africa, language was 
included in the analysis to examine whether English-speaking Africa has a better quality of 
governance than French-speaking Africa. In fact, use of legal traditions (especially British 
Common Law and French Civil Law) spread throughout the world through colonisation: La 
Porta et al. (1999) found that English speaking countries have better governance compared to 
French speaking countries. Though La Porta et al.,’s (1999) study is at the corporate level it 
will be interesting to see if the same assertion also holds at country level in Africa. Other 
studies such as Al-Marhubi (2004) have used the same approach to test determinants of 
country governance across the world. For simplicity due to availability of data, Language was 
used as a dummy in the analysis. A similar approach has been used by Mahoney (2001) to 
examine the association between Common Law and economic growth across countries.  
In order to reliably estimate the extent to which accounting is captured in the current 
governance measures, other control variables (i.e. established determinants of governance) 
are needed. Unfortunately most of the sets of determinants available are those developed as 
part of the WGI and IIAG which have already been included in the average value.  
Nevertheless, for the purpose of the study (which is not to investigate the determinants of 
governance in its broad sense), one control variable was identified (in addition to Language 
variable) that cover most of the sample countries. This variable is economic development 
(Al-Marhubi, 2004) which is measured as per capita real gross GDP, i.e. the higher the 
economic output the better the governance quality. This data was collected from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. Another variable is institutional quality (Keefer 
and Knack, 1997; Rodrik, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999). “Ideally, measures of institutional 
quality would consist of objective evaluations, comparable across countries and over time, of 
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the institutions that protect property and contractual rights” (Keefer and Knack, 1997: 592). 
Unfortunately, very limited data are available on institutional quality that cover the sample 
countries. For example it would be good to include the Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI) data but these data do not cover the sample countries. The ‘CPIA14 public 
sector management and institutions’ rating of the World Bank could also be used, however 
nearly half of the observations are missing for the sample countries. 
Accounting system assessment data for Africa were sought from various sources including 
the World Bank, the IMF15, DFID16, EU17, PEFA18 and individual country websites and online 
databases. Key consultants and policy advisers were also consulted on possible sources of 
such data. PEFA assessment reports were thus identified as the most complete on accounting 
systems assessment in Africa. Data from these reports were then used for the study in regard 
to accounting. Some of the reports were obtained directly from the PEFA website 
(www.pefa.org) and others from the website of the Ministry of Finance of some countries. 
Only data covering accounting system dimension were of primary interest. Thus, nine 
dimensions were identified and collected, namely: (1) effectiveness of payroll controls, (2) 
effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure, (3) effectiveness of internal 
audit, (4) timeliness and regularity of accounts reconciliation, (5) availability of information 
on resources received by service delivery units, (6) quality and timeliness of in-year budget 
reports, (7) quality and timeliness of annual financial statements, (8) scope, nature and 
follow-up of external audit, and (9) legislative scrutiny of external audit reports. 
In respect of governance measures, the main available measures with a wide coverage are the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
                                                          
14
 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. 
15
 International Monetary Fund. 
16
 UK Department for International Development. 
17
 European Union. 
18
 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability. 
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(IIAG). Both of these governance measures cover almost all of Africa and are produced 
regularly – now on a yearly basis. They were collected from the World Bank website 
(www.worldbank.org) for the WGIs and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation website 
(http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org) for the IIAG. The governance data were collected 
over the period of the PEFA assessment for each country, i.e. normally 3 years, though the 
assessment of two countries – Mozambique and Uganda – only covered 1 year at the time of 
the data collection.  
 
3.4.1. Sample Selection 
Ideally, the entire population formed by all African countries19 should be included in the 
analysis. But owing to the problem of the availability of PEFA assessment data for all the 
countries, a two-stage sampling process was used. The first stage consisted of selecting all of 
the African countries that have been subjected to at least one PEFA assessment with the 
report available either on PEFA online database or on the individual country’s website. 
Twenty-five countries were then identified as of 31 December 2010 (see Appendix 3.4 for the 
full list of identified countries).  
The countries identified at this stage constituted the population for the second-stage process. 
At the second stage, a check was conducted as to whether each country assessment report 
covered all of the accounting dimensions mentioned above. When one or more dimensions 
were missing for a country, that country was excluded from the sample. This process led to 
the exclusion of three countries; hence reducing the final sample size to twenty-two countries 
(see Appendix 3.5 for the list of these countries). 
 
                                                          
19
 53 countries as of 31 December 2010. 
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3.4.2. Conversion of Data 
The PEFA data used in the cross-national analysis were provided in the form of rating of each 
dimension of the individual accounting system indicators. The rating awarded to a specific 
dimension or indicator ranges from D (worse) to A (desired value). Between these extreme 
values there are five intermediate values: D+; C; C+; B; and B+.  
In order to carry out a statistical analysis of the accounting system assessment, a nominal 
value was assigned to each rating value as follows: D=1; D+=2; C=3; C+=4; B=5; B+=6; and 
A=7. Then the simple average value of the dimensions that constitute each accounting 
indicator was calculated and attributed to that indicator. The resulted value of each of the nine 
indicators per country is presented in Table 3.  
 
3.4.3. Construction of Accounting System Index  
The index is simply referred to as Accounting Index. It is an indicator of the strength of the 
accounting system of a particular country relative to the other countries under study. The 
model provided in McGillivray (1991) for the Human Development Index was used to 
construct the Accounting Index (AI). The model is as below. 
      (∑    
 
     ) (1) 
where     is the Accounting Index for country j,      is the ith indicator of relative accounting 
weakness in country j, i = 1,... k and j = 1... l. The term ∑    
 
      is the simple weighted 
average of the relative accounting weakness calculated on each of the accounting indicator. 
The relative accounting weakness is calculated on the nine indicators presented in Table 3.4. 
Because the weakness is a relative value, it is scaled between zero and one using the equation:  
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Table 3.4: Value of Accounting Indicators per Country 
 
Accounting system indicators 
Country 
PI-18: 
Effectiveness 
of payroll 
controls 
PI-20: 
Effectiveness 
of internal 
controls for 
non-salary 
expenditure 
PI-21: 
Effectiveness 
of internal 
audit 
PI-22: 
Timeliness 
and regularity 
of accounts 
reconciliation 
PI-
23:Availability 
of information 
on resources 
received by 
service 
delivery units 
PI-24: 
Quality and 
timeliness 
of in-year 
budget 
reports 
PI-25: 
Quality and 
timeliness 
of annual 
financial 
statements 
PI-26: Scope, 
nature and 
follow-up of 
external 
audit 
PI-28: 
Legislative 
scrutiny of 
external 
audit 
reports 
Benin 1.00 3.00 3.67 3.00 1.00 3.00 2.33 1.00 1.00 
Botswana 6.00 5.00 4.33 5.00 7.00 5.67 4.33 3.67 5.67 
Burkina-Faso 4.50 3.67 1.67 3.00 1.00 6.33 5.67 2.33 5.00 
Burundi 1.50 2.33 1.67 1.00 3.00 1.67 1.00 1.67 1.00 
Cape Verde 6.50 6.33 2.33 6.00 1.00 4.33 3.67 2.33 1.67 
Central 
African 
Republic  
1.50 3.00 3.67 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.67 1.00 1.00 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
1.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 4.33 2.33 1.00 
Ghana 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.67 4.33 4.33 3.00 
Kenya 4.00 3.00 4.33 4.00 1.00 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.00 
Madagascar 2.00 3.67 5.00 2.00 1.00 3.67 3.00 1.00 1.00 
Mali 5.50 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 2.33 2.33 1.00 1.00 
Mauritania 2.00 2.33 2.33 4.00 1.00 2.33 2.33 2.33 5.00 
Mauritius 6.50 7.00 5.67 7.00 7.00 5.67 7.00 5.67 3.00 
Morocco 5.50 4.33 4.33 7.00 5.00 6.33 2.33 3.00 2.33 
Mozambique 2.00 2.33 3.67 5.00 3.00 3.67 4.33 3.00 5.00 
Niger 4.00 3.67 3.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 4.33 1.00 4.33 
Rwanda 3.50 3.00 5.00 6.00 1.00 3.67 5.00 3.67 3.00 
São Tomé 
and Príncipe 
1.00 2.33 2.33 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.67 1.00 
Sierra Leone 3.00 4.33 2.33 3.00 7.00 5.67 2.33 2.33 3.67 
South Africa 7.00 5.67 7.00 6.00 7.00 5.67 7.00 5.67 6.33 
Uganda 2.50 3.00 4.33 5.00 5.00 4.33 4.33 5.00 3.00 
Zambia 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 4.33 5.67 5.00 
 Source: Computed from PEFA data 
 
    (
(  
     )
  
    
 ) (2) 
where   
  is the desired value of the ith accounting indicator, i.e. the value 7;     is the actual 
value of the ith accounting indicator of country j; and   
  the actual minimum value among 
the  countries under study. 
In one extreme case where a country j attains the desired value for all of the accounting 
indicators, the value of equation (2) for that country is zero – which means that there is a total 
absence of any weakness in the accounting system – and therefore AI in equation (1) takes its 
maximum value of one. In the other extreme case where the country j instead only achieves 
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the minimum value for all of the accounting indicators, equation (2) is one – which means 
total relative weak accounting system – and therefore the value of the index AI for that 
country is zero (its minimum). In any other cases, the value of the index will lie between 
these two extreme values, i.e. between zero and one. The Table 3.5 below shows the 
accounting weaknesses and Accounting Index for the studied countries.  
 
Table 3.5: Accounting weaknesses and Accounting Index  
 
Accounting weaknesses Weighted 
average 
weakness 
Accounting 
Index (AI) Country I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 
Benin 1.00 0.67 0.63 0.67 1.00 0.75 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 
Botswana 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.44 0.56 0.22 0.31 0.69 
Burkina-Faso 0.42 0.56 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.13 0.22 0.78 0.33 0.57 0.43 
Burundi 0.92 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.92 0.08 
Cape Verde 0.08 0.11 0.88 0.17 1.00 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.55 0.45 
Central African 
Republic  
0.92 0.67 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.13 
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
1.00 1.00 0.75 0.67 1.00 0.38 0.44 0.78 1.00 0.78 0.22 
Ghana 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.33 0.63 0.44 0.44 0.67 0.55 0.45 
Kenya 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.44 0.67 0.60 0.40 
Madagascar 0.83 0.56 0.38 0.83 1.00 0.63 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.23 
Mali 0.25 0.67 0.75 0.50 0.67 0.88 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.28 
Mauritania 0.83 0.78 0.88 0.50 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.33 0.75 0.25 
Mauritius 0.08 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.22 0.67 0.16 0.84 
Morocco 0.25 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.78 0.67 0.78 0.43 0.57 
Mozambique 0.83 0.78 0.63 0.33 0.67 0.63 0.44 0.67 0.33 0.59 0.41 
Niger 0.50 0.56 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.44 1.00 0.44 0.72 0.28 
Rwanda 0.58 0.67 0.38 0.17 1.00 0.63 0.33 0.56 0.67 0.55 0.45 
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
1.00 0.78 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.92 0.08 
Sierra Leone 0.67 0.44 0.88 0.67 0.00 0.25 0.78 0.78 0.56 0.56 0.44 
South Africa 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.89 
Uganda 0.75 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.44 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.50 
Zambia 0.83 0.67 0.75 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.44 0.22 0.33 0.53 0.47 
 Source: Computed from PEFA data 
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3.5. Data Analysis 
 
3.5.1. Issues Encountered During the Fieldwork that Influenced the Conduct of the 
Research 
Prior to the analysis of the data, an account was made of the issues encountered during the 
fieldwork that influenced the conduct of the research. The researcher started the fieldwork in 
early January 2011 in Benin. Before entering the field, unsuccessful attempts were made to 
gain access to the Ministry of Finance and other government institutions. Reflections on the 
possible causes of this failure revealed that it was due to the nature of the subject of the 
research – State ‘governance’ and accounting systems. This was further confirmed during the 
pilot where for example a government official declined the researcher’s request to take part in 
the pilot by saying: 
Who says ‘governance’ says politics, and you know the prevailing situation in the country. I don’t 
want trouble 
Furthermore, some officials and consultants in the field of governance and accounting who 
were approached at the start of the fieldwork advised the researcher that, given the sensitivity 
of the research subject in the context of the case study countries and the need for increased 
anonymity and confidentiality, approaching research participants individually would be more 
effective than approaching them through the hierarchy. Such an approach was then adopted 
and was effectively perceived by interviewees to provide a more secured confidentiality and 
anonymity than even a formal protocol. Furthermore the first three officials were asked to 
sign the consent form in Benin prior to the interview refused and withdrew their initial 
consent altogether by advancing that their anonymity and confidentiality could not be assured 
if at the same time they were required to leave their signature and name in a document. After 
the loss of the third interviewee, the researcher decided to only read the content of the 
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‘consent form’ at the beginning of each interview to obtain the interviewee consent without 
the requirement to sign the form. 
Nonetheless, the researcher still attempted to obtain formal access to the Treasury and 
Accounting Department (TAD) in Benin in order to observe the working environment and the 
operating of the system, interview key officials at the department, and collect documents 
related to government financial and budget reports. A formal letter was addressed to the 
hierarchy of the department which remained unanswered and could not be found when the 
researcher was trying to follow up. With a further copy of the letter with the recording 
reference and additional arrangements the researcher finally gained access to the organisation. 
However, some caution on the part of most interviewees in the organisation was noticed, 
owing to the fact that they knew that access was granted by the hierarchy. This distrust was 
heightened by the advent of the Wikileak’s affair at the time of the fieldwork and some 
officials (including those outside the department) even became very wary about the 
researcher as if he was working undercover. Similar distrust was experienced in Ghana where 
even many of the officials (including those from the Ministry of Finance) who the researcher 
contacted prior to going into the field either avoided meeting him or simply withdrew the 
initial consent. Some officials even required that no note be taken while they were responding 
to the interview questions. In order to accommodate these issues, the researcher avoided 
directly asking questions that could be seen as being political, and used more observations 
and informal discussion where possible which helped collect additional evidence. In fact 
observation was facilitated in both countries by the fact that no specific office was provided 
to the researcher, and he spent most of the time going through the various departments and 
offices every day.  
Also, despite the access granted at the TAD in Benin, no official was formally allowed to 
give the researcher any documents including government financial and budget reports. All 
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attempts made, including at the Chamber of Accounts, to have access to any reports were 
refused for the reason that such documents cannot be made public or used in the context of 
research.  As a result of this, the researcher decided to put more weight on evidence from the 
interviews and observation. 
Overall 72 interviews were conducted in both countries. It is important to emphasise that all 
interviews in Benin were conducted in French. Given the considerable amount of data, only 
the direct quotations from the text data used in the findings reporting were translated into 
English by the researcher himself. Because of the sensitivity of the subject and the ethical 
requirements of confidentiality, the researcher found it inappropriate to engage the service of 
a professional translator. This was considered an appropriate approach since the research is 
not about discourse analysis. Thus, the translation of certain expressions was made in a way 
that would make sense in English rather than being a literal translation from French to 
English. The approach further facilitates the incorporation of the researcher’s reflections from 
the data collection into the analysis process. 
 
3.5.2. Data Analysis Process 
Prior to the analysis, it is important to re-emphasise what is considered as research evidence 
in the context of this research. Data gathered from interviews, observation, documents, 
questionnaire and statistical tests or econometric analysis are considered as research evidence. 
The analysis of such data requires the researcher to derive embedded meaning which involves 
more than a literal reading of research evidence such as interview data. It also involves 
interpretation of and reflection on the evidence gathered to give a meaningful and coherent 
account of the data as suggested by Mason (2002). 
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All of the interview and notes data collected were recorded in Word documents with 
numbered lines to make them suitable for the analysis process. Having organised the data in 
such format, the researcher read and re-read the text data several times in order to become 
familiar with the data as suggested by Denscombe (2007). This process was followed by the 
development of codes to retrieve and organise the data in a format that helped address the 
research questions. The development of the codes was guided by the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2, and the political theoretical framework presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4). 
Denscombe (2007: 292) defines codes as “tags or labels that are attached to the raw data” that 
differentiates the data based on the researcher’s reflections about the information (see also 
Miles and Hubberman, 1994)). Specifically, the codes were derived from elements of State or 
government accounting systems and governance, and the internal and external politico-
economic factors that form the constituents of the political economy framework. These codes 
were subsequently applied to the interview data collected, recognising any new codes that 
emerged from the data that were not covered by the initial framework or literature reviewed. 
Similarly, the application of the codes to the data recognised those codes that did not fit with 
the evidence gathered (Denscombe, 2007). 
As suggested by Mason (2002) the coding approach to organise research evidence involves 
making assumptions about both the phenomena to be categorised and the form that the 
research evidence will take in order to answer the research questions. This mean that the 
approach is not completely neutral as it involves the researcher’s judgement as to what 
specific information qualifies as evidence in the research context. 
After the first level of coding, the primary codes were grouped into sub-categories, and then 
into categories. Taking the example of financial reporting (FR), the primary codes developed 
were ‘timeliness’ (TM), ‘disclosure’ (DIS), ‘accessibility’ (AC), ‘competence’ (CP), 
‘continuing professional development’ (CPD), ‘ethical stand’ (EV), and ‘recording system’ 
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(RS). Timeliness, disclosure and accessibility were subsequently grouped under 
‘transparency’ (TP). Similarly, competence, CPD, and ethical stand were grouped under 
‘quality of accountants’ (QoA). Transparency, quality of accountants and recording system 
were, in turn, grouped under financial reporting. Figure 3.1 illustrates this example. 
Figure 3.1: Illustrative example of codes structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
 
The development of codes and categories was associated with the identification of 
themes/concepts or traits that helped to provide explanation and draw conclusions. It is 
important to emphasise that the whole interview data analysis process was iterative. This 
means that each step “was revisited on more than one occasion as the codes, categories and 
concepts get developed and refined” (Denscombe, 2007: 292). 
With regard to the survey, each questionnaire completed and returned was assigned a unique 
number. Then, they were entered into SPSS in order to facilitate the analysis. The main 
descriptive statistics computed for the analysis were frequencies, means, mean differences, 
and t-test statistics. Also, histogram charts were used to provide a visual representation of 
certain frequencies. 
TM DIS AC CP CPD EV 
TP QoA RS 
FR 
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Concerning the secondary data, following the conversion of the data and the construction of 
the accounting index as presented in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, and using the governance 
measurement data, an econometric model (random effects regression) was used to test the 
hypothesis that the current governance metrics do not capture accounting information. This 
analysis was conducted using Stata. Furthermore, mean statistics and t-test statistics were also 
used to examine the association between accounting and governance (more details are 
provided in Chapter 5). 
The actual presentation of the findings is covered in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The following 
chapter deals with the theoretical paradigm underpinning the research and the framework 
used to develop an understanding of the factors hampering or preventing the development of 
sound governance and accounting systems in Africa. 
 
3.6. Chapter Summary  
In this chapter the evidence sought in the study has been defined and explained, and the 
research design used in the study developed. The case study has been justified as the main 
research design with four evidence collection approaches, i.e. interview, observation, survey 
and documentary analysis. The specific instruments used in the data collection process were 
also covered.   
The cross-national design was the second design used complementary to the case study. The 
data used in this method and their sources were presented. The researcher presented how 
these data were treated to prepare them for the required analysis and the model used in the 
process was developed. The chapter finishes with the processes and methods used for the 
analysis of the collected data. 
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4.1. Introduction  
One of the purposes of this study is to examine the state of accounting systems and the 
development of accounting and governance in Africa, particularly through the studied 
countries in the lens of political economy. This chapter briefly discusses the research 
philosophy and role of theory in research. It then presents in more detail the theoretical 
framework adopted for the study. Research philosophy and theory are important in 
addressing the research query (Heeks and Bailur, 2007) and answering the ‘why’ question (de 
Vaus, 2009). They represent the foundation for any research undertaking and determine the 
nature of theoretical framework to be employed. 
At the very beginning of his monetary analysis, Friedman (1970) emphasises the significance 
of the theoretical framework by asserting that “every empirical study rests on a theoretical 
framework” (p.193). More specifically “a theoretical framework is an essential starting-point 
for any case study” (Humphrey and Scapens, 1996: 88) but these authors also argue that the 
framework should, at the same time, be capable of being challenged and refined as a result of 
the research process. In this study, the Political Economy Framework is adopted to explain 
the current state of accounting systems in Africa and their limited contribution to governance 
improvement despite their potential.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The research philosophy and its main concepts are 
discussed in the second section. In the third section, the role of theory and the Political 
Economy Framework are presented. The concluding points are presented in the last section. 
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4.2. Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is about the development and nature of knowledge. It is the way in 
which phenomena are treated by researchers in answering a research question – for example 
whether phenomena are treated as real and objective, as social constructions, etc. (Heeks and 
Bailur, 2007). Knowledge of research philosophy is beneficial as it helps clarify the research 
design and facilitate the choice of an appropriate design (Blumberg et al., 2005). Although, 
the researcher’s philosophy is likely to be influenced by practical considerations, the main 
influence is suggested to be that of his/her particular view of the relationship between 
knowledge and the process by which it is developed (Saunders et al., 2009). Research 
philosophy deals with concepts such as: ontology, epistemology, paradigm, and pragmatism. 
 
4.2.1. Ontology 
Ontology is concerned with the assumption which the researcher holds about the nature of the 
reality of the phenomenon being investigated (Ryan et al. 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). One 
extreme ontological assumption views reality as a concrete structure representing objective 
facts with all its relationships being in place ever since and our objective as researchers is to 
find out what those relationships are. This aspect of ontology is termed as objectivism. The 
objectivism view portrays the position that the reality of social phenomenon exists outside of 
social actors. In other words, social phenomena are external to and independent of social 
actors. 
The other extreme ontological assumption recognises that the reality is out there but we 
cannot go beyond certain point, and thus everything we perceive from that reality comes out 
from our mind and is therefore entirely subjective – reality exists only in the individual 
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consciousness. This view is termed subjectivism. According to this view, reality does not 
exist outside social actors, and there is continual interaction between social phenomena and 
social actors. This is also associated with the concept of constructionism or social 
constructionism for the reason that “it is necessary to explore the subjective meanings 
motivating the actions of social actors in order for the researcher to be able to understand 
these actions. Social constructionism views reality as being socially constructed” (Saunders et 
al., 2009: 111). 
Between these two ends there are different notions of reality. This means that depending on 
where the researcher is on this continuum, he or she will see the world in a particular way, 
and this will in turn affect his/her epistemological stand. 
 
4.2.2. Epistemology 
Epistemology is about what knowledge is in a particular discipline and how it can be 
acquired (Fallis, 2008). It is concerned with what constitutes acceptable knowledge and how 
this knowledge can be gained. This, according to Ryan et al. (2002), depends on how the 
researcher perceives the reality of the phenomenon of the study, i.e. his or her ontological 
assumption. There are two extreme epistemological stands: one is related to the position of 
natural scientist and called positivism and the other is called interpretivism (Saunders et al., 
2009). 
For a positivist researcher, social reality is represented by objects that are considered to be 
real and observable which have a separate existence to that of the researcher. Positivism is 
therefore concerned with universal laws or theories about the external world or phenomenon. 
The role of the researcher in this context is to derive these laws/theories from the observed 
84 
 
social objects or phenomena. In this context, “to generate a research strategy to collect... data 
you are likely to use existing theory to develop hypotheses. These hypotheses will be tested 
and confirmed, in whole or part, or refuted, leading to the further development of theory 
which then may be tested by further research” (Saunders et al., 2009: 113). 
In interpretivism, however, social systems cannot be treated in the same way as natural 
phenomena due to their complexity and recursiveness (Ryan et al., 2002). Interpretivism 
emphases the difference between humans’ role as social actors, in the sense that humans play 
a part in human life that can be interpreted in a particular way by different people. 
Furthermore, not only do people interpret the social roles in accordance with the meanings 
they give to these roles, but also they tend to interpret other people’s roles in accordance with 
their own set of meanings. The challenge facing the researcher in this sphere is to be able to 
enter the social world of their research subjects and understand their world from their point of 
view (Saunders et al., 2009). 
 
4.2.3. Research Paradigm 
A paradigm is a way of understanding social phenomena in order to attempt an explanation of 
those phenomena. According to Marshall (1997: 16), “research paradigms are particular ways 
of thinking about... [the researchers’] subject matter which they share with others of like 
mind. They include: assumptions, conceptualisations, values, attitudes, orientations and 
beliefs”.  
Saunders et al. (2009) identify four paradigms corresponding to four concepts: radical 
change, regulation, subjectivist, and objectivist. Subjectivist and objectivist are as discussed 
under ‘ontological assumptions’ above. Radical change is concerned with a judgemental and 
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critical perspective of the way organisational affairs are conducted, and the suggestion of 
ways in which these affairs may be conducted in order to make fundamental changes to the 
normal order of things. The regulatory perspective, on the other hand, “seeks to explain the 
way in which organisational affairs are regulated and offer[s] suggestion as to how they may 
be improved within the framework of the way things are done at present” (Saunders et al., 
2009). The regulatory perspective is less critical and judgemental than that of radical change. 
The former seeks to improve things within the existing state of affairs while the latter seeks to 
overturn the existing state of affairs. 
 
4.2.4. Pragmatism 
This philosophical stand recognises that it is sometimes unrealistic in practice to choose 
between one ontological or epistemological position and another. According to this view, the 
driving factor of a position is the nature of the research question(s). If the research question 
does not suggest either position, the pragmatic stand suggests the adoption of a variation in 
the ontological/epistemological assumption or simply the adoption of mixed methods that 
appears more suitable in that specific context. 
The pragmatic stand is the main philosophical position of the researcher given the nature of 
the research questions developed. One of the research questions examines the role of 
accounting systems in governance development. This question will be addressed using both a 
positivist and an interpretivist approaches. The first part of the question, more suitable for a 
positivist analysis, concerns observable facts related to the current state of systems organised 
in the form of data – convertible into numerical data – that the researcher believes are 
objective and may be less open to bias. The other part of the question is concerned with 
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practitioners’ experience, view and documentary evidence that will be examined using an 
interpretative standpoint.  
Another research question is concerned with this role of governance in the World Bank’s and 
other donors’ agenda in Africa and the consideration of accounting system in such role. This 
involves a brief examination of the current state of governance and accounting in two cases 
of African countries, along with the role of donors. To address this question, an interpretivist 
approach is considered to gain valuable insights into this complex social world that, it is 
suggested, would be lost if attempts are made to reduce that reality to a simple data series for 
the purpose of generalisation.  
 
4.3. Theory 
4.3.1. Role of Theory 
Theories are attempts to answer ‘why’ questions in social science (de Vaus, 2009). “Theory is 
about the connections among phenomena, a story about why acts, events, structure, and 
thoughts occur. Theory emphasizes the nature of causal relationships, identifying what comes 
first as well as the timing of such events” (Sutton and Staw, 1995: 378). It helps understand 
the systematic reason for a particular state of phenomena or a particular occurrence or non-
occurrence of a phenomenon.  
According to Runkel and Runkel (1984), theory is a continuum rather than a dichotomy. In 
this perspective, theory is an ongoing of research efforts instead of the complete opposition of 
those efforts. Moreover, Weick (1995: 386) argue contrary to Sutton and Staw (1995) that it 
is “... more difficult to separate what is theory from what isn’t, especially if theory starts with 
guesses and speculations and ends with explanations and models.” Weick (1995) further 
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claims that the theorising process consists of activities such as abstracting, generalising, 
relating, selecting, explaining, synthesising, and idealising. More specifically, theory explains 
or predicts something in a proportion of cases. In this perspective, theory differs from law as 
the latter explains something that holds true in every case (Marshall, 1997).  
Blumberg et al. (2005) suggest that theory has various roles in research. Among other things, 
theory helps narrow the range of facts that the researcher needs to study. It suggests which 
research approaches are likely to lead to maximum meanings, and can be used to predict any 
further facts that may be found. More specifically, in positive research, theory development 
occurs through the generation and testing of hypotheses. However, in interpretive research, 
theory plays a central role. It is both the input and output of the research process. In a case 
study for example, there is an ongoing relationship between theory and the case observations. 
Existing theory will be used to make sense of the case observations, but through these 
observations it may be found that the theory needs to be refined, modified or even rejected 
(Ryan et al., 2002). 
 
4.3.2. Political Economy Framework (PEF) 
 
4.3.2.1. Overview  
The term ‘Political Economy’ has a long history and various meanings. It “was introduced in 
the 17
th
 century to denote what is today referred to as economics” (Arndt, 1983: 46). More 
specifically, it meant, at its inception, the relationship between government and the economy 
for the promotion of competitive markets in order to create an efficient allocation of 
resources. “Modern welfare economics uses the phrase in a normative sense to refer to the 
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quest for that policy alternative benefiting most people at least cost” (Wamsley and Zald, 
1973: 64).  
Various researchers have used the term Political Economy to refer to analyses that link 
economics and politics (see, Haggard and Webb, 1993; Bowles and White, 1994; Lewis, 
1996; Roland, 2002). Political Economy explores the determinants of a subject of study and 
“examines the relationship between the various politico-economic forces and interests which 
act to constitute and maintain institutions” (Bowles and White, 1994: 241). Political and 
economic factors are “central concerns in efforts to develop dynamic analyses because so 
many of the pressures for changes occur in the external environment” (Wamsley and Zald, 
1973: 64) mostly in the international arena especially regarding the developing world in the 
terms of Harris (1975). 
In spite of the existence of many variants of political economy approach, most of these 
variants stress the interrelationship between political and economic forces in society (Cooper 
and Sherer, 1984). Whether the approach applies at micro-level, i.e. organisational studies 
(see Wamsley and Zald, 1973; Arndt, 1983), or at macro-level, i.e. national, central or 
international institutions studies (see Haggard and Webb, 1993), all emphasise the interplay 
between internal and external politico-economic forces and actors involving dynamic 
analyses of changes. From these studies, most of the key concepts used in the PEF can also 
be drawn. 
 
 
 
89 
 
4.3.2.2. Key concepts in PEF 
 
4.3.2.2.1. Economy 
The term ‘economy’ is defined by Arndt (1983: 48) as “the productive exchange system of a 
social unit or society transforming ‘inputs’ into ‘output’; and the social unit “encompasses 
organizations, groups, families, etc.” (p.47). This definition of economy is very narrow 
reducing the term to a single transformation or production and exchange system. Economy 
covers a large range of aspects such as production, exchange, markets, capital, consumption, 
employment, inflation, and growth at macro-level. The economy of a country or an area is 
about the level or state of these elements at a particular time or over a period of time.  
In Political Economy analysis, the term economy is usually divided into internal economy 
and external economy (Dwyer and Welsh, 1985; Haggard and Webb, 1993; Bowles and 
White, 1994). Viewed at the micro-level, internal economy is “the internal economic 
allocation system analyzed in terms of the internal economic structure and processes” (Stern 
and Reve, 1980: 62) within an organisation. At macro-level, it refers to the level of 
production, exchange, capital, consumption, inflation, employment and growth within the 
borders of a country or a region. The external economy is the state or organisation of these 
elements across national boundaries usually outside the control of national authorities.  
Internal economic forces are those influences that apply pressure on governments in certain 
directions arising from national economic conditions and system. These include for example 
economic crisis (Haggard and Webb, 1993) and strong labour organisation groups (Bowles 
and White, 1994). External economic forces, on the other hand, are those arising from 
international economic conditions such as changes in commodity prices, and business cycles 
90 
 
in developed countries (Haggard and Webb, 1993). These forces are not within the control of 
the country concerned.  
 
4.3.2.2.2. Polity/Politics 
The concept polity can be understood as politically organised group(s) or society. According 
to Arndt (1983: 48) “polity refers to the power-and-control system of a social unit, a network 
of social units, or society.” Politics is, however, a much broader concept.. Once, the idea of 
politics was associated “with the idea of power, of command, and... a state superimposed 
upon society” (Sartori, 1973: 8). In the context of political economy, politics is about what 
determine the policy options from which governments and policymakers make their choice, 
and the outcome of the implementation of the chosen policies.  
There are both internal political forces and external political forces. Internal political forces 
concern the domestic actors “operating within the institutional sphere of the state and in the 
wider [national] political system” (Bowles and White, 1994: 245). These domestic actors 
exert pressures on government and policymakers regarding policy/reform choice and changes; 
and therefore play an influential role in political decision-making. In respect of external 
political forces, they refer to influences and pressures from various actors in the international 
political arena. These actors exert pressures on government and other political actors 
regarding their choice of policies/reforms and sometimes intervene in the implementation 
process.  
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4.3.2.3. Features of Political Economy from previous studies 
The Political Economy framework has been used by various researchers in many different 
disciplines. In the field of accounting, some scholars have attempted to use the theory to explain 
changes and standard settings. Examples of these studies include: Cooper and Sherer (1984), 
Perry and Nolke (2006) and Ramanna (2008). The application of the framework to other disciplines 
includes marketing (Stern and Reve, 1980; Arndt, 1983), public organisations (Wamsley and Zald 
(1973), central banks (Bowles and White, 1994), transparency (Fung et al., 2003), and corruption 
(Boerner and Hainz, 2009). These studies have covered, to various extents, the variables and 
dimensions applied in a Political economy analysis both at micro and macro level. 
In the field of marketing, Stern and Reve (1980) have developed a Political Economy 
framework for the analysis of distribution channels. The proposed framework is composed of 
two major systems: (1) the internal political economy and (2) the external political economy. 
In the words of Stern and Reve, the internal political economy is the internal structuring and 
functioning which encompasses two dimensions, i.e. (i) the internal economy, that is, the 
internal economic structure and processes, and (ii) the internal polity, that is, the internal 
socio-political structure and processes. The external political economy is concerned with the 
external environment. It involves the external economy, i.e. the prevailing and prospective 
external economic environment, and the external polity which can be described as the 
distribution and use of power resources in the external environment.  
Arndt (1983) has extended the initial Political Economy framework developed by Stern and 
Reve (1980). He presents the elements of a Political Economy paradigm for the construction 
of theory in marketing. From the two main attributes developed by Stern and Reve (1980), 
Arndt (1983) has gone one step further by filling in some of the cells as shown in Table 4.1, 
thus identifying the main elements of Political Economy analysis in a marketing context. 
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Table 4.1: Major Components of Political Economy 
Environment Relation to the Environment Internal Structure and Processes   
 
External Political Relations Internal Polity 
 
 
Dependence relations Goals of the social unit 
 
 
Interorganisational form Distribution of power POLITY 
 
Control mechanisms Power bases 
 
  
Boundary-spanning 
positions  
  
Mechanisms for managing conflicts 
 
Characteristics of the 
Environment      
Proximity 
     
Capacity           
Differentiation External Economic Relations Internal Economy 
 
Concentration Competitive markets Structure of the social unit 
 
Turbulence Quasi-integrated systems Internal exchange process ECONOMY 
 
Integrated vertical marketing systems Allocation rules 
 
  
Incentive systems 
 
            
Source: Arndt (1983: 48) 
 
In Table 4.1 Arndt (1983) identifies proximity, capacity, differentiation, concentration and 
turbulence as common to many attempts to develop inventories of environmental dimensions. 
He argues, however, that it appears futile to try to develop a complete list of all relevant 
variables in the environment. The external political relation is concerned with attempts to 
influence the decision premises of the parties to the organisational relationship. Dependence 
relations, the structuring of inter-organisational forms, and the control mechanisms 
established are believed to be three particularly important characteristics for understanding 
the relations between the social unit and the external polity. 
With respect to external economic relations, competitive markets, quasi-integrated systems 
characterised by bargaining and administrative routines specified in contracts, and fully 
vertical marketing systems are identified to be key aspects of this dimension. Internal polity, 
on the other hand, is concerned with the way authority is distributed, mobilised, utilised and 
limited. It involves essentially goals of the social unit, distribution of power, power bases, 
boundary-spanning positions, and mechanisms for managing conflicts. 
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The final variable in Arndt’s framework is related to the internal economy, involving the way 
the social unit is structured, the allocation rules in terms of accounting budgeting, 
information and decision instruments to enforce compliance, and the design and practice of 
rules to distribute the rewards available in order to motivate the personnel.  
Although the framework developed by Stern and Reve (1980) and extended by Arndt (1983) 
was conceived for a micro-level analysis, i.e. in the field of marketing at corporate level, it 
has two main benefits for a macro level analysis. First, it makes clear the implication of both 
internal and external factors/forces in the analysis. Second, despite the fact that the type and 
nature of the dimensions of a political economy analysis at micro-level will obviously differ 
from that of an analysis at macro level, the framework inspires, with additional research, 
ideas about the nature and scope of variables to be considered in any research setting based 
on political economy. 
Similarly, in accounting, many of the researchers who have used a Political Economy model 
in their analysis have done so by outlining the particular attributes of the political and 
economic factors considered (see for example Perry and Nolke, 2006). All such studies have 
been conducted with focus on the private sector. Cooper and Sherer’s (1984) study is an 
exception to this. They have designed a Political Economy framework for accounting 
research with the intention to reinforce calls “to understand how accounting systems operate 
in their social, political and economic context in order that ‘better’ accounting systems might 
eventually be designed” (p.201). They suggest three features that characterise their political 
economy framework of accounting.  
The first is related to ‘power and conflict’ in society with accounting argued to operate in the 
specific interests of elites or classes (power), and a continuing conflict between antagonistic 
classes (conflict). The second feature is concerned with the specific historical and 
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institutional environment of the society in which accounting operates. Bringing the 
framework into the historical perspective is necessary to understand the roles of the 
government and the state in accounting reports and policies on one hand, and the pattern of 
the roles of accounting practice and by implication the historical assessment of the social 
values of these roles on the other. The third feature of the framework involves the 
acknowledgement of the potential of people and accounting to change and reflect differing 
interests and concerns. An illustrative example of this feature is that when ‘accounting’ for 
corporate activities, for instance, ignores externalities, that is, social costs, it may well 
encourage self-interest at the expense of social interests. 
Again, this Political Economy framework is designed to work at micro level. The accounting 
systems involved in the framework are part of private sector accounting and the framework 
itself was developed in the private sector context. Nevertheless, all of the features outlined in 
the framework could apply well for a macro or country level analysis. The historical 
background and in particular the former colonial ‘patron’ has significant influence over the 
extent of the success of policy/reform implementation (Stone, 2004; Shirley, 2005) and 
possibly over the design process. 
At the public sector level, Wamsley and Zald (1973) and Bowles and White (1994) have 
developed a political economy framework for the analysis of public organisations and central 
bank independence respectively. Wamsley and Zald (1973) offer a framework that is 
characterised by four main variables: the external political environment; the economic 
environment and exchanges; the internal political structure and process; and the internal 
economy. The external political structures are viewed as the sum of the external political 
structure and the external political interactions of an organisation. The first is concerned with 
the distribution of sentiments and power among an agency’s relevant others. Included in the 
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‘relevant others’ are opposition or support for the organisational goals and programmes. The 
second – external political interactions – represent “the efforts by the executive cadres of 
organisations to alter their own domain or that of their neighbours, and thus alleviate 
uncertainty” (p.65).  
The second variable is composed of the economic environments and the economic exchanges. 
The economic environments involve a costs and behaviour analysis necessary for obtaining 
factors of production and exchange at the organisational frontiers. The economic exchanges, 
on the other hand, are intended to implement established goals and tasks and are viewed as 
legitimate. 
The third variable in the framework – internal political structure and process “refers to the 
structure of authority and power and the dominant values, goals and ethos institutionalized in 
that structure” (Ibid: p.67). Four main political functions20 of executive cadres are identified 
whose performance is dependent upon five internal political dimensions, namely: “ (1) 
Constitutions, (2) degree of goal consensus, (3) unity of authority, (4) patterns of subunit 
power, demand aggregation-articulation, and conflict resolution, and (5) patterns of 
leadership succession and cadre maintenance” (Ibid: p.68). 
The final variable, the internal economy, involves the coordination of behaviour and 
allocation of resources necessary for the performance of technical functions of the 
organisation in order to produce an output that satisfies the relevant ‘others’ as defined earlier. 
In such system where the technological aspects of the organisation are concentrated, 
instrumental and efficiency norms take precedence over legitimacy. 
                                                          
20
 These functions are: “(1) developing and defining agency mission, ethos, and priorities; (2) developing 
boundary-spanning units and positions to sense and adapt to environmental pressures and changes; (3) 
insuring recruitment and socialization of agency elite to maintain coherence and pursuit of goals; (4) 
overseeing the internal economy, harmonizing it with shifts in niche or goal proprieties” (Wamsley and Zald, 
1973: 67). 
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In contrast, the framework designed by Bowles and White (1994) has less to do with 
economic exchanges at organisational level but rather more concerned with the broader 
national economy. In their argument Bowles and White divide the political variables into two 
broad categories. The first category refers to ‘economic forces and movements’ which are 
‘political’ in nature because they exert “pressure on governments in certain directions and 
condition the range of feasible policy options available to [them]” (Bowles and White, 1994: 
244). The second category concerns ‘political pressures’ in the operation of the political/state 
system. These pressures are ‘economic’ in nature, as argued by the authors, “in the sense that 
they reflect economic forces in society at large and beyond, they influence economic 
processes through their impact on policy and they embody economic power through their 
control over resources” (Ibid: p.244). Examples of these pressures include the influence of 
interests groups, the motive of politicians, and the interests of specific state institutions. 
In the actual application of the framework, the authors group the main politico-economic 
forces/actors under three main headings: (1) the domestic socio-economic forces and the 
relations between them; (2) the domestic pressures from political and state systems; and (3) 
the international political and economic actors and pressures. 
Using the Central Bank as an example, the first group would include finance, labour and 
industry and the relations between them in different economies. It is argued that, because of 
their particular political character due to their special relationships with the financial sector, 
Central Banks might be expected to make the distributive consequences of their actions 
together with their policy and politics favour that sector over others in society. Therefore, a 
‘privilege relationship’ might be expected to influence both the actions and the politics of an 
agency to favour some interest group(s) or others.  
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The second group related to the domestic pressures from political and state systems is 
concerned with “the domestic actors and processes operating within the institutional sphere of 
the state and the wider political system” (Ibid: p.245). These include both pressures from 
interests groups and the mass public and the calculations of elected officials seeking to stay in 
power. The intra-state competition between government agencies and between levels of 
governments adds intensity to these pressures which in turn influence the choice of 
policy/reform.  
The last group concerned with the international political and economic forces and actors 
relates to the political and economic pressures and processes from the international sphere. 
These actors include international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF 
which influence significantly “the fortunes of weaker developing countries whose 
macroeconomic independence has been usurped by these agencies” (Ibid: p.253). Also, 
certain strong countries in the West such as the US and Germany have been taking measures 
to enforce economic and other policies in other countries, especially the developing ones. 
This means that countries might be pushed towards policies/reforms that may not be of high 
priority for them but are for the ‘pushers’, and neglect areas of significant importance to the 
development of the country, all this with the support from leaders and influential interest 
groups only seeking to secure their stake. 
At a more national level, Haggard and Webb (1993) have conceived a framework that is 
particularly applicable to developing countries. Haggard and Webb (1993) have designed a 
Political Economy framework to examine the influence of political institutions on the 
adjustment process, and the relationship between economic conditions and the politics of 
reform. The framework involves three broad clusters of variables: (1) the institutional 
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characteristics of the political system, (2) the aspects of the internal and external economy, 
and (3) the design of the reform programme. 
Political interests and institutions are covered under the first cluster, with the argument that 
politicians and bureaucrats are sensitive to pressures from interest groups because they rely 
on these groups for political support, votes and money. The political regime as in whether it 
is democratic or authoritarian is the first variable of the range. While initial premises portray 
democracy as a necessary condition for economic development, evidence suggests that “the 
optimism about the effect of democratization on economic performance may not be 
warranted...” (Haggard and Webb, 1993: 146). The second variable is about the economic 
consequences of changes in regime in terms of transitions to and from democratic rules. 
Political and economic conditions which exist at transition point influence the ability of a 
new government to manage the economy.  
In regard to the electoral cycle approach, it is postulated that timing is critical to successful 
reform especially in developing countries where there is a high degree of information 
asymmetry. In the same way, partisan orientation is argued to be an alternative to the 
electoral cycle approach. However, according to the authors, “there is only scattered evidence 
from the developing countries on how party orientation might affect policymaking, in part 
because the simple distinction between left and right... does not easily fit the developing 
world” (Ibid: p.149). While the importance of the party system in organising support for or 
opposition to reform is argued to be critical to the success or failure of reforms, its role in 
developing countries is less evidenced. Discipline and competence of the bureaucracy are 
reported to play critical role in the good functioning of government.  
The next cluster of variables involves the internal and external economic aspects. Haggard 
and Webb (1993: 152) observe that “economic conditions influence not only the policy 
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agenda, but also the political actions of organised groups and thus politicians’ calculations 
about what can be done and what cannot be done.” They suggest four major relevant factors 
or variables under this cluster. The first is about the intensity and length of the economic 
crisis. Crisis stimulates reform efforts as well as increasing public tolerance of them. In 
addition, the perceptions of politicians and policymakers about the economic crisis play a 
determinant role in the extent and type of action they take.  
The outcomes (or the perceptions about the outcomes) of previous reforms represent the 
second factor. Previous experiences with economic reforms are likely to shape the current 
decision-making of politicians and policymakers about future reform and policy, although in 
different context. The next factor is concerned with the distribution of income. “Sharply 
unequal income distribution creates social and political divisions that undermine consensus 
for economic reform, increases uncertainty about the actions of future government, and 
shortens time horizons...” (Ibid: p.155).  
In regard to the external economic and political constraints, the authors advance three 
channels through which the external milieu might influence policy choice. The first channel 
is the effects of prices and demand cycles. It is argued that policy changes in the developing 
world can be traced to fluctuations in world prices of raw materials and to business cycles in 
the developed countries. The second channel refers to the influences of the international 
networks including foreign advisers and training programmes for technocrats at foreign 
universities that result in the transmission of policy-relevant knowledge. Loan conditionality 
is the third channel. The influence of conditionality on policy and reform is obvious and this 
is clearly outlined by Haggard and Webb (1993: 156) in the following terms: “unity among 
creditors and their power over the flow of financial resources provide them with substantial 
influence”. 
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The final cluster is the design of the reform programme. Policymakers who undertake reform 
programmes have considerable control over the design and tactics of reform under three main 
considerations. Firstly, the success of a reform depends on the pace of the reform programme. 
Reform programmes are more successful when implemented quickly because, as argued, 
doing so would weaken interest groups that are attached to the status quo, and increase the 
credibility of the reform. Secondly, the query as to whether reforms should be undertaken in 
stages or all at once is considered. Haggard and Webb report the result of a World Bank 
study suggesting that “bundling reforms allows a government to offset the losses associated 
with one component of the program with the gains from another – form of compensation” 
(Ibid: p.160). This means that undertaking all of the reforms at once is preferable to 
sequencing reform programmes. Thirdly, it is of concern as to whether compensation 
measures such as wages increases should be undertaken along with reform programmes. 
According to Haggard and Webb, evidence suggests that compensation measures are 
necessary but they succeed neither economically nor politically if the incentives offered are 
contrary to the overall thrust of the reform programme. 
 
4.3.2.4. Potentials and limitations of PEF 
 
4.3.2.4.1. Potentials of PEF 
The value of Political Economy rests in part on its generality and in part on its integrative 
potential. “Political Economy is fairly general, as the paradigm may be applied in theory 
construction in a wide range of... [fields]. It is integrative through offering a unifying 
framework by incorporating economic and socio-political constructs” (Arndt, 1983: 44).  
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The PEF approach is concerned with why optimal policies/reforms are not adopted, or if 
adopted, why they are not successful or fail to deliver the intended results/outcomes (Haggard 
and Webb, 1993). In doing so the approach emphasises the institutional features and 
influences in a sort of trans-disciplinary mode of investigation, which would benefit the study 
of accounting (Cooper and Sherer, 1984) and governance. The framework provides a broader, 
more holistic approach for analysing how accounting systems have been considered in the 
‘push’ towards governance development. 
As argued by Stern and Reve (1980: 53) “a premise of the PEF as initially formulated is that 
complex socioeconomic interactions involve multilateral interactions as opposed to ‘simple’ 
cause-effect mechanisms”. In this sense, the PEF will make a significant contribution to the 
study of the development of macro-level accounting systems and governance by mapping out 
most, if not all, relevant actors/forces and their respective role. 
Moreover, the Political Economy perspective as an organising framework has the potential 
for producing new theoretical insights (Stern and Reve, 1980). The framework is helpful in 
providing insights into the forms of meaningful relationships amidst key concepts or 
variables that may be brought out from the analysis. These relationships can further be 
operationalised and tested using alternative approach(es) to ensure validity. 
 
4.3.2.4.2. Limitations of PEF 
As pointed out by Arndt (1983: 52) “the most important limitations of the Political Economy 
paradigm relate to the methodological problems and the vagueness and incompleteness of the 
framework.” Many of the constructs and relationships identified by the Political Economy 
paradigm are not easy to capture via conventional methods such as cross-sectional surveys. 
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Nevertheless, small scale studies and unobtrusive methods, Arndt argues, may be feasible at 
least in exploratory research. 
In addition, John and Reve (1982) argue that the framework entails the use of key informants 
drawn from within the organisations or institutions under study posing issues of constructs 
validity and reliability. However, these problems are not specific to the Political Economy 
approach. Most qualitative studies use informants from the case organisations and therefore 
run the reliability and validity risk. These risks can be reduced with the use of appropriate 
selection techniques and triangulation approach. 
Finally, the framework is incomplete and vague (Arndt, 1983). However, the vagueness of 
the framework may be what allows for its generality, being able to be applied in a wide range 
of fields: marketing (Stern and Reve, 1980), economic policy reform (Haggard and Webb, 
1993), accounting (Cooper and Sherer, 1984), etc. Attempts to limit the vagueness of the 
framework may well result in the reduction of the scope of its application. 
 
4.3.2.5. Relevance of PEF to the study 
It is believed that an authentic understanding of the development of accounting systems and 
governance in Africa requires an analytical perspective. In the words of Harris (1975: vii) “... 
it is the nexus between what is conventionally considered politics and what is considered 
economics that requires [the] primary attention [of the researcher]. Only by studying this 
nexus can we understand in any meaningful sense the causes” of the current state of 
accounting systems and governance in Africa and the ‘prerequisites’ for their improvement. 
Such study intends to bring in a single and comprehensive analysis of accounting and 
governance in terms of what are conventionally considered as separate aspects of ‘social 
reality’. 
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Although the nature of the research questions suggest a pragmatic approach in examining the 
study data and other materials as discussed earlier in this chapter, an attempt is made to use a 
framework as a template for organising the analysis. The framework required is one that, as 
argued by Harris, engages in a holistic or global consideration of the interaction between 
internal and external factors that influence the development of accounting systems and 
governance. From this perspective, a Political Economy framework is considered to perform 
such an integrative role. The research is original as it is the first of such study to the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge. No similar studies have been found in the literature to serve as a 
reference. There is a need to start somewhere, and hence, the proposed framework to obtain a 
holistic picture of accounting and governance systems development in Africa. As a starting 
point, it is argued in this study that the economy and politics, especially in Africa, are 
inseparably linked and cannot be studied in isolation in respect of governance and accounting 
issues. 
Applying the political economy framework to the study of governance and accounting 
systems in Africa will particularly help to underline the structure of the internal politico-
economic factors, and the type and nature of the external or international political and 
economic dependencies as fundamental to understanding/explaining the policy/reform 
choices accessible in terms of governance and accounting systems development. This 
analysis will highlight the constraints and influences exerted by the external political and 
economic forces/actors and how to accommodate the various forces and interests which will 
help to develop a framework that associates accounting systems and governance for policy 
formulation. 
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4.3.2.6. Proposed Political Economy Framework 
In Figure 4.1 governance and accounting systems reform/policy in Africa and its outcome in 
terms of quality is shown to be the result of the interactions between three categories of 
forces/actors: internal political systems and institutions, internal economy, and international 
economic and political forces/actors. Each of these forces/actors is characterised by a set of 
factors and/or players.  
In the political and institutions category, Haggard and Webb (1993) suggest that transition 
from authoritarian regimes to democratic rules brought about by a faltering economy is a key 
factor in helping incoming democratic governments to secure support for various policies and 
reforms. Governance and accounting improvements are expected to form part of these 
reforms/policies. For instance, structural adjustment reforms following the collapse of many 
authoritarian regimes in Africa had governance improvement underpinnings (Boafo-Arthur, 
1999). Haggard and Webb further argue that the electoral cycle is a factor in political elites’ 
calculations on the timing and choice of reforms/policies. Similarly, interest groups such as 
unions, powerful political parties, and civil society organisations can influence reform/policy 
initiatives and the nature of these reform initiatives. 
An important factor in the success of governance and accounting reforms/policies when that 
are adopted is the quality of the bureaucrats within government institutions. “The prospects 
for policy reform... depend on characteristics of the state itself, particularly the discipline and 
competence of the bureaucracy” (Haggard and Webb, 1993: 151). Furthermore, the patterns 
in which bureaucratic leadership is developed and cadres are maintained determine the extent 
of the success of public organisations/institutions (Wamsley and Zald, 1973), in particular the 
success of accounting institutions within the governance sphere of a country. A component of 
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the accounting system – the financial reporting system – is directly under the control of the 
ministry of finance in most countries. 
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed Political Economy Framework 
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It is presumed that the nature of this relationship may affect both the development and the 
working of the financial reporting institution and thus the quality of the output produced from 
the system and its contribution to governance improvement, especially if the government 
lends itself to opaque financial practices as is observed in many African countries (Cain et al., 
2001; McMillan, 2005). The last factor in this category is the Constitution (Wamsley and 
Zald, 1973). The Constitution is the supreme legal framework that determines the governance 
system and structure of a country. As such it is a critical factor regarding the basic foundation 
of the nation’s accounting system. 
The second category of forces is concerned with the internal economic factors. Economic 
“crises increase a government’s willingness to attempt to remedial measures and the public 
tolerance for them” (Haggard and Webb, 1993: 153). Where relevant, the nature of the 
remedial measures is indicative of the importance that policymakers attribute to accounting. 
In addition, the weight of the national economy at global level will determine the extent of 
external influence over the country’s reform initiatives. Intuitively, the smaller the country’s 
economic weight, the greater the external influence over its reform/policy initiatives will be. 
Furthermore, Haggard and Webb suggest that the outcomes (or perceptions about the 
outcomes) of previous reforms influence the nature and choice of subsequent reforms/policies. 
The private sector is the last factor in this category. It is an important player in governance 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009), and business association or ‘patronat’21  is a key private sector 
organisation that is presumed to ‘push’ for policy changes. 
Regarding the international economic and political forces/actors, it is argued that although 
international economic conditions might affect the national economy in various ways, their 
implications in terms of policy/reform in developing countries are rather indirect via the key 
                                                          
21
 The ‘Patronat’ is a French name which can be defined as the collective body of the employers in an economy. 
In a narrow sense, it is the body of the bourgeoisie. 
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players in the international context. These players are the World Bank, the former colonial 
‘master’ or ‘patron’, the other financial international institutions such as the IMF, and the 
‘strong nations’ such as the US, Germany, UK, France, etc.  
The role of the Wold Bank at the forefront of governance reform/policy in Africa and the 
nature of power relations involved is now widely established (Haggard and Webb, 1993; 
Bowles and White, 1994; Harrison, 2005). These studies point out “how the World Bank’s 
governance agenda is subject to political and ideological influence and how governance 
reform can have a variety of effects on power relations” (Harrison, 2005: 240). The 
implication of the IMF in the governance reform process is also acknowledged (Harrison 
2005). Similarly, former colonial masters not only influence governance policy in their 
former colonies (Iheriohanma and Oguoma, 2010) but also have left some colonial heritage in 
terms of institutions (Mafeje, 2002; Saldanha, 2004; Shirley, 2005) that affect the 
development of governance in those countries. Moreover, certain countries called ‘strong 
nations’ have been taking measures to exert greater controls/influence over the policy choices 
of developing countries (Bowles and White, 1994). These players mainly use three mediums 
to transmit their influence over governance policy. The first is loan conditionality, as used by 
the World Bank and other financial institutions such as the IMF. The second is the use of 
advisers by the various players to provide technical/political advice/assistance. The last 
medium is the provision of specific training. 
This proposed framework will be drawn on later to explain the current state of accounting 
systems in Africa and their limited contribution to governance development despite their 
widely recognised potential.  
The following chapter presents the findings related to the assessment of the accounting 
systems in Benin and Ghana. 
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4.4. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, research philosophy and the role of theory have been discussed and the 
theoretical framework adopted for the study was presented. The discussion of research 
philosophy carried out in the first section covered its definition and key concepts involved: 
the concept of ontology, epistemology, research paradigm and pragmatism.  
In the second section the importance of theory in research was outlined as being fundamental 
to understanding the systematic reason for a particular state of phenomena or a particular 
occurrence or non-occurrence of a phenomenon. This section moved on to discuss the 
Political Economy analysis. The PEF explores the determinants of a subject of study and 
“examines the relationship between the various politico-economic forces and interests which 
act to constitute and maintain institutions” (Bowles and White, 1994: 241). 
Applying the political economy framework to the study of governance and accounting 
systems in Africa will particularly help to underline the structure of the internal politico-
economic factors, and the type and nature of the external political and economic 
dependencies as fundamental to explaining the current state of accounting systems in Africa 
and their limited application in terms of governance improvement. The key features of the 
PEF adopted to carry out this analysis were presented. 
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CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS IN BENIN AND GHANA  
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5.1. Introduction 
Accounting systems in English and French Africa are divided into Anglo-Saxon and 
Francophone systems owing to historical and colonial heritage. In fact, most of Africa – over 
40 out of 53 countries – has been historically under either English or French ‘domination’ or 
both. The roots of the modern accounting systems in these countries have as a result stemmed 
from France and Britain in accordance with the practice in the ‘métropole’. Further, as 
commented by a World Bank officer during the study, “there is a third system which is the 
Lusophone system. [This system] is close to the French one and it is rather the Francophone 
people who advise on it” [BWB01]. So in essence, it is meaningful to retain the initial 
division into English and French systems when addressing accounting systems in most of 
Africa. 
This chapter therefore focuses on the two systems, using the illustrative cases of Benin and 
Ghana. The Benin system operates in a regionally coordinated system organised and 
monitored by a regional body called UEMOA
22
. This body has relatively the same systems as 
its sister body from central Africa – the CEMAC23. UEMOA and CEMAC encompass 14 
countries of French Africa, hence the rational of using Benin as an illustrative case of the 
French African system of accounting. On the other hand, the Ghanaian system, as opposed to 
the Beninese one, is not regionally coordinated. This is the case in most of English Africa.  
The analysis conducted in this chapter is problem centric rather than theory driven, although 
the accounting literature helps to identify some of the characteristics or features of State 
accounting systems that guided the analysis. The analysis is conducted in order to address the 
research question related to the state of accounting systems in Africa. Evidence is primarily 
drawn from interview data and observation and then corroborated with other documentary 
                                                          
22
 Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine or ‘West African Economic and Monetary Union’. 
23
 Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale or ‘Economic and Monetary Community of 
Central Africa’. 
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evidence. Reliance solely on documents in the context of the case study countries may be 
very misleading in drawing conclusion as warned by a senior official from Benin during the 
first-phase interview: 
…if you want to do a good research work that will make a difference compared to what people 
have been doing, you have to be cautious about what you see in documents, especially when these 
documents are produced by the governments and those working with them… You must go and 
talk to people – those with good integrity and capable of telling the truth. So look out for that.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In the second and third sections, the accounting 
infrastructure and an assessment of the state of the accounting systems of Benin and Ghana 
are examined respectively. Then in the fourth section a comparative analysis of accounting 
systems in the two countries is conducted. The fifth section provides a summary of the 
chapter.  
 
 
5.2. Accounting Infrastructure and Assessment of the Accounting System in Benin 
 
5.2.1. Accounting Infrastructure in Benin 
Accounting infrastructure in Benin took its roots from the French system, as is the case for 
most of French speaking Africa. The Benin system of accounting is an illustrative case of at 
least two regionally established accounting systems in Africa, that is, the UEMOA and 
CEMAC. The system can be described as being composed of a financial reporting institution, 
internal audit (and control) institutions, and an external audit institution, as shown in Figure 
5.1 below. 
The primary element in this system is the consideration of ‘public accountant’. Ordinance 
No.69.5/PR/MEF of 13/02/1969 considers a public accountant as: 
Any civil servant that has the quality to execute on behalf of the state, a local government or a 
public organisation the operations of receipts, expenses and handling of financial assets. 
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The Ordinance also defines three requirements to be an accountant. First, one must be 
nominated (although the technical requirements are not considered in this condition). Second, 
once nominated, the person must take an oath. Third, he must provide a deposit to cover 
irregularities or malfeasances committed during the term of office. The Ordinance further 
states that “no accountant can take office if he/she is not able to justify that he has 
accomplished the last two formalities”, i.e. the taking of an oath and the provision of the 
deposit. In return the accountant is paid a responsibility allowance. The conditions for being 
internal and external auditors are covered by the legal frameworks relating to each institution. 
It is important to note that in Benin, as is the case in most of French speaking Africa and in 
France (Moussa, 2004) there is a clear distinction between the ‘accountants’ (those who 
manipulate government funds) and the ‘credit managers’ (those who administer budget 
appropriations). 
 
5.2.1.1. DGTCP or Treasury and Accounting Department (TAD) 
Initially established by Law No.61.35 as the Treasury department, the TAD was reviewed in 
1969 by decree No.65-47/PR/MEF by adding the accounting function to the department, 
hence the current name of ‘Treasury and Accounting Department’. In spite of this addition, 
the department did not produced any financial accounts for the period preceding 1998 as 
described by one of the heads of the department:  
Before 1998, from the point of view of the organisation of the [department], we still had the 
accounting services... [but] it was only at the head office that the accounting entries were made. 
That was from 1961 to 1994. And there were some congestion that hindered the maintenance of a 
thorough accounting. Therefore it was not possible to produce any accounting, statistical and 
financial report... In terms of financial accounting, the situation was the same from 1994 to 1998 
as it was before 1994. The financial administrations – customs and tax – did not maintain any 
financial accounting. Rather they maintain an auxiliary accounting... which was in fact a receipts 
budgetary accounting. [BP007] 
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Figure 5.1: Benin Accounting Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Developed by the researcher  
 
From 1998 the accounting function of the TAD was reorganised with what is called 
‘Instruction C1’ (followed later by C2 and C3) which decompresses the public accounting 
function. From that point, the ‘Recettes des Finances’ and ‘Recettes-Perceptions’24 started to 
maintain financial accounting. Furthermore, government transactions were also decentralised. 
As a result of this decentralisation, there is a first level of centralisation of government 
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accounts at the decentralised unit level. The accounts resulting from this level of 
centralisation are sent to the state’s Chief Accountant’s office 25  which carries out the 
aggregate centralisation. This is then forwarded to the ‘Direction Générale de la 
Centralisation des Comptes de l’Etat’ (DCCE), created in 1994 whose responsibility is the 
production of the overall government accounts. 
The financial statements produced by the TAD include the ‘Compte de Gestion’26 , the 
‘Compte Général de l’Administration Centrale’27 and the ‘Projet de Loi de Règlement’28. 
These accounts are sent to the Chamber of Accounts for examination, and only the last one is 
sent to Parliament after the Chamber of Accounts’ examination to be passed as a law. 
 
5.2.1.2. Internal Audit Institutions  
According to the decree No.2006-627 of 04/12/2006 the internal audit institutions
29
 in Benin 
are divided into two groups. The first group is referred to as ‘nationwide internal audit 
institutions’ with a nationwide mandate to exert their competence and investigative authority 
over any government institutions and public organisations across the country. These 
nationwide audit institutions are the Inspection Générale d’Etat (IGE), Inspection Générale 
des Finances (IGF),  and Inspection Générale des Services et Emplois Publics (IGSEP). The 
other group is referred to as ‘sectorial internal audit institutions’ whose competence and 
investigative authority are limited to the sectorial ministries to which they belong – this is the 
case of the Inspection Générale des Ministères (IGM) – and Inspection Générale des Services 
                                                          
25
 This office is called ‘Recette Générale des Finances’ and the Principal Public Accountant is the ‘Receveur 
Général des Finances’. 
26
 Management Accounts. 
27
 General Account of the Central Administration. 
28
 Draft Budget Law on the execution of the budget. 
29
 The internal audit institutions are commonly called ‘control and inspection institutions’ in most of French 
speaking Africa. 
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des Administrations Financières (IGS) established in key specific financial administrations 
(namely the TAD, the Customs Department, and the Tax Department).  
The IGE or General State Inspectorate is defined as “a control institution of the state with a 
nationwide authority to coordinate the activities of all the other control and inspection 
institutions. It has a general and permanent control, investigative and fact-finding mission” 
(Decree No.2006-319 – Article 1). Among other things, the IGE is responsible for the 
financial and accounting control of the State and local governments, public organisations and 
enterprises, and other specific engagements such as special investigation, control and fact-
finding engagements in particular situations. The head and “the members of the IGE are 
appointed by decree taken by the Council of Ministers. They are selected on application 
among those with a postgraduate degree in finance, management or law and who have had a 
least 10 year experience at managerial position in public, parastatal or private enterprises or 
organisations” (Decree No.2006-319 – Article 7). Once appointed, the head and members of 
the IGE must take an oath.  
The IGF or General Inspectorate of Finance is defined, according to the decree
30
 No.93-45 as 
“a control institution with nationwide authority that assists the Minister in charge of Finance 
in discharging his/her permanent control mission of the finances of the State, local 
governments, public and parastatal organisations, and all organisations that receive a 
financial grant or material assistance from local governments or concessionaires of public 
services”. The IGF’s main function is financial audit and control. It has two types of mission: 
one is ‘permanent’ and the other is ‘special’. The permanent mission concerns all public 
accountants and is led by the head of the IGF. The special mission concerns all 
                                                          
30
 This decree was renewed in late 2010. 
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Ordonnateurs
31
 and credit managers, public accountants, and managers of public institutions. 
The head of the IGF and his deputy are nominated by decree taken by the Council of 
Ministers among the general inspectors of finance with the most years in office, with the 
highest grade who have never been involved in any malfeasance.  
The IGSEP or General Inspectorate of Public Services and Jobs was established in 1997 by 
decree No.97-608 and is placed under the direct authority of the Minister in charge of Public 
Service. The IGSEP has a nationwide authority and is responsible for the general control of 
the State’s personnel management, and the application of administrative ethics regulations. 
The head of the IGSEP and his deputy are nominated by decree taken by the Council of 
Ministers among the general inspectors of class A1 with the most years in office. According 
to the decree No.2006-627, they are assisted by general inspectors nominated under the same 
conditions among those of class A1 with the most years in office.  
“The IGMs or [General Inspectorates of Ministries] are control and inspection institutions 
with authority limited to the ministerial departments within which they are established” 
(Decree No.2006-699 – Article 2). The IGMs had existed before under the name of DIVI32 
but this was changed in 2006.  The IGM is directly attached to the sectorial ministry within 
which it is established and assists the Minister in controlling the public organisations within 
the ministry. The IGM is headed by a General Inspector and a deputy appointed under the 
same conditions as the head of the IGF. However, one of the two must have a background in 
the field of the sectorial ministry and the other in accounting and/or finance. They are assisted 
by Inspecteurs-Vérificateurs. In hierarchical terms, the IGMs are under the first level 
authority of the IGF and IGSEP and the second level authority of the IGE, but they also 
maintain their autonomy as control institutions in the sectorial ministries. Beside the IGM, 
                                                          
31
 These are administrative or budgetary accountants. They initiate and engage operating transactions on the 
accounts of the State or local governments. 
32
 ‘Division de l’Inspection et de la Vérification Interne’ or ‘Inspection and Internal Verification Division’ 
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there is the Inspection Générale des Services (IGS). Like the IGM, the authority of the IGS is 
limited only to the three Financial Administrations in Benin as aforementioned within which 
the IGS is established. 
Another internal control institution which is very independent of the above structure (i.e. the 
IGE, IGF, IGSEP, and IGM) and which is attached to the Ministry in charge of Finance is the 
‘Contrôle Financier’. The Contrôle Financier can be translated as Financial Control but it 
represents a particular financial control and is not concerned with the broad coverage of the 
concept. In terms of decree No.93-178 (Article 1) the Contrôle Financier in Benin is 
concerned with a priori control, i.e. before the occurrence of any liability relating to 
transactions and events engaging the government or public organisations. This control comes 
in two forms. The first is called ‘regularity control’ which is to ensure that transactions and 
operations are concluded or conducted in accordance with legal and regulatory requirements. 
The second form is ‘materiality control’, i.e. physically ‘checking’ that the goods or services 
contracted on behalf of the government are properly delivered according to the agreed terms. 
The Contrôle Financier differs from the above internal audit institutions in the sense that the 
latter are concerned with ‘concomitant control’ – i.e. during the execution – while the former 
is concerned with a priori control.  
 
5.2.1.3.External Oversight Institutions: The Chambre des Comptes (CC) or 
Chamber of Accounts and the Finance Committee of the National 
Assembly 
The Chambre des Comptes (CC) is the external audit institution (the equivalent of the office 
of the auditor general) in Benin. The CC is one of the three chambers of the Supreme Court 
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established by Ordinance No.21/PR of 26/04/1966 and put into force by law No.90-012. 
These laws were renewed and replaced by law No.2004-07 enacted on 23/10/2007.  
According to the Constitution of Benin and law No.2004-07 the CC has two main functions. 
One is concerned with the ‘Loi de Règlement33’. In terms of this function, the CC conducts 
all control, as determined necessary, on the execution of the budget and “produces a report on 
the execution of each finance law. At the end of this control it issues a ‘general declaration of 
conformity’ between the individual accounts of the public accountants and the overall 
government accounts” (Article 1 of law No.2004-07). This is what is usually referred to as 
‘Contrôle Administratif’ (or Administrative Control). This report provides Parliament with 
the information necessary to understqnd how the government has employed the funds that 
have been allocated to it through the finance law and enables the Parliament to pass the ‘Loi 
de Règlement’. According to the Constitution in its 99th article, the “Lois de Règlement’ 
control the execution of the finance laws subject to the subsequent clearance of the accounts 
of the Nation by the Chamber of Accounts of the Supreme Court”. This means that the 
control is not completed with the vote of the ‘Loi de Règlement’. The accounts must 
subsequently be cleared through the other function of the CC. The other function is related to 
the judgement of public accountants through the accounts produced. In this regard, public 
accountants must provide their accounts to the CC within the prescribed deadline. The CC 
issues an opinion as to whether the accounts are ‘truly and fairly’ presented and “can fine the 
accountants for late transmission of their accounts..., judge and sanction [them] for 
mismanagement...” (Law No.2004-07 – Article 42).  
In addition to these functions, and where necessary, the CC assists Parliament in the 
examination of the Nation’s accounts for “all investigations and studies relating to the 
execution of public receipts and expenses, or the management of the treasury of the Nation, 
                                                          
33
 Audited Budget Law (on the execution of the budget). 
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local governments, government departments or institutions subject to its control” 
(Constitution – Article 112). The CC is led by a President proposed by the President of the 
Supreme Court from among the magistrates and jurists of the highest rank with at least 15 
years of professional experience and appointed by decree taken by the Council of Ministers 
(Constitution – Article 134). In terms of the 10th article of law No.2004-07, the President, 
Councillors and Auditors must take an oath before taking office.  
The ‘Commission des Finances et des Echanges’ or Finance Committee (FC) is one of the 
committees of the National Assembly set up according to its internal rules. According to 
these internal rules, the FC is entrusted with the examination of all proposals that have 
financial consequences, in particular the finance law (government budget), the Loi de 
Règlement, the financial ratifications, and the reports from any financial investigations 
commissioned by the National Assembly. After the examination of any proposal, the 
Committee prepares and issues a report with an ‘opinion’ that is submitted to be voted on in 
Parliament. The National Assembly will therefore consider the report together with the 
opinion before any vote is made. 
 
5.2.2. State of Accounting System in Benin 
 
5.2.2.1. Brief Assessment of the Legal Framework 
As discussed above, various laws and regulations govern the functioning of the accounting 
system at all levels. In addition to these legislations, there are also regional regulations that 
member countries are required to adhere to. These regulations are in the form of ‘directives’ 
which are issued and monitored by UEMOA. Benin, as a member country of this organisation, 
has put some of these directives into national laws but has still fallen short of incorporating 
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some of the key ones as discussed later in this chapter. So in principle, a legal framework 
exists. 
In terms of framework, the legal framework exists and the necessary institutions also exist in 
internal control in order to control the procedures, and… [an] external control concerning the 
whole government [also exists]. [BC003] 
However the framework is not well adapted to the environment and fails as a result to meet 
expectations, as expressed by a senior official:  
The law and regulations that we’ve got until now are not really adapted. Therefore in that respect, 
it poses a legal problem. [BC002] 
This is exacerbated by the fact that the Parliament which is the main institution in charge of 
ensuring an effective accounting legal framework does not give appropriate consideration to 
the matter. 
The laws are not proposed to be passed by serious MPs; by a Parliament that shows the 
appropriate level of concern [BO003 – 59-60].  
For example the format of the balance sheet and other statements included in the Compte de 
Gestion is not covered by any law or regulation as recognised by an accountant in the 
division responsible for the preparation of the accounts.  
We must recognise that there is no law or regulation that govern that [i.e. the balance sheet and the 
revenue and expenditure statement] in detail. [BP010]  
This situation leaves the accountants with no or little reference points when it comes to 
producing the government and public institutions’ financial statements. 
Another example concerns the ‘Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finances’ or organic law 
relating to the finance law. The organic law governs the legal framework of the finance law 
in France and in most French speaking countries. This law is above all other laws in financial 
matters except the Constitution. In Benin, this law is very limited and somehow outdated. 
According to an MP who had served on the Finance Committee for several years: 
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The Organic Law that should include this provision [i.e. passing the Loi de Règlement of the 
previous year before voting the Loi des Finances of the following year] has not been passed by the 
Parliament. We are in the UEMOA system. The UEMOA directives must be translated into 
national laws, and that is what many countries are very slow to do. This causes a gap between 
what is expected and what is actually done… And for Benin it is even worse because the Organic 
Law dated 1986 is still applicable in our public finance. That is a gap which is not good. [BAN02] 
The above impediment is a significant one since it contributes to the ‘negligence’ of the vote 
of the Loi de Règlement often seen as a “bare formality with no real meaning attached to it” 
according to the terms of a public official. It also hampers to some extent the adoption of the 
directives of UEMOA aiming at a harmonised accounting system across the region. 
 
5.2.2.2. Assessment of the Institutions in Charge of the Functioning of the 
Accounting System 
 
5.2.2.2.1. The TAD 
The TAD as discussed in Section 4.2.1.1 is the government department entrusted with the 
State financial accounting. In order to play this role the TAD is organised to cover all the 
Départements
34
 of the country although some townships are not yet covered due to lack of 
resources and their relative size. However, the activities of the department are primarily 
hampered by the effectiveness of its internal control bodies as explained by a senior official 
at the TAD. 
The control bodies of the TAD do not even have a control manual. They don’t know [well] the 
areas that should be controlled in the system. There is a control cell at each division of the TAD 
that controls the operations of the division. [But it is] the lack of manual and the lack of 
knowledge of the areas to control that poses the problem of accounting… [BP006] 
                                                          
34
 The Départements are the administrative areas or regions of Beninese territory. 
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Moreover, the absence of a manual outlined in the above comment is not only limited to the 
internal control bodies. It is also found to be a general problem at the TAD level according to 
another official of the department. 
There is also an institutional problem, that is, the manuals of procedures. The manuals are not 
produced and since things are changing it’s difficult for people to follow instructions. As a 
consequence we come to a situation where the personnel are subject to improvisation. [BP007] 
On the other hand, the TAD has been under various reforms to improve its performance since 
1998. One of the latest of these reforms is the accounting software reform introduced in late 
2004 with the aim of, among other things, placing the financial reporting system across 
government administrations throughout the country into a network in order to ease the 
centralisation of the accounts. However the problem of the system network remains unsolved. 
At the moment all the accounting cells of the TAD should have been put in network with those of 
the Customs, Revenue Department and the other public administrations but it is not the case. [And] 
because of this, delay in the centralisation of the accounts persists. [BP007] 
When the opinion of one of the key officials who had worked on this reform was asked on the 
success of the reform, he said: 
Well, at some point they started saying that there is no more resource on the project… In addition, 
there should be technical resources available for the project [which was not the case]. For example, 
in the Départements there should be an inter-connection in place which was not done… We could 
help people from the Départements when they have problem directly from the centre here [head-
office of the TAD] at the time the inter-connection was working… but it is not working anymore. 
[So] if they have problem you have to travel to Atacora [a Département in the North of Benin], 
that’s over 600 kilometres! [BP001] 
Furthermore, the TAD has, above all, a leadership problem from both within the department 
and external administrations that a senior official calls the ‘actors’ of the system: 
The problem is about the actors [of the system] who do not perceive how far the reforms should 
go… These are the General Directors, the Chiefs Divisions [and] the Ministers. [BP007] 
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5.2.2.2.2. The IGE, IGF and IGM 
The IGE, IGF and IGM are internal control institutions. There are more control institutions 
but the study focuses on these three due to limitations on access to respondents in the other 
control institutions. Despite these limitations, these three are representative of the internal 
control institutions in Benin. In fact almost all of the public officials interviewed only refer to 
these institutions as the main internal control institutions. 
These days there are many control institutions that have been created. I mean the IGM, the IGE, 
the IGF, etc… More specifically each has a role to play in the normal course of things. The IGM 
is normally the primary internal control institution. It’s in the absence of any suspicion that they 
should carry out internal audit and alert the Minister that ‘eh, be careful! Things are not working 
well in here’. Apart from… [the IGM] there are the IGE and IGF which are nationwide 
institutions... They go beyond sectorial ministries to other institutions. [BC004] 
These institutions are given authority to control all public organisations under their authority. 
More importantly, the nationwide control institutions have authority to investigate all public 
institutions and organisations across the country.  
We [IGE] are a public control institution. We are a Service of the Presidency, [and] we have the 
ability to go anywhere. The President gives us power to go anywhere, even at the Presidency. 
[BIG01] 
In principle, this authority confers to these institutions some respect and consideration from 
public officials that should strengthen their activities. However, in practice, they are limited. 
Despite their operational independence from those institutions and organisations that they 
control, all officials interviewed, including members of these institutions observe that the IGE 
and IGF – the most powerful control institutions in Benin – are not organisationally 
independent, and this impairs the effectiveness of their activities. Apart from the problem of 
technical competence, the key limitation lies in the fact that they are usually directed toward 
which institutions and who they should control. More seriously, the IGMs which are the first 
order control institutions established within each ministry have no procedures manuals to 
guide them in their work.   
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There is no [procedures] documentation. We rely on what was done in the past to replicate, i.e. 
what other people did in the past… [BIG04] 
In addition, members of the IGM report that their skills are limited due to lack of training or 
continuing professional development [CPD]: 
We don’t do it [CPD]. It is a flaw. We have already told the PAIC [Control Institutions Support 
Project]. We told them that the government will only be useful when there is a reasonable control! 
From the leading control institution up to the IGM, I haven’t undertaken any training. We never 
stop telling this during our meetings. [BIG04] 
Moreover, when asked whether they are able to carry out their control activities throughout 
the ministries including the office of the Minister, a senior member of the IGM answered that 
it is not possible to report on the Minister. 
We can’t report on the Minister. Never!... Let me explain… we are under the Minister…; i.e. we 
are under his command. So while being under his command, we can’t control him. We are not 
independent from the Minister. [BIG04] 
The challenges of the IGMs that undermine their mission as first order control institutions are 
summarised by a senior official as follow: 
…the IGMs at the ministries, first they are not organised institutions, they [members of the IGM] 
are not professional. It is those public officials that are no longer needed who are sent to the IGMs 
[as members]. Therefore they don’t have adequate training. Second, when you are within a 
ministry it’s the Minister who commands you to control something while in general the Ministers 
themselves are at the heart of the problems occurring in the institutions. You can understand that 
the Minister cannot ask his Inspector to control the person with whom he undertook a fraud. So 
the IGMs have this problem. Very few IGMs can prove that they are autonomous. It is only when 
a Minister wants to dismiss an FD [Finance Director] that he sends the IGM [to control him]. But 
when he [the Minister] and the FD get along very well, you’ll never see an IGM carrying out such 
control. So these are some of the problems of the IGMs. [BC003] 
Furthermore, they are deprived off access to resources to be able to carry out any substantial 
work. 
When you look at the credits [funds] that are allocated to us to do this job you will cry. Moreover, 
we don’t even use up these credits. You’ll see that the fourth quarter is cut to nil or your budget is 
cut by 25%. [BIG04] 
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5.2.2.2.3. The Chamber of Accounts 
The public accountants, in the Beninese system of financial management, are a ‘guarantee’ of 
good management of public resources, and the role of the Chamber of Accounts is to ensure 
that this ‘guarantee’ of good public resource management is properly fulfilled. It follows that 
the Chamber of Accounts is at the heart of the accountability chain. In fact, before the 
government accounts are sent to the Parliament or the citizens, they are required to be 
examined by the audit institution for the reasons explained by a senior auditor at the Chamber 
of Accounts: 
…when the government complete the execution [of the finance law] they don’t send the accounts 
to the Parliament directly nor do they send them to the citizens directly. This system is simply 
justified by the fact that it is a technical matter and we need a neutral ‘check’ on it. So that’s two 
reasons: (1) it’s a technical matter and (2) there is a need to have a neutral ‘check’ on it. The 
financial jurisdiction has therefore been created to inform the Parliament and the citizens on the 
manner in which the resources have been effectively managed. [BC001] 
In simple terms, the role of the audit institution within the overall governance system in 
Benin is described by the above official as: 
…(1) There is the authorisation given by the Parliament in terms of public revenue and 
expenditures – it’s a public business, not private! Then, (2) there is the execution according to 
established procedures. And since what has been executed does not belong to those who have 
carried out the execution, (3) there is a need for accountability. These are the three democratic 
pillars… They are particularly crucial for public finance management. The accountability pillar is 
the responsibility of the financial jurisdiction [i.e. the audit institution]. [BC001] 
Despite the existence of the above structure and the recognition of the core role of the audit 
institution, the activities of the Chamber of Accounts are seriously limited by the lack of 
organisational independence, which also impairs dramatically the institution’s access to 
resources to accomplish its mission. 
…our Chamber of Accounts here is not operating due to its attachment to the Supreme Court. 
They are not independent! They don’t have resources. [BP006]  
Overall, a senior auditor at the Chamber of Accounts concludes on the state of the institution 
in terms of discharging its mission as follows: 
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My personal appreciation is that, in general, very little has been done with regard to the main 
mission of the jurisdiction. And its contribution to good public finance management is very 
modest at the moment. [BC001] 
 
5.2.2.2.4. The Finance Committee of the Parliament 
The Finance Committee plays an important role in the accountability chain. The Committee 
is entrusted with the exanimation of all dossiers that has a financial consequence with the 
Finance Law at the centre of this role. In principle: 
…as soon as there is a draft law with financial consequences it is sent to the Committee to 
examine. So the Commission [examines the proposal] and produces reports that are sent to the 
[National] Assembly plenary before a vote is taken. It proposes an opinion and the plenary votes 
for or against the proposed opinion. But in general, they vote for [the opinion]. [BAN02] 
Therefore in principle, the Finance Committee should play a role: 
…in maintaining a good State accounting system because the Committee has the right to control 
everything that the government or the institutions do. [BAN02] 
However, in actual fact the Committee is very limited, as explained by the above MP, 
member of the Finance Committee. 
Unfortunately, in practical terms there are no tools or qualified human resources to help them do 
the work. MPs are elected as I explained on the basis of political considerations. So we are 
requesting them to do some work they are not qualified for. [BAN02] 
This observation has led another MP of the Finance Committee, when asked whether the 
Committee plays any role in controlling the State through accounting and audit, to conclude 
that the Committee does not play any such role. The situation is considered to be a significant 
blow in the performance of the overall accounting system owing to the fact that the 
Parliament has a great deal of oversight power over the executive for its management of State 
resources. 
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5.2.2.3. Assessment of the Accounting System Functions 
Apart from the budget, management accounting in Benin is almost absent. There are periodic 
treasury statements in the form of weekly (and probably monthly) cash positions of the State 
that take into account the outstanding payments for the week. Therefore the assessment of the 
accounting functions focuses more exclusively on financial accounting and audit. 
 
5.2.2.3.1. Financial Accounting 
Although the objective of financial reporting is not explicitly mentioned in any legal 
documents, it is commonly understood among the leaders and public officials that financial 
reporting has a control objective for both the executive and the Parliament. 
[Financial reporting objective is] first, to enable the government to see how the budget has been 
executed. Second, to allow the Parliament to assess the use of the resources allocated to the 
government… For the government the ‘Compte de Gestion’ is the main document, but for the 
Parliament it’s the ‘Projet de Loi de Règlement’ that allows them to assess whether the budget has 
been executed as authorised. Therefore, the objective for both parties [the government and the 
Parliament] is control. [BP004] 
However this objective is not often met because of delay in reporting. 
For the Parliament… the fact that the accounts are examined with significant delay, how can they 
[the accounts] enable them to assess the government on the next budget? So for the Parliament it’s 
just a formality because the current Parliament is examining the accounts of the preceding fiscal 
years, perhaps, the period when they were not MPs yet. So for me, it’s not [effective]. If the 
system is such that the accounts are not examined by the Parliament timely, it cannot be of any use. 
[BP004] 
The actual performance of financial reporting in Benin is assessed through the recording 
system in place, transparency of the accounts, and the quality and ethical stand of public 
accountants. Although transparency covers the recording system, the two are discussed here 
separately from the perspective of the interviewees. 
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5.2.2.3.2. The Recording System 
Recording in Benin is a mixt of computerised and manual system. The country tried to 
introduce a computerised system in 1999 and 2004 but it is not complete. Many data are still 
produced manually. Despite the initiative that would lead to a complete computerised system 
(that has actually contributed to improve the delay in reporting), record keeping at the 
grassroots and in ministries is depicted to be in a chaotic state by officials working in the 
system. 
…unfortunately at our government level, I would say, in our institutions, i.e. all the organisations 
that receive public funds… no record-keeping is practically maintained. You cannot go to a 
Ministry and ask to see their receipts and expenditures, i.e. ‘How much funding did you receive?’ 
they will tell you approximately; ‘What have you used the funds for?’ No ledger is practically kept, 
no financial recap documents exist such that a control can be done on specific documents in 
government institutions and public organisations, except state-owned enterprises. But even in 
these state-owned enterprises there are a lot of problems. [BIG01] 
Given this situation of the recording system, an instruction document has been issued to 
improve record keeping in the various public institutions. But it is observed that the 
instruction has not been followed and the situation remains identical compared to the period 
prior to its introduction. 
We have issued a document to make people maintain accounting documents… The 
implementation should have started as from the beginning of 2010, but practically no institution or 
administration follows the instructions contained in the document. You see, just a very small 
aspect of public financial accounting is in place; and no-one keeps non-current asset registers. 
[BIG01] 
However, the system at the headquarters of the TAD is quite computerised although some 
divisions are still not covered. But the fact that the input (data) from the ground lacks 
reliability affects the quality of the output from the system. The financial information 
produced is less likely to reflect the substance of government transactions. In addition, there 
is a further weakness in the system at the point of transfer of the manually recorded data into 
the computerised system. 
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It [the system] does not guarantee 100% reliability because if the accountant needs to record the 
transactions manually before inputting them into the computerised system instead of recording 
them straight in the system in the first place, the risk of error is there. They are obliged to do that 
because the computer system is not always stable. [BP004] 
The weak recording system facilitates all sort of mismanagement or malfeasance practices 
such as inefficiencies, frauds and embezzlements at all government levels. However, the 
absence of records (and documents) together with the limited internal and external audit 
(covered later in the chapter) does not help to assess the extent of these instances.  
 
5.2.2.3.3. The Transparency of the Accounts 
One of the definitions of transparency provided by officials is that: 
The government is like a business. And I think that the things we do at the government level… in 
terms of expenditures and revenue… in the end the government should give account of these. And 
we should be able to see whether the expenditures… have been correctly made according to what 
was authorised. It is in these terms I see transparency. Because transparency, in my view, is to see 
and understand whether what should be done with government resources is what has actually been 
done. [BAc01] 
This definition highlights two key elements of transparency which are: (1) accessibility to 
financial information produced to see what has been done; and (2) sufficiency of disclosure to 
enable people to understand whether what is done is what should have been done. The third 
element observed by other officials is the timeliness of the financial information. 
In terms of accessibility to the financial information produced in Benin, it is not possible for 
citizens to have easy access to this information. For example despite formal request to go 
through a set of government accounts in the course of this research, it was not possible for 
anyone to grant such access. And one of the officials at the TAD explains that: 
When students come to us I must recognise that there is some resistance to giving information out. 
Certain information is not given out especially when it is concerned with financial information, 
financial operations, disbursements… [BP004] 
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The above official sent the researcher to the Chamber of Accounts which is legally mandated 
to make the report public. Even at the Chamber of Accounts, where the financial statements 
should be available to the public, the researcher’s request was simply denied, and all other 
attempts failed. 
A senior official at the Chamber of Accounts acknowledged: 
We produce our reports well but we do not publish them… The publication is only possible 
through public reports. And the production of the public report is not progressing up to now… 
otherwise, we work, we’ve got a lot of reports that are not known to the population. [BC003] 
Regarding disclosures in the notes to the accounts, although it was not possible to have access 
to the actual accounts to examine them, an official working on government accounts 
acknowledged that no disclosure is made to the notes of the accounts to explain what makes 
up the material accounts. 
No we don’t do it [the notes to the accounts]. In fact what’s the problem? Often the Chamber of 
Accounts requests the notes to the accounts, but if we have to do the notes, we need to edit the 
accounts sheet in ASTER [accounting software] for them to see the transactions that have been 
recorded on each revenue and expenditure account during the year that led to the general 
balance… Well, it seems laconic but we are at our beginnings. [BP011] 
The other element of transparency is the timeliness of the accounts. The law has defined the 
time-frame for the production of the financial accounts as the end of the June after the fiscal 
year-end. But in practice this deadline has never been met in Benin. 
There is a legal deadline but we never keep to that deadline. That’s why there is such delay. We 
are in 2011 but we haven’t produced [the accounts] for 2009. It’s a lot of effort we do. [BP010] 
The seriousness of the delay in producing the accounts is appreciated by another official from 
the TAD. 
There is a serious issue about that [timeliness]. There is a significant delay in the production of the 
accounts. The delay is very significant. As evidence, 2008 accounts were only transmitted [to the 
Chamber of Accounts] in July-August 2010, and the accounts for the fiscal year 2009 have not 
been completed until now when I’m talking to you. Normally, the accounts for 2009 would have 
been transmitted [to the Chamber of Accounts] by end of June 2010 at the latest. So we already 
have a delay of more than 6 months [and we still have not completed them]. So the production of 
the accounts is a serious problem. [BP004] 
131 
 
Furthermore, the delay itself causes a problem with the preparation of the accounts making 
them less reliable as observed by a consultant: 
…the problem at the TAD is about the ‘Centralisation’ [of the accounts]… When the 
‘centralisation’ is delayed, the accounts cannot be checked with credibility. In fact if the delay is 
six months for example, we are in a rush to issue the accounts and because of that we validate the 
irregularities and move on. [BP006] 
 
5.2.2.3.4. The Quality and Ethical Stand of Public Accountants  
Most interviewees are of the view that many public accountants in Benin meet the conditions 
required to be accountants. 
In general, most of the public accountants have the profile of a public accountant. What does that 
mean? Being public accountant means having been nominated, having taken an oath, in some 
countries having provided a deposit which we don’t have here, [and] having taken office. There 
are three criteria: being nominated, having taken an oath and having effectively taken office. 
Therefore, most public accountants in Benin fulfil these three criteria. [BP006] 
However it is at technical competence level that problems arise, and this is recognised by 
officials, including the accountants themselves. Although there are few accountants who have 
outstanding training, the majority are found to lack technical competence, stemming from the 
recruitment stage. 
There is a bias from the recruitment process – the profile is not well defined. At this level the 
recruitment is done as it is done for all civil services without any major difference. There is not 
much emphasis on the accounting background requirement… [BP015] 
Even after being recruited, public accountants do not go through specific training 
programmes to ensure a certain level of technical skills.  
I will say they [public accountants] don’t have adequate competence because there is no training. 
It is on the job training. When you are recruited you come with your certificates, and you are 
allocated to a department or a service and you stay and work there. It is up to you to find your way. 
[BCA02] 
With regard to ethical standing, public accountants in Benin are not subject to any specific 
ethical requirements apart from the ones that apply to all civil servants. The only piece of 
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legislation specific to public accountants is the aforementioned Ordinance No.69.5/PR/MEF 
but this Ordinance does not contain provisions for ethical requirements. It requires public 
accountants to provide a deposit before taking office. In some ways, the provision of the 
deposit aims to mitigate the potential unethical conduct of public accountants.  
They require the provision of a legal deposit [to be public accountant]. Before the accountant 
assumes office he needs to provide the deposit. How the deposit works and I know, it is taken out 
of your responsibility allowance. If you are to be given 100 [CFA francs], they will take 30 out of 
that each time until the end of your term in office. If at the end no irregularity is found, you 
recover your deposit. Otherwise, it is used to compensate the government for your misconduct. 
[BP009] 
But in practice: 
The government does not pay the responsibility allowance. And that is why the government also 
does not request the provision of the legal deposit. [BP006] 
Moreover, the Ordinance which dates to 1969, is said to be outdated and no longer covers 
most of the issues related to the current environment of public accountants in Benin; thus the 
proposal of a new piece of legislation to overcome the shortcomings of the Ordinance. But no 
substantial progress has been reached with this attempt, as reported by two senior officials at 
the TAD. 
There is a document that we call ‘The status of public accountant’ – the law 69-5. It is outdated… 
Another law [decree] was drafted five years ago. It has never been tabled in Parliament. [BP006] 
…up to now we [public accountants] don’t have a status. We were using Ordinance 69-5. But the 
Ordinance is outdated and so another legal document is required for accountant status. And for 
long we’ve been doing everything, it [the new decree] is at the Presidency and not progressing. 
They call you, you go there and work and work. After that nothing comes out. [BP009] 
The ethical environment of the public accountant is therefore very weak. It is actually 
observed that most public accountants have a poor level of integrity in performing their 
professional duty. 
Very few [public accountants] have a good level of integrity. It is weird... I saw [an invoice of] 
purchased tyres and I screamed – 500,000 [CFA francs per unit]! He [the accountant] didn’t know, 
so I put it in a joke and I told him ‘Sir X, I’ve got a car and I need a tyre’; and he replied ‘Ah, with 
50,000 [CFA francs] I can help you buy one even a BRIDGESTONE tyre’. He told me that. 
During the course of the review I took the invoice out and said ‘Sir, you just told me that I can buy 
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a tyre with 50,000, look I saw that you bought it 500,000 per unit’. At that point he told me ‘Sir, 
you should understand – it’s the government, when people sell to the government they don’t get 
paid on time, so they increase the price’. But it’s too much, 10 times! So they are in the system. 
Everywhere we go we find a lot of irregularities all over the chain. Very few of them have a good 
standard of integrity! [BC004] 
Normally, the public accountant should not be involved in placing orders in the Beninese 
system. It is the ‘Ordonnateur’ (i.e. the credit manager) who places orders and the accountant 
is concerned with the payment. But in reality, as observed by officials and the accountants 
themselves, the system does not operate like that. More importantly the non-performance of 
the whole system is caused by the lack of interest in maintaining an adequate financial 
reporting system in Benin, as concluded by a senior official. 
…the problem is that no-one is concerned about a rigorous maintenance of [financial] accounting. 
What people are concerned about is to disburse money. [BP006] 
 
5.2.2.3.5. Internal Audit/Control 
There are a significant number of internal audit/control institutions in Benin as mentioned 
above. The existence of these institutions enables the performance of various internal audit 
activities at government and institutional levels as observed by interviewees. Some 
interviewees even comment that the various internal audit activities performed mean that the 
internal audit is not the main weakness in the Beninese accounting system. The credit for 
these comments rests with the relative critical weaknesses of the other elements of the 
Beninese accounting system. Despite being the relative ‘strongest’ link of the chain, internal 
audit/control does not have a significant impact on financial management in Benin. 
In fact, for a long time this accounting in Benin has not been followed. An accounting system 
where people make expenditures which are not controlled, which are not controlled because those 
entrusted with this control are internal to the system, and so are not able to express their point of 
view, are not able to criticise as they should, and recommend sanctions as they should. There are 
small-scale sanctions that are taken, some small-scale controls that are made. But in the end this 
accounting is not rigorously followed. And if you see what happens, the expenditure chain – the 
governments have repeated it several times – the expenditure chain is undisciplined!  There is a 
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huge indiscipline within the expenditure chain in Benin, simply because there is no rigorous 
control! [BO003] 
Moreover, for some officials, internal audit and control are totally absent owing to the lack of 
effectiveness of internal audit activities allowing increasing misappropriations and 
misconducts by functionaries and State officials: 
…these days, there has been an increasing trend in embezzlement… at the ministries. It’s because 
there is no control. There is no control because after all accounting is a control mechanism… Even 
if the accounting/journal entries are automated using a computer system, the control is missing 
and this gives ideas to people. And this makes people ask whether there is any accounting system 
in place. [BP006] 
In fact, as is further observed by the above official, people start their misconduct by putting 
the internal control system to test. If the system is not effective and responds appropriately to 
the test then misappropriations and irregularities flourish, as seen in Benin. 
[The absence of control] gives ideas to people. First they always start by putting the system at test. 
A teller wants to see if the accounting system is able to detect [a misappropriation]. If it detects it, 
he will put it under the cover of an error and he will not do it again. But if it goes undetected, like 
a letter through the post, he immerses himself into it and this is what happens in general. [BP006] 
Even a senior official at the TAD acknowledges this observation, which facilitates 
misconduct at various levels of accountants. 
If we manage to conceive automated accounting entries it is a good thing. That’s what we’ve tried 
to do with ASTER [current accounting software] in here… It’s a good thing, but it is limited and 
people who use the system cheat or they begin to commit fraud. [BP010] 
People cheat the system and commit fraud because the internal control is not working. The 
internal audit that is supposed to ensure effectiveness of the internal controls and helps the 
government in its management of public resources fails for various reasons covered in more 
details in Chapter 7. 
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5.2.2.3.6. External Oversight: External Audit 
External audit in Benin concerns two forms of controls. The first control is the one that leads 
to the production of the ‘Report on the Execution of the Finance Law’ and the second one is 
concerned with the judiciary control. In addition to these constitutional controls, a third 
control has been added recently; that is, performance audit. 
The control related to the Report on the Execution of the Finance Law, also known as 
‘budgetary control’, has been carried out for the finance laws from 1998 to 2007 according to 
officials at both the TAD and the Chamber of Accounts. The purpose of this control is only to 
establish the extent of the conformity of the executed budget to the forecast budget without 
going through the supporting accounting documentation and evidence. The judiciary control 
has never been performed in Benin, and yet it is the ultimate control that would reduce the 
scope of wrong-doing and irregularities in the management of public resources. 
The judiciary control is the actual judgement of the accounts. It’s like we judge someone in a 
tribunal. The Chamber of Accounts judges whether you have complied with the legal requirements, 
whether you have the proper authority to conduct the transactions, and whether you have 
conducted them efficiently. [BP006] 
It is the judiciary control that is not done and it is this [control] that can dissuade people [from 
misconduct] and ensure [public] accountants’ accountability. [BP006] 
Concerning performance audit, officials at the Chamber of Accounts define two types of 
performance audit: ‘direct performance audit’ and ‘attestation performance audit’.  
…direct performance audit is where you assess the performance of the institution by yourself 
relatively to the elements [i.e. key performance indicators] established by the institutions. In 
contrary, attestation performance audit is where the institution produces its own performance 
report and you attest that the content of the report is reliable. [BC002] 
According to this definition, it is the direct performance audit that provides greater assurance 
regarding the performance of the institution and the reliability of the information provided. 
However, this audit has never been conducted on any public institution management or 
government project in Benin. Only the attestation performance audit is performed. And even 
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here, it is very limited in terms of scope and results. An auditor provides an example of how 
this performance audit is conducted in reality: 
…I was just back from an assignment where due to lack of vehicle… I could not go to the North. 
It is a performance [audit] assignment. I’m in charge of the Ministry X. Because of the lack of 
vehicle I got to revisit my work plan. I didn’t try to go to the mountainous regions [centre of 
Benin]. There is no resource – anyway when it is about the Chamber of Accounts. I’m talking 
about human, material and financial resources. I take [the example] of this Ministry… for the 
performance [audit]… I’ve got two fiscal years’ management to examine and each is 50 billion 
[CFA francs]. You see? No, it’s too superficial. I couldn’t go into any detail because I’ve got a 
deadline…
35
 [BC004] 
Furthermore, no follow-up is organised on those audits performed to check whether the 
recommendations made have been implemented and, if not, take further actions as necessary.  
I must acknowledge that we do not organise well the follow-up [of our recommendations] because 
of lack of resources. The small number that we are, we are all very busy with our dossiers on a 
daily basis. There is no one to organise the follow-up of our reports. [BC003] 
The overall state of the accounting system in Benin can be summarised with the following 
observation from one of the donor officials working on Beninese public finance management: 
Accounting is very weak in Benin. It is very weak because there is an organisational problem, a 
competent human resource problem. There are problems with the centralisation of the accounts… 
There is virtually no financial reporting in Benin; the ‘Loi de Règlement’ and the annual accounts 
are either badly produced or stuck at the [Chamber] of Accounts. So it’s a domain where there is 
significant weakness… Concerning internal control… I’ve got the feeling that it is weak. On the 
other hand… internal audits – those performed by the IGE and IGF – exist and are perfectible but 
they are not the main weakness. And at the end of chain, if we take the external control, it is rather 
weak… even very weak. [BWB01] 
The following section assesses the accounting infrastructure and the accounting system in 
Ghana – the second case study country. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 The details about the amount, years and name of the ministry involved in this comment have been modified 
by the researcher to avoid the interviewee being identified. This comment gives a rough idea of the substance 
of the interviewee’s overall comment. 
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5.3. Accounting Infrastructure and Assessment of the Accounting System in Ghana 
 
5.3.1. Accounting Infrastructure in Ghana 
Accounting infrastructure in Ghana took its roots from its colonial history, i.e. from the 
British accounting system. This system is composed of a financial reporting institution which 
comprises the Controller and Accountant-General Department (CAGD), the internal audit 
institutions (Internal Audit Units, and Internal Audit Agency); external oversight institutions 
(the Audit Service and the Public Accounts Committee); and Audit Recommendation 
Implementation Committees – (see Figure 5.2).  
 
5.3.1.1. Controller and Accountant-General’s Department (CAGD) 
The CAGD was established as the Treasury under the colonial administration, and was re-
named Accountant-General Department in 1937 as the institution responsible for financial 
accounting in Ghana. In 1967 the name changed again to become CAGD. The latter change 
in name was motivated by the need for the Accountant-General to exercise adequate financial 
controls over the budget execution process
36
. Currently the institution is headed by the 
Controller and Accountant-General. According to the Financial Administration Act (FAA) 
654: 
The Controller and Accountant-General is responsible for the compilation and management of the 
accounts prepared in relation to the Consolidated Fund and other public funds… [He/she] is the 
Chief Accounting Officer of the Government who has responsibility to keep, render and publish 
statements of public accounts… [He/she] is the chief adviser to the Minister [of Finance] and the 
government on accountancy matters and is the person who approves accounting instructions of 
departments and promotes the development of efficient accounting systems within departments… 
[He/she] receives, disburses and provides secure custody for moneys payable into the 
Consolidated Fund and other funds.  
                                                          
36
 See www.cagd.gov.gh  
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The annual financial statements prepared by the CAGD as per Article 41 of the FAA 654 are 
composed of a balance sheet showing the assets and liabilities of the Consolidated Fund at 
the end of the financial year, a statement of revenue and expenditure, a statement of cash flow 
of the Consolidated Fund for the financial year, and notes to the accounts. The Consolidated 
Fund is the one into which revenue or other moneys raised or received for government 
business or on behalf of the government, and any other moneys raised or received in trust for 
or on behalf of the government are paid. 
 
Figure 5.2: Ghana Accounting Infrastructure  
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139 
 
5.3.1.2. Internal Audit Institutions 
The two main internal audit structures in Ghana are the Internal Audit Units and the Internal 
Audit Agency (IAA). The latter was created as part of the public financial management 
reform programme by the Internal Audit Act 658 in 2003 to be the central internal audit 
agency to improve efficiency, accountability and transparency in the management of public 
sector resources. The IAA acts as the supervisory body of internal audit activities and 
performance within the public sector and is governed by a Board of nine members appointed 
by the President of the Republic. The IAA does not in the first place carry out the continuing 
internal audit work directly in the MDAs (Ministries, Departments and Agencies) and 
MMDAs (Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies). The continuing internal audit 
work on the ground is carried out by the Internal Audit Units, which then report to the IAA. 
According to Article 16 of the IAA Act 658, there shall be established in each MDA and 
MMDA an Internal Audit Unit to carry out internal audit and submit their reports to the IAA, 
copied to the management of the concerned MDA or MMDA. However, the internal audits 
established in the autonomous bodies of Constitution shall rather submit their reports to the 
Auditor-General. The IAA Act 658 also provides that the Internal Audit Units shall be staffed 
with the personnel required to ensure the effective and efficient internal auditing of the MDA 
and MMDA concerned. 
 
5.3.1.3. External Oversight Institutions: The Audit Service and Public Accounts 
Committee 
The Audit Service was first established as the Audit Department in 1910 by the colonial 
administration (Britain). It became the Auditor-General’s Department in the 1950s, and then 
the Audit Service in 1969, which is still the name currently in use. The institution is headed 
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by an Auditor-General and governed by a Board of seven members appointed by the 
President. According to Article 187 of the Constitution, the Auditor-General takes an oath 
before assuming office.  
The functions of the Audit Service are defined in both the Constitution and the Audit Service 
Act 584. According to Article 187: 
The public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices, including the courts, the central and local 
government administrations, of the Universities and public institutions of like nature, of any 
public corporation or other body or organization established by an Act of Parliament shall be 
audited and reported on by the Auditor-General. 
In addition, in terms of Article 16 of the Audit Service Act 584: 
The Auditor-General may in addition to the audit of public accounts, carry out in the public 
interest such special audits or reviews as he considers necessary and shall submit reports on the 
audits or review undertaken by him to Parliament. 
In the performance of these functions, the Constitution grants total access to the Auditor-
General and the Audit Service’s personnel to all books, records, and documents considered 
related or relevant to the accounts being audited. 
The ultimate external oversight rests with the Parliament via the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC). The PAC is one of the eleven standing committees of the Parliament and is composed 
of a maximum of twenty-five members under the chairmanship of a member who does not 
belong to the ruling government party. In actual practice, the PAC is chaired by the leader of 
the officially designated ‘minority party’ in Parliament (Parliamentary Centre, 2009). 
In fact according to Article 187-6 of the Constitution “parliament shall debate the report of 
the Auditor-General and appoint where necessary, in the public interest, a committee to deal 
with any matters arising from it”. Hence the constitutional underpinning of the role of the 
PAC as the ultimate external oversight body for State financial and other resources 
management in Ghana. Moreover, in order to strengthen this power, there shall be a Financial 
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Administration Tribunal “to enforce recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee on 
the Auditor-General’s reports as approved by Parliament” (Article 67-b of the FAA, 654) 
 
5.3.1.4. Audit Report Implementation Committee 
Since 2003 an Audit Report Implementation Committee (ARIC) has been required by the 
Audit Service Act 584 in each institution, body or organisation subject, to auditing by the 
Auditor-General. Despite being instituted by the Audit Service Act, the ARIC does not serve 
only to implement the recommendations of the Auditor-General, but also those from the 
internal auditors. According to Article 30-2 of the Audit Service Act: 
It shall be the duty of the Audit Report Implementation Committee to ensure that the head of an 
institution, body or organisation (a) pursues the implementation of matters in all audit reports as 
well as the Auditor-General's reports endorsed by Parliament as well as financial matters raised in 
the reports of internal monitoring units in the institution, body or organisation; and (b) annually 
prepares a statement showing the status of implementation of recommendation made in all audit 
reports as well as the Auditor-General's reports which have been accepted by Parliament and any 
other related directives of Parliament. 
The same article in its Point 3 further states that: “The [above] statement shall show remedial 
action taken or proposed to be taken to avoid or minimise the recurrence of undesirable 
features in the accounts and operations of the institution, body or organisation and the time 
frame for action to be completed”; hence, the crucial role of the ARIC in the implementation 
of recommendations resulting from audit findings. 
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5.3.2. State of Accounting System in Ghana 
 
5.3.2.1. Brief Assessment of the Legal Framework 
Ghana has a huge legal arsenal that governs each component of its accounting system. In fact, 
the Ghanaian legal framework governing the accounting system is seen by the various 
officials as significantly in line with international standards and requirements, despite the 
existence of some weaknesses.  
I would say it [the legal framework] is not different to what you expect internationally because 
they have the documents – public financial regulation through [to] the Financial Administration 
Act. On that there is a clear authority and direction for stakeholders to play their role. That is at 
the legal documentation level. [GNG06] 
Concerning the audit institutions in particular, a consultant working with both the internal and 
external audit institutions in Ghana commented that: 
Legally, laws back all of them. Legally there are no issues… As for legality, there are enough laws 
and regulations to give them [support], so that’s not a problem. [GCO01] 
However, the application of the framework in practice is limited, as if the law has been 
enacted as an end in itself. There has been some progress in application, but in substance, few 
legislative documents have been properly and fully implemented. For example, it is observed 
by donors that: 
The law requires that the financial statements of all these entities be produced within 3 months off 
the annual fiscal year and the audit should be completed 3 months after that, that’s 6 months off 
the fiscal year – end of the June after the fiscal year. While this is done for most of the MDAs, it’s 
not done for all of the MMDAs. And even there Ghana has suffered from maintaining its financial 
management arrangement on the basis of a non-harmonised chart of accounts. Different MDAs 
use their own charts of accounts. [GWB01] 
These legal requirements have been prescribed by the 1992 Constitution (Article 187-5) and 
the FAA 654 (Article 41) since 1992 and 2003 respectively. But by 2011 the requirements are 
still yet to be fully implemented. Despite the fact that the last part of the above donor 
143 
 
official’s observation is a legal requirement, a high ranked official at the CAGD 
acknowledges that each MDA still uses a different chart of accounts, and that: 
…[it] is now… [they] are building capacity to be able to propose the format and content of the 
accounts of ministries. [GC001] 
On the other hand, a key requirement of the FAA 654 to establish a Financial Administration 
Tribunal to enforce recommendations from auditors’ findings in order to curb 
misappropriations and misconducts is still yet to be implemented, about nine years after the 
Act was enacted. 
 
5.3.2.2. Assessment of the Institutions in Charge of the Functioning of the 
Accounting System 
    
5.3.2.2.1. The CAGD 
The CAGD is the government department in charge of State financial reporting. It covers the 
government (both central and local) and all public organisations.  
…the CAG provides accounting staff or accounting supervision for the staff in the ministries, 
departments and agencies for them to be able to account for the monies that they are given. So you 
find that even though we have Ministry of Finance, the accounting unit is supervised by the 
Controller [i.e. the CAGD]. And you’ll find that most of the staff have been seconded and been 
sent from the Controller’s department to the particular ministries. [GCO01] 
It is observed that the department has a good organisational structure with an adequate profile 
regarding the leading officials. 
…there’s responsibility placed on the Controller and Accountant-General at the government 
level… when you come to administration of the payroll [for example], first of all, they make sure 
that the payroll processing department is headed by a professional who has worked in the system 
of the Controller for some time now without any adverse findings. So they make sure that they 
have people who are in charge. [GA001] 
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Nevertheless, in spite of this structure, the department lacks effectiveness, as controls are 
seen to be lax. For example, in the area of the main bank reconciliations, review is reported to 
be overlooked. 
…there was some issue of un-reconciled non-performance of bank reconciliation, we realised 
that… most [of the] bank reconciliations prepared at the national level are being done by 
professionals, they have contributed in them such that sometimes they limit the extent of review of 
those statements. [GA001] 
Moreover, the CAGD oversight of the accounting personnel and functions seems to be weak 
and needs to be strengthened in order to enable the department to effectively discharge its 
responsibility for State financial reporting. 
…there is a need for strong oversight by the Controller. The Controller should not leave them 
[accounting personnel]; because [the] Controller is the Public Accountant he should be seen to be 
giving direction, giving support. [GA010] 
 
5.3.2.2.2. The Internal Audit Units and Internal Audit Agency 
By the law, all MDAs and MMDAs are required to have an internal Audit Unit to carry out 
internal audit work and report to the IAA with a copy to the head of the MDA or MMDA. In 
actual practice, this requirement is met by some MDAs and MMDAs but a significant 
number are found not to be complying with the requirement. Moreover, for even those MDAs 
and MMDAs that have internal audit units, staffing the units is still a critical issue which 
undermines the effectiveness of the internal audit unit. 
They don’t all have internal auditors. For some of them we have recruited and are waiting for their 
appointment. But for others they don’t [60-61]… You know in Ghana you can’t recruit without 
the clearance of the Ministry of Finance. If you recruit without their clearance they won’t pay 
them. So they are now working for a grant to be able to recruit. If you don’t get financial grants, 
it’s difficult to recruit. The government has to budget for all these before anything is done. [GIA01] 
With regard to the IAA in its supervisory role, it also faces similar problems relating to 
staffing. The agency is yet to be well enough staffed to effectively play its supervisory role. 
In addition, the fact that the internal auditors on the ground are not the agency’s staff 
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compromises both the proper performance of this role and the work of the internal auditors. 
Because of this, the Internal Audit Agency Act requires some amendments to make internal 
auditors and internal audit units part of the agency: 
We are trying to amend the law so that the internal auditors become part of us, become our staff so 
that we can have direct control over them… They rather feel comfortable reporting to us. If you 
are to report to the head from there, before the information comes to us the head would compare 
[it] to another query and you’d have to feedback… [GIA01] 
It is problematic to see this amendment due to happen in the near future given the fact that the 
current Act has been only partly implemented, nearly ten years since its enactment, and 
officials are sceptical about major changes in the short term.  
 
5.3.2.2.3. The Audit Service 
The Audit Service plays an important role in the Ghanaian resources management system 
because of its specific oversight mandate, that is, to review and report on the management of 
the various public institutions, and by doing so, ensure that these institutions are held 
accountable for their use of public resources. 
When you look at the overall governance system, officially, in Ghana we are seen to be an 
oversight body to other institutions. Especially, throughout the budget process we are to ensure 
that for all department expenditures, they all know the importance of budget; and apart from that, 
all department account for their budget expenditure. We ensure that the departments spend 
smoothly under the provisions of the law. [GA004] 
This mandate has given the Service important power in the eyes of the public because its 
reports are sent directly to the Parliament, as mentioned by the above auditor. 
…I would …say that the way our mandate [is defined] we carry more power or strength based on 
where our reports get to; because we report straight to Parliament and individuals are called by 
PAC to answer all the queries. [GA004] 
The power of the Audit Service is further strengthened by the perception of the independence 
of the Auditor-General vis-à-vis the other State institutions. 
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The Auditor General as you know in Ghana has security of tenure so the position is extremely 
independent because the occupant has the same term of office as the Justice or the Court of 
Appeal. So you can’t just remove the person in that office. So that’s the line of independence of 
that office. [GNG02] 
However, despite being provided by the Constitution, the independence of the Auditor-
General and the Audit Service as a result is called into question, even by senior auditors at the 
Audit Service. 
…the major challenge we even have is with regard first to the independence of the Audit Service. 
How independent are we, and how do people recognise us, and do people leave us – they don’t 
interfere? All these must come into play. [GA001] 
Also, on organisational grounds, although the Service does not face any interference in its 
actual audit work plan and performance, the possibility that the President can request it for 
any investigation has some impact on the performance of the institution. 
…looking at the organisational independence, the Auditor-General has the right to choose 
whatever audit he wants to carry out. But then the Constitution still gives the President, he can 
also direct the Auditor-General on request, he also requests the Auditor General. But then, it’s a 
request but it’s not imposition. OK. So in our selection of our audit works, we are not actually 
guided…, nobody interferes in what we decide or what we do, but knowing that the President can 
request us to, [and] …he tries to. There was a moment the President requested us to do an audit 
which was a due diligence audit. We were trying to ascertain the level of indebtedness that the 
former government... had left... when the government was voted out, he wanted to establish the 
liabilities that they left behind... The only think is that sometimes it conflicts with our own work. 
And we need to anticipate some of these things. [GA007] 
 Moreover, when taking into account the financial constraints of the institution, one can 
ascertain the significance of the above impact on the effectiveness of the Audit Service. 
...very often [in] Ghana Audit Service we don’t get the required budget that would help us to do 
our job. We often fall on the donors to also impress on government to help us in these terms. So 
they are aware of the challenges that we face on a continual basis regarding financial support. 
[GA003] 
For example:  
…this year [2010] our budget is cut by 52%! So it’s like we are not getting the funding we need to 
perform our work [GA007] 
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In fact, the Audit Service is not financially independent. The budget of the Service is 
controlled by the Ministry in charge of Finance which, from the view of senior officials at the 
Audit Service, impedes the effectiveness of the institution to a great extent. 
…our budget is controlled by the Ministry of Finance. You see, when we are auditing the Ministry 
of Finance and they are responsible for your budget; that is also an impediment. And that same 
affects the engagement of staff. You need to engage [and] you have to put them on payroll, and 
the payroll is only paid by the [Ministry of Finance]. So this is what is happening. It’s like you 
cannot engage people that you think you need because you don’t control the salary budget. So that 
is the problem with budgeting. [GA007] 
 
5.3.2.2.4. The PAC 
The PAC plays a crucial role in the accountability chain in Ghana, being the only authority 
(representing the Parliament) to examine the Auditor-General’s reports and call on the 
Executive and other public institutions members to answer queries arising from the Auditor-
General’s findings. In this respect, it is noted that the PAC is making an impact on the 
promotion of accountability in Ghana. 
The PAC is making a lot of impact especially since they started doing public hearings. Now these 
things are being heard all over the country and people are following. When the auditees are 
coming, we know that they’d come well prepared, and PAC would not entertain any ministry or 
agency who does not come with the sector Minister. So the sector Minister, because he is in 
charge of overseeing overall direction, would have to be sitting in person before PAC looks at the 
Auditor-General report on that particular ministry. And it shows the seriousness that is attached to 
the work of the PAC. [GA007] 
However, the effectiveness of the PAC in promoting accountability in terms of addressing 
issues of mismanagement and system failure beyond its authority to conduct public hearings 
on the findings of the Auditor-General is limited. 
In practice, if I have to talk [about] when I was there from the Public Accounts Hearing in the 
Parliament, I find it not to be [strong] enough in terms of addressing system wide failure, wide as 
in careless in service, mismanagement or misappropriations or maladministration and so forth – I 
don’t think it is addressing that. What it does now is to take the Auditor-General Report, identify 
the issues that are there and call [out] individuals who have not accounted in full in terms of 
receipts and payments and those [things]. However why it keeps happening is not being addressed. 
[GNG06] 
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In fact, the power and authority of the PAC to implement its recommendations and to bring 
people to account is seen to be limited. 
Implementation [of PAC’s recommendations] is not very well. PAC hasn’t got the power, it 
cannot set charge or put people before court. [GA007] 
Moreover, the PAC itself is too under-resourced to work effectively. It also has a capacity 
problem in terms of accounting and finance skills and knowledge of its members. 
It is not well resourced. There are the Clerk, the Assistant, they are just 4 people. It is not well 
resourced. [GA007] 
And 
…in the PAC they don’t all have [accounting skills or knowledge], and you can count the number 
[of those who have]... very often what you see is that, yes, you’ll find a very few qualified 
accountants. [GNG05] 
Concerning the last point in particular, it is seen not to be a significant impediment because 
the auditor’s reports are prepared in a way that is not too technically challenging for them. 
Also the PAC is assisted by the Audit Service in all its hearings.  
…the public sector account is also prepared in such [a way] that the audit reports don’t go very 
technical into the accounting issues. But then when that is required, the Audit Service is there to 
brief the PAC on what the case [is] as far as accounting issues are concerned, as far as technical 
issues are concerned. [GNG05] 
In addition, the Chair of the PAC is a chartered accountant by tradition which also helps in 
overcoming, to some extent, the capacity problem of the Committee. 
 
5.3.2.2.5. The ARIC 
The ARIC plays the important role of ensuring the implementation of audit recommendations 
whether external (from the Audit Service and PAC) or internal (from the IAA). Nevertheless, 
it is observed that ARIC has not been established in many public institutions despite being a 
legal requirement. 
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There’s supposed to be what they call [an] ‘Audit Review Implementation Committee’ which is 
supposed to be established within each government department and implement[s] some of these 
reforms. What you find is that for some departments and some local government agencies, these 
bodies don’t even exist. [GNG02] 
For example in 2009, an audit at the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly concluded that “the 
Assembly had not constituted an Audit Reports Implementation Committee” (Audit Service, 
2009a: 138). A similar conclusion was made for the Tema Municipal Assembly despite the 
Act being in force for over a decade. 
Even where these departments and agencies exist, their composition is called into question. 
…the recommendations of the PAC [are] supposed to go to the Audit Report Implementation 
Committees. But how have they been instituted? How have they been constituted? Are they 
effective? Again it’s like the same groups of people, the same institutions implementing or calling 
one of them to account or effecting a corrective measure… So then whatever’s been taken out it 
can go back to the same group of people who are failing the system. [GNG05] 
Moreover, it is observed that some of the existing ARICs in government departments and 
institutions are not functioning: 
They [ARICs] are not functioning well. In the management they are not meeting. ARICs have to 
be operational and functional. Some of them are right put in place but they are not meeting; it 
means that they are not functioning. Some are functioning, some are not functioning. [GIA01] 
This observation is also corroborated in the Auditor-General findings. For example, the audit 
of the MOFA (Ministry of Food and Agriculture) headquarters in 2009 found that: 
…the Department had established an ARIC but it was not functional. Management attributed this 
condition to time constraints and inadequate personnel. (Audit Service, 2009a: 11) 
With regard to the overall role of the Committee in ensuring the implementation of audit 
recommendations, it is perceived that the Committee has not made any significant 
improvement to date. 
…we have in our Audit Service Act the creation of Audit Reports Implementation Committees 
(ARICs). That is a creation, so they are supposed to implement the Auditor-General reports and 
report back to the Auditor-General and to Parliament. So they are supposed to implement these 
recommendations… But then, you see, the reason I’m saying that it’s like almost our reports 
reflect the same problems years in years out. And if they were implementing the extent of these 
issues would have reduced significantly. [GA007] 
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5.3.3. Assessment of the Accounting System Functions 
 
5.3.3.1. Management Accounting 
The management accounting function in Ghana is limited to budgeting, and often, to some 
monthly financial statistics. In fact the over-riding focus of the management accounting 
function is budgeting, as explained by a senior accountant at the CAGD. 
If the thing is not budgeted you cannot spend it. So if you need that in budget preparation, that is 
where the information is compiled by the accountant on the project, and they also [justify] what 
they want to do and why they are doing it… In the various ministries like the government 
institutions we have accountants there who are actually [the] Controller’s [i.e. the CAGD’s] staff... 
So their duty is to see through the information given to them which they compile to budget [so that 
it] can be justified. [GC003] 
However, despite the involvement of accountants, the management accounting function is 
limited by political considerations and the quality of leadership: 
Interesting, in my limited knowledge and observation, the management accounting level in the 
public sector appears rather weak because we realise that sometimes the politicians or the person 
who is supposed to have the ultimate responsibility for the accounting stuff may not even have a 
clear understanding of the operations of accounting stuff. [GNG05] 
 
5.3.3.2. Financial Accounting 
 
5.3.3.2.1. The Recording System 
The Ghanaian recording system is composed of a mixture of manual and computerised 
systems. The system is 
…partly automated and partly manual. The automated part is supported by [the] software called 
ACCPAC. It is a data collection system used to capture detailed transactions from all the treasury 
units from the country. The system is available at the central department [CAGD]. The data comes 
in the form of manual transcripts… At MDA level, they have some software and spreadsheets to 
collect reports from cost centres … To a great extent, the department [CAGD] has a manual 
system. [GC001] 
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In terms of relative weight: 
…up to today the predominance of recording is manual… it is only consolidation which is 
generally more electronic. [GWB02] 
It is noted that at the MMDA level, record-keeping has improved with donor conditionalities. 
However, at the MDA level which represents the main government outlays, the recording 
system is a huge challenge. 
Regarding recording I think that recording at the lower level [MMDAs]... with the support from 
DFID they manage to prepare their accounts. So they are doing well on that area… But for the 
MDAs who are like the Ministries of Education, Offices in Accra and so on, with those [ones] we 
have a huge problem. Only a few have been able to prepare [accounts]… But a large number of 
the ministries have not. Again, getting their offices in the regions to account to Accra to have a 
consolidated figure at ministry level is also a challenge. And so it makes the consolidation at the 
Controller level of the public accounts a huge problem! [GA010]  
Similarly, according to another official: 
[The recording system] is not satisfactory; especially at MDA level it’s not satisfactory. What I 
see there often, there’s a lot [more] interest in raising payment vouchers, processing payment… 
than keeping financial records – I mean keeping accounts, good books of accounts…That’s what I 
see. That’s why you see almost all the MDAs are not preparing accounts. Because the MDA is 
more [concentrating] on disbursement than keeping records. [GA003] 
Recording is a critical issue reported through the Auditor-General reports over the years with 
no material improvements. The major recording issues involve falsification of records, 
destruction or withholding of records, and simply absence of recording altogether. At the 
central government level, taking the case of the ministry in charge of overseeing recording 
and reporting for example – the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) – one 
of the reported instances reveal that:    
…[a] review of inventory records disclosed that assets made up of office equipment and furniture 
acquired by the Ministry since 1997 had not been recorded in any Fixed Assets Register to 
safeguard them. Besides, [it is] observed that there were no inventory lists displayed in any of the 
offices in the main building and the annexes. (Audit Service, 2007: 39) 
Another more recent instance shows that the: 
MoFEP’s delay in providing [the Auditor-General] with information on transfers into GoG 
[Government of Ghana]/Vodafone’s escrow accounts resulted in [his] inability to verify the 
assertions and review the underlying records supporting the transfer of an amount of 
GH¢983,025,000 into the GoG/VODAFONE escrow accounts. (Audit Service, 2009c: 8) 
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At the lower level of government, an example of recording cases reported reveals that:  
Stores worth ¢12.49 billion, including a fuel component of ¢4.90 billion were not recorded in 
appropriate records by 38 Assemblies before they were allegedly used, contrary to existing store 
regulations. The non-recording of store purchases before their usage is one of the methods used in 
covering up non-delivery, theft and misuse of stores, as stressed in my previous reports. (Audit 
Service, 2009b: 8) 
Even at the CAGD, officials recognise that the recording system poses problems for the 
accounts to the extent that significant discrepancies appear between accounts. Various causes 
are suggested to explain the discrepancies, all pertaining to recording.  
The major challenge we are having is that we should match the consolidated accounts and the 
accounts prepared by MDAs. We do not do that but we should. For 2010 we had a working 
committee to work on it but we do not do that… There are some differences or discrepancies. The 
accounts do not match. It’s not necessarily about misappropriation. Some of the causes are clerical 
errors, omissions, and more importantly direct debit! [GC001] 
Furthermore, the maintenance of the records that have been captured is also observed to be a 
problem. According to a senior auditor’s estimation, nearly half of records go missing or are 
misplaced once an audit has been conducted. This makes retrieving the records for further 
audit and subsequent needs a huge challenge. 
The maintenance, I would say, if I’m to rate I would say there are 53% in terms of [maintenance] 
because we have laws covering the maintenance of those public records, and you have to keep the 
records... and again, yeah I would say somehow OK. The other 47%, some the moment the audit 
is finished, the records, they don’t manage; [there were] times even before we came [there were] 
missing payment vouchers and so on. So records maintenance is a problem and maybe updating 
the financial statements is a challenge – that’s the 47%. [GA010] 
This is corroborated by various instances in the Auditor-General reports’ findings. For 
example a recent audit of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly reported that: 
Payment vouchers and their respective supporting vouchers covering expenses incurred in 2004 
amounting to ¢2,041,524,969, and ¢3,752,528,901 in 2005 could not be made available during the 
audit. This was due to improper filing of payment vouchers and other documents. (Audit Service, 
2009a: 116) 
A similar conclusion is drawn during the audit of the Shama Ahanta East Metropolitan 
Assembly. In fact, the earlier satisfaction with recording at the lower level of government is 
the grounds for the move from a stage of non-reporting to a stage of reporting in local 
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governments. Although this move is an improvement in itself, the underlying problem 
remains unchanged in substance; i.e. the reports produced do not reflect the underlying 
transactions and events occurring in these governments.  
Nonetheless, the Ghanaian government is now considering a harmonised system across all 
government levels, which is confirmed by many officials, including donor officials. But the 
expected improvements in the outcome are still ‘a dream’, given previous practices. 
…the government is working towards having [an] ORACLE system – IFMIS [Integrated Financial 
Management Information System]. So we are hoping that may minimise this reporting [problem]. 
This is a dream! We are hoping! [GA010] 
The reason for caution regarding over-optimism about the expected outcome of the new 
government project is that: 
…people benefit from chaos, recording chaos. Corruption thrives with chaotic systems. If the 
systems are clear-cut it’s very difficult for somebody to put a transaction and yet not have such a 
transaction proven to be correct or wrong; somebody will be able to get it correctly. [GWB02] 
For example: 
…because the recording system up to today is still fundamentally manual, people still do not want 
to record certain things [where] they believe by recording them, it could actually cause problems 
where perhaps… the system is chaotic itself [GWB02] 
 
5.3.3.2.2.  The Transparency of the Accounts 
The transparency of the accounts is assessed through (1) accessibility of financial information 
produced, (2) sufficiency of disclosure to facilitate understanding of the information, and (3) 
timeliness of financial information. 
The financial accounts are supposed to be publicly available – to any interested user and the 
general public at large – once the accounts are audited. 
The annual report is available to every member of the public, once it’s been audited by the 
Auditor-General and the audit report is published it’s available to the general public. Until it’s 
audited and the audit report published it’s not available, but once that is done it’s available to the 
general public. [GC004] 
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Specifically, 
[The Government financial reports] should [be accessible] because first of all I think copies are 
supposed to be available in the library, they should be on the internet, etc. [GC005] 
But, in practice, accessibility to government financial accounts is rather limited, mainly due 
to lack of awareness and logistics. 
…the annual financial reports come out, but then the issue is how many of us know where those 
annual financial reports are; particularly..., many would not know where the financial reports are, 
how to find them. Interestingly, when you go to the Controller nobody will lead you to the annual 
financial reports. [GNG05] 
Logistics is a serious issue in accessing government accounts in Ghana. At various occasions 
the researcher has been directed to public libraries and the CAGD and the Audit Service 
websites to access government financial reports. All attempts to access the reports online 
failed and it was only possible to consult four copies in one of the libraries the researcher was 
directed to, i.e. at GIMPA
37
. It was via the intervention of a senior official that the researcher 
was able to obtain some copies of the Auditor-General reports.  
Similarly, the technical language of the government financial reports is another factor that 
limits their accessibility to the public. According to some officials, one needs to be 
accounting literate before being able to understand the reports. 
If you’re not understanding the report maybe you’re not accountant literate and I think in that 
regard in any other country I believe it is so. It is financial statements and definitely… you have to 
be an accountant first [to understand them]. If you cannot appreciate accounting then I suppose 
you won’t be able to understand. [GC004] 
As for proper accounts... it gives a lot of information; but the problem is that… people don’t 
understand financial reports. If you give a set of the accounts of an organisation to most people 
even some accountants they can’t read them and understand. [GCO01] 
With regard to disclosure in the notes to the accounts, it is observed that there is some 
resistance to disclose, but the situation has been improving over recent years, with more 
disclosures being included in the financial reports. For example: 
                                                          
37
 Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration. 
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…if you look at the issues that we’ve been raising over the past 5 years for instance in 2007 some 
of the issues were… about disclosures. Over the years Controllers have been convinced down on 
that: because they are using cash-basis some of the issues cannot be disclosed. We were able to 
challenge them and in the accounts from 2007 there [has] been more transparency. [GA001] 
Although disclosure has improved, there are still, however, some practices that hold back 
transparency in that respect. Instances of non-disclosure include for example: 
Divestiture receipts of GH¢159.4 million lodged into the Consolidated Fund were neither 
acknowledged nor disclosed in the Public Accounts by CAG [Controller and Accountant-General]. 
(Audit Service, 2008b: 5) 
[Auditor-General’s] review of the accounts disclosed that programme loans totalling GH¢183.2 
million which were routed through MDBS during the year [2008] were not disclosed as part of the 
borrowings in the Public Accounts. (Audit Service, 2009c: 6) 
The increasing use of ‘direct debit’ to pay third parties directly from the Consolidated Fund 
by the CAGD on behalf of an MDA is another practice that reduces the transparency of 
accounts in Ghana, because: 
In terms of transparency... If it is something that an MDA ought to and we do it on their behalf the 
tendency of an MDA not reporting on it is very high… so accounting for it would be difficult. 
[GC002] 
In 2007, direct debit transfers made for overseas travels and purchases alone not confirmed 
by ten MDAs totalled GH¢286.2 million (US$162.3 million). This could not be traced to the 
treasury records of the related MDAs (Audit Service, 2008a:3). 
With regard to timeliness, there has been a significant improvement in the production of the 
main public accounts, i.e. the Consolidated Fund, in recent years. While there is still some 
delay in the monthly financial reports, the CAGD has been able to meet constitutional 
deadlines for the production of the annual financial statements on the Consolidated Fund. 
If I were to give a mark out of 10, maybe I would give between 6.5 and 7 for monthly and maybe 
9 for annual; because the annual accounts have always been on time for the last 4/5 years. So in 
that regards, they’re [making] a major improvement. [GC004] 
156 
 
Despite this improvement in timely reporting, there is, however, a significant delay between 
the time the report is produced and the time it is published. But the late publication of the 
annual reports is outside the control of the CAGD. 
 
5.3.3.2.3. The Quality and Ethical Stand of Public Accountants 
Most senior public accountants, especially at the CAGD, are either professional accountants 
or in the process of professional qualification. When recruited, the public accountant is 
expected to go through an induction programme with some level of encouragement for CPD. 
First of all we have a training section for the Accountant-General department and they [public 
accountants] would normally be taken through things like induction, things like emerging issues in 
financial reporting… they encourage them to participate in CPD programmes organised by the 
institutes of accountants and other organisations. And generally the Accountant-General 
department would sponsor them. [GC005] 
This organisation helps maintain the skills and professional competence of public accountants 
in carrying out their roles across the government.  
In Ghana, it is observed that there are no specific requirements for being public accountant 
apart from being appointed. Of course, one needs to have some accounting competence 
before being appointed but this is not covered specifically in legal provisions – it is rather left 
to the discretion of the Controller and Accountant-General. 
However, at the operational level, the skill and competence of some accountants is rather 
weak. For example an audit at the MOFA notes that: 
Accounts Personnel at some cost centres lacked the skills to keep the books of the cost centre but 
had taken up accounting roles and functions through promotion. Their recording of transactions in 
the vote ledger and preparation of accounting returns were inaccurate and contained errors. (Audit 
Service, 2009: 8) 
As for ethical standpoint, there is no code of ethics designed specifically for public 
accountants in Ghana. They are required to comply with the code of conduct designed for all 
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functionaries. Given the particularity of the role of public accountants, especially with regard 
to the management of public funds, the absence of a code of conduct to deal specifically with 
this role is a limitation. This limitation is, however, improved by the fact that most senior 
public accountants belong to a professional body with a code of ethics.  
[There is no such code of ethics] because in the public sector we have the code of conduct for civil 
servants. And then individually because the accountants belong to professional bodies they are 
also bound by the individual professional body. [GC003] 
But the effectiveness of the professional bodies’ code of ethics in Ghana, in terms of 
enforcement and sanction, it is limited, and as a result, impairs somehow the quality of public 
accountants in the public perception. 
For us professional, our institute is not strong! The institute disciplinary measures are not strong. 
[For example] ACCA in Ghana, I don’t know if it’s because they don’t get the information... so 
that they take things as professional body. [GCO01] 
A former board member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants made a similar observation 
with some caution: 
If there’s a breach [of the code], there could be internal discipline within the organisation itself… 
if you are a member of a profession, the profession may also take it up and then pursue it through 
its disciplinary procedures. There have been a couple of cases. I don’t even know whether they 
were processed to a logical conclusion. But the safest side would be to say that in theory there are 
mechanisms for tracking down on members and maybe taking disciplinary action as and when 
necessary. [GC005] 
This laxness in enforcing ethical rules/standards clearly has an effect on the integrity of some 
accountants who are found to be involved in unethical behaviours at various levels of their 
functions. For example, as an illustrative case:  
An audit conducted in 2007, revealed that in June 2004, the [Ghana Statistical] Service purchased 
one Land Rover Defender 110... from Mechanical Lloyd Company Limited at the cost of 
GH¢45,019.50 [paid with] cheque No.376708... [The Auditor-General], however, noted [that]... 
the former Deputy Financial Controller, Mr William Ofori-Konneh, allegedly raised a second 
payment voucher numbered 11/10 in September 2004 for GH¢45,019.51 supported by the original 
invoice No.03/LR/04 and a demand notice from Mechanical Lloyd Company Ltd as well as a duly 
signed Stored Received Advice... which would have been attached to the initial payment voucher. 
(Audit Service, 2008: 39) 
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In the same year it was noted that: 
A Schedule Officer at the Treasury failed to produce payment voucher No.0415640 for 
GH¢351,900 dated 29 December 2006 for audit. As a result, the purpose for which the amount 
was paid vide cheque No.058741 could not be ascertained. [The Auditor-General was] informed 
during the audit that the former CTO [Chief Treasury Officer], Mr Francis Aryeetey, allegedly 
effected the payment using falsified documents aimed at misappropriating the amount of 
GH¢351,900 [US$200,000] from the MoFEP Contingency Fund Account. (Audit Service, 2008: 
38) 
 
5.3.3.3. Internal Audit/Control 
Internal audit and control is weak in the Ghanaian financial management system despite the 
enactment of the Internal Audit Agency Act for nine years now. Due to the weaknesses in 
internal controls, it is observed that there are many leakages throughout the accounting 
system, causing substantial loss in the disbursement process. An illustration was provided by 
an official: 
Yesterday we just a had a meeting in this office where we discovered that transfers from the 
national [government] to the Districts and regional [governments], sometime the transfers, say a 
million dollars from the original or from the national level, then before it gets to the District it’s no 
longer one million dollars, it becomes 6 hundred or 7 hundred [thousands]! Where’s the backlog 
of the 3 hundred [thousands]?... It got lost on the way! So the leakages in the accounting systems 
[are high] [GNG04] 
The other major weakness was reported to be in the commitment control. 
I think one of the greatest weaknesses is capturing commitments for the purpose of determining 
what the potential expenditures areas will be: [a] weak system of commitment controls which 
impacts [on] the expenditure areas which is in itself an in-transparent financing of the budget. 
[GWB01] 
Interestingly, the observation regarding internal control weaknesses was not only made by 
officials with accounting literacy, but also by NGO officials with no significant background 
in accounting. According to one of these officials: 
…if you look at the Auditor-General report, it tells you one picture, it’s called something ‘internal 
control mechanism’; one thing that you’ll take away from reading these reports is that the internal 
control mechanism within the accounting system is quite weak! [GNG02] 
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For example, in 2009 at the MOFA the Auditor-General qualifies the weaknesses in the 
internal controls as ‘systematic weaknesses’ by concluding that: 
…in most of the cost centres visited, the Auditors found Veterinary Services were distanced from 
the Agricultural Development Units [ADUs] in terms of functions and management, and 
performed their own activities that in some instances the management of the Agricultural 
Development Unit (ADU) was unaware of. At other cost centres there was a reluctance to report 
to Directors of the ADUs. This has led to many Veterinary Service Units at the ADUs handling 
their own finances or receipts from IGF [Internally Generated Fund], though their staff had not 
had any training in bookkeeping. Controls over the collection, recording and banking of IGF were 
therefore generally weak, and in some instances fraudulent practices were identified. (Audit 
Service, 2009a: 7) 
The above control weaknesses are not limited to the MOFA but are found in most MDAs, as 
reported by the Auditor-General: 
Interim reports issued during the period under review suggest that internal controls have, as in the 
previous years, not improved significantly. Duties and responsibilities have not been clearly spelt 
out in some of the MDAs and record keeping and custodial responsibilities have, generally, not 
been satisfactory handled. Those recurring shortcomings have resulted in improper cash 
management, poor tax administration, payroll irregularities and inadequate procurement control 
functions. (Audit Service, 2008a: 2) 
However, the internal audit that is supposed to help maintain and monitor the effectiveness of 
internal controls is not in place in many MDAs and MMDAs.  
They don’t all have internal auditors. For some of them we have recruited and are waiting for their 
appointment. But for others they don’t. [GIA01] 
For those MDAs and MMDAs that actually have an internal audit, it is not effective due to 
lack of capacity and resources, subject to management perceptions of internal audit function. 
Currently now I think it [internal audit] is not as effective because the capacity is not up to speed... 
They don’t have that many staff. Additionally they put in a lot of low-level staff at the [internal] 
audit services. [GCO01] 
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5.3.3.4. External Oversight: External Audit 
The external audit in Ghana involves various audits including financial, performance, 
revenue, forensic and IT audits. According to officials and the researcher’s observation all of 
these audits are carried out under specific divisions. This arrangement aims to increase the 
effectiveness of the work through use of specialised skills, dedicated resources, and 
independent planning (though coordinated at the top level). There have been significant 
improvements in staff resource in the overall audit. 
If you look at the skills level at the Audit Service I’d say that currently most people who are 
employed are more skilled. [GA004]  
In financial audit, the division in charge has made significant improvements in its work 
allowing it to meet constitutional deadlines for audited financial reports. 
…if you come then and look at the audit that we carry out in our department we [have been] able 
to meet constitutional deadlines [from] 2006 to date, for the last 5 years... It’s other reports that 
lack deadline. This shows the level of timeliness of all these reports... So once we have been able 
to report on time, we can say that there is improvement in terms of reporting. [GA004] 
The financial audit is the traditional audit in Ghana and given its limitations in the areas of 
resources uses, operations and decision-making, it has been complemented by performance 
audit since 2001. As noted by a high-ranked official at the Audit Service “the major area 
these days is performance audit”. This is so because: 
The huge expense government incurs has to do with projects, contracts, and the functioning, the 
system that has been set to guide the regulatory framework; that has to do with the implementation 
of procedures… for achieving the major goals of the government – even government programmes 
are more important than mere financial audit. The programmes with performance approach – these 
are the areas of concern. That’s where our resources go. [GA002] 
Specifically: 
…now take a scenario: you go to the office, you audit everything that has happened with the 
implementation of government programmes, let’s say highway, you’ve got to know roles – this is 
that, this is that – and then you just go, they put you in a[n] air-conditioned car on the road; you 
see the road – the length is this, this and that – and as auditor you have no technical level to know 
about the component of the road. In recent times we have machines which you can apply [to] 
walls, you can apply [them] on [the] road and get to know the compaction – what level of 
compaction, what gravel has gone in there – then you’ll be able to say whether the cost that they 
161 
 
say was applied is commensurate with it or not. You see the tendering standards but the 
component of the concrete – all this. So that is why this performance audit has come in. [GA002] 
Until early 2011 about 35 performance audits performed have been performed at the MDA 
and MMDA levels, covering various areas such as health, environment, agriculture, mining, 
sanitation, the infrastructure, road, disaster management, police service, and education. Like 
the other audits carried out at the Audit Service, many impediments have hindered the 
effectiveness and the impact of the work. Some of these impediments are internal while 
others are external. Internally: 
I think that our problem is collaboration within our institution because where we need support 
from our counterparts I mean the other branches [of the Audit Service at the MDAs and regional 
levels], because we can’t sit here and look at the whole country. We can only look at the country 
when there [is] collaborative support from them. Because they see differently from what we see 
because of the various objectives that they may have. We see a big challenge, so we find ourselves 
overstretching our resources. So that’s our own big challenge. [GA003] 
Externally, a major impediment is around access to information from the entity being audited 
in certain circumstances. 
The main difficulties have to do with getting information from corporations, from auditees when it 
has to do with fraud issues. We don’t get the documentation that we want to get. It is not released. 
Some had been destroyed. [GA006] 
Also, it was noted that there is a lack of commitment from management and other officials 
regarding audit matters. 
And then, our clients often respond to audit issues as long as it’s an academic exercise rather than 
being committed... what I’m trying to say is they try to give response because you need one but 
not because they are committed to solving the problem! So you find them saying this and then 
when you put it in the report, they say that no it’s not good, let’s change that. Then you begin to 
ask yourself whether the people are really committed to change. [GA003] 
The issue has always been when you come with the management letter exhausting all the avenues 
in terms of resolving the issues in their office, when they have to respond, when they go to 
Parliament – the PAC, they’ll say that when the [management] letter came they responded but you 
didn’t capture. So when they are responding there you’ll be astonished. [GA009] 
In fact, the impediments are many and can be summarised as follows. 
…the impediments are many. You come up with an audit report and someone is supposed to be 
prosecuted..., then the lawyer should be there and this should be there to handle the situation and 
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all that; so there are a lot of things that are not working. And it can be very frustrating if you’re an 
auditor. You spend all your time and come up with substantial evidence and nothing is done about 
it; or maybe it concerns a big guy who has to do with the President. [GA002] 
Moreover, the late reporting – though not under the auditor’s control – is seen as a key 
problem. The Auditor-General sends his reports to Parliament: 
And by the time it [the report] goes to Parliament, the previous person has retired or has gone and 
the new person also doesn’t feel responsible. [GA009] 
 
 
5.4. Brief Comparative Analysis of the Accounting Systems in Benin and Ghana 
Accounting systems in Benin and Ghana have various similarities and differences. The main 
similarities and differences are discussed in this section. Both Benin and Ghana have 
accounting infrastructures made up of three components, i.e. (1) a financial accounting 
institution (in Benin the TAD, and in Ghana the CAGD); (2) internal audit and control 
institutions (where the oversight body is the IGE in Benin, and the IAA in Ghana); and (3) 
external audit and oversight institutions (the Chamber of Accounts and Finance Committee in 
Benin, and the Audit Service and PAC in Ghana). There is, however, a major difference at 
the infrastructure level; in Ghana there is a specific body – ARIC – responsible for the 
implementation of audit recommendations whether from internal or external auditors. Despite, 
the ineffectiveness of ARIC in most government institutions (either not functioning or absent 
altogether), the mere existence of such an institution in some organisations is in itself a major 
difference, as further improvements can be leveraged on this and then expanded to other 
institutions. 
The TAD and CAGD are in charge of treasury and financial reporting, with the Head of 
department depending directly on the Minister of Finance. However, while the Head of the 
CAGD is the Chief Accountant of the State in Ghana, the Head of the TAD is not the 
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principal accountant in Benin; it is rather the ‘Receveur Général des Finances’ who is the 
State Chief Accountant under the authority of the Head of the TAD. With regard to 
functioning, both departments have a good internal organisational structure and are now 
producing financial reports, with the CAGD having improved more than the TAD in this 
respect. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the institutions is hampered by what some 
consultants see as a ‘leadership problem’ in terms of supervision and direction of both the 
accounting personnel and the accounting work. Further, the internal control within each 
department is found to be lax, which impairs the quality of the department’s outputs. There is, 
however, a significant difference in the main output which is the timeliness of the financial 
reports. While the CAGD has been able to meet constitutional deadlines for the Consolidated 
Fund, the TAD is still very late in producing the ‘Compte de Gestion’. 
In internal audit (and control), there are a number of internal control organisations in the case 
countries, with a greater number in Benin (about five) than in Ghana (only two). These 
institutions are established in each country with important pre-audit and internal control 
missions. However, in both countries internal audit institutions lack capacity and resources to 
effectively perform their function. As a result, instances of inefficiency, fraud, embezzlement 
and mismanagement are rising in these countries. It follows that in terms of outcome or 
impact of internal audit institutions and auditors, there is no major difference between the two 
countries. 
With regard to external audit, there is a difference in institutional arrangements between 
Benin and Ghana. The Chamber of Accounts – the external audit institution in Benin – is part 
of the Supreme Court with, in theory, power to impose certain sanctions on public 
accountants and ‘ordonnateurs’ and to get its recommendations acted on. This is not the case 
with the Audit Service in Ghana. The lack of power of the Audit Service limits the extent of 
its impact, with almost the same issues being reported again and again. Another important 
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difference lies in the performance of the audit function. There has been no actual audit of 
public accounts in Benin since the establishment of the Chamber of Accounts, making it 
impossible to assess the real state of public finance management in the country (which is 
acknowledged by all of the auditors interviewed), while in Ghana financial audit has been 
conducted for decades now. However, a budgetary review is being carried out by the 
Chamber of Accounts on the accounts from 1998; but this review is not performed on a 
timely basis and does not go through the accounting books. 
Overall, in terms of results and impact, there is not much difference between these two 
countries. In particular, the integrity of government financial reports is found to be very 
limited. A similar observation is made by Chan (2006) regarding developing countries in 
general, who notes that “considering the vulnerability of the government in developing 
countries to financial misconduct, the reliability of numbers in their financial statements 
cannot be taken for granted” (p.9). The evidence gathered suggests that audit 
recommendations are rarely implemented. Moreover, Beninese government accounts are not 
audited. This is the situation in most of francophone Africa where ‘government accounts are 
rarely verified by the supreme audit institution’ (Moussa, 2004). In both case study countries, 
accounting misapplication and financial misappropriations have increasingly been reported. 
A further assessment of the differences in accounting systems between Benin and Ghana in 
terms of impact (information) and quality of accountants was conducted by surveying 117 
research participants, i.e. 62 in Benin and 55 in Ghana. The comparison of the results of the 
two independent surveys using a t-test is presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Table 5.1: Independent Sample Test with Accountants Responses included  
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. T 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Extent of availability of 
information on the work of 
the State accountants and 
auditors 
Equal variances assumed 1.697 .195 -1.869 .064 -.57889 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent of belief that the 
State accountants are 
proficient in carrying out 
their work 
Equal variances assumed 6.081 .015 -.105 .917 -.02727 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent to which the State 
accountants show good 
standards of integrity and 
professional behaviour 
Equal variances assumed .207 .650 -1.387 .168 -.37478 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent to which the State 
accountants are not part of 
governance problems 
Equal variances assumed 2.245 .137 -.751 .454 -.24242 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
 
The t-test was conducted to find out whether there are any significant differences in the 
means of the unrelated samples. As discussed in Chapter 3, the sample includes respondents 
from civil servants non-accountants and accountants, civil society or NGOs, and the private 
sector. The results in Table 5.1 include all of these respondents in each sample. The first two 
columns of the table present the results of the ‘Equality of Variances’ test. The results 
indicate that equality of variances can be assumed except for ‘State Accountants’ Proficiency’ 
(SAP). As a result, the corresponding t-test statistics (except for SAP) are used, which 
indicate that there is no significant difference between the impact of the accounting systems 
in terms of information in the two countries. 
However, asking accountants to assess their own effectiveness runs the risk of introducing 
bias in the result. Because of this risk, they are removed from each sample. When the 
accountant respondents are removed (Table 5.2), the t-test shows that there is a significant 
difference between Benin and Ghana in respect of information on accountants and auditors 
work (at 5% level). There is more awareness of the work of accountants and auditors in 
Ghana. There is however no significant perceived difference in the quality of State 
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accountants between the two countries. This result is not surprising. In Ghana, despite the 
logistical problems, the government accounts are publicly available which, in addition to the 
public hearing on the Auditor-General findings held by the PAC, contributes to increasing 
awareness of the work of accountants and Auditors. This is not the case in Benin. The 
government accounts are not accessible, and there is no open hearing on the auditors’ work 
which, as a result, limits the awareness of public accountants and auditors’ work.  
Table 5.2: Independent Sample Test without Accountants’ Responses included  
  
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Extent of availability of 
information of the work of 
the State accountants and 
auditors 
Equal variances assumed .085 .772 -2.562 .012 -.81587 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent to of belief that the 
State accountants are 
proficient in carrying out 
their work 
Equal variances assumed 4.942 .029 .208 .836 .06277 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent to which the State 
accountants show good 
standards of integrity and 
professional behaviour 
Equal variances assumed .285 .595 -.794 .430 -.23968 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
Extent to which the State 
accountants are not part of 
governance problems 
Equal variances assumed .123 .727 -.208 .836 -.07684 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
   
 
 
Table 5.3, below, is provided as a summary of the main similarities and differences between 
the Beninese and the Ghanaian accounting systems. 
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Table 5.3: Similarities and Differences Between Accounting Systems in Benin and 
Ghana 
Legal framework 
Similarities Implementation of legislative provisions is poor in both countries 
Differences 
Legislation regarding the accounting system is more advanced in Ghana 
than in Benin 
Institutional 
framework 
Similarities 
Single accounting and treasury institution in both countries 
Independent external audit institution in both countries 
Both the TAD and the CAGD have a ‘leadership problem’ in terms of 
direction and supervision 
Internal control to the TAD and the CAGD is reported to be weak 
Differences 
The head of the treasury and accounting institution in Ghana is the 
Chief Accountant of the State, but in Benin it is rather the Receveur 
Général des Finances who is the Chief Accountant under the 
authority of the Head of the institution 
The authority of the external audit institution in Benin is rooted in the 
Judiciary while in Ghana the institution obtains its authority from the 
Parliament 
Too many internal audit institutions in Benin (about 5) compared to 
Ghana (only 2) 
There is an audit reports implementation institution in Ghana to 
oversee implementations of audit recommendations, while there is no 
such institution in Benin 
Financial Accounting 
Similarities 
Quality of middle and low level of accountants is poor in both countries 
Recording systems are poor in both countries 
Differences 
Financial reports are somewhat accessible in Ghana while they are not 
in Benin 
Financial reports are now produced in a timely manner in Ghana while 
they are still significantly delayed in Benin 
Internal audit/control Similarities 
Both countries lack resources and capacity 
Internal audit and control in both countries are poor 
External audit 
Similarities 
Non-financial audit reports are delayed in both countries 
There is non-financial audit conducted in both countries, though it is 
less effectively conducted in Benin. 
Differences 
There is a financial audit in Ghana while in Benin there is not. Only 
budgetary control is carried out in Benin which does not follow the 
requirements of financial audit. 
Financial audit reports are produced in a timely manner in Ghana, while 
the budgetary control production is significantly delayed in Benin 
Overall impact 
Similarities 
Despite all the above similarities and differences, there are increasing 
accounting misapplications and financial misappropriations in both 
countries  
Differences 
The major difference in terms of impact between the two systems is 
related to the extent of information. There is more information about 
the work of accountants (including auditors in Ghana than in Benin  
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5.5. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the research question regarding the state of accounting systems in Africa has 
been addressed by using the case of Benin and Ghana. The chapter first examined the 
accounting infrastructure and the assessment of the accounting system in Benin. An analysis 
was conducted of the financial reporting department, the internal audit and control 
institutions, the external audit and oversight institutions, and the accounting system functions 
in Benin. 
A detailed analysis was carried out of the accounting framework, namely the financial 
reporting institution, internal audit institutions, external audit and oversight institutions and 
audit recommendations implementation institution, in Ghana. Also, the accounting functions 
– financial reporting, internal audit and control, and external audit – in Ghana were examined.  
A comparative analysis of the accounting systems in Benin and Ghana was conducted by 
drawing from the analysis carried out in the prior two sections and the results of a small scale 
survey. It was found that accounting systems in both countries are very weak at all levels. 
The main difference in accounting system impact between the two countries is around the 
greater awareness of the work of public accountants and auditors in Ghana than in Benin. The 
next chapter continues with the presentation of the empirical results by examining the link 
between governance and accounting systems. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE LINK BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING 
SYSTEMS AND THE APPROACH OF THE WORLD BANK AND DONORS TO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING IN AFRICA  
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6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings on the link between governance and accounting and their 
development in Africa. Using the governance index, and accounting index (developed in 
Chapter 3) and data from interviews and surveys in Benin and Ghana, this chapter examines 
the link between governance and accounting systems in Africa. To establish a causal 
relationship between governance and accounting certain conditions must be fulfilled. The 
approach suggested by de Vaus (2009) was used to demonstrate the potential causal 
relationship between governance and accounting, after examining the extent to which 
accounting systems information is captured in the current governance indexes. Furthermore, 
the chapter presents the findings related to donors’ approach to the development of 
governance and accounting systems. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter aims to address two research questions. The first 
relates to the link between accounting and governance. The second is about the World Bank’s 
and other donors’ approach to the development of governance and accounting systems in 
Africa. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 a brief critical assessment of the state of 
governance in Africa is conducted. This is followed by an examination of the extent to which 
accounting is captured in the current governance measures in Section 6.3. Then the causal 
relationship between governance and accounting systems is investigated in Section 6.4. In 
section 6.5 the approach of the World Bank and other donors to the development of 
governance and accounting in Africa is examined. Section 6.6 provides a brief discussion of 
the findings of the chapter. Finally, Section 6.7 provides the concluding comments. 
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6.2. Brief Critical Analysis of the State of Governance in Africa 
 
6.2.1. Snapshot of the State of Governance from the Current Governance Indexes  
The analysis is based on the current governance indexes subject to the limitations of the 
indexes discussed in Chapter 2. In the absence of a more reliable set of governance data, 
these indexes are used for a preliminary analysis. Further illustrative evidence is drawn from 
the case study data for Benin and Ghana.  
 
Table 6.1: WGI Average for the Sample Countries from 2000 to 2008 
Country 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Benin 48.9 44.8 42.5 41.7 38.2 43.2 43.4 42.4 
Botswana 72.8 71.7 75.6 73.6 73.3 69.8 70.8 71.3 
Burkina Faso 42.1 39.4 42.9 41.2 40.1 38.3 40.0 41.3 
Burundi 5.5 8.3 8.9 8.1 12.1 12.9 12.8 13.9 
Cape Verde 67.3 59.7 62.6 63.3 58.5 66.7 68.0 66.0 
Central African Rep. 11.9 10.4 6.1 8.2 9.3 8.8 10.3 11.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.5 2.1 2.9 3.3 3.1 3.7 4.3 4.7 
Ghana 50.4 46.8 46.9 46.5 51.5 55.7 54.9 55.3 
Kenya 22.6 24.8 28.2 29.2 27.0 29.1 28.5 28.4 
Madagascar 44.5 45.1 49.9 48.4 47.4 44.6 46.1 40.1 
Mali 39.5 43.0 45.7 46.0 46.9 43.1 43.3 40.2 
Mauritania 42.0 49.1 46.1 37.9 38.7 31.5 31.9 21.7 
Mauritius 73.6 73.3 75.1 74.3 73.1 71.0 74.1 77.1 
Morocco 49.0 46.6 44.8 45.8 42.2 43.3 43.4 42.6 
Mozambique 40.7 40.0 36.7 36.6 38.2 40.4 40.9 41.9 
Niger 26.5 26.4 28.2 28.7 32.4 27.5 25.8 27.2 
Rwanda 14.4 17.7 20.4 24.6 20.3 32.8 34.7 37.5 
Sao Tome & Principle 50.1 45.3 38.6 36.3 34.6 38.9 41.3 40.1 
Sierra Leone 7.8 16.5 15.0 21.4 18.7 18.7 20.2 20.8 
South Africa 60.5 61.0 61.0 64.6 64.4 65.6 63.7 62.4 
Uganda 25.8 25.6 30.5 30.8 30.7 32.8 33.1 32.6 
Zambia 29.8 30.3 30.8 32.2 30.3 34.7 37.9 41.8 
Source: Computed from the WGIs 2010 
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of Average WGIs 2000 with 2008 for the Sample Countries  
Source: Developed from WGIs 2010 
 
Table 6.1 shows the WGI averages for the sample countries from 2000 to 2008. It is observed 
that governance scores for most countries are below average, i.e. 50. Only few countries are 
above average (Botswana, Cap Verde, Ghana (at some points), Mauritius, and South Africa). 
Furthermore, while some countries have achieved improvements over the review period such 
as Burundi, Rwanda and Zambia, the governance quality of many countries has deteriorated 
over the review period. For example, Beninese governance was rated 48.9 in 2000 as against 
42.4 in 2008. Eight other countries recorded a similar trend. The overall trend is illustrated in 
Figure 6.1 by comparing the WGI average scores in 2000 with the average scores in 2008 for 
the sample countries. 
Surprisingly, almost all of the sample countries achieved improvements in their governance 
quality in 2008 compared to 2000 according to the IIAG (Table 6.2). In fact, according to the 
IIAG from 2000 to 2008, the governance quality of most sample countries is above average, 
suggesting good governance development in most Africa. Moreover, comparing 2008 
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governance scores with 2000 shows an improvement in governance for all of the sample 
countries except for Mozambique (which was somewhat static). Compared with the WGI, the 
same countries such as Benin and Madagascar which show worsening governance under the 
WGI now show improving governance according to the IIAG. Such contradicting analysis 
from these governance indicators makes drawing conclusions about the actual governance 
quality in specific countries difficult, if the objective of the analysis is to inform policy 
decisions between countries.  
 
Table 6.2: IIAG for the Sample Countries from 2000 to 2008 
Country 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008 
Benin 55.70 56.01 54.97 54.18 55.49 56.58 58.88 58.20 
Botswana 72.10 72.01 72.07 71.35 72.81 73.55 73.86 73.59 
Burkina Faso 50.12 50.90 51.10 51.50 51.95 52.08 51.05 51.58 
Burundi 35.09 36.16 36.31 37.20 39.17 41.73 44.45 45.27 
Cape Verde 73.99 73.02 73.59 73.60 73.70 72.70 75.10 78.01 
Central African Rep. 29.53 30.19 29.22 28.31 30.71 29.07 30.94 35.00 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 25.77 25.62 25.97 25.40 28.54 30.02 30.84 33.25 
Ghana 61.77 62.73 62.92 62.79 61.93 63.06 64.08 65.96 
Kenya 52.28 53.13 53.01 53.45 53.20 54.18 54.03 53.74 
Madagascar 56.73 57.03 55.50 55.87 56.83 56.58 59.81 58.37 
Mali 50.34 51.53 52.22 51.51 52.46 52.97 53.40 54.54 
Mauritania 48.12 49.26 50.17 50.36 49.87 49.62 52.07 50.57 
Mauritius 76.37 76.53 76.43 76.78 77.47 77.96 79.23 82.83 
Morocco 52.82 55.36 55.47 56.79 57.51 57.23 58.71 57.83 
Mozambique 52.95 53.35 53.84 53.79 53.36 53.83 53.79 52.38 
Niger 43.44 44.16 44.21 43.88 44.49 45.60 44.99 46.59 
Rwanda 44.04 44.07 45.13 46.45 47.05 47.91 47.90 48.53 
Sao Tome and Principe 58.48 58.99 55.64 56.57 58.86 58.74 60.44 60.23 
Sierra Leone 39.20 41.50 43.30 43.28 43.38 43.67 47.10 48.91 
South Africa 69.41 68.98 69.17 69.06 69.12 70.16 70.62 69.44 
Uganda 49.24 50.21 50.05 49.79 50.12 51.07 53.07 53.57 
Zambia 49.77 50.55 50.65 51.08 51.55 52.98 54.96 55.30 
Source: IIAG for 2009. 
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6.2.2. State of Governance in Africa: Evidence from African Leaders and Cadres 
 
6.2.2.1. The General State of Governance 
When leaders and cadres including governance activist NGO officials were asked to 
comment on the state of governance on the continent, all agreed that most public officials or 
leaders know the requirements of good governance, but they lack the will to put these 
requirements into practice. As a result, governance quality throughout the continent is 
reported to be poor. This point was clearly made by a public official: 
In Africa like in Benin, it’s all about bad governance. It’s not because we don’t know what it 
[good governance] requires, but we never do it, we look for ways to get around it. [BAc01] 
The situation is not materially different between authoritarian regimes (via a coup d’état) and 
democratic ones, as observed by an NGO official: 
It starts with the method by which people get in a position of trust. In the past ‘military coups’ 
were very common in Africa. So somebody thinks that he can move you and manage well and he 
can come by force and you go. He may have good intentions, yes, that things aren’t running well 
and you want to change the system. You come with good promises for you to be acceptable to the 
country [i.e. to win the support of people]. And so people are now watching how are you going to 
implement those promises. On the other hand, through democracy you come [with] a manifesto 
and raise hope ‘these are the things I can do for you or for the country’. Unfortunately, most 
people who come into power by either regime – coup or democracy – want to stay on. [GNG03] 
Leaders are able to stay in power because of the weak State institutions and governance.  
…institutions are very very poorly developed and not very well entrenched. And because there are 
weak institutions… in places where there are democracies there are still problems with patronage, 
clientelism and corruption. The problem here is the weakness of the institutions in such that in 
most African countries we haven’t really given an opportunity for institutions to properly 
crystallize and consolidate and rather be a problem. [GNG01-NGO] 
Leaders, therefore, have an interest in deliberately keeping institutions in their weak state. For 
example, a survey of 119 cadres, civil servants or other officials conducted in Benin and 
Ghana reveals that about 66% observe that there is an abusive exercise of power in these 
countries ranging from fairly abused to very abused power. 
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As a result, there is a lack of accountability, lack of public participation in government 
process, and a quasi-absence of control over government business and public officials 
altogether.  
The governance problem [in Africa] is especially about the difficulty to account. The difficulty in 
involving the population for whom we are doing development, we have difficulty in involving 
them. There is also the problem of being controlled. And that is what makes our Presidents to 
want to stay in power. [BO003] 
Interviewees also provided their views without much difficulty on the state of governance in 
Africa through key governance dimensions, namely corruption, rule of law, electoral system, 
accountability and citizen participation. Corruption in all its forms was a common problem 
mentioned by all interviewees as one of the major governance problems in Africa. As noted 
by an MP: 
The first [governance] problem is corruption, nepotism, and of course the mismanagement of 
public finance. [BAN01] 
Indeed, the major motive for people to get into power, in the words of some interviewees, is 
to loot the State finances for their private wealth. 
...When you’re observing you come to realise that people get into politics, into government as a 
short-cut to richness, to have power; because if you have power you can access anything you want. 
You can negotiate a [government] loan, collect it and take it to a Swiss bank and leave it there and 
nobody will say anything! That’s the shock! [GNG07-NGO] 
Another governance problem is the rule of law. The formal legal system is relatively strong. 
The survey conducted in Benin and Ghana found that 40% of respondents observe that the 
strength of the formal legal system ranges from fairly strong to very strong in Benin and 
Ghana for example, against only 36% for whom the strength of the system varies between 
fairly weak to very weak. However, interviewees noted that the actual application of the rule 
of law is weak, and this weakness contributes to the development of corruption and lack of 
accountability. One official made this observation with reference to the system in the 
developed world. For example, following the ‘MP expenses scandals’ in the UK in 2009 
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where some MPs were involved in fraudulent expenses claims, those MPs found guilty were 
sanctioned, including imprisonment
38
 for some of them. The official observed, however, that 
in Africa this is yet to be seen. 
Staying with abuse of office, corruption and lack of accountability, an MP described the 
situation together with public tolerance of the abuse of government resources: 
We’ve got a colleague – Rosine Soglo
39
– she used to tell anecdotes. There is one that she used to 
tell. She said that Houphouet Boigny [former President of Cote d’Ivoire] told them that when you 
give [public] money to someone to manage, you can’t prevent them from using part of it for 
themselves, but the problem is that they use all the money that you give them for themselves… 
[BAN01] 
He added that: 
Here [Africa] people think that when it is a public thing it’s not for anyone and they can use it as 
they want – and it is no one’s business. As a result, they use everything [for themselves]… When 
you give [public] money to people to manage, they don’t do anything and all the money 
disappears… People say ‘well, you can’t ask someone to prepare some sauce and prevent them 
from tasting’. So people think it is normal for those responsible for managing government 
resources to use them for themselves. [BAN01] 
This is confirmed by the results of the above survey which found that 79% of respondents 
observe that the level of financial accountability in Benin and Ghana, as illustrative examples, 
varies from fairly weak to very weak. This percentage is 72 for political accountability. 
Unfortunately, to the interviewees, rule of law does not seem to work in these countries. This 
was further emphasised by an NGO official: 
…in developed countries corruption is... minimal... and anybody found to be corrupt is dragged to 
the rules, so that they allow their regulations to work effectively when it comes to such things. But 
how many of our politicians who are found to be corrupt during their [term] have been dragged to 
the law to be judged? [GNG07-NGO] 
She added that: 
…the ‘rules of law’ do not work effectively. We have them in the book but we don’t use them.  
People see things but they can’t talk, because when you are not in government you have to be 
careful when you speak. [GNG07-NGO] 
                                                          
38
 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/may/11/mps-expenses-scandal-what-next?CMP=twt_gu 
[Accessed on 11/05/2012] 
39
 Former First Lady in Benin. She has been an MP in the Beninese Parliament from the first legislature to date. 
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This suggests that the rule of law is selective in its application, being used as a tool to silence 
people who are critical of the ruling elite. In other cases, it is noted that the rule of law is not 
followed, irrespective of how well it is designed. 
...no matter how strong the rules are, they are followed at best at 60%; at 40% you miss the 
essence – that’s Africa. As a result, no one follows the rules. [BCA01-Chief Cabinet Minister] 
Concerning the electoral system, interviewees noted that elections in Africa are not really free 
and fair.  
…even though the electoral commission is supposed to be neutral, in Africa to be able to ensure 
free and fair elections, it seems that it doesn’t work. [GNG07-NGO] 
According to the survey results 44% of respondents found that the integrity of the electoral 
system is weak (fairly weak-very weak) against 37% who observed the opposite, while 19% 
did not pronounce either way. Relatively, a higher proportion of respondents are of the view 
that the electoral system is weak.  
Tribal affiliation and cronyism were mentioned as one of the contributing factors. It was 
found during the interviews that the citizens themselves contribute to some extent to the 
weakening of governance. In fact citizens from certain regions or ethnic groups are not 
willing to sanction misbehaviour of leaders of their own kind. This undermines governance 
improvement. 
One other thing is the ‘citizens’ involvement’. I also think that when people have support in the 
population, localities; we realise they have developed loopholes in government and people in 
government know that whatever happens they have support and they are safe and won’t be 
disturbed. So when you [the citizens] also get involved in supporting misbehaviour because they 
are from your region or ethnic group you cannot hold somebody to control for you. [GNG07] 
In summary, to control the electoral system, leaders use a combination of various means: 
…what they do is to try to find ways of staying either by changing the law or by generating funds 
to buy patrimony for political patronage to prepare for the next elections, to buy votes, to buy 
officials involved in electoral process; so that they’ll help you to win the next elections. [GNG03-
NGO] 
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Further illustrative evidence on the state of governance in Africa was provided from the two 
countries used in the case study, i.e. Benin and Ghana. 
6.2.2.2. Illustrative Evidence from Benin and Ghana 
 
6.2.2.2.1. Benin 
In Benin, most institutions required by good governance are in place in one form or another. 
Also, the formal functioning of these institutions is observed by most interviewees. But 
fundamentally, no substantial result is achieved. This is what a Chief Cabinet Minister noted: 
...there is a systematic renewal of government institutions when the term comes to an end. In the 
past, it was not obvious. However there is still always a weakness. When the renewal is done, we 
don’t have the same results. Those who come are not prepared enough. There are examples where 
the laws are complied with, [and] we talked about governance, we follow everything; but those 
who come are not prepared, and it is the institution that suffers... We do everything to follow the 
rules and good governance principles but in the end there is no result, and it’s just a waste! 
[BCA01] 
In other words, in theory, governance in Benin is good, but in practice it is yet to be seen, 
because implementation of governance requirements is not properly effected. 
Governance in Benin, from a theoretical standpoint, is good. There are laws that exist. Intellectual 
efforts have been made to require good governance from our government institutions… If we take 
all the successive governments, they take some laws that comply somehow with good governance 
principles: the international conventions which are ratified… whether from the African Union, the 
UEMOA, the ECOWAS, there are a lot of laws and rules that require good governance. They put 
in place the [Annual] Peer Review mechanism via the NEPAD. All that is good. Internally, there 
are some rules. For example, some work has been done in respect of the appointment of people. 
It’s not complete, but we know more or less the profile required; otherwise decrees are taken to 
specify that this must be done in this way… [But] these laws and rules are not well implemented – 
they are not well applied. [BO002] 
This leads many officials to conclude that governance in Benin is weak because what is done 
in practice does not reflect what should be done, i.e. actions do not follow governance 
principles: 
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There is no governance in Benin. Because you cannot talk about governance if the institutions are 
not adapted for that; if the actions you take every day do not go in that direction… [BP006-
Consultant] 
Similarly, a public official noted: 
Although it may seem contradictory, I said that in Benin we only talk about ‘good’ governance as 
it is the case everywhere in Africa… but I notice that it’s much easier to find instances of ‘bad’ 
governance than ‘good’ governance [BAc01] 
Specifically, corruption, for example, is escalating, according to the various officials 
interviewed.  
When I take for example one of the important aspects of governance which is the control of 
corruption, in 2008 Benin was ranked 96
th
 according to the report of Transparency International, 
in 2009 Benin ranked 106
th
, in 2010, 110
th
. It speaks for itself. [BO001] 
These rankings have been checked and confirmed by the Corruption Perception Index reports 
of Transparency International
40
. Corruption scandals involving the government are rising, and 
maintained in an opaque system.  
Corruption, forget about it… if the system was working… it is not only a CEN-SAD
41
 scandal that 
we would have heard; we would have heard about dozens of scandals. That one is what has 
become public for one reason or another. All the scandals that have become public, it’s because 
they have reached such a level that people could not keep silent on them. It’s because there had 
been some facts, and then some reactions followed, etc., that we had been able to know what was 
going on. If a Minister was not dismissed with harsh criticism from everywhere and he felt the 
need to justify himself, we wouldn’t have known that such scandals were going on. Yet every day, 
there are many scandals happening. When I said that a Pastor is given an OP [order of 
disbursement without supporting documentation], who knew? This is serious. What was the OP 
used for? No one knows. [BC001-Auditor] 
The CEN-SAD scandal is confirmed in the Human Rights Watch 2010 report
42
 about the 
involvement of high ranked government officials. To conclude on the impact of corruption on 
Beninese public finances, one official made the following comment: 
I always tell people - we always say Benin does not have money, we don’t have money - I say 
‘well, if we want the river Ouémé to dry, it’s very simple. It goes through several villages before it 
reaches here [Cotonou]. If each village drains the river into their farms you won’t have any water 
                                                          
40
 Available for the various years from www.transparency.org 
41
 This is a scandal involving billions of CFA francs (Beninese currency) in which the government is alleged to be 
involved. The acronym CEN-SAD stands for Community of Sahel-Saharan States. 
42
See http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154331.htm  
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in here’. And the government budget is like that. If everyone takes the government money in their 
wallet, the government will have no money to spend. But this is what happens. [BP006] 
It is noted that the overall financial governance system is not working. The audit institution is 
handicapped in terms of effectively playing its overseeing role according to governance 
principles. The situation is more explicitly described by an official: 
The system of public finance governance in Benin is not working for the reason that I am going to 
explain. Because, in general, there is an absence of accounting [i.e. rendering accounts]. The 
mission of the Judge of Accounts is not being carried out because it is he who is ultimately 
responsible to say whether things have been done well or not. So the system of public finance 
management is not working as expected. That’s the situation basically; i.e. the logic of rendering 
account is not in place. Moreover, the non-functioning of the [audit institution] makes the three 
[governance]… pillars be reduced to two in reality. Hence we have the two big pillars which are in 
place because the MPs continue to vote the budget every year, and the Executive continues to 
execute it without respecting the established procedures: there are a lot of OPs, there are 
scandalous things that we hear. But because there is no accounting, we cannot see what is done 
wrong in that system. So if the third pillar exists, it is a pillar that is worth ten times less than the 
other two pillars, so that the system cannot be balanced. The system is very very unbalanced. 
[BC001] 
The same observation is made by an NGO official: 
For us, the budget has never been a guidance document. We have the budget on one hand, and we 
execute what we want on the other... They themselves [i.e. the government] recognise that there is 
indiscipline throughout the expenditure chain. There is no accountability. [BO003] 
 
6.2.2.2.2. Ghana 
Governance in Ghana has improved compared to its state under the former authoritarian 
regime. So in that respect, the general opinion is that Ghana is doing relatively well. For 
example, when asked to comment on the quality of governance in Ghana, a public official 
responded that: 
I would say that now there is a slight improvement in terms of governance. Because now we have 
many ‘western’ institutions which can even criticise certain open decisions. The President for 
example occasionally gives some address to the nation and after that the media are allowed to 
question him. But during the military rule this wasn’t there. Nobody even has the courage to 
confront or to question any military boss on certain things. So I would say to some extent there is 
improvement in the governance system in the country. [GP003] 
181 
 
Also, by comparing Ghana to other countries such as Togo, for example, (Togo is a 
neighbouring country with no or limited progress in the free press for example
43
), then Ghana 
can be said to be making improvement in governance. 
...if you compare Ghana to other countries we are also making progress [GNG01-NGO] 
However, when looking at these improvements in the country’s own context, interviewees 
reported that they are occurring more at the political level than at the economic or financial 
level. In that respect, an NGO official said that:  
Generally on the political governance indicators there’s been improvement and you’d notice that 
the level of improvement in political governance outstrips the level of improvement in economic 
and sort of public financial management indicators... In other areas such as local governance 
almost no improvement there, such as public financial management very little improvement, 
corruption not enough improvement. [GNG01-NGO] 
A similar observation was made by another official: 
Our governance at the moment is overwhelmingly dominated by political governance... If we talk 
more on the political side where I’m interested and where I know a bit about, the political side is 
very active. It is active because there [are] very active citizens who are involved in politics with an 
active media notwithstanding their own biases... [However] you expect governance to improve 
economic governance that makes public sector and private sector relationship very collaborative in 
pushing the country and the economy forward. I don’t see that much. [GNG06] 
With regard to corruption, it is observed to be high, and even higher than what is actually 
reported in formal corruption indexes.  
Personally, I think it’s high. But when you look at reports it’s also high but not as high as we tend 
to perceive it. Like we release corruption perception and for the past 3/4 years it appears to be: It 
was 3.3 in 2006, 3.7 in 2007, 3.9 in 2008, and again another 3.9 in 2009, and last year it was 4.1. 
That’s the perception out of 10. If you score 10 it means you are not perceived as corrupt at all. 
But then 4.1 is still even below 5 [average]. So we still think that it’s high. But then you also move 
into the streets, you go into the main streets and you are witnessing services, things which should 
have been done on a timely basis, people on the road frustrated, and all the misuse cases, then you 
begin to think that score [is better than reality]... The news is reporting corruption cases and you 
don’t even see the government arrest or even ordering investigations [and] you begin to see that 
the score is even much better than what is happening on the ground. [GNG03-NGO] 
Interviewees also noted increasing political patronage across government institutions and 
agencies, which undermines the sustainability of the effective governance of these institutions: 
                                                          
43
 See for example http://www.afrol.com/articles/16869  
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...in the past two years we had these party stakeholders, people who worked... hard for the current 
government to win elections. In the end they have to be rewarded in terms of jobs; so sometimes 
the government pressured hard to put them in places where they don’t fit. In the public sector 
economy, most directors of the various state-owned institutions are appointed by the President 
mainly partisans, except where the law has a certain provisions that there must be representatives 
of workers, representatives of this and that, even that the law also provides that the President will 
elect or appoint about four people on the Board. So virtually every state institution, it’s a party 
person who is the Chair of the Board and even some of them are part of the government. They put 
them across. So it’s rewards for loyalty for contributions in terms of time, funds for the campaign 
process... And this doesn’t encourage good governance. [GNG03-NGO] 
The rule of law is also found to be weak and this undermines public trust in the legal and 
judiciary system to obtain justice. The consequence on public behaviour can sometimes be 
dramatic, as noted below: 
In Ghana so many cases have been before court for so many years, so some people don’t want to 
think their judiciary is working. They would say go and come this and that... [for] so many years! 
So when somebody [says] ‘eh this is a robber’ people would just jump to you and beat you to 
death. [GNG07-NGO] 
The following section examines the extent to which accounting information is captured in the 
current governance metrics prior to analysis of the causal relationship between accounting 
and governance. 
 
6.3. Test of the Extent of Accounting Contribution to Variations in the Current 
Governance Metrics 
Examination of the data sources used to construct the two main governance metrics in Africa 
showed that almost no accounting related sources are included. This is an evidence to 
conduct a causal relationship analysis between governance and accounting because if 
accounting information was included in the governance measures, such an analysis would be 
redundant and therefore not necessary.  
Data on the various variables are collected as presented in Chapter 2. In order to determine 
the appropriate econometric model that fits the data, a graphical analysis was carried out by 
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plotting the current governance measures (WGI and IIAG) against accounting and the other 
independent variables. As shown in Appendix 5.1, the association between governance and 
the predictor variables is suggested to be linear. The two models (one for each governance 
index) used for the examination are described below. 
 
                                                                        
 
                                                                       
 
Where         is the Ibrahim Index for African Governance for country i at time t;   is the 
Worldwide Governance Index (constructed as the simple average of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators);     is the intercept, i.e. the value of         when all the     and 
     are zero; the   for each of the independent variables (except for Language and Time 
dummies) indicates the amount of change expected in the governance variable when there is a 
one-unit change in the value of that variable, holding constant all other variables in the model; 
the   for Language (being a dummy: 1=English, 0=French) indicates the amount of change in 
the governance variable if the country is an English speaking country;  and      is the error 
term representing factors not captured in the model that contribute to governance 
improvement.    and    are time dummies to control for time. 
Since the data structure is a panel, the models are estimated by Random Effects (RE) Linear 
Regression. Owing to the fact that the variable of interest (accounting) only varies across 
countries over the measurement period (i.e. time invariant), Fixed Effects (FE) regression is 
not appropriate. As a result, RE was used subject to further diagnostic test for random effects 
(see later).  
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If the hypothesis that accounting is not a determinant of the current governance measures 
holds for either of the governance indexes, then the accounting coefficient will be 
insignificant for that governance index, otherwise, the coefficient will be positive and 
significant. 
 
6.3.1. Preparation of the Data for Analysis 
 
6.3.1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
IIAG 62 0.5423 0.1282 0.2540 0.7796 
WGI 62 0.3894 0.1921 0.0306 0.7429 
GDP/capita (Eco Dev) 59 990.22 1376.99 88.25 4419.91 
Accounting Index 62 0.3921 0.2220 0.0787 0.8920 
Language 55 0.3455 0.4799 0.0000 1.0000 
 
Table 6.3 above shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
The mean governance score is above average according to the IIAG, while it is far below 
average according to the WGI. This difference could be explained by differences in 
measurement methodology and coverage. The average scores for accounting systems are poor: 
the scores are below 40%. The mean real GDP per capita is close to US$1000 but this masks 
huge differences between countries which are reflected in the large standard deviation and the 
wide gap between the minimum and maximum values. 
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Table 6.4: Correlation Matrix 
  IIAG WGI EcoDev Language Acc_Index t1 t2 
IIAG 1             
  
       
WGI 0.9585 1 
     
  0.0000 
      
EcoDev -0.8635 -0.8250 1 
    
  0.0000 0.0000 
     
Language 0.5667 0.4489 -0.5186 1 
   
  0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 
    
Acc_Index 0.6709 0.6360 -0.7815 0.6867 1 
  
  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   
t1 -0.0399 -0.0101 0.0257 0.0312 0.0126 1 
 
  0.7583 0.9380 0.8469 0.8210 0.9227 
  
t2 0.0031 -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0158 -0.0064 -0.5000 1 
  0.9811 0.9713 0.9705 0.9087 0.9604 0.0000   
 
 
6.3.1.2. Normality Test of distribution of the variables 
A normality test was performed for various transformations of each of the variables included 
in the models using the Stata ‘ladder’ command. This test suggests that the transformation 
with the lowest chi-squared statistic be selected. After the test, the transformed value used for 
each variable is summarised in Table 6.5 below. A further numerical normality test is 
performed on the transformed value for all of the variables. The results are shown in Table 
6.6. 
The Pr (Skewness) and Pr (Kurtosis) columns of Table 6.6 give the P-values for the skewness 
and kurtosis of each distribution respectively. The last two columns (right) give the combined 
statistics and the corresponding P-value. On the basis of the combined results, the null 
hypothesis that the variables are normally distributed is not rejected, and there is no evidence 
that variables are not normally distributed. 
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Table 6.5: Variables Transformation 
Variable Transformation 
WGI Identity = No transformation 
IIAG Identity = No transformation 
GDP/capita (Eco Dev) 1/Square 
Accounting Index Square root 
Language Identity = No transformation 
 
 
Table 6.6: Numerical Normality Test Results 
    
joint 
Variable Obs Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
WGIs 62 0.7699 0.1500 2.25 0.3244 
IIAG 62 0.9240 0.7736 0.09 0.9551 
EcoDev 59 0.6910 0.7070 0.30 0.8610 
Acc_Index 62 0.9568 0.3062 1.09 0.5812 
 
 
6.3.1.3. Test of Outliers 
A graphical examination of the data is carried out to identify potential outliers that may have 
some impact on the results of the regression. As shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 in Appendix 
6.1, there are no data points that are considerably far away from the rest of the data points. 
In addition to this, however, the impact of potential influential outliers was examined using 
DFbeta by using an OLS regression. The DFbeta for a predictor (independent variable) and 
for a specific observation is the difference between the regression coefficients with that 
specific observation included and excluded, the difference is scaled by the standard error of 
the coefficient. Although a cut-off point of      (n being the number of observations) is 
suggested in theory, Bollen and Jackman (1990) suggest that in practice it is common to use a 
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cut-off point of 1. Accordingly, no observation was identified as significantly influential in 
predicting the governance score. The DFbetas are far below 1. 
 
6.3.2. Regression 
 
Table 6.7: Regression Results for Model 1 and Model 2 
  Model 1 - IIAG (Obs=62) Model 2 - WGI (Obs=62) 
  OLS RE OLS RE 
Cons 0.7300*** 0.7446*** ***0.6112 *0.5634 
Std error 0.0717 0.1247 0.1460 0.3140 
t-stat/z-stat 10.18 5.97 4.19 1.79 
EcoDev -1.6167*** -1.6842*** ***-2.5130 **-2.3700 
Std error 0.2708 0.4901 0.4145 0.9341 
t-stat -5.97 -3.44 -6.06 -2.54 
Obs 59 59 59 59 
Language 0.0242 0.0225 -0.0229 -0.0320 
Std error 0.0228 0.0378 0.0488 0.0814 
t-stat/z-stat 1.06 0.60 -0.47 -0.39 
Obs 55 55 55 55 
Acc_Index 0.1163 0.1058 *0.2711 0.3126 
Std error 0.0736 0.1294 0.1507 0.3103 
t-stat/z-stat 1.58 0.82 1.80 1.01 
Obs 62 62 62 62 
t1 -0.0103 -0.0091** 0.0061 0.0097 
Std error 0.0219 0.0039 0.0373 0.0067 
t-stat/z-stat -0.47 -2.36 0.16 1.44 
Obs 66 66 66   
t2 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0032 
Std error 0.0220 0.0036 0.0389 0.0080 
t-stat -0.18 -1.09 -0.08 -0.40 
Obs 66 66 66   
(Adjusted) R2 0.7386 0.7625 0.6441 0.6763 
F 
Stat/WaldChi2 
49.94*** 118.12*** ***43.27 ***59.46 
RESET Passed   Passed   
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
  
Prior to the analysis, the potential effect of influential observations on the results was 
examined as aforementioned. A further robust option was used which helped to control for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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6.3.2.1. Diagnosis Test for Random Effects, Autocorrelation 
The Breusch and Pagan lagrangian multiplier (LM) test for random effects was performed 
after the regression as a diagnosis test. The results (Chi-square of 50.75 for Model 1 and 
51.15 for Model 2, both with a P-vale of 0.000) indicate that there are significant differences 
across countries, suggesting that the use of RE regression is appropriate. Because of this 
presence of cross-country differences, the OLS is not suitable for estimating the models. 
In addition, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was conducted to ensure that the results 
are efficient. According to Drukker (2003), the Wooldridge test is a good test for detecting 
first order autocorrelation in linear panel data models. The results of the test are presented in 
Table 6.8. According to these results there is no evidence of first order autocorrelation. 
Finally, the models were estimated with and without the language variable
44
 (because it is 
relatively highly correlated with accounting) and the time dummies for robustness check and 
consistency of the estimates as a result. The results are presented in Appendix 6.2. These 
results do not show any significant change in the coefficients of the accounting variable in 
either model. 
 
Table 6.8: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
  Model 1 (IIAG) Model 2 (WGI) 
  F-stat P-value F-stat P-value 
EcoDev 0.010 0.9230 0.103 0.7515 
AccIndex 0.836 0.3719 0.103 0.7510 
Language 0.881 0.3610 0.166 0.6884 
t1 0.011 0.9167 0.133 0.7194 
t2 0.790 0.3852 0.152 0.7007 
 
 
                                                          
44
 As a dummy variable the presence of language also adds to the time dummies 
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6.3.2.2. Analysis of the Regression Results 
It is important to explain the negative sign of the coefficient of economic development. As a 
reminder, the value of this variable used in the models is the transformed value. The 
transformed value is
 
              
. Therefore, a small transformed value reflects a large 
economic development, which is indicative of good performance. So a negative coefficient of 
the variable means that a decrease in the transformed value leads to an increase in the 
governance score. In other words, improvements in economic development lead to 
improvements in governance quality. 
In both models (WGI and IIAG), as shown in Table 6.7, economic development is found to 
be significantly associated with governance quality in the expected direction. In other words, 
these results indicate that improvements in this variable would lead to improvements in 
governance quality. The magnitude of the effect of economic development on governance 
quality is not of much concern in the study; it is rather the overall effect which is considered. 
The effect of this variable on governance is positive. This conclusion is expected and is in 
line with the current governance literature. 
The results also suggest that there are no significant differences in governance quality 
between English and French Africa. The results remain the same even in the presence of time 
effects (i.e. when excluding time dummies from the model). The results are also consistent 
across both models. These results are surprising given the suggestion of the literature at both 
micro (La Porta et al., 1998) and macro (Al-Marhubi, 2004) levels of governance that English 
Common Law countries have ‘better’ governance quality than French Civil Law countries. 
However, when focused specifically on Africa, the findings of this study do not support this 
literature on the difference between country governance on the basis of legal origin.  
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Interestingly, the results of both models show that the current governance measures (both 
WGIs and IIAG) do not capture accounting system related information. It can be concluded 
that the hypothesis is confirmed. In this regard, a consultant noted that: 
…the people [who] produce governance indicators do not know much about accounting – 
accounting is too technical. They tend to be people whose background is in political science… and 
not really accountants. There is a famous saying ‘if the only tool you’ve got is a hammer, you treat 
everything as if it a nail’. Maybe this is the problem. [UB001] 
It is important, however, to draw attention to the limitations of these results. The main 
limitation is the limited data available on accounting system data across the continent which 
has constrained the analysis. Only 22 observations were available, which is quite small. More 
extensive data is likely to provide more insight into the extent of the effect of the various 
variables on governance and the magnitude of accounting contribution to variation in the 
indexes. Also the number of control variables (existing determinants of governance) available 
for the sample countries is limited. This could significantly invalidate the results and 
conclusions drawn. Moreover, there is a very high correlation between some of the control 
variables specifically economic development and accounting which could also invalidate the 
results of the regression analysis. Due to these limitations, an alternative approach is used to 
examine the causal relationship between accounting systems and governance as presented in 
Section 6.4 below. 
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6.4. Examination of the Causal Relationship between Governance and Accounting 
The causal relationship sought in these settings is not sufficient in its own right but is 
necessary. Improvements in governance can be produced in more than one way. Accounting 
may contribute to the improvements but it is not the only cause. In other words, it can be the 
case that improving accounting by itself is not sufficient, so it has to be accompanied by 
something, else such as effective legal system, and can get quite complicated. Thus, the 
examination conducted in this section attempts to suggest whether there is a potential causal 
relationship between accounting and governance.  
This exanimation is based on the approach suggested by de Vaus (2009). According to de 
Vaus (2009) two conditions must be satisfied before establishing a causal relationship 
between two phenomena, i.e. governance and accounting in this study. The two conditions 
are: (1) governance and accounting must co-vary; and (2) the causal relationship must make 
sense. The second condition is further split into three sub-conditions, i.e. both variables must 
be capable of change, there needs to be a time sequence, and the causal relationship must be 
theoretically plausible. However, the condition that both variables must be capable of change 
can be linked to the first condition, because if they co-vary it implies that they change over 
time or across units. Another condition attached to causal relationship is time sequence of the 
variation.  
Therefore, to establish a causal relationship between two phenomena four aspects need to be 
established: 
1) An association between the phenomena (measured by correlation coefficient, R2), i.e. 
is variation in accounting linked to variation in governance? 
2) Time sequence, i.e. variation in accounting has to come first, followed by the effect 
on governance. The changes expected are not deterministic but rather probabilistic (i.e. 
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if accounting improves by 10% on the index, for example, how much is the 
probability that governance improves?). 
3) A potential or simple plausible mechanism to explain how a change in the causal 
variable (accounting) is linked to improvements in the caused variable (governance). 
This is the theory. 
4) A deliberate attempt to vary the causal variable (accounting) in order to create a 
change in the caused variable (governance). 
Concerning the third condition, i.e. the theoretical condition, it is difficult to establish a 
universally accepted theoretical explanation of why a change in one variable causes a change 
in another variable. This is because of the creative tendency of human nature to always find a 
reason to explain something as far as it is convincing. For example studies such as Al-
Marhubi (2004) find that governance is determined by economic development and find 
plausible reasons to explain why this happens in this way, while other studies argue for the 
opposite point of view, that governance determines economic development, and then explain 
this with plausible reasons (see, for example, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002). Because of this 
issue, the theory condition is considered in this study as a ‘catch up’ game. However, an 
attempt was made to reduce this limitation by seeking the theoretical explanation externally 
from the perspective of practitioners, policy-makers and policy advisers. Also, the second and 
fourth conditions require an experiment design which, given the nature of the subject of the 
study, and particularly the time frame of the PhD (3 years), is not feasible.  
Therefore, the crucial matters considered are 1) the association between accounting and 
governance, and 2) an explanation, not from the researcher’s perspective, but from donors, 
governments and other organisations, as to how accounting contributes to improvements in 
governance.  
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6.4.1. Association between Accounting and Governance and Time Sequence  
The association between governance and accounting is measured by the covariance, 
correlation and R
2
 statistics. By definition, covariance is the extent to which two random 
variables co-vary or vary together. The random variables concerned here are governance 
(WGIs and IIAG) and accounting (Accounting Index). Mathematically, the covariance 
between these two variables can be written as: 
 {[             ][                         ]} 
Where        is the governance index (whether IIAG or WGI) of country i at time t; 
       is the mean value of the governance index;              is the accounting 
index of country i at time t; and              is the mean value of the accounting 
index. 
The assumption is that there is a positive relationship between governance and accounting. If 
this is the case, then the covariance between the two variables will be positive, indicating a 
linear relationship between governance and accounting. But it will be difficult to tell how 
strong this relationship is from the covariance statistic, owing to differences in data scales. To 
address this problem, the correlation coefficient is calculated. If the correlation coefficient is 
close to 1 (because a positive relationship is expected), then it indicates a strong positive 
linear relationship between governance and accounting. Otherwise, such a relationship will 
be seen as a weak one. However, the data available on governance (and to some extent on 
accounting) are limited, which will certainly affect the results.  
Covariance between the WGI and accounting and between the IIAG and accounting is 0.026 
and 0.018 respectively. This result suggests that the relationship between accounting and 
governance is positive and linear.  
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Table 6.9: Correlation between IIAG, WGI and Accounting and R2 
  
Correlation 
Coefficient 
R
2
 
IIAG 0.6696 0.4484 
WGI 0.6602 0.4358 
 
The coefficient correlation (R) is 67 and 66 for IIAG and WGI respectively. The square of 
the R gives the effect size, i.e. the common variance between governance and accounting, 
which is more indicative than the covariance statistic calculated earlier. As shown in Table 
6.9, the R
2
 for both WGI and IIAG is about 44%, which relates to the association between 
governance and accounting. Hence about, 56% of the variation in governance is explained by 
other factors. It is important to note that these proportions (44% and 56%) are also indicative 
of the wobbliness or messiness of the measures (both accounting and governance). It is not 
expected to find very high correlation owing to all of the weaknesses pointed out about the 
governance (and accounting) measures, including the judgement involved regarding the 
weighting of the dimensions or indicators included in the measures. However the 44% of 
covariance or association between governance and accounting is considered large enough to 
proceed to the next step, which is the time sequence. 
Regarding the issue of the time sequence, ideally it would have been done so as to add 
strength to the finding and the argument of the causal relationship. Despite this, an attempt 
was made to expand the analysis related to the R
2
 above by dividing the sample countries into 
two groups in order to observe the mean governance score of each group. The first group 
(observed group) is composed of countries with an accounting score of 45% or above. The 
second group (control group) is composed of countries with accounting score below 45%. 
The adoption of the 45% cut-off point is motivated by the need to get the maximum possible 
number of countries in the observed group. Thus, nine countries were selected on this basis as 
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the observed group. To form the control group, nine countries were randomly selected from 
the remaining thirteen countries. The mean governance scores of both groups are provided in 
Table 6.10 below. 
As shown in Table 6.10, the mean governance score (both WGI and IIAG) of the observed 
group is much higher than the score of the control group. This also confirms the conclusion 
drawn from the R
2
 statistic above that an improved accounting system is associated with 
improved governance. Furthermore, a t-test statistic was calculated to test the significance of 
the governance difference between the two groups. The results, as presented in Table 6.11, 
indicate that the governance difference between the two groups is statistically significant at 1% 
for both the WGI and the IIAG. 
Table 6.10: Governance Mean 
  
 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
WGI Control group 9 0.275 0.153 
Observed group 9 0.511 0.182 
IIAG Control group 9 0.466 0.108 
Observed group 9 0.632 0.112 
 
 
Table 6.11: Independent t-test of Governance Difference 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality 
of Means 
    
F Sig. t 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
WGI Equal variances 
assumed 
1.068 .317 -2.965 .009 -0.235 
IIAG Equal variances 
assumed 
.135 .718 -3.199 .006 -0.166 
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6.4.2. Explanation of the Contribution of Accounting to Governance 
Improvement 
 
6.4.2.1. General Link between Governance and Accounting 
According to the various officials involved in the study, accounting systems contribute 
considerably to governance improvements. Put it simply, the quality of accounting has an 
impact on the quality of governance. In fact accounting is perceived to be: 
…an ultimate governance tool. Because if the various controls that organise the recording system 
are well established, it should be a tool that would contribute to good governance. [BP006-
Consultant] 
The relevance of this to operational performance was emphasised by NGO and World Bank 
officials who explained that: 
Accounting helps manage better the financial resources, and thus allows public authorities to 
better meet the needs of the peoples. [B61-NGO] 
…the management accounting meaning cost-benefit analysis, issues being tackled in terms 
of …say, whether you should make or buy, this accrues from information related to whether in 
actual fact you should develop certain things yourself or you should actually buy those things 
using the cost-benefit analysis; it’s using financial information for good decision-making. 
[GWB01] 
Such a contribution is noted to be obvious given the various functions that an accounting 
system performs in government processes. 
Obviously, accounting has a role to play in governance. Simply because at least accounting 
maintains the records of what has been done, i.e. the history, records what is being done, and helps 
to evaluate [government] activities, and control procedures. [BAN02-MP] 
For example, 
The execution of the budget that is voted [by Parliament] should be tracked to ensure that the 
[government] financial operations, i.e. collection of receipts and payment of expenditures, are well 
executed. All these must be tracked, and this is the role of accounting. Therefore we cannot talk 
about governance without talking about accounting. [BO002-NGO] 
Another example where accounting contributes to governance improvements is the budget 
processes, as observed by the good governance activist NGO official: 
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One of the key governance processes in many countries, especially in Ghana, is budget and budget 
processes. So this is one sort of key areas where an improvement in accounting mechanisms can 
assist. Because if we have better or more widely understood, more widely implemented 
accounting standards, if we have more accounting professionals within the public services in our  
[government], institutions and agencies it will certainly help to improve governance in a number 
of countries. But that means that certain areas, tracking of government expenditure etc., areas such 
as helping parliamentarians monitor the executive are all concerned. [GNG01-NGO] 
This role makes accounting a key governance pillar without which it would be hard to sustain 
improvements in governance over time. This point was made clear by officials who suggest 
that in the absence of a sound accounting system, public managers will struggle to sustain 
effective governance. For example, a Chief Cabinet Minister noted that: 
Accounting is the central element. Without accounting there is no governance. I gave an example 
of board members [of an institution] who awarded loans to themselves; how did we come to know 
that it had happened?... If there was no accounting, we wouldn’t know… An institution without 
quantified history cannot develop. It is a fundamental element. It [accounting] is also a decision-
making tool. It is accounting that provides the basis for both an ad hoc and a prospective analysis 
of an institution or an organisation. Only accounting provides us with the raw materials. [BCA01-
Chief Cabinet Minister] 
In addition to being a decision-making tool, accounting also helps uncover and deal with 
inefficiencies in government system and the excesses of government officials and 
functionaries that deteriorate governance. Dealing with these inefficiencies and excesses 
therefore help to improve governance. 
In our system today, everyone begins to realise that without accounting we cannot talk about 
governance. The beginning of [government] information is the role of accounting. It is accounting 
that permits to reveal the financial shortcomings; it is accounting that permits to reveals the 
excesses of [public officials]. [BCA01-Chief Cabinet Minister] 
In fact, it is observed that the limited contribution of accounting to governance improvements 
in Africa is not due to accounting system per se, but to the way the accounting system is 
implemented. For example, in Benin, research participants comment that: 
Accounting is an important governance tool but it is also badly used. [B80P] 
More specifically: 
The contribution of accounting to good governance is well understood but limited because the 
leaders do not want good governance. They show some good will and apply a bit of it under 
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pressure from the development partners, but very little action [is] really undertaken to improve 
governance. For example, Benin does not have a Court of Accounts to date. [B73-NGO] 
Interviewees have also provided specific examples of contributions of accounting systems to 
governance quality improvements, as presented in the following section. 
 
6.4.2.2. Specific Contributions of Accounting to Governance 
In addition to addressing how accounting improves governance in general, the officials 
interviewed also provided specific areas in which accounting plays its role. These areas 
include accountability, transparency, and control of corruption. The areas are broadly 
synthesised by two NGO officials. 
A strong public accounting sector is critical to ensuring public accountability and the promotion of 
government transparency. [GQ-NGO] 
Accounting has a direct role as far as combating corruption is concerned. By revealing the 
quantity of money in the spending system to the general public, transparency and accountability 
are achieved. [G14-NGO] 
In fact, the contribution of accounting to governance improvement is primarily via 
accountability, seen as the ultimate objective of governance framework. 
Accounting and governance are closely linked in the sense that every good governance issue ends 
with accountability. Without accountability, governance will not be effective since the main 
objective of governance is to ensure that roles and principles are applied and resources are well 
accounted for. [G44-Accountant] 
For example: 
If you pay tax, one should be able to see how those taxes are used for [their] intended purposes. 
And you can only do that by having a good accounting system…yes we in the beginning want to 
buy a computer, yes we’ve got the computer; nobody bothers whether it’s of good quality or it will 
serve the purpose or not, is it the best of the market at the price that we use?… This role is the 
essence of having an Audit Service! [GNG03-NGO] 
The role of accounting in accountability is further highlighted by public officials: 
It’s like the words, isn’t it? The words accountability and accounting, same roots, so definitely you 
have to report back or give a detailed report on what you have been tasked with. So if you have 
been tasked with some money to manage, at the end of the period you are supposed to tell 
whoever gave you the role how you did it and then what effect happened. So in the public sector 
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definitely, once public funds have been collected in the form of tax... somebody at a point should 
tell whether the money government [collected] is spent on such and such... Definitely accounting 
is central, providing financial reports. [GCO01-Consultant] 
The role of accounting in accountability is to actually ensure that you know the funds that we use 
belong to some people, funds are properly accounted for and there is probity in our operations and 
that gives the taxpayer some sort of relief that the tax he is paying is going for the best purpose. 
[GP001-Public official] 
Another contribution of good accounting systems to governance quality is transparency: 
Normally, the role of accounting is to contribute to government transparency. [BCA01-Chief 
Cabinet Minister] 
An NGO official explained how this works: 
Accounting can play a very important role in all the issues... That has to do with use of the 
resources that are at hand and making the information available so that we can be able to say 
whether this year we are able to generate some amount of money, how much has been spent in 
what? We are in debt? Or we’ve been able to save? and all that… The government organisations, 
if you leave them alone some of them will do their own things. So everybody should be audited to 
create the climate to do the right and then people [will] begin to trust that you are using their 
resources judiciously, and it promotes transparency and integrity. [GNG07-NGO] 
This means that when accounting is able to produce financial reports in a timely fashion that 
are accessible, then government transparency will be improved. 
…if accounting is able to prepare reports accurately and timely and available to all, then 
accounting is helping transparency. [GNG05-NGO] 
Concerning control of corruption and fraud, accounting has an important contribution to 
make as noted by various officials. 
Accounting can play a very useful role in the sense that if there are good internal controls, we 
should be able to stop some of the fraudulent practices. [GP003-Public official] 
Because, 
…if [accountants] can …do the right things, they can help reduce corruption because they work to 
detect misuse of moneys. [GNG03-NGO] 
In fact,  
In reality, when it is required to ensure a good management of public finances, it is to ensure that 
corruption is absent in public finance; and the primary institution that has been thought of to carry 
out this role is the financial judiciary [i.e. the audit institution]… Because if there is a 
jurisdictional control [audit], it is because we want to ensure that the procedures are followed. It is 
compliance with procedures that deters corruption. For example, a product with a price list should 
not be charged at four times its price. If the [audit institution] was working properly, these are 
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some of the things that should be done, therefore fighting corruption on a permanent basis. 
[BC001-Auditor] 
Unfortunately, this role of accounting through its audit dimension is less understood which 
explains to some extent the marginal place accorded to accounting when it comes to 
addressing governance problems in the country. For example: 
In Benin, the role of the [audit institution] in fighting corruption is very badly perceived. And this 
misunderstanding explains everything [that is happening]. The citizens do not understand; and not 
only the citizens; even the decision-makers do not understand anything about this role… That’s 
the reality. [BC001-Auditor] 
Apart from accountability, transparency and control of corruption, some officials observe that 
accounting also helps improve resource allocation, which is an important part of governance. 
In making reference to this point, an interviewee observed that: 
In fact… the government tries on resources both human and material, but the accounting aspect 
looks at the material [including financial] resources and their allocations. Although the 
management takes crucial decisions about how these resources are allocated, [accounting] is also 
key because where wrong decisions are taken about the allocation of resources, where priorities 
are misplaced [it] can have negative impact on development [and governance] [GNG04-NGO] 
Furthermore, it is observed that the contribution of accounting to governance development is 
crucial, because its role goes beyond the common understanding of its impact to address how 
to improve governance for development for human security. 
Accounting is very very important. Now let’s talk about, I talked about human security. Well, the 
accounting can play [an important role], because if there’s transparency, there’s accountability and 
a portion of the society does not feel cheated, I mean there is security, there is stability; so 
accounting is very important! Wherever it has been mismanagement of resources there has been 
human insecurity. Look at Nigeria... So accounting – the management of resources – has a very 
important role to play in human security. [GNG04-NGO] 
The contribution of accounting systems to governance improvement for development is 
further emphasised by a World Bank official in these terms: 
It is the effective use of …funds [that] reduce[s] corruption, [promotes] better procurement 
activities for services or goods …that will all add to achieving a state of outputs, and then ensure[s] 
that there is accountability across the board to reporting, external auditing and public oversight 
meaning legislative oversight... Without those the concept of accountability is incomplete. 
Because if you only produce final report on spending for development and this is absolutely done 
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through the [financial] accounting and reporting process and there is no oversight in terms of 
admonishing those responsible for implementation as to whether in fact the funds were properly 
utilised through an audit process that has not been conducted, then the goal of development is 
threatened. [GWB01] 
The findings of this section suggest that there is a potential causal relationship between 
accounting and governance. The first test about the association between governance and 
accounting was successful. The second test, to demonstrate that the causal variable should 
come first then the outcome variable second, could not be conducted as suggested by de Vaus 
(2009), since this requires an experimental setting. However, it was shown that countries with 
improved accounting systems also have better governance quality. In addition, from the 
evidence from various officials, it was seen that improvements in accounting functions/roles 
help improve governance. For example, as noted by the following official (reported above): 
…if we have better or more widely understood, more widely implemented accounting standards, if 
we have more accounting professionals within the public services, in our  [government], 
institutions and agencies it will certainly help to improve governance in a number of countries. 
[GNG01] 
 
6.4.3. Contribution of Accounting to Governance Quality in Benin and Ghana: A 
Survey Analysis  
On the basis of the conclusion above, an assessment was conducted on the extent of the 
contribution of accounting to governance improvement in Benin and Ghana based on the 
results of a small scale survey of 46 respondents in Benin and 42 in Ghana. As a reminder, 
these respondents were drawn from civil servants, managers in the private sector, and staff of 
good governance activist NGOs. The results are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13 below. 
The results in Table 6.12 show that on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, 1 meaning a very limited 
contribution and 7 a very high contribution, the mean of accounting contributions to 
governance quality is 4.8 and 4.4 in Benin and Ghana respectively. This score is above 
average and indicates a relatively strong contribution of accounting to governance quality in 
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both countries. This perception also suggests that improvements in accounting system quality 
are expected to result in improvements in governance. In the absence of accounting data over 
time to allow for this observation, a comparison was made between the accounting index and 
the corresponding governance index between the two countries using the WGI. The 
accounting index in Benin is 0.17 for a WGI of 0.41, while the accounting index for Ghana is 
0.45 for a WGI of 0.55. It can be seen that an improved accounting system – i.e. that of 
Ghana compared to Benin – is related to an improved governance quality, despite the 
limitations of the WGI as discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, the extent of the contribution of accounting to governance quality in Benin is 
suggested to be higher than in Ghana as reflected in the mean difference. This apparent 
difference is tested statistically using independent sample t-test statistic. As shown in Table 
6.13 the Levene’s test for equality of variances indicates that equality of variances can be 
assumed at 5% significance level. Therefore the t-test can be used to assess this difference. 
The test shows that there is no statistical difference between the contributions of accounting 
to governance improvement in these countries (P-value of 0.337). This result is not surprising, 
because a statistical test conducted in Chapter 5 based on the survey indicates that the main 
difference between accounting systems in Benin and Ghana is that there is more information 
about the work of accountants (including auditors) in Ghana than in Benin. However, 
fundamentally, the accounting issues, and governance issues as a result, are the same in both 
countries. 
Table 6.12: Mean of the Contribution of Accounting to Governance Quality in Benin 
and Ghana  
  
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Benin 46 4.7826 1.84888 
Ghana 42 4.4286 1.56397 
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Table 6.13: Comparison of the Contribution of Accounting to Governance Quality 
Between Benin and Ghana  
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Evaluation of the role of 
accounting in the country 
governance 
Equal variances assumed 3.494 .065 .965 .337 .35404 
Equal variances not 
assumed     
.972 .334 .35404 
 
  
6.5. Examination of the Approach of the World Bank and Donors to the Development 
of Governance and Accounting Systems in Africa 
This section critically examines the approach of the World Bank and other donors to the 
development of governance and accounting systems from the perspective of African leaders 
and cadres, and officials from donors themselves.  
 
6.5.1. The Development of Governance 
Donors or development partners have been playing a significant role in the development of 
governance in Africa by putting pressure on governments to reform existing institutions or 
adopt institutions which are thought to be important to improve the management of the 
country’s resources for development. Acknowledging these pressures for governance 
improvements, an NGO official noted that: 
Definitely pressures are coming from outside to improve… External pressures are coming from 
outside from donors or international agencies. [GNG01] 
With specific regard to the World Bank’s role, traditionally its institutional supports have 
been geared towards institution building, irrespective of the nature of the regime in place. 
However, recently these supports are rather directed towards institutions arising from a 
democratic process. This complements the pressure from or the ‘push’ of the other 
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development partners for the democratic process itself and the institutions that support this 
process. A World Bank official explained, 
…It’s only recently that we’re having a trust fund normally to support building of institutions 
arising from a process of democratisation in particular countries. And the only institutions we’re 
looking at [are] institutions of governance rather than the institutions of 
democratic ...strengthening or whichever. That is only done by the United Nations –UNDP – as 
well as by the bilateral partners. [GWB02] 
However, while democracy is an ideal system subject to certain conditions, the way it has 
been pushed through States in Africa is seen to cause problems rather than improve 
governance and development as a result. 
The way democratisation of the States is being carried out should not be homogenous in all 
countries; especially in Africa, things should be done differently. That governance, democracy 
could slow the achievement of the Millennium Goals… could slow development. [BO003-NGO] 
In fact, the observation of the above official can be better understood when one examines the 
development of democracy in the developed countries and compares it to the type of 
democracy being developed in the developing countries, and in Africa in particular. 
…all of today’s rich countries initially gave voting rights only to those who owned more than a 
certain amount of property or earned enough income to pay more than a certain amount of tax. 
Some of them had qualifications related to literacy or even educational achievement… which were, 
of course, closely related to people’s economic status anyway and were usually used in 
conjunction with property/tax conditions. So, in England, the supposed birthplace of modern 
democracy, only 18% of men could vote [as a result of those conditions]…In France, before the 
introduction of universal male suffrage in 1848 (the first in the world), only 2% of the male 
population could vote due to restriction regarding age (you had to be over 30) and, more 
importantly, payment of tax. In Italy, even after the lowering of the voting age to 21 in 1882, only 
around two million men (equivalent to about 15% of the male population) could vote, due to tax 
payment and literacy requirements (Chang, 2007: 173).  
This means that those who are called to exercise their ‘democratic’ right are those who first 
understand the meaning of their action (the vote) through the minimum level of education or 
qualification requirements; and second have a stake in the process (represented by the 
minimum tax contribution requirements) which would make them vote for the political 
programmes that best reflect their stake. Even though voting rights are now given to anyone 
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aged 18 and over (or even 16 under certain conditions) in most Western countries
45
, it is also 
a legal requirement in these countries that children must go to school for a minimum number 
of years – up to the age of 16 in the UK46. However, in Africa most of those47 who are called 
to participate in the democratic process are illiterate, and therefore do not really understand 
the importance of their action in the democratic process. There is no minimum number of 
years of education in most African countries. Voters also do not feel that their contribution to 
the government budget as taxpayers is a stake. For example an NGO official in Benin 
reported that: 
...last year on 6 January 2010, FONAC organised a press conference to condemn the appointment 
of a lady in a position of responsibility – a lady who had already been involved in embezzlement... 
The following day, I went to a restaurant… and people were discussing the issue: ‘Elias… has 
again denounced that the lady has embezzled [CFA francs] 100 million... is that money? People 
embezzle more than that, and nothing happens…’ That day I remained quiet and then said ‘excuse 
me Sirs, 100 million is not money. Can you see the extent to which we tolerate corruption?’... 100 
million, and it doesn’t bother our compatriots – the taxpayers; they are told that their money is 
being stolen and it doesn’t bother them! [BO001-NGO] 
These observations lead the interviewees to note that: 
In fact, Africa has inherited a system of governance which is not its own with some rules that 
cannot be implemented given our level of knowledge, our cultures… [BO003-NGO] 
Furthermore, the cultural characteristics as mentioned above are ignored in most of the 
current governance and democratic systems in Africa. Failure to accommodate the local 
traditions and cultural characteristics has led to a clash with the democratic system. This 
contributes to governance deterioration. 
...You go to a region for example where people are used to kings… we know that by principle the 
king does not tell lie because when he says something, he does it... People easily confound elected 
                                                          
45
 For example in the UK the age to register to vote is 16 but you cannot vote until you are 18, or you will be 18 
within the lifetime of the electoral register (see: 
http://www.aboutmyvote.co.uk/who_can_register_to_vote.aspx). In France, from 1974 all French citizens 
aged 18 and over have the right to vote (see: http://www.vie-publique.fr/decouverte-
institutions/citoyen/participation/voter/droit-vote/quelles-sont-conditions-pour-voter.html) 
46
 This is stated by the British Council in these terms: “By law, all children in England and Wales between 
ages 5 and 16 must receive a full-time education, while in Northern Ireland, children must begin at age 
4” (See http://www.britishcouncil.org/usa-education-uk-system-k-12-education.htm) 
47
 For example a study in 2009 found that West Africa had the highest number of illiterates in the world – see 
http://www.africanews.com/site/West_Africa_has_world_highest_illiteracy_rate/list_messages/26827  
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officials who, like the kings, only tell the truth and they cannot be called to account. And so, 
people don’t call them to account, and they find it normal. Those who call them to account are 
seen as those who are against the elected official. And this is what happens in our countries here. 
That is a trait of Africa that will make us fall back with regard to the basics of democracy and 
good governance. [BAN01-MP] 
This cultural problem is also underpinned by an education problem. The preceding 
observation suggests that the basics of the democratic system are not well understood by the 
citizens, presumably due to lack of education on the system and the high illiteracy rate. 
Moreover, the foundations necessary to maintain democratic systems should precede any 
democratic initiative, not the opposite. The former President of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, noted 
the importance of these foundations to any democratic system, particularly in Africa, when 
questioned on the matter, by replying firmly as follows: 
…we can vote people in and out… it’s OK. But… what we need to do in this country is to 
establish a situation where even if it was the devil who should come and sit on top of us in Ghana, 
by virtue of certain procedures and certain practices, the devil cannot get away with doing 
whatever he wants, he will necessarily have to do what the people expect
48
. 
Institutional reforms and policies to strengthen governance require some accommodation to 
local reality, without which progress will be hard to achieve. As reported above, the absence 
of this feature has undermined progress in governance building. However, when asked why 
the current governance and democratic system in most of Africa are not making significant 
progress despite the various supports from the World Bank and other donors, a World Bank 
official responded that ‘people want chaos to thrive’. The same official made a similar 
comment when asked why accounting reforms are not succeeding, by noting that it is because 
of: 
…the general desire to maintain chaotic systems in support of sustained fraud and corruption. 
[GWB02] 
A similar view was expressed by another donor’s official that people have vested interests in 
maintaining poor systems. This suggests that leaders are corrupt and it is because of this that 
                                                          
48
 M’Bokolo et al. (2010). 
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institutional reforms are not successful. However interviewees object to the fact that the 
current state of governance in Africa is, to some extent, the result of the failure of the donors’ 
(including the World Bank) approach.  
This is further emphasised by Chang (2007) who reported that the development partners are: 
…using corruption as an unwarranted ‘explanation’ for the failure of neo-liberal policies (for they 
believe that those policies cannot be wrong) but the solution to the corruption problem that they 
have been promoting has often worsened, rather than alleviated, it (Chang, 2007: 168). 
In fact, using the failure of the ‘shock therapy’ strategy of transition proposed by the West as 
an illustrative example, Stiglitz and Chang (2001) note that: 
The ‘transition orthodoxy’… maintains that transition failed not because the policies of the 
Washington consensus were wrong, but because they were poorly implemented by corrupt and 
incompetent governments (Stiglitz and Chang, 2001: 8) 
Such position was challenged by the former World Bank Senior Vice President, Professor 
Stiglitz, by arguing that “transition therapy failed because the conventional neoclassical 
model, on which shock therapy was based, was fundamentally flawed… [and] that the 
process of institutional reform is not something that can be achieved through utopian social 
engineering...” (Stiglitz and Chang, 2001: 9). 
More specifically, officials noted that the failure of donors’ approach is mostly due to their 
lack of understanding of the local environment. For example, when an official was informed 
of the current research project, he advised the researcher that: 
...if we are going to solve governance problems you have to have the right analysis ...I hope you’ll 
be able to do something different that is based on our reality and context; not like those experts or 
consultants from the World Bank or IMF, etc. [GCO02-Consultant] 
He added that: 
They don’t understand the environment in which they come with their suitcase of solutions. How 
do you expect them to understand why it’s not working? That’s why the first and only obstacle 
they find is corruption and low capacity… Since more than 20 years they haven’t come up with a 
single good solution. It would be a complete different result if they got the analysis right at some 
point. So try to work outside of books... and the common path. So go and listen carefully to people 
and don’t get in the traps of conventional [frameworks]. [GCO02] 
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It is observed that to get out of this trap regarding the current governance initiatives (both 
reforms and policies) relative to the local context and reality, leaders will need to make 
courageous decisions to challenge reform programmes from donors and redesign these 
reforms in line with local environment conditions. So: 
It will require some difficult decisions. You know why? Some people would have to say ‘you 
know we can’t afford this so we’re not interested in it’. But you can’t imagine who our politicians 
are, telling people ‘we need to implement, yes we’ve just received [US$] 10 million’ [GCO02] 
 
6.5.1.1. Monitoring of Progress in Governance in Africa 
Interestingly, the WGIs (Worldwide Governance Indicators) and the IIAG (Ibrahim Index for 
African Governance) are initiatives from the World Bank (for the WGIs
49
), although the 
Bank disclaims responsibility for the results
50
, and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation (for the IIAG) 
to monitor progress in governance across Africa over time. The limitations of the measures 
have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and in Section 5.3 above. In this section, awareness 
of the measures is examined through the results of both the interviews and survey of cadres, 
civil servants and other officials.  
Assessment of the awareness of the governance index conducted during the interview with 
public officials, consultants and NGO officials found that very few public officials have in-
depth knowledge of these indicators. For example, when asked whether he knows about the 
WGIs, an interviewee responded: 
I’ve heard about it, but I don’t know much about it… [BCA01] 
He has no awareness of the IIAG at all. Some of the consultants interviewed acknowledged 
having some awareness of the indexes, especially of the WGIs. They clearly pointed that the 
governance indexes measure governance performance within a country. The results for the 
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 The WGIs monitor progress in governance quality across the world including Africa. 
50
 See Olowu (2010) for more detail. 
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NGO officials are mixed. For example in Benin, only two NGO officials declared they have 
some awareness of the WGI and very limited knowledge of the IIAG. In Ghana, four NGO 
officials were able to make similar comments. 
Figure 6.2: Awareness of the WGIs  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Awareness of the IIAG  
 
From the results of the survey, most respondents have limited awareness of both WGIs and 
IIAG, as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. It can be seen from the figures that the number of 
respondents who are unaware (from ‘fairly much unaware’ to ‘very much unaware’) are 
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greater for the IIAG than for the WGIs. In percentage terms, 66% of respondents are unaware 
of the IIAG, as against 56% for the WGIs. When the proportion of respondents who did not 
state the extent of their awareness is taken into account, only 22% are aware of the IIAG and 
32% of the WGIs. This finding is surprising, given the importance of the issue of governance 
and its monitoring. The survey was conducted in the main cities of Benin (Cotonou) and 
Ghana (Accra) where there are better infrastructures, and thus better access to information 
and news. If the level of awareness is that low in the main cities, then its level would be very 
limited in the other cities and towns of the respective countries. More surprising is the level 
of awareness of the IIAG. In fact, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards good governance prizes 
to Heads of State across Africa who have “demonstrated excellence in office”51 and complied 
with constitutional rules. This is expected to increase the awareness of the organisation and 
the IIAG. A subsequent measurement of the awareness of the IIAG will help assess whether 
these activities help improve the awareness of the index. 
 
5.5.2. The Development of Accounting Systems 
Accounting systems in Africa are poorly developed, as evidenced in the previous chapter and 
illustrated by the accounting index computed for some 22 countries. Given the involvement 
of the World Bank in accounting development in Africa, a World Bank official explained the 
root of the problem as follows: 
…What we can observe is that, the trend, if we go back 20 or 15 years on average, the World 
Bank approach to public finance rather focused on the upstream of the public finance management 
cycle. So the focus was on budget preparation, the creation of programme-budgeting, multi-year 
budgeting. There is an explanation for that. For a long time, it was economists, pure economists 
who were in charge of these issues. And these people only work with an approach that focuses on 
the allocation of resources to sectors; i.e. sectors to reduce poverty, sectors of priority, etc. 
[BWB01] 
                                                          
51
 See http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-prize 
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So it is economists rather than accountants who have been designing accounting policies and 
reforms for most African countries for decades. The danger with such an approach is the lack 
of specific technical skills and knowledge, and limitations in the application of accounting 
(including audit and management accounting) principles both at framework and 
implementation levels. As a result, the approach did not incorporate sound accounting 
principles adapted to the context in their framework to improve either the practices on the 
ground or the outcome in terms of results, i.e. value-for-money and good use of public 
resources, for example.  
Nevertheless, it is noted that there has been some improvement in the World Bank’s approach 
recently that focuses somewhat on accounting. 
The downstream approach that tries to focus on accounting, budget execution, internal and 
external controls, is more recent. And this is also due to the fact there has been some evolution in 
the profile of the staff of the Bank with more specialists of public finance… There are people who 
have work experience with… [audit institutions], treasury departments, etc. Their approach is 
more legal and practical on the matter…For example, on public expenditure, we ensure that some 
limits or caps are voted by the Parliament; the finance laws are followed in execution. This means 
that there should be systematic mechanisms in place to block overspending in the information 
system, etc. These matters were not addressed by economists, but are now dealt with by public 
finance specialists. [BWB01] 
Again, this new approach is seen not to be producing results, because practice in the area has 
not changed much. For example a budget officer in Benin noted that: 
In here, budgetary allocations follow historical characteristics rather than the requirements of the 
new techniques [of] result-based management… [BB001-Public official] 
This suggests that not much has changed in terms of practices. Furthermore, another World 
Bank official observed that reform initiatives leading to the MTEF and programme-based 
budgeting, for example, referred to as some of the key improvements in recent public finance 
management reforms and innovations, have failed: 
You’ll find that it’s a Medium Term Expenditure Framework that most countries have started 
developing which [is] not based on any realism, or [is] ‘donor-driven’. While the MTEF – 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework – or the Programme-Based Budget may well [serve] in 
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theory as a basis for the budget of government but having got their cue from the planning side, this 
turns to be a white elephant in most cases [GWB01] 
The World Bank’s approach to accounting development is further limited by the fact that the 
‘new’ public finance specialists of the Bank are also replicating what economists did in the 
past, and, in addition, replicating best practices as a standard approach to accounting across 
countries and environments.  
The idea is that there is no reason why Africa cannot, or Francophone Africa cannot, go toward 
these best practices. [BWB01] 
‘These best practices’ mean: 
…what we call the ‘new public management’, i.e. programme-based budgeting, multi-year 
budgeting, accruals accounting, performance control. These are what we call ‘second generation 
reforms’ which are realisable for many countries. [BWB01] 
Programme-based budgeting and multi-year budgeting were part of the economists’ approach 
to accounting according to the same World Bank official, but these are now being repeated 
again for Africa by the ‘specialists’ of PFM, suggesting that the context-based knowledge of 
these PFM ‘specialists’ should be called in question. More concerning is the push towards 
‘accrual’ accounting in environments where the basic infrastructures are so weak. The reason 
for pushing these reforms through is that they have been successful in developed countries 
like France, and yet: 
[in France] there are much more resources than in most [African] countries. And two, there is a 
technical level in France that is too high for most of the countries. [BWB01-World-Bank official] 
Despite that, the: 
…idea is that there is no reason why Francophone Africa cannot go toward these standards. 
[BWB01] 
Such an approach is conflicting and demonstrates a lack of understanding of the real problem 
within its environmental context. This point was made by a consultant who noted that the 
specialists or consultants who design accounting systems in Africa do not really understand 
the problem of accounting in its real context in Africa, and do not even have the capacity to 
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understand it, suggesting that, to some extent, the flaw in the design of accounting systems in 
Africa is not necessarily deliberate. 
On their side [i.e. donors] they have very intelligent people with suitcase of solutions! But they 
have no understanding of the problem… [They do not] even have the capacity to understand the 
problem. [GCO02] 
The point made here is that donors and their specialists and consultants have PFM skills and 
experience in different systems and environments with different cultural traits that ‘blind’ 
their understanding of the developing world, especially in Africa where even the basic 
infrastructures they ever think of do not exist. Describing a typical donor expert, the above 
consultant noted that: 
…when you are explaining you cannot just assume people will understand, you have to spend a lot 
of time describing our context that he doesn’t understand. When you say there’s no power he says 
what are you talking about? Where are you living?... He doesn’t know that we can stay 8 months 
with no power. He has never seen something like this. So when you say that the system isn’t 
working, you need to take account of these [things]. He doesn’t understand what you’re talking 
about. [GCO02] 
Similarly, another consultant commented that: 
I don’t think they [donors] understand the environment in which we live here… [BP006-
Consultant] 
This is because in the developed world, power is so basic that it is almost impossible to 
imagine how people could live eight months without power. In the developing countries not 
much attention is given to such basic needs as adequate power systems. For example, one of 
the main reasons advanced for the limited results, and possibly the failure, of the new 
accounting system being developed in Benin since 2005 was described by an official as 
follows: 
…there should be an inter-connection in the ‘Départements’ but it is not the case. The internet 
connection does not work, and this made the programme worthless… If people have a problem 
[with the system] you have to travel… 600 kilometres [to help]. [BP001-Public official] 
Another official added: 
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What happens very often is that the power system fails or it is unstable; and this causes the 
equipment to break-down often… [BP004-Public official] 
In order to accommodate this everyday reality people have developed certain habits. 
However, the lack of understanding of such habits embedded in local culture, i.e. how things 
are done in the society to accommodate the environment, led to accounting not working 
because its design does not suit these realities. 
Public account[ing] is not the [drivel] that we’ve been asking to do. That’s the reality. To look at it 
from the other side, you want to run the public account[ing] system that is accommodating with 
the culture or you want to run a public account[ing] system that will even constrain that culture. 
[GCO02-Consultant] 
When questioned, all the Bank’s officials interviewed noted that accounting systems in the 
case study countries are still in a chaotic state. However, they did not note that this ‘failure’ is 
due to some extent to the Bank’s approach to accounting reforms and policies. According to 
them, the factors that account for the limited progress in accounting development are: 
Capacity deficiency, that’s one. Number two is the inability to implement well-sequenced reforms 
or policy related reforms to support implementation of the accounting systems. Three, I think the 
general desire to maintain chaotic systems in support of sustained fraud and corruption [GWB02-
World-Bank official] 
The first two factors, i.e. ‘capacity deficiency’ and ‘inability’, are both related to the same 
issue, that is, weak capacity which together with corruption are the main two excuses the 
World Bank and donors find for the lack of progress in accounting. Even the lack of sequence 
in reforms and policies in the area is also attributed to weak capacity. Officials challenge this 
by noting that: 
...because there is poor capacity and so much corruption, any time it [reform/policy] doesn’t work, 
automatically it’s corruption or it’s low capacity… Accounting is so poor because we don’t 
understand how to apply accounting in a country where infrastructures are so weak. [GCO02-
Consultant] 
Another consultant supported the above observation by noting that failure of accounting 
reforms in Africa and other developing countries occur because they are not built in context. 
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There is another issue. With regards to experience, accounting reforms are often failures. Why is 
that? One reason is that accounting reforms are given to the big accounting firms… [or] 
consultants [who also] provide accounting services to implement… So they come into a country 
and look at the accounting system and say you don’t have accrual accounting or a double entry 
accounting at all, or you have computerised at a very low level, you certainly have not integrated 
your accounts with other systems like payroll, purchasing, etc. And then they propose a quite 
elaborate and ambitious reform of the accounting system by moving to accrual accounting, 
computerised and integrated everything (payroll, accounts payable/receivables, etc.) and that 
projects goes on forever and typically fails because there is a shortage of programmers, shortage 
of good accountants, and you trying to make a big jump from very, very far… So if DFIC comes 
to me and say we are working in Malawi and someone comes up with an accounting project, what 
do you think… as an independent advisor or observer? I will say, clearly [about the] accounting 
project without even reading it, on the balance of previous experience, [that] the chances are that it 
won’t work... [UB001-Consultant]   
Furthermore, one consultant noted that, in addition to their limited ability to understand the 
real issue in the African context, donors also face other challenges represented by the lack of 
reliable feedback on their approach from African leaders. 
On our side we are such beggars that we don’t listen and even the few of us that are listening and 
know there’s a problem and would think effectively… will stand up and be saying ‘oh yes it’s 
good, oh yes it’s good’. So, on this side we’re not giving accurate feedback because we are afraid 
that they will stop [giving funds]… Either we understand and we are afraid or we don’t have [the] 
confidence to think about it. So either we’re too busy begging or we are too busy being afraid. 
Look at [the] reality... Because they always say we are corrupt, we have low capacity, it’s true we 
are corrupt but it is not the reason why we have these problems. So let’s find a new reason [based 
on our reality] to solve them. And when we solve them, you know what I mean, corruption will go 
down. Corruption is the consequence of weaknesses; the weaknesses are not the consequence of 
corruption! [GCO02-Consultant] 
This is supported by another consultant who acknowledged that donors do not understand the 
local context well but: 
…I cannot blame everything on them because they rely on information given to them from our 
people… [BP006-Consultant] 
In addition to the limitations of the donors’ approach, the accounting system itself is not of 
much interest to them. For example, following the observation of one of the World Bank’s 
officials on the weaknesses of accounting systems in Africa, he was then asked how these 
weaknesses inform future reform programmes of the Bank with specific regard to accounting. 
He responded that: 
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We don’t have a programme in that area. [BWB01] 
But at the same time, he acknowledged that having a good accounting system would help 
improve the management of financial resources: 
…we have interest in having a good accounting system in place in order to ensure that people 
don’t misuse donors’ funds, as well as having an external control [i.e. external audit]. In that 
perspective it is important, because what we do is to try to use the national system instead of 
separate operations that complicate their management of which the [audit institution] or the 
Parliament is not aware at all… [BWB01] 
It stands to reason that, if donors recognise that accounting could help at least to improve 
public finance management, their lack of interest in the matter in governance initiatives has 
other explanations which are rather considered as complementary explanations. This is 
covered in the next Chapter. 
 
6.6. Brief Discussion of the Findings 
Overall, the findings from this chapter complement existing studies on governance, beginning 
with the limitations of the current governance metrics (see for example, Apaza, 2009; Olowu, 
2010; Thomas, 2010). Although, Grindle (2004: 525) argues for ‘good enough governance’ 
by asserting that “…all good things cannot be pursued at once”, the role of accounting in 
governance, as shown in this chapter, is so crucial, given its effect on government resources 
management, that ignoring or marginalising it in any governance initiative and framework 
would result in serious flaws.  
Interestingly, Grindle (2004: 525) also suggests that the focus should be on “…learning about 
what’s working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps”. This means that if the 
current governance framework being implemented across Africa was working, there would 
be no need to question it much. But the reality on the ground as reported in this study, and in 
various recent studies (Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Andrews, 2010) shows that it is not 
working as expected.  
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The analysis carried out in this chapter complements, extends and challenges existing studies 
in many ways. In the area of elections, the study gathers evidence that electoral systems in the 
case study countries and in most of Africa, are not generally free and fair, with tribal 
affiliation and cronyism serving as contributing factors to flawed elections. This study 
complements, for example, the findings of Branch and Cheeseman (2009) about the Kenyan 
elections in 2007, and those of Lynch and Crawford (2011) about Ivory Coast’s 2010 
elections and across Africa in general. Also, the rule of law in the two case study countries is 
found to be weak and often selective in its application. A similar conclusion was made by 
Joseph (2008) who observes that “the struggle to cross the frontier from personal rule to rule-
based governance is still far from over in much of Africa” (p.100). Governance is most likely 
to be limited without a sound and neutral legal system that is consistently applied.  
With regard to approach to democracy-based governance, a key condition for a sustained 
democracy is the design and maintenance of a good education system accessible to all 
citizens irrespective of their family background and state of wealth (Chang, 2007). The 
maintenance of such an education system is costly and not many African countries can afford 
such costs at the current stage of their development. The Beninese government, for example, 
tried to introduce a ‘free primary school’ education policy in late 2006 which soon revealed 
its limitations, as parents were required to contribute to school budgets, to provide in kind 
contributions or both.  
This is not, however, to suggest that ‘dictatorship’ or ‘authoritarian regimes’ are preferred to 
democracy. The suggestion from the evidence gathered in this study is that there are different 
levels of democracy. Moreover, the foundations for a sustained democratic system and 
governance are not well established in most of Africa. The implication for policy and practice 
is that efforts are required to build the foundations with strengthened accountability systems 
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and to adapt democracy to the reality of African and other developing countries, and possibly 
give voting rights only to people with a certain level of literacy. 
Furthermore, donors’ argument that the limited results from or the failure of their approach to 
governance are due to increasing corruption and low capacity (see, for example, Schacter, 
2009) that are present across Africa was suggested to be unwarranted in this study. Similar 
findings are reported by Chang (2007). It is rather the donors’ lack of understanding of the 
environment in the case study countries that accounts for these failures. Similarly, various 
prior studies such as Andrews (2010) and Rodrik (2000) observe that understanding of local 
environment and context is of significant importance to the success of governance or 
institutional reforms.  
Concerning accounting, the evidence gathered revealed that despite, for example, the 
evolution in donors’ approach, the subsequent reported improvements in accounting were still 
insignificant. For example, the MTEF and Programme-Based Budgeting have failed 
altogether in essence. Moreover, the tendency has moved towards the replication of ‘best’ 
practices in accounting reforms. Practices are only ‘best’ in context. The contextual settings 
within which ‘best’ practices are ‘best’ are unlikely to exist in a similar nature and form and 
to the same degree elsewhere. This means that before an attempt to reproduce a ‘best’ 
practice in an environment, one must primarily ensure that pre-conditions exist which are 
similar to the settings of the environment where the best practice was initially identified. 
However, donors’ approach is to reproduce identified ‘best practice’ from one environment to 
another, irrespective of the existence of pre-conditions. In a similar way, having examined 
PFM reforms in Africa, Andrews (2010) reports that “…existing reforms face limits that can 
only be overcome with adjustments in reform approach…” (p.ii). As a result, he recommends 
“…less emphasis on reproducing the same reform models and more on better understanding 
what context-appropriate reforms look like” (p.ii). Also Rodrik (2000: 3) is at pains to note 
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similar limitations and thus advises that “…a strategy of institution building must not over-
emphasize best-practice ‘blueprints’”. 
This research also extends existing studies related to donors’ approach in general. Existing 
studies such as Andrews (2010) and Rodrik (2000) assume that donors can obtain a better 
understanding of the local reality by themselves if they wish to. However, the findings of this 
research suggest that donors have limited ‘capacity’ to actually understand the context, even 
if they wish to. In most Africa, infrastructures are reported to be poor, and basic facilities 
such as power and internet facilities, etc., are very limited. This reality causes well designed 
reforms in ‘normal’ environment conditions, such as those existing in the developed world, to 
fail when implemented in the context of many African countries.  
 
6.7. Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented findings on the link between governance and accounting systems 
in Africa. Before the presentation of these findings, the findings on the state of governance in 
Africa were reported. Governance in Africa was found to be weak with a high level of 
corruption, weak financial accountability, weak rule of law and weak electoral systems. Also, 
the research findings suggest that accounting information is not captured in the current 
governance metrics. This led to the examination of the causal relationship between 
governance and accounting. The findings suggest that there is a potential causal relationship 
between governance and accounting systems based on data from twenty-two African 
countries and data from the case study countries. This suggests that an improvement in 
accounting systems is likely to result in an improvement in governance.  
Furthermore, the chapter reported findings on the approach of the World Bank and other 
donors to the development of governance and accounting in Africa. The study found that the 
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way democracy is being ‘pushed’ through in States in Africa is not consistent with how 
democracy has evolved in today’s developed countries. Moreover, the lack of understanding 
and accommodation of local culture in governance initiatives undermines governance 
improvements. Concerning accounting, it was found that initial accounting system reforms 
and policies were designed by economists more concerned with resource allocation than 
accounting per se. However, despite the evolution in the profile of those in charge of 
accounting reform at the World Bank, the practices have not changed significantly, which 
explains to some extent the limited results from or failure of the subsequent reforms such as 
the MTEF and programme-based budgeting. Also, it was found that donors’ experts and 
consultants have limited capacity to understand the environment and local reality in Africa in 
order to be able to design suitable accounting systems for such environment. This is further 
complicated by the absence of accurate feedback on donors’ approach from African leaders. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION: GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTING AND THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BENIN AND GHANA  
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7.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings from the research drawing on the Political Economy 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4. Analysis of the data is carried out on the basis 
of the elements of political economy that emerged most commonly from the interviews with 
African cadres and elites as well as officials from donor agencies, and from documentary 
evidence. This analysis, in turn, guided the organisation of the findings. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter aims to address the research question related to what 
factors are preventing the development of sound governance and accounting systems in 
Africa despite the various reform initiatives. Evidence is sought from African cadres’ and 
leaders’ perspectives of the various forces and factors that are generating dysfunctions in the 
development of good governance and accounting in the case study countries in particular, and 
in Africa in general. Where possible, additional evidence, mostly documentary, is sought.  
Although an initial analytical framework is adopted following preliminary discussion with 
officials from the case study countries and then formalised using elements of political 
economy framework presented in prior studies, the actual framework used in this chapter as 
an organising approach for presenting the findings is based on the themes and elements that 
emerged from the analysis of the data (see Figure 7.1). The adoption of such an approach is 
aimed at avoiding force-fitting the data into a pre-defined ‘box’, ignoring the dynamic nature 
of the data itself and of the political economy framework. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section presents the elements of internal 
political system and institutional forces in the case countries. The third section deals with the 
internal economic interests and forces, while the fourth section deals with the various 
international political and economic interests and forces at work in the area of governance 
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and accounting systems in the studied countries. The final section presents the concluding 
comments from these findings. 
 
7.1. Internal Political System and Institutions Forces 
 
7.1.1. Transition to Democracy 
The research findings reveal that transition from the old political regime, i.e. the so-called 
dictatorship or authoritarian regime, to democracy lacked preparation, given the 
circumstances when the transition occurred. At the time leaders were more concerned with 
regime change, given the public outrage in the context of a rising social and economic crisis. 
As a result, not much consideration was given to the system or framework required to sustain 
the new regime in line with the local environment and context in order to achieve the 
objectives of the transition. One of the officials involved in the transition process concluded 
that: 
We had not been really prepared. It was in those years 1989 that we started talking about these 
things, the PER [Public Expenditure Review], the PERAC [Public Expenditure Reform 
Adjustment Credit] and a lot of things like that; we started talking about reforms. But in fact we 
had never been prepared for that. Even the legal framework we have until today is not really 
adapted. [BC002]  
With regard to accounting systems, during an address to the participants at a colloquium on 
the ‘Control of Public Finance in UEMOA Member Countries’ on 21 July 2010, Maxime 
Akakpo, ‘Conseiller’52 at the Chamber of Accounts in Benin, observes that the weaknesses of 
the institution entrusted with auditing in Benin, for example, stem from the transition to 
democracy.  
 
 
                                                          
52
 A Conseiller at the Chamber of Accounts or a Judge of Accounts is the highest ranked Auditor in Benin. 
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Figure 7.1: Representation of the Political Economy Forces/Interests in Benin and 
Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Political System and Institutions 
Forces 
These forces concern the political stakeholders’ 
interactions, legal and institutional frameworks 
in place within the country that work to shape 
governance and accounting reforms and the 
performance of the governance system. 
Transition to Democracy 
Constitutional underpinning of 
Governance & Accounting Systems 
Interest Groups Influence: Political 
Parties & Civil Society 
Relations between Government 
Agencies/Institutions 
Cadres Maintenance 
Electoral Cycles 
Excessive Use of Political Power 
Internal Economic Interests/Forces 
These are economic interests and forces of 
the internal political and other 
stakeholders that motivate their 
influence/non-influence on governance 
institutions 
Private Economic Interests of 
Political Leaders and 
Supporters 
Economic interests of Business 
Organisations 
International Economic and Political Interests 
and Forces 
These concern various influences from the 
international arena on governance institutions 
and accounting systems in order to secure 
some economic and political interests in the 
case study countries. 
Colonial ‘Patron’ The World Bank Donor Community as a Group 
Use of 
External 
Experts 
Conditionality Advisers 
Governance 
Institutions  
&  
Accounting 
Systems 
QUALITY  of  GOVERNANCE 
Source: Developed by the researcher 
225 
 
It was, following the National Conference of the Vital Forces, that we saw a very timid start of the 
Chamber [of Accounts]’ activities…In fact the performance of the Chamber of Accounts is 
affected and even seriously impeded by lack of quality human resources and by the absence of an 
independent organisation. (Akakpo, 2010) 
In fact the National Conference of the Vital Forces is the one that marked the transition from 
the previous Marxist and authoritarian regime to democracy in Benin and which is the 
underlying force behind the Beninese Constitution. The main concern of these leaders at that 
point is similar to the point of transition to independence, where the focus was more on 
political institutions than accountability. The lack of independence of Beninese audit 
institution reduces significantly its accountability role. It should be remembered, as warned 
by Mr Akapko in his address, that the 1789 French Revolution was triggered by public 
resources management considerations, and that accountability, especially accountability for 
public finances, is what secures a living, accommodation, an education, clothing, and health 
for the citizen.  
This observation made Mr Akapko further question whether people had really thought of 
what should be done to stop maladministration of public resources at the transition point. 
Discussion with leaders suggests that, at least, this question was not thoroughly put forward 
at the time in order to design an accounting system that would otherwise help improve 
accountability in Benin. Political considerations had overwhelmingly dominated leaders’ 
concerns at the time.   
In fact, some leaders observe that most of the governance problems that emerged soon after 
the transition are actually due to the lack of preparation. Even the constitution has suffered, 
containing many provisions which do not support an adequate system of check and balance 
and accountability. 
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7.1.2. Constitutional Underpinning of Governance and Accounting Systems 
The Constitution is the supreme legal framework of a country and as such it should be 
designed to ensure a balance of power between the Executive, the Legislative and the 
Judiciary. But in the case study countries, the exercise of power is very unbalanced, with the 
Executive having an overwhelming power over the other institutions. For example, per the 
56
th
 article of the Beninese Constitution, the President appoints three of the seven members of 
the Constitutional Court, the President and all of the members of the Supreme Court which 
controls the overall judiciary system. According to the same article, he also appoints the 
members of all the other State institutions except for the Parliament. 
… It [the exercise of power] is not balanced because the Constitution made it unbalanced. In our 
Constitution we wanted a strong President and we have one. A President that can even bypass the 
Parliament. It is not the will of an individual, but our Constitution that has given him such 
possibility! [BC003] 
In Ghana, for example, the Constitution in its 78
th
 article significantly compromises the 
independence of the Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive, with specific requirements that the 
majority of Ministers shall be appointed from MPs. Apart from the consideration that the 
President may not be able to find the quality expected in terms of skills and experience in 
sufficient number within Parliament (because MPs are not elected because they have a 
specific background or skills), MPs may even try to be soft on issues with the expectation of 
being called to the government at some point. 
…at the moment we have a system of Parliamentary arrangements that compromise[s] the 
independence of the Parliament. Why do I say that? I say that because you expect that 
constitutionally a number of members of Parliament are also part of the executive as Ministers of 
the State. And there is a desire in every MP to advance. So MPs who are not in the executive yet 
hope that the opportunity exists to be going in so they won’t push hard. So that is the challenge 
they have. [GNG06] 
Regarding accounting systems in particular, both case study countries have provisions in the 
Constitution regarding the external control or audit institution which, in Ghana is the Audit 
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Service
53
 and in Benin the Chamber of Accounts. The Chamber of Accounts is an 
independent institution because it is part of the Supreme Court, which is independent from 
the Executive and the parliament as per the 125
th
 article of the Beninese Constitution.  
In terms of the functioning of the Chamber of Accounts, it does not need the approval of the 
government, i.e. the Chamber of Accounts does not function like the General Inspectorate of 
Finance or the General State Inspectorate or the other administrative control institutions. [BC002] 
However, the independence is weak due to the way in which it is provided in the Constitution. 
The Chamber of Accounts of Benin is one of the three Chambers of the Supreme Court with 
a very specific mandate compared with the other Chambers; that is, it acts as ‘gendarme’ to 
ensure the effective and efficient management of public finance and resources. As a result of 
this specific role, requiring the Chamber to follow the same procedural and administrative 
rules or red tape as the other Chambers in conducting the Chamber’s activities is inconsistent 
and impedes its effectiveness, as observed by a senior official at the Supreme Court.  
The real problem that needs to be dealt with to ensure the Chamber of Accounts’ effectiveness, if 
we think that it can play its constitutional role, is to take the Chamber out of the Supreme Court… 
They [the Magistrates at the other Chambers] think… that the same procedures applying to the 
other Chambers should apply to the Chamber of Accounts. Yet, there are some particularities. In 
here we deal with public finance. They don’t understand that... Even the President [of the Supreme 
Court] said that they cannot deal with us with any special arrangements and that we are within a 
Court… I have sent reports to the ‘Parquet’ since 2004-2005 and these reports never got out! 
[BC004] 
The independence of the Chamber of Accounts is further weakened by the appointment 
process of the President of the Supreme Court, the ‘Conseillers’ and the President of each 
Chambers. In fact, according to Article 133, the President of the Supreme Court is nominated 
by the President of the Republic, and per Article 134, the ‘Conseillers’ and the President of 
each Chamber are also nominated by the President of the Republic based on the people 
proposed by the President of the Supreme Court. Clearly the President of the Republic 
appoints those who in return are charged to control him. As commented on ironically by a 
                                                          
53
 Although it is not explicitly stated in the Constitution that it is independent from the Executive and the 
Parliament as is explicitly written in the Beninese Constitution. 
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senior official at the Supreme Court: ‘we nominate who we want to nominate’ meaning ‘not 
necessary who deserve to be nominated’.  In the same way, in Ghana, the Auditor General 
(article 70 of the Constitution) and all the Audit Service Board members (Article 189 of the 
Constitution) are appointed by the President. As highlighted by officials in Ghana, this 
approach affect the independence of the Auditor-General. 
Let’s look at the appointment of the Auditor General. Some people think that that does not make 
us independent. But ...some of these things are actually informed by the law. Our Auditor-General 
is appointed by the President... To some extent, some people think that it does not make the 
Auditor-General fully independent. Now this is an issue based on Constitutional provision. 
[GA007] 
The only ways the effectiveness of this approach of appointment can be secured is either 
through an effective ‘checks and balances’ system put in place to review independently the 
appointment of these officials before endorsing it (which is rarely the case in substance), or 
when the term of office of the incumbent head of audit and board members overlap to cover 
the term of office of a President who is different from the one who has appointed them. 
However, this has rarely been the case. In Benin for example, apart from the first democratic 
President, none of his successors have had only one term of office, which means that in most 
cases the Presidents are controlled by those they have nominated.  
Moreover, the Constitution provides, at best, very limited support for accountability, 
especially financial accountability. The actual control that would ensure accountability of 
public officials is not performed (Benin) or is incomplete (Ghana). Now, in Benin, the reports 
on the little that is done are not required to be sent to Parliament, which has a greater power 
over the Executive to take action on the findings of these reports. The only report sent to 
Parliament is the Report on the Execution of the Finance Law, which is purely a ‘budgetary 
control’ report. 
[This control] is just a budgetary control to say: this is what that has been authorised and this is 
what we have executed without looking at the supporting accounting documentation. [BC004] 
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Some time ago the President [of the Chamber of Accounts] went to the Parliament and they 
complained that they never received any attestation performance audit report; and the President 
told them that the law [Constitution] does not specifically cover this report, and the only report 
that must be sent to them is the Report on the Execution of the Finance Law to enable them to vote 
the ‘Loi de Règlement’. [BC004] 
Even in Ghana, where the audit reports are sent to Parliament and examined by the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC), Parliament fails to conduct the process to any meaningful 
results in terms of bringing people to account. 
The prospect in the public accountability [is] in the Parliament, unfortunately, that’s where the 
problem… begins. Because the PAC in Parliament has a lot of power in order to scrutinise the 
report and bring those felons to account. They fail miserably on this level, they fail miserably. 
[GNG02] 
This failure actually stems, to some extent, from the Ghanaian Constitution, which does not 
provide the Parliament with any power over the implementation of the PAC and the Auditor-
General’s recommendations: 
What they [PAC] do is simply write to what they call Audit Report Implementation Committees – 
ARIC. The Parliament writes through the PAC to ARIC… Apart from writing to them and getting 
[them] also write back on what they have done or not... [they do not bother] as to whether people 
who are supposed to be sanctioned – are they sanctioned? Nobody takes action on that. If you ask 
them [the PAC], they will say it is not within their domain because they have finished their work, 
and now it is for the executive to take action. If the executive is not taking action, there is not 
much they can do. [GNG06] 
Referring to the political machinery at work in these systems, one official, like many leaders, 
advised against an over-reliance on the independence of the external audit institution granted 
by Constitution: “we must say that when talking about independence there are a lot of 
parameters to take into consideration outside of the legal provision that establishes it”. 
[BC002] 
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7.1.3. Interest Groups Influence 
The study highlights the role of two main interest groups in governance in Benin and Ghana. 
These groups are political parties/groups and civil society. 
 
7.1.3.1. Political Parties or Political Groups 
Political parties or groups are perceived by public officials, NGO officials and even MPs to 
work mainly for partisan interests rather than for the nation’s interests. This originates with 
how the representatives of the citizens, i.e. the MPs, are positioned on the various committees 
in parliament: the positioning is more politically orientated than on the basis of the elected 
MP’s background. It is a fact that MPs are not elected based on their background but once 
elected this should at least guide the area/field where each representative will be able to make 
an effective contribution to satisfying the citizens’ interests. But this is not often the case, as 
described by an MP: 
…once you enter the Parliament, again it’s the political groups that manage to position their 
members on the various Committees. So it’s a consideration that is purely political… that’s the 
general framework. [BAN02] 
In addition, debating on issues is more party orientated than in the public interest.  
Parliament should work hard so that issues of personal interest don’t come first. But for now most 
of the issues are seriously politicised, and the voting is subjective depending on who has most 
MPs in the House. If it’s the government, then you are sure that almost all the things that are 
tabled [will be passed]..., and if the opposition is the minority then most of time they will boycott 
the hall... If it is a national interest they should discuss it objectively before the partisan interest. 
We haven’t got to that stage. [GNG07] 
A major consequence of this functioning of the citizens’ representative system is the failure 
to address the issues that are important to those they represent. 
On that [public interest] again unfortunately the fighting of the opposition and the party in 
government, [is] good as when it is in their own interest. When it is about the general population, 
it is rhetorical, they don’t address the substance; they antagonise the people, just playing party 
purpose but not addressing the poor issues that should be dealt with. [GNG02] 
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An important issue to the citizens is the effective functioning of State institutions to 
ultimately ensure the accountability of the government. But this issue is not really being 
addressed in either of the case study countries by the interaction between the political 
parties/groups. Formers MPs in both countries observe that MPs do not pressure the 
government to account because the fighting of the ruling and opposition parties does not 
often go in that direction.  
Moreover, the fighting is sometimes organised to weaken institutions working towards 
ensuring some level of accountability. The creation of the IGE in Benin, for example, to help, 
at least in theory, improve accountability in government organisations, faced serious partisan 
fight that has weakened the effectiveness of its work to some extent, as explained by a public 
official:  
If people want to be honest, they will say that… when the IGE started… it had some importance. 
The work done was reported to the President of the Republic… and it was examined 
systematically by the Council of Ministers in the same week. And the [appropriate] decisions were 
taken... Those decisions that could be implemented immediately were taken; and those people who 
should be removed from office were removed; [for] those who should be prosecuted, the process 
was started; recommendations related to the organisation of the controlled administrations were 
taken into account. So the IGE was not a scarecrow! At that time everyone started to realise that 
with this regime things will change: ‘the IGE is there, [so] if you mismanage the IGE will come 
and control’…  Too bad! Every one of us has realised that things did not progress like that… If I 
should talk about the case of Ben and Nick [pseudonyms] they were both elected as MPs at the 
[National] Assembly. Ben was supporting the government [and] as soon as our report touched on 
him… he [changed party and] went into the opposition… So that’s what it [IGE] should be and 
this is what it is now. Politics is involved in everything. We can’t do what we should do 
anymore…  [BIG02] 
 
 
7.1.3.2. Civil Society 
There is noticeable progress in civil society activity in both case countries, with an increasing 
number of NGOs in various domains, unions and media. Interviewees from NGOs and State 
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institutions perceive that there are very active citizens who are involved in civil society 
organisations with an active media. For example: 
As we talk now we have one of our banks… the Ghana Commercial Bank [GCB]… which had 
been doing very well consecutively for 3 years…; consecutively for 3 years it was the first 
performing bank. Meanwhile, the West, IMF and the World Bank are putting pressure on Ghana 
to sell that off… before the elections – that’s 2008 – people had to demonstrate against the 
Government of Ghana trying to sell [GCB and] the Agricultural Development Bank. So they had 
to postpone… Interestingly, they haven’t sold it [yet]. [GNG08] 
However two main factors affect the effectiveness of civil society activities. The first is the 
level of education and understanding of issues by the citizens involved, which limits the 
effect of their roles as pressure groups to improve governance. 
The citizens are not adequately informed of what you would expect the political system to yield 
for them... There is a smaller middle class, a very small middle class, a large base of unemployed, 
badly educated [people] that move around [more] on sentiment than on issues – that’s a challenge 
there. [GNG02] 
The second factor is the capturing of the civil society by political machinery. 
…and sadly civil society that is the hope to bring about change is gradually also being politicised. 
[GNG02] 
There is no doubt that the purpose of politicians in getting hold of civil society organisations 
is to reduce the extent of their pressure or otherwise shift the pressure to different directions, 
and clearly not towards accountability. Politicians are found to be getting involved directly in 
civil society organisations with the purpose inhibiting their quest for accountability. For 
example: 
At the moment, immediately when the other government lost power they created an NGO called 
AFAG – Alliance for Accountable Governance. All that they are talking is politicised and 
oversized, and it’s to manipulate what they say… [If] the police appeal an opposition person or a 
person who was in the previous government embezzlement, they would demonstrate, they 
campaign on human rights that they cannot arrest them – I mean that’s not civil society. [GNG06] 
There is however a positive contribution from the involvement of politicians in civil society. 
According to some interviewees, politicians from the opposition help the NGOs they control 
with information in order to increase the extent of their pressure on the government for 
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change. However other interviewees argue that there is a danger with politicians, whether 
from the opposition or the ruling government, being involved in civil society because they 
may not provide the correct information on which civil society bases its activities. The other 
important danger is that civil society is by definition independent from politics; and therefore 
the involvement of politicians is at odds with this principle and is seen as a significant blow 
to their contribution to governance. An example of such a blow in the perception of citizens 
is that of an NGO in Benin called ELAN that campaigned strongly against the revision of the 
Beninese Constitution to allow former President Mathieu Kérékou to stand for a third term. 
Initially the ELAN gained significant supports from all over the country, but the support 
faded quickly when it was discovered that the current President was behind their activities 
and the head of the NGO was appointed a Minister soon after the elections. 
Concerning the role of unions as civil society organisations, they had been very strong up to 
the point of transition to democracy. But since then there has not been any noticeable 
contribution of their role in ‘pushing’ towards improved governance. For example, in Benin, 
most recent attempts by unions to demonstrate against corruption and poor State finance 
management have either been repressed by the police or the IGE being sent to intimidate 
them. However, in Ghana, although unions are divided between politicians, some union 
organisations are perceived to objectively pressure government for changes. But it is also 
recognised that there is not much noticeable change coming out of these pressures. 
With regard to the media, although it has increased in size and is very active in providing 
citizens with information, the contribution of some media units to governance is limited due 
to their lack of independence from political influence.  
The media has not grown professionally over the years to address their critical role of reporting on 
the State from the ground… so the media hasn’t grown as fast as it should given the time nearly 
16 years of coverage, 18 years of multiparty democracy. They should have matured better than 
that. [GNG06] 
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When we consider the report on the state of free media… Benin is plummeting throughout the 
regime… You see! Why is that? It is observed that money [given to] [and] the contracts signed by 
the government with some media have limited them a lot. For example ORTB [State TV and radio] 
has become an organisation that is only at the service of the government rather than a public 
service organisation – a media to which the opposition does not actually have free access. [BO001] 
Interviewees recognise, however, that despite the observed weaknesses, some media units are 
playing a positive role by keeping people informed about governance related issues. But the 
main problem is the incapacity of the citizens to take any meaningful action in the current 
governance system. 
It’s butcher force. You know but you can’t do anything [GNG08] 
It follows that civil society has not been playing its role as would be expected in terms of 
pressuring hard for institutional changes and accountability. The main reason for such a 
situation is the significant political influence obstructing this role directly, by getting 
involved in civil society activities, or indirectly, by means of financial support, as described 
by an official. 
I’m saying that it [political buying of civil society] has permeated the society and that is my 
concern now. The kings, the religions, the unions, everybody receives [money] again and again. 
And we come to the question that… ‘since it has permeated the society, can we stop it at some 
point?’ [BC001] 
 
 
7.1.4. Relations between Government Agencies or Institutions 
Research in the case countries revealed that the relation between the Ministry in charge of 
Finance and the accounting and control department undermines to some extent the outcome 
of reforms and the effectiveness of the department. For example, interviewees observe that 
payroll reforms in Ghana to deal with payroll fraud (which “takes a sizeable chunk of 
government money and constitutes a big leakage for government” using the terms of a 
government official) encounter a lot of problems, and some of these problems are deliberate 
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because of vested interests within the Ministry of Finance in connivance with the Controller 
and Accountant General Department.  
In Benin, according to some officials, the lack of effectiveness of the financial control 
institution (IGF) is due to the attachment of this institution to the Ministry of Finance, even 
when the institution does good work. 
They [IGF] do a good job. But the problem is that it is limited. The IGF issues its reports but it is 
up to the Minister of Finance to take any action on them. It is up to the Minister of Finance to 
introduce it [the report] to the Council of Ministers or not. [BC004] 
…They make good recommendations but it doesn’t help much. Rarely [does] anything meaningful 
come out from their reports. [BC003] 
In the same way, the attachment of the IGE to the Presidency in Benin has seriously 
undermined the performance of the institution in terms of its contribution to governance.  
It [the IGE] is an ineffective institution, they can do a good job but if the government… those who 
are touched on by the reports are politically powerful and can compromise the re-election of the 
President of the Republic, the latter can decide to put it under a bushel, and that would be the end 
of it! The report will never be published. There are a lot of reports like this in the process – we 
know. [BP006] 
Let me give an example. They [the IGE] got an assignment to investigate whether there were any 
government organisations that had deposited funds at ICC [a Ponzi-like scheme in which the 
government is alleged to be involved]. The IGE report answers ‘Yes’ but [it] was made to say that 
no government organisations deposited funds at ICC, while everyone knows that some 
government organisations did… When we manipulate such information, it poses a problem for 
governance. [BP006] 
 
 
7.1.5. Cadre Maintenance 
Cadre maintenance concerns the development of staff at the various levels of leadership in 
government organisations and State institutions to ensure a quality service and leadership 
succession in these public institutions. But in general, although all officials interviewed 
recognise the importance of cadre development, they also acknowledge that it is yet to be 
seen in actual practice. 
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… the institutions are worth what the people who run them are worth, i.e. those charged with their 
functioning. [BC002] 
… when we talk of governance, we need to give a place to training to ensure leadership 
succession… [But] in Africa, we are afraid of leaving leadership positions… All the issues lay 
there; i.e. if I’m here now, I should train certain people so that when I leave they can take over the 
position. But I will manage to make sure that there is no training [so that I can stay at the position 
for life] (Chief Cabinet Minister) 
The quasi-absence of leadership succession is now a serious problem in one of the key 
institutions in one of the case study countries as observed by an official concerned about the 
situation.  
Today, we’ve got a serious personnel problem, a quality personnel problem. The personnel is too 
old and will be retiring soon… [BP010] 
According to interviewees, the problem with cadres in Benin stems from the recruitment or 
appointment stage, where the profile is not well defined, and even in case where it is well 
defined it is not followed in actual practice. An example was given about the ‘Chart of the 
Functioning of the Government of Dr Boni Yayi’ issued by the President and signed by all 
his Ministers. Unfortunately non-compliance with this chart started with the President himself 
initially with his attempt to impose the Chief Cabinet of the Ministry of Primary Education of 
his first government what is described as an opaque context, which resulted in the resignation 
of the Minister. This example, according to a joke made by a public official during a 
discussion, has given “the tone of what kind of compliance is required”. An interviewee 
concerned about the situation objected that we cannot always say “do what I say not what I 
do” meaning that if the leader’s action goes against what they say, it gives the opposite 
message, i.e. “do what I do not what I say”. 
In actual practice, appointment of officials is observed by interviewees to be essentially 
driven by political considerations.  
Political clientelism affects a lot the choice of public officials. The appointment of officials to 
technical functions is more political than technical. How can you expect to get results with such a 
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system? For example, to appoint… [a] director…, it is not the competence that we look at first. Is 
he in my political party? Did he campaign for me? [BIG003] 
In terms of continuing professional development, many officials recognised that training is 
absent or very limited and not targeted to result in any significant impact in terms of 
improving their competence for the effective functioning of public administrations and 
institutions. A senior official at a government institution commented:  
It happens but rarely… but it is not really what you would expect for those seniors, those in charge 
of sensitive roles... It is not what you would expect… If training exists, is it targeted to the job…? 
Is it linked to our competencies? These are interrogations, because I must recognise that we are 
not effective in that respect. [BP016] 
Concerning accounting specifically, the situation is no better, as described by two consultants 
working on the accounting system. 
…problem arises in terms of knowledge and competence [of public accountants]. The problem 
arises for [some] reasons… There is a lack of competence or lack of know-how, the absence of 
knowledge of public accounting. Most of them do not master the technical principles of public 
accounting… So, most of them don’t understand that. [BP006] 
Currently I think it is not… effective because the capacity is not up to speed and they haven’t 
really, I mean they have more work to do. They don’t have that many staff. Additionally they put 
in a lot of low-level staff at the [internal] audit services. And because of that they don’t even have 
confidence to deal with senior managers... Most of the problems... in the public sector, it manages 
from the top. So they are able to find the low grade problems, but the real serious ones they don’t 
even have the confidence to deal with. [GCO01] 
The situation is really appalling in terms of CPD. Training is substantially absent and subject 
to political will. 
… Things change; instead of training those who are competent or want to work well, we don’t do 
that. We send Jack on training because he is from my political party… There is no CPD anymore. 
[BO001] 
From an auditor’s point of view, some accountants are very poorly trained. 
The first question I ask myself is whether there is still a training plan in place. Because sometimes 
you come across some people [accountants] and you’ve got the impression that you are in front of 
an agronomist, i.e. someone who has never studied accounting… [BC004] 
The study finds that, all in all, cadre maintenance is poor in both countries as is the case in 
most of Africa. As a consequence, institutions are poorly run and, in most cases, according to 
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political will. The situation is similar in terms of accounting systems, characterised in some 
cases by low-level and poorly skilled staff. The impact of poorly skilled cadres on the 
outcome of reforms in Benin is given below. 
There is… a personnel problem at the TAD as is the case in the public administrations and 
institutions, that is, incompetent people, those who handicap the completion of reforms. There is 
also an institutional problem, that is, the manuals of procedures. The manuals are not produced 
and since things are changing it’s difficult for people to follow instructions. As a consequence we 
come to a situation where the personnel are subject to improvisation, and these make reforms 
obsolete. You see! When the personnel have a problem, they don’t have any valid interlocutor… 
they don’t have any [good] leaders who can tell them ‘in this situation this is what to do’. [BP007] 
 
 
7.1.6. Electoral Cycle 
Most interviewees are of the view that the electoral cycle has no significant positive impact 
on governance. At best it has no impact at all; otherwise, it deteriorates the quality of 
governance. During the pre-electoral period, political leaders identify the various weaknesses 
in governance and make promises to address them as part of their political agenda. However, 
once they assume power, the promises end there until another election is announced. It is also 
found that, in some cases, not only does the quality of governance not improve, but it 
deteriorates during the post-electoral period. 
… during the presidential campaign, Yayi Boni [current Benin President] promised that ‘6 months 
after I assume office as President of the Republic I will create the Court of Accounts’ because as 
President of BOAD [a regional development bank] he knew that Benin is one of the last countries 
yet to implement this reform; and he said ‘6 months after I assume office I will create the Court of 
Account’. And when he came, not only did he never talk about it, [but also] all the things we did 
in order to make progress in the process [were unsuccessful] and everything about it was buried. 
The dossier was on his desk before he came because it was one of the dossiers that were handed 
over to him when he took office. He committed to do it during the campaign; the dossier was then 
there [and] he didn’t do it. And now that he is at the end of his term they start promising ‘we will 
revise the Constitution to create the Court of Accounts’; now ‘give me a second term for me to do 
it’. What has prevented him from doing it during the first term? I listened to him and it made me 
smile. He wants to use this reform again as a campaign manifesto! [BC001] 
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Even in cases where the regime shows some positive signs that may improve governance at 
the early stage of the post-electoral period, a State official objected that those signs are just a 
politically astute way to build political image. Since these signs do not stem from the leaders’ 
good will, they quickly fade and leave the actual traits of governance to show. 
In general, it begins with the campaign period where political leaders with political programmes 
start presenting them; and those with no political programme use demagogy and things like that. 
Then when they come to power, they seem to apply governance, good management principles at 
the start... but it doesn’t last no matter what government is in power. They take advantage of the 
illiteracy of the population to govern their way. [BP013] 
Moreover, in certain cases, especially, during the pre-electoral period, interviewees observe 
serious disregards to the legal and institutional frameworks.  
…we had to sell off our telecommunication company that has been established over 40 years now 
with all the networks, telephone lines across the whole country… And Kufuor, the President 
himself, had to even, as we know it, pushed away everybody and took the negotiation himself 
directly and sold the firm off. He got… millions of dollars payback... [GNG08] 
This is further confirmed by the report commissioned on the sale of Ghana 
Telecommunications Company (GT) (70% of the share capital) to Vodafone International 
Limited BV released on 16 October 2009 as below. The report also found that the entire sale 
is unlawful. 
There was executive interference in the sale of GT with former President, John Kufuor, being the 
one who agreed on the transaction price, technical considerations and the underlying legal 
assumptions of the Vodafone offer of May 15, 2008. These negotiations by the former president 
were highly irregular, unconventional and did not rely on expert advice (Sawyerr, Deputy Chief of 
Staff). 
The disrespect for legal and institution frameworks outlined in the above example happened 
in the pre-electoral period in 2008 in Ghana. The payback personally obtained from the 
transaction has obviously, according to a public official during an after-interview discussion, 
partly funded the 2008 presidential electoral campaign, since Mr Kufuor was listed to contest 
it.  
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The current on-going ‘Woyome saga’, where Mr Alfred Woyome – the ruling government 
party’s financier – has been paid GH¢58 million for a non-existing contract according to the 
State Attorney General, Martin Amidu (of the same ruling government party) who qualifies 
the scandal as a “gargantuan crime” is another case happening as the 2012 election 
approaches. Moreover, Mr Martin Amidu whose office tenure is secured by the Constitution, 
was fired by the President on January, 19 2012 after disclosing information about the case, 
for the reason that his “…behavior is incompatible with acceptable standards expected of 
Ministers and appointees of the President”54.  
In terms of accounting procedures, the situation is similar with no or limited regard for the 
required procedures by leading officials of the Executive. 
There is a trend in this [pre-electoral] period that has generalised completely. [Even] the ministries’ 
Finance Directors talk about it when they get together with their friends. The Ministers say ‘listen 
manage to find [CFA franc] 2 million. I’m organising a meeting to support the President, that and 
that’. And he [the Finance Director] does everything to find 3 million; he keeps 1 million for 
himself and gives 2 million to the Minister… [BC001] 
Similarly in this period, requests for disbursement outside of required procedures have been 
substantiated.  
…often the Government Secretary writes to the Head of the TAD saying that the Council of 
Ministers has met and decided to disburse a certain amount of money! You see! It’s not something 
that should be expected… So the procedures are very marginally complied with. [BP004] 
…the Council of Ministers takes a decision to give funds to a particular person; especially in these 
electoral times we pay a lot of expenses via OP [payment without supporting documents]. [BP05] 
According to many officials at the TAD and in some ministries the recent budget was only 
executed by about 50% and one would wonder why leaders are giving ‘priority’ to such 
irregular disbursements/expenditures outside the budget that has been voted by the 
Parliament. Overheard comments during interviews and informal discussions with officials 
                                                          
54
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indicate that the main motive is to build up funds for electoral campaigns and to ‘secure’ 
some votes. 
Overall, the study found that the electoral cycle has a negative impact on governance due to 
its lack of influence on how political leaders abide by the legal and institutional frameworks, 
on the one hand, and its limited impact on making political leaders keep electoral promises on 
the other. 
 
7.1.7. Internal Political Environment: The Excessive Use of Political Power 
At the heart of governance lie the people, the ‘elite’ in charge of the frontline role of 
leadership. The elite exercise their leadership role by using the political power conferred to 
them. The study reveals that in both case countries most of the officials interviewed are of the 
view that politics is too intrusive in the running of State institutions. 
The politics dominates too much the administrative, while each should normally play its own role. 
Yet our administrations are well structured, the government having their political side where they 
can put their people, and the administrative side where they should put pure technicians. But I 
observe that, generally in practice, the trend reverses and everything becomes more political than 
administrative. [PB013] 
For example: 
...Normally, the Secretary of the Ministry… and the Chief Cabinet [of the Ministry] are purely 
administrative; [and] it’s the Deputy Chief Cabinet [DCC] who is political. The DCC is the 
political man of the Minister who helps him to consider the contours of the political decisions he 
wants to make… But unfortunately, the Chief Cabinet who should be an administrative… is 
political, and everything is lost altogether. The DCC [is] perhaps political, the Chief Cabinet 
political, and the Minister political and the ministry is lost! There is no longer any objective vision. 
There are only political visions with calculations behind. [BP013] 
The ‘excessive’ use of the political power by the elite is more explicitly outlined by a 
governance activist NGO official and a public official: 
The legal framework would be there but they would exercise the power the way they want. And 
above all they taunt you! That’s what happens with all governments… That’s where the 
disappointment lies. [BO002] 
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Our system here has been weakened by the politicisation of issues. They come to government, 
they remove people and they put their own people there. So the systems don’t work... [GNG08] 
The research findings show that excessive exercise of political power takes three forms. First, 
it is done through the appointment of public officials irrespective of legal requirements. 
Those appointed in such a manner have no concern for governance principles, especially for 
accountability requirements established by the legal and institutional framework in existence 
in these countries. 
…the human resources appointed to certain positions do not follow [the required] procedures. And 
there are many reasons for that. Either it is because of political affiliation, or there is too much 
interference from external hierarchy. And they give up the good practices for the bad ones… 
[BO002] 
…the other side of this is that because you are put in there by the President, you’d not want to do 
anything that will displease the President! [GNG03] 
It is a game! If you take the Auditor General report, every year, there are [an] amount of people 
who are ruining the State... Why they are not doing anything? That’s how the accountability of the 
financial management system works! [GNG06] 
As a result of the appointment system, accountability is rather geared toward the President or 
the government – as outlined by the second interviewee above – instead of toward the 
relevant State institutions or the citizens at large, as required by governance principles. 
Second, excessive political power is also used to deprive State institutions entrusted with 
control or accountability function of access to resources. This is to prevent these institutions 
from exercising their monitoring role, and therefore to maintain a weak accountability system 
that allows corruption and malpractice to thrive. One of the key institutions subject to this 
excessive political power is the one in charge of audit in both case study countries.  
Now in our country, instead of providing the external control institution [with resources], i.e. the 
financial jurisdiction, so that the management of public resources by the government can be 
monitored, the government typically deprives that institution from access to resources and prefers 
to give the resources to those institutions that it controls and used the control results for one-sided 
and political purposes. That’s the tragedy with us! [BC001] 
As a result, the Chamber of Accounts is unable to accomplish its accountability function. 
243 
 
… concerning the fulfilment of the Chamber of Accounts’ mission, it is very limited at the 
moment because the Chamber of Accounts covers much less than 10% of its mandate… [BC002] 
Similarly, in Ghana: 
They [state auditors] do a good job but they are under-resourced. And this under-resource issue 
causes a lot of problems for its own effectiveness… So what happened is this, sometimes you look 
at the report they figure that accountants or this District Administrative Officers in region X 
embezzled this amount of fund but… the report is late... If the report is there, by the time you go, 
this man is no longer at the post. He’s gone… So this late reporting which, to a large extent, 
involves the lack of resources means that accountability is not taking place. [GNG02]  
On the other hand, the institution in charge of financial reporting is not exempted. The 
research witnessed live instances during the interview at the TAD in Benin. All of the 
instances were related to system failure caused by lack of resources and insufficient human 
and material resources impeding the work flow in various divisions. In one of the instances, a 
manager upset with a recurring system failure was complaining to another manager with 
higher authority in these terms:  
…the work is difficult and yet the resources are not provided. [BP008] 
Third, excessive political power diverts the mission of government institutions which are then 
used as a ‘weapon’ against other governance players – often the pressure groups. This is 
particularly prominent in Benin with the internal control institutions, some of which are given 
‘extensive’ power over government and non-government organisations. 
It’s not because unions want to go on strike [that] I will send the IGE to control them… The PR 
[President of the Republic] sends the IGE because the unions’ members want to go on strike. 
[BC004] 
…When we take the IGE… which is the leading [internal] control institution, the fact that it is 
attached to the Presidency is a problem in itself. Because it is only when the President says ‘go’ 
that they go – I can put it simply like that... So if the President or even the government asks to 
slow down on a certain dossier, they will slow down. And also they are proved to have discredited 
themselves all the time along. Because we’ve got the impression that it has become a machine to 
terrorise the opposition or heads of firms that, perhaps, belong to the opposition or the opponents, 
etc... When it is done like that the spirit of the control mechanism is misguided… [BO001] 
The example of the use of the IGE to ‘terrorise’ unions in Benin is confirmed in a recent 
study by Wynne (2011), who reports that the IGE has been used by the executive in its 
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campaign against unions’ pressure on corruption and poor management of State finance, 
among other things. By doing so, the role of some governance players is reduced or 
weakened, and the quality of governance deteriorates as a result. 
 
7.1.8. Summary Discussion on the Internal Political System and Institutional Forces 
In the sphere of internal political system and forces, prior studies such as Haggard and Webb 
(1993) suggest that following transition to democracy “the new government can more easily 
gain support for broad initiatives if the regime change occurred because of failures in 
economic policy” (p.148). Such initiatives may include institutional reforms in line with the 
democratic framework, and thus potentially increases government and individual political 
leaders’ accountability.  
However, this research does not support such analysis. In particular in Benin, the absence of 
adequate preparation at the transition point triggered by social and economic crisis had led to 
the design of institutional reforms which are reported to be not well aligned with the local 
context, with the design of an accounting system that limits accountability. A related issue is 
the Constitution of these countries. The Constitution, which, as the supreme legal framework, 
is supposed to provide an adequate system of balance of power and an accounting system 
with appropriate authority and power to strengthen accountability, fails to provide such 
provisions. The balance of power in these countries is very compromised, with the executive 
having overwhelming power over the parliament and the judiciary.  
These findings add to existing studies. For example, similar findings regarding the excessive 
power of the executive, through the President, are reported in various African Development 
Bank studies in Chad, Gabon, Mauritania and Benin (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c), and in 
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Tripp (2000) and Koch’s (2011) studies regarding Tanzania. Another study by Diamond 
(2008) supports these findings by reporting that:  
Governance in Africa is in a state of transition, or some would say, suspension… Of course, 
formal institutions… can coexist with the informal practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic 
mobilization, and personal rule by largely unchecked presidents (Diamond, 2008: 138). 
In particular, the accounting institutions lack the power, resources and effective independence 
to play any significant role in government accountability. This reality is not only confined to 
Benin and Ghana. It is reported in many countries in Africa, such as Uganda (Global Integrity, 
2009), Tanzania (Koch, 2011), Nigeria (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010), etc. For example, Iyoha 
and Oyerinde (2010) report that in Nigeria: 
Checks and balances are lacking with the Auditor-General of the Federation also lacking the 
required independence. Recently, the Auditor-General of the Federation (Ejenavi) announced that 
Nigeria does not have a ‘functioning Audit law’. The various basic laws and rules such as the 
Auditing, Accounting and Financial Standards rules which regulate auditing in Nigeria are not 
comprehensive and harmonized enough to cater for Nigeria’s environment (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 
2010: 369). 
The implication of these findings for both practice and policy is that a governance framework 
without an adequate accountability mechanism is deemed to be limited at best, or failed at 
worst. The problem is particularly acute in Benin, where the supreme audit institution carries 
out less than 10% of its constitutional mandate without any power or authority to 
significantly improve the situation; in particular, no government account has been audited 
since its establishment. It is scandalous that government and officials are unaccountable in 
their management of public resources, which also impairs their political accountability, as the 
public is deprived of vital information in order to effectively exercise their ‘democratic’ 
rights including voting out officials and governments whose performance is found 
unsatisfactory. As argued by Stiglitz and Chang (2001: 13) “meaningful participation in 
democratic process requires informed participants”. 
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Another key internal political factor is the electoral cycle. The political business cycle models 
postulate that the ruling parties will manipulate economic policy to improve economic 
conditions in the short term when elections approach, in order to maximise their electoral 
chances (Haggard and Webb, 1993). Thus, it is expected to observe similar behaviour from 
the ruling parties in terms of governance improvements when elections approach. However, 
Haggard and Webb also point out that such political business cycle models may not work in 
the developing world, owing to the lack of effective institutional factors which are present in 
the developed world.  
This research does not support the political business cycle in the area of governance. 
Evidence from Benin and Ghana supports the irrelevance of the political business cycle, and 
rather proves the opposite. In fact, during the pre-electoral period, various disregards to 
institutional rules and procedures including those pertaining to the accounting systems have 
been observed, resulting in, among other things, scandalous financial misconducts, and thus 
deterioration of governance quality. Indeed, it is evident that institutional factors such as 
totally independent media (Haggard and Webb, 1993) and informed and active civil society 
in these countries are limited. But the overarching factor is suggested to be the weak 
accountability system, including political accountability, where the electorate vote on 
‘sentiment’ 55  with limited understanding of the implications of their vote. The weak 
accountability system also relates to the weak electoral systems where election results can be 
manipulated successfully with no major constraining factors, as noted in studies such as 
Abbink (2010) and observed by many interviewees in this research.  
It is predicted that civil society and political groups play an important role in governance 
development in Africa, particularly with reference to the successful opposition of civil 
                                                          
55
 This is the term used by one of the NGO officials to describe the lack of education of the electorate and their 
limited understanding of elections and their voting implications.  
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society and political party groups to the attempt of the respective presidents of Zambia in 
2001, Nigeria in 2007, and Malawi in 2009 to amend the Constitution to run beyond the 
constitutional terms (Posner and Young, 2007). Thus, the civil society and party groups are 
suggested as key interest groups with an important role in ensuring government and political 
leaders’ accountability, and governance improvements accordingly. The findings from Benin 
and Ghana partly support Posner and Young’s study, with successful opposition from 
political groups and civil society, particularly from the former NGO ‘ELAN’, to force former 
President Mathieu Kérékou to renounce any formal attempt to amend the Constitution at the 
end of his constitutional terms in 2006. There have also been successful civil society 
oppositions to the sale of the Agricultural Development Bank and Ghana Commercial Bank 
in Ghana in 2008 for example.  
However, this study also found contradictory evidence regarding the influence of political 
groups and civil society organisations in terms of governance improvement. Apart from a few 
particular instances in Benin and Ghana (some mentioned above), no major influence from 
these interest groups on governance quality was observed in both countries. In fact, political 
groups fight for party interests rather than national ones, sometimes even diverting the work 
of accountability institutions such as the IGE in Benin to serve political purposes. Civil 
society is also being politicised, limiting its core role in the case study countries. As 
mentioned in this chapter, the head of the NGO ‘ELAN’ has been a member of the executive 
in Benin as a Minister since the end of the campaign that led to the election of the current 
President in 2006. Also, the initial objective of the NGO (renamed ‘ELAN AFRIQUE’) to 
fight for improved democracy and governance changed in 2009 to fight for poverty 
alleviation, education and women’s emancipation56.  
                                                          
56
 See http://elanafrique.canalblog.com/ 
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Another area of the internal political factors is cadre maintenance. The effectiveness of public 
institutions and administrations is dependent on the formal structure of the executive power, 
appointment, promotion and removal processes that are in place (Wamsley and Zald, 1973), 
i.e. the cadre maintenance system. According to Wamsley and Zald (1973), cadre 
maintenance should follow a consistent appropriate pattern for the institution aiming to meet 
the expectations of the organisation, its elite and others groups including control agencies. 
Evidence from Benin and Ghana suggest that cadre maintenance is a general issue affecting 
most public institutions where the appointment and promotion of executives follows, most 
often, political clientelism. Continuing professional development is also subject to political 
will and is very limited.  
The implication for practice and policy is that poor cadre maintenance affects the 
performance of public institutions in delivering public service and its internal agenda for 
reform as and when appropriate (see, for example, Schacter, 2009). The situation sets 
“…pervasive doubt about state capacity... The doubt rule[s] out prospects for the self-
regeneration of the state or for its own internal reform into a more effective actor in the 
development process (Mkandawire, 2002: 15). Mkandawire may be too sceptical, arguing 
that “the doubt rules out prospects” for successful internal reform initiatives. This does not 
necessarily rule out prospects but points to the limited ability to undertake such initiatives in 
some, probably critical, government institutions. 
 
7.2. Internal Economic Interests/Forces 
Two economic forces are found in the study. These are the private economic interests of 
political leaders and supporters, and the economic interests of business organisations. 
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7.2.1.  Private Economic Interest of Political Leaders and Supporters 
The economic interests and forces rest both with those who access power and those who 
support them to get into the position of power. Before accessing power, political leaders 
spend substantial amounts of resources, in part from themselves and in part from the political 
party. In addition, they get support from various individuals and business people. The 
economic interests of those who access power is to recover the financial resources spent, with 
a surplus. 
Those who get elected are those who spend the most. And that person when he comes to power… 
it’s like he made an investment. [So] when he comes he wants to recoup his investment, and that’s 
what brings about all the things that we see – that’s the governance problem… [BP006] 
Interestingly, once established in the position, they want to consolidate their power and pay 
back those individuals and businessmen who supported them during the process: 
When you are in the position, because you want to stay for the things you spend time and 
resources to get you in that position, you want to get back financial resources; you want also to 
pay back people who have helped you to be in that position in terms of rewarding contracts, in 
terms of appointments. [GNG03] 
And in the case of Ghana, in the past two years we had these party stakeholders, people who 
worked towards, they worked hard for the current government to win elections. In the end they 
have to be rewarded in terms of jobs; so sometimes the government pressures hard to put them in 
places where they don’t fit. In the public sector economy, most of directors of the various state-
owned institutions are appointed by the President, mainly partisans… So it’s rewards for loyalty 
for contributions in terms of time, funds for the campaign process... And this doesn’t encourage 
good governance. [GNG03] 
For these economic interests be satisfied as described above, the institutions need to be weak 
and pressures for reforming them limited or easily waived by the ruling power in place 
without the fear of any major consequences. This is explained in the following comment by 
an NGO official who works as a governance watchdog. 
…why our [are] leaders not putting in place effective governance mechanism?... Because it’s not 
always in their interest to do so. There is no incentive to leave a place where institutions are weak. 
That means that the leader will have more power. Throughout the system the leader has a great 
opportunity to consolidate his whole [power] within the system by giving out patronage, by giving 
out positions, by giving out contracts, etc. You can do that if the institutions are weak. If the 
250 
 
institutions are strong you can’t really do that. So there’s still incentive on the leaders to do that. 
So there has to be crucial demand from various sources before you can see improvement. [GNG01] 
It follows that the need of political leaders to satisfy their private economic interests and 
those of their supporters gives them an incentive to maintain weak governance institutions 
including institutions of accounting systems. The weak accounting system enables 
government officials and functionaries to award contracts without due process, and abuse the 
system.  An official describes the situation in local governments as follow: 
[You find]…people in the local government system sitting on this tender board and then awarding 
contracts to themselves [because] accounting systems are very weak down there. [GNG02]   
In Benin, the audit institution found that in executing the 1999 and 2000 finance laws, the 
government collected extra resources that were neither authorised by nor reported to 
Parliament. Furthermore, the report on the execution of the 1998 finance law notes among 
other matters the existence of illegal overspendings and the existence of revenue and 
expenses outside the budget (Akakpo
57
, 2009). It is recalled here that the audit institution is 
deprived of the resources to be able to do its work effectively. Moreover, the institution has 
never carried out since its establishment the judicial financial control which is its main audit 
mandate to deter public officials and accountants from mismanagement and misappropriation. 
And yet this institution is an important control institution underpinning the accounting system 
and ultimately good governance. Interestingly, the underperformance of the institution is 
deliberately maintained by the political leaders in order to maintain an opaque public finance 
management system from which they are the first to benefit (Akakpo, 2009). 
 
                                                          
57
 Maxime Akakpo is a Coneiller at the Chamber of Accounts in Benin. He has an extensive experience both at 
the Ministry of Finance and at the Chamber of Accounts, and his desire to write this piece of work is motivated, 
as he claims, by his duty to inform the citizens of how public finances are managed in Benin from his 
experience.  
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7.2.2. Economic Interests of Business Organisations 
The study has tried to find out whether business organisations or trade associations have any 
impact on governance, whether positive or negative, on the premise that a certain quality of 
governance is necessary for business to prosper. So, if, for example, the governance 
environment deteriorates, are trade associations able to pressure government to change policy 
in order to improve? This is because, when governance deteriorates and result in, for example, 
strong public outrage everyone loses; in particular companies may lose their business, 
including loss of assets and markets.  Surprisingly, members of trade associations interviewed 
in both case study countries admit that business organisations do not play any major role in 
governance.  
…you know …it’s not like in Europe where there is a lobby of heads of companies to get this and 
that. We only fight for our businesses. It’s true that many firms turn around the government to be 
awarded contracts. But it’s not to change this issue or that. Well, we’ve got a reduction in 
corporate tax rate some time ago but it’s not to require improvement in governance. [BPA02] 
They do not find themselves in pressuring governments to improve governance because this 
is risky in the case study countries’ environment for two reasons. First, according to 
interviewees, if the government identifies a company as being part of any activity pressuring 
for changes against the government, they will ask the Revenue Service to chase that company 
for hefty fines that could send the company into bankruptcy. This usually takes the form of 
unwarranted tax evasion investigations to fine the company for one reason or another. Second, 
if the company is able to survive at all, it becomes almost impossible for that company to get 
any government contract, even if it bids for a public tender and its offer is obviously the best. 
For these reasons trade association members or individual companies avoid any actions that 
would upset the government, in order for them to still be able to win government contracts 
and secure their business interests.  
We [company managers] are running our companies to make money. If you put yourself in the 
government’s way, then you are sure to go out of business or throttle your company for some 
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time... So the wise manager sees how to get along with the government to keep business going 
[BPA04] 
 
 
7.2.3. Summary Discussion on the Internal Economic Interests/Forces 
Elections and ‘vote buying’ require significant resources which are initially constituted by 
contributions from various supporters or coalitions of supporters. Such contributions 
represent economic stakes for the political leaders and their supporters which are rewarded in 
various forms such as awarding contracts (often fictitious contracts or ones without due 
diligence), appointments (often to positions where the appointees do not fit) or sometimes 
direct diversion of resources (both financial and material) for personal use. Reform initiatives 
with potential to affect these economic interests are likely to fail. For example, a study of 
governance reforms in Uganda reveals that: 
…anti-corruption initiatives are not motivated by strong political incentives, as successful 
implementation could potentially undermine support for the regime from highly placed officials 
and politicians who are susceptible to detection and prosecution. (Robinson, 2006: 32) 
On the other hand, while Goldsmith’s (2002) study on business association and governance, 
surprisingly, suggests that “African business associations are likely to be foundation stones 
for future progress in governance” (p.48), this study found contradicting evidence from Benin 
and Ghana, in that, business organisations do not exercise any major influence on governance 
improvement. At best, they do not influence governance quality in these countries, except for 
aligning with the government for their business economic interests through government 
contracts (including bending contract award rules). The limited role of business organisations 
is also due to the ‘repressive’ nature of government actions when a firm is identified as 
pressuring for changes against the government. Such repressive actions are similarly reported 
in Abbink (2010), concerning civil society in general.  
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An important implication of these findings is that businesses have an interest in improved 
governance quality, at least, for their survival in the long run. In fact, when governance 
deteriorates and leads to public outrage, for example, businesses will suffer with loss of assets, 
staff and resources; if these losses are very significant, it may result in the company going out 
of business altogether. 
 
7.3.  International Political and Economic Considerations 
The study identifies three main international actors shaping the quality of governance and 
accounting systems in the case study countries. These actors are the World Bank, the former 
colonising countries, or simply ‘colonial patrons’, and the donor community as a group. 
There is, however, a fourth actor represented by other individual developed countries but 
evidence related to the involvement of these countries individually is too limited to warrant 
further considerations. 
 
7.3.1. The World Bank 
According to interviewees, including officials from the World Bank (WB) itself, the Bank 
uses three main mechanisms in its direct support to strengthening governance, particularly in 
Africa: loan/grant conditionality, internal advisers, and external experts/consultants. 
 
7.3.1.1. Loan/Grant Conditionality 
The term ‘conditionality’ is no longer in use in WB operations. It has been replaced by ‘prior 
actions’ and ‘triggers’, which in essence are still conditionality, as explained by one of the 
Bank’s officials. 
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Well, we now don’t say ‘conditionality’. We say ‘prior action’ or ‘triggers’. Prior action [means] 
that this action needs to be completed, which is still conditionality but we don’t just call it 
conditionality [anymore], which needs to be completed before we can advance this amount of 
money. Then triggers are the actual actions which trigger us thinking about providing funds to 
you… We have prior action for the year that you are preparing an operation… the year after that is 
a trigger. But the second year that trigger becomes a prior action and the subsequent year will 
become a trigger like that. This is how we do these things. [GWB02] 
Therefore since the application of the news terminologies is the same in substance as for 
conditionality, the latter remains the preferred term used throughout the study. The main 
rationale for the use of conditionality is to push governments towards the adoption of certain 
reforms which in the view of the WB should improve governance. To get such reforms 
through, the Bank uses its economic power represented by its financial support.  
... We undertake some actions in these countries, and these actions take different forms. They can 
take the form of budgetary support. Here... either we give a grant or we give this IDA 
[International Development Association] loan [of] some millions of dollars [over] 10, 30, 50 years 
depending on the [priorities], and in return we negotiate with the country the reforms that we find 
important… The idea is to make the States commit to adopt certain type of reforms for the 
disbursement to take place. [BWB01] 
The Bank said that the adoption of reforms is based on the outcome of discussion and 
agreement. But according to government officials, the reforms are imposed given the 
economic power of the Bank. 
It’s especially the World Bank which, often, when they come to a country like Benin for example, 
imposes itself, requires certain reforms with the threat to stop financial supports if not adopted. 
[BP013] 
Notwithstanding how the reforms get through, they require governments to commit more to 
the adoption than the implementation, and this is where the whole process lacks effectiveness. 
The Bank uses its economic power to get the reforms adopted but does not push in the same 
way towards the implementation of these reforms, which calls into question the Bank’s 
motive in adopting such an approach. For example the WB would require that a certain law 
be drafted in the process of a reform as conditionality: this law is never passed, and so what is 
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the whole purpose of drafting such law? This flaw in the approach is recognised by the Bank 
in these terms: 
Our triggers and prior actions for reforms must transcend to ensuring that laws are actually 
established not [just presenting] draft laws to Parliament… You can present the law to Parliament 
and we just give the money and the law would lie there for the next ten years and so on. So we 
must bring Parliament into the look for reforms, in the absence of which… we are dividing our 
support for the country by pushing only at the government level when it should be at the whole 
country level, and Parliament is part of the country, is part of the overall government process; but 
we tend not to [apply] any triggers for Parliament, nothing! [GWB02] 
Moreover, even when the law is passed, the whole process ends there, and not much is done 
to implement it. So the whole reform process is simply about passing a law. For example, the 
reform that led to the vote of the Financial Administration Act in Ghana to establish a 
financial administration tribunal since 2003 has never seen this tribunal being set up to 
strengthen the accounting system.  
…you know we’ve been working with Parliament on public hearings. Unfortunately, over the 
periods a key request by the Public Accounts Committee that was approved by the executive has 
still not been implemented to have a financial tribunal. The tribunal that would prosecute people 
who steal [public funds] – it hasn’t been done! It’s more than 3 [actually 9] years now, it hasn’t 
been done and there is no hope to get it done! [GNG08] 
This is confirmed by the WB itself. 
For example... there is a law in the Financial [Administration] Act which says that there should be 
a tribunal established for financial misappropriation to enforce Auditor-General recommendations 
which have been looked at by the PAC of Parliament. But nobody ever, has ever actually gone 
through that tribunal. So there’s no enforcement of that tribunal. [GWB02] 
It is not surprising that nobody ever goes through the tribunal, as observed by the WB 
because the tribunal has not been set up in the first place for about nine years now. And as 
stated by the public official above, there is limited hope of seeing this done unless significant 
pressures internally and externally, especially from those with financial economic power, 
shake the different parties involved to get it through. It could still be established with pressure 
from stakeholders, but the establishment is not an end in itself, but it is rather the 
effectiveness; so pressure needs to be applied in both directions. 
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The leaders are content with the situation because they are only required to ‘adopt’ and not 
necessarily to implement. One of the reasons for this approach that comes out from the study 
is that the Bank itself faces some pressures from “the big shareholders of the Bank, i.e. the 
big countries”58 who have political and economic interests in these countries. This is covered 
in more detail in the ‘donor community as a group’ section below. 
In brief, it is found that the Bank is more concerned with pushing towards a legal and 
regulatory environment that leads to a stable investment environment in order to prepare the 
path for foreign investments, the majority of which are from big corporations from the ‘big 
countries’. It follows that some aspects of good governance are more rhetorical than seriously 
designed efforts to strengthen governance and build accountable States. And this is easily 
observed from the low emphasis on implementation of reform. Even when it happens that 
some implementation aspects are included as part of the conditionality, they do not occur in 
actual practice, and the Bank is not itself very demanding on that front. The failure in this 
regard is acknowledged by the Bank, when asked their view on the lack of effectiveness of 
conditionality: 
I agree with you 100%. Me, I think some 90% of these development policy operations are just 
actions to manage… [governments]. Because invariably the governments don’t really meet those 
triggers. But we find a way to contour it to make sure they get the money. [GWB02] 
 
 
7.3.1.2. Internal Advisers 
Another direct mechanism of the WB to strengthen governance in Africa is the use of 
advisers. This is where the Bank uses its political influence to shape government policy and 
reforms. When asked about the political influence of the WB in its financial support towards 
reforms, it replies that: 
                                                          
58
 This is a term used by a World Bank official to refer to the major shareholders of the Bank. 
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Interesting enough, the World Bank is apolitical at least in theory! It does not actually enforce 
elections normally… [GWB02] 
This response clearly implies that its apolitical role is only in theory and that in practical 
terms the Bank does undertake some form of politics. This is further supported by the fact 
that this official laughed at the question as a sign of unexpected naivety on the part of the 
researcher to ask such a question. It follows that the apolitical discourse of the WB is more 
for public image and public relations than a practical stand. Such discourse does work in 
society and even with many officials although some are cautious, clarifying that the Bank 
does not engage in politics ‘directly’ as illustrated in the statement below: 
The WB does not do politics directly so it doesn’t have a governance sort of politics programme. 
[GNG01] 
However, other officials recognise that the Bank has some political influence, especially 
through its advisers appointed to assist the government directly at various levels. An example 
is given about the Ministry of Finance of Ghana. 
The WB and the IMF for instance have officers located in the Ministry of Finance. They have 
their own offices at the headquarters, but they have offices which are located in the Ministry of 
Finance to be close to them. They have an influence; the WB has influence on how Ghana really 
do[es] what they set… Whatever they say, Ghana needs to listen... [GNG07] 
Interviewees observe that the political influence of the Bank, however, has some impact but 
the contribution to governance improvement is still not significant. Two main reasons are 
found to explain this limited impact. The first is that:  
…to improve governance in any country it’s a hard work, hard work. You’re really pushing up 
against the political system that is very reluctant to improve… [so] if they are not succeeding [it] 
wouldn’t  [be] blame[d]… entirely on them... [GNG01] 
In fact the political leaders want ‘chaos to thrive’59 and efforts of the Bank to strengthen 
institutions go directly against this desire of the leaders who manage to neutralise the Bank’s 
                                                          
59
 A term used by the World Bank. 
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effort. The second reason is the one given earlier as the pressure from the ‘big countries’ that 
have political and economic interests to secure.  
 
7.3.1.3. External Experts/Consultants 
The final mechanism to directly support governance improvement is the use of external 
experts or consultants. This approach is part of the technical assistance of the Bank. It takes 
three forms according to the findings of the study. The first is concerned with the design of 
reform, which is perceived to work when based on the local context and is undertaken with 
effective collaboration and consultation with the relevant people. However when the purpose 
of the consultant/expert is to replicate ‘best practices’ the reform is expected to fail due to, at 
least, lack of ownership.  
…if you employ a consultant or an adviser from somewhere to develop it [reform] and say that 
‘this is the best thing that will be used for all countries that are benefiting from your funds’ it 
might not work. So if it is not working, you brought it and say it is not working. [GNG07] 
The second form of the use of external experts is capacity building. According to the Bank, 
they identify capacity need based on weaknesses in the government system and provide 
resources to train officials in various fields via a consultant. The officials interviewed have 
different experience with this approach. For some, the use of consultants to train public 
officials improves their competence. For others, this approach does not help, due to the broad 
knowledge of the consultant who lacks specific experience. 
When it happens that we organise training, it is not adapted to the role. It is something general. 
[And] the consultants who do these trainings have the same problem. [BP015] 
The third use of external experts is related to undertaking certain practical assignments such 
as evaluation of systems or performance of an audit assignment for example. Such approach 
is effective when there is a lack of local expertise, and the use of an expert is followed by 
capacity building in the specific area. When local expertise exists, the use of external experts 
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does not help for two reasons. The first reason is the fact that the consultant is very expensive 
compared with the local labour rate, which poses an efficiency issue. The second reason is 
that although the external expert may have relevant competence, they may not have the 
specific contextual knowledge and experience, which poses the problem of effectiveness. 
When the support comes with the condition that [the funds] should be given to a consultant instead 
of... you’re given [it does not work]. Because the consultant is given high rates… the consultant 
hasn’t got the experience of the public sector [in this country] or doesn’t understand the culture 
like the beneficiary institution. [GA003] 
 
 
7.3.2. Colonial ‘Patron’ 
The roots of the initial governance and accounting systems framework in most of Africa can 
be traced back to the colonial period. As argued by Zacarias (1999: 87) “African States are 
successors of colonial States which had been established” by Europe. England and France 
were the main colonisers in Africa (see for example Firmin-Sellers, 2002). This results in a 
divide between French and English systems which is rooted in the colonial inheritance from 
France and England which had set the initial governance and accounting framework during 
and at the end of the colonial period. Despite, however, the end of colonisation, the 
relationship between the former ‘colonisers’ and their ‘colonies’ still has a significant 
influence (Herbst, 1997) over the development of governance and accounting in Africa. As 
noted by Iheriohanma and Oguoma (2010): 
Probably, the [historical] relationship… was designed by the western initiators to ensure 
domination of the colonies for their projected intention and gains. This is evident in the kind of 
administrative and leadership style and legacies and development programmes provided by the 
colonialists in Africa… It could be interpreted that the development structures and policies by the 
colonialists never allowed space for the emergent leaders in Africa to revolt against the structures 
or worst still that these leaders did not realize the necessity to reform the inherited development 
structures to the needs of Africa and Africans (p.410). 
260 
 
While the governance framework is framed around three pillars: the Executive, the 
Legislative and the Judiciary, across Africa, the structure of the framework varies depending 
on whether it is English or French Africa. 
Evidence for this part of the research was available more on France for French speaking 
Africa than on the UK
60
 for English speaking Africa. Most of the evidence suggests ‘advice’ 
as the main channel used to shape governance and accounting systems in Africa, although 
some evidence suggests training as another channel.  
The weak governance in Africa is looked at in view of its historical, and more specifically its 
colonial, past. The challenges faced by African countries in improving their governance and 
economic development are in part due to their colonial history. As reported by Verschave
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(1999: 304) “For some historical reasons, post-colonial Africa is facing some difficulties to 
reconstruct its own political, economic and social architecture”. Despite their formal 
independence, the former French colonies in Africa are still under the domination of France 
which “has continued to run them indirectly via its advisors remained in those countries” 
(Pesnot, 2011: 9). In a recent documentary, Pesnot (2011) uncovers that: 
In fact for decades Paris has never stopped to impose its tutorship and to do everything to 
safeguard its economic and political interests in Africa… And to do this, successive [French] 
governments have used all sorts of means… [including] secret accords with the [African] leaders 
authorising Paris to interfere in their internal affairs (p.10). 
Since independence, France has been found to maintain a double-sided relation with in Africa: 
one official and one unofficial, as described by Verschave (2004) 
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 The consideration of the UK is because Ghana, which is one of the case study countries, is a former colony of 
the UK. 
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 Mr Verschave had been sued for ‘offense à chef d’Etat, i.e. offence to Head of State’, a charge that no one 
has ever been cleared of when it is concerned with foreign Presidents in the French tradition, but in light of the 
amount of evidence presented at court, the tribunal declared that Mr Verschave and his editor could not be 
condemned and what was written was the result of serious investigations (Verschave and Beccaria, 2001; 
Verschave, 2004) 
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You have the upper side – the visible part of the iceberg: France, the best friend of Africa, a State 
of human rights, etc. – and then, in fact, you have 90% of the relations immersed [the non-visible 
part of the iceberg]: i.e. all the mechanisms to maintain the domination of France over Africa with 
African accomplices (p.10). 
In terms of democracy, for example, it is rare in Africa that the citizens really choose what 
leaders they want to lead and manage their country’s economic and social resources for their 
own development. This is noted throughout a recent documentary film by Patrick Benquet in 
2010 based on memoires and confessions of some of the French leaders who have been 
involved and played an active role in French politics in Africa at various points in time. For 
example, following the 2009 election in Gabon that saw Ali Bongo, the current President, 
being elected, Maurice Delaunay
62
 observed that:  
…the State elections were somehow manipulated [by France], of course, as it’s the case 
everywhere [in Africa]. 
More precisely it was the challenger of Ali Bongo who actually won the elections with about 
42% against 37% for Mr Bongo! However, when asked whether France was supporting any 
candidate to that election, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, declared publicly that:  
I am telling the Gabonese: ‘now it is down to them to choose [their President]’. Only they can 
choose. I’m saying it as clearly and simply as possible, France has no candidate. 
According to Mr Delaunay they usually receive orders from the French government to make 
sure that certain candidates are elected, and in the end the candidates are elected no matter 
how. More specifically, following an extensive investigation (which lasted 10 years), 
Verschave (2004) concludes on democracy in French Africa that: 
With our [French] money we help people [in Africa] to acquire some democratic instruments; at 
the same time, [the French system] manages to do the opposite by ensuring that these people have 
worse than a dictator, a dictator ‘legitimised democratically’. And this did not happen only in one 
country. It happened fifty times between 1991 and 2003, with the same system, the same discourse 
each time whether in Togo, in Cameroon, in Congo-Brazzaville, in Gabon, in Djibouti, in 
Mauritania, etc. (p.21)… France manages to ‘validate’ through ballot boxes the opposite of the 
citizens’ will even if it means upsetting the advocates of democracy (p.23). 
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This reality leads Patrick Benquet (2010) to note that: 
By violence or by more or less democratic elections the system of control over our [French] old 
colonies is put in place with the coming to power of Presidents dedicated to the interests of France 
– Presidents referred to as ‘Black Governors’ to mean that nothing has changed since the time of 
the Colonial Governors: ‘French Administrators at the order of Paris’. 
Furthermore, some French leaders admit that even the Constitution has been shaped 
according to French directives. So, the leaders of most of Africa are not those chosen by the 
populations and the legal framework is not designed on the basis of the Africans’ will, in 
contrary to public discourse for legitimacy. On that basis it is expected that those who are 
chosen do not feel any accountability duty vis-à-vis the citizens and the institutions of their 
country. The accountability is actually directed toward the colonial patron, and the office of 
these leaders is secured as long as they satisfy the interests of the colonial patron. 
Furthermore, the leaders are given a ‘free pass’ to manage the country’s resources in the way 
and manner they want without fear of any consequences, as confessed by many of the French 
leaders. 
All the ex-French colonies are embarked in the system with a number of Heads of State to whom, 
in return of the submission, it is said ‘help yourselves with the public purse, make no difference 
between public and private money, and build yourself fortunes’. A number of them took it at face 
value and built themselves fortunes that equal the external debt of their countries (Verschave, 
2004: 13) 
This explains to some extent the failure of the various efforts to improve governance in 
Africa, despite the official discourse of the actors and the goodwill of some of these actors. 
Most of those leaders who attempted to govern somehow in line with governance principles 
did not survive the system. For example: 
…in Madagascar, one of the few businessmen who escaped from this system, Marc 
Ravalomanana, became president with a strong support from the population because he was 
producing made in Madagascar, and as Mayor of the capital he broke with the traditions of looting 
State resources (p.17).  
However, Mr Ravalomanana did not survive the system. He was forced to quit power in 2009 
before the end of his second term. 
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Even when a dynamic electoral system is put in place that sees alternative leaders coming to 
power, such as is currently in place in most of Africa including both case study countries, 
especially Ghana, it is observed that the leaders who assume power are often those who 
commit themselves to safeguarding the interests of the colonial and other patrons rather than 
the interests of the citizens they are elected to govern. Taking the case of Niger, Mamane 
Sani Adamou
63
, member of Alternative Espace Citoyen, described the situation in the country:   
Areva that is charged with the supervisory role of French atomic energy is a [French] 
multinational that governs Niger practically through its control over [Nigerien] uranium... 
Originally it was a defence agreement that obliged Niger to sell its uranium to France. 
Subsequently, anyone who dares to revise somehow, for example the first President of the 
Republic, Diori Hamani, who simply wanted to revise the price of the uranium by establishing an 
energy equivalence between one kilogramme of uranium and a tonne of oil, was one of the factors 
that caused his departure – the 1974 coups d’état. And today you will not find in the Nigerien 
political class, those candidates most likely to be elected, someone who would dare challenge 
what Areva is doing in Niger.  
The consequences for the people of the way Areva carries out its activities are dramatic. 
Yet the consequences are disastrous. Because when you go to a radius of 200 kilometres there is 
no vegetation, there is no animal, the population breathes radon – you have a level of radioactivity 
which is abnormally high. And all these consequences do not bother any local or national leaders. 
These consequences do not bother the leaders because they are not accountable to the citizens. 
Their accountability duty is towards France – the colonial patron. By coincidence, the recent 
Nigerien President’s – Mamadou Tandja – attempted to challenge and managed to revise the 
price of the uranium in 2008
64
, was ousted in a coups d’état amid a political crisis. 
Another case of lack of accountability towards the citizens and institutions of the country is 
provided by the sale of Ghana Telecommunications Company [GT] to Vodafone 
International Holdings BV. In actual fact the sale of GT was made to Vodafone UK under the 
cover of the holding company, according to the investigation report and research findings. 
The sale scenario is described by a senior official as:  
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…under the pretence that in Ghana we couldn’t get enough resources for that year’s national 
budget [2008] we had to sell off our telecommunication company that has been established over 
40 years now with all the networks, telephone lines across the whole country. We sold it to UK 
Vodafone. And as I said if you read the political economy, the changes that happened you’d know 
clearly what’s happening. First, a visit is planned [where] Ghanaian Officials are meeting with the 
Queen and the other things that they planned. [The] Ghana Government visits UK; the Queen had 
a banquet with Kufuor. They give Ghana 40 million pounds for maternal and child health. They 
give us; and that money doesn’t even come to go into our own system or power where we are 
already addressing poverty! They just say that any pregnant woman who wants to go to a hospital 
the bill will be paid off. And in the end do you know how many women would go? How the 
money was spent? No you can’t trace it. And after that the discussion on sale [of GT] to Vodafone 
comes up. And Kufuor, the President himself, had to even, as we know it, push away everybody 
and took the negotiation himself directly and sold the firm off. He got… millions of dollars 
payback... 
As investigation revealed that the sale of GT was illegal. Also, there was a better offer from 
Telekom SA for a lower shareholding. Moreover, out of the US$900 million of the sale value 
of the company, only US$266.57 million (less than one third of the sale value) were actually 
realised under a complex financial arrangement which is less likely to uphold the argument of 
lack of resources for 2008’s budget that was initially advanced. Unlike developed countries, 
governments in developing countries are made to take full responsibility between a public 
sector body and a foreign entity for one major reason. If the public sector body defaults, it is 
the government that is in charge of meeting the entity’s obligations. However this does not 
mean that the head of government himself is actively involved and taking over the whole 
responsibility of the sale of a public entity established by the citizens, the taxpayers’ money. 
An official noted that the UK encourages a President to boycott the legal and institutional 
framework with illegal inducement only because of its economic stake. To legitimate the deal, 
it is reported that MPs from the ruling government party were bribed to endorse it. Yet the 
UK is a signatory member of the Anti-Bribery Convention, in force since 1999 (Hannon, 
2011). Surprisingly there was no reaction whatsoever from any agencies or development 
partners working on governance strengthening.  
France plays a significant role in the current state of accounting systems and the extent of its 
contribution to accountability and transparency in French speaking Africa in particular.  
265 
 
If I take France for example, they have a technical assistance policy in Francophone Africa. In 
accounting specifically, when I go to these countries there is often a [French] adviser to the Head 
of Accounting or the Head of Treasury... So France for example is active in certain [African] 
countries. I can think of Tchad, for example, where there is a Technical Assistant appointed who 
assists the Director General of Public Accounting. This is also the case in other French speaking 
countries. [BWB01]  
One of the reasons for such a direct relation with the accounting department in Africa is to 
ensure that the system does not track the ‘unofficial’ financial transactions between Africa 
and French political leaders, as observed by various former French political officials. For 
example, when one of the French political leaders, Robert Bourgui, involved in the 
maintenance of this system, tried to speak up in January 2011 about the existence of the 
complex and opaque financial transactions from French Africa to French political leaders, he 
recognised at the same time that he had no physical evidence, because the system is built to 
leave no track whatsoever of these transactions. In extensive documentary research conducted 
by Verschave (1999), he uncovered however that:  
…the weaknesses and loopholes in the public accounting systems of the [African] States (is not 
difficult to maintain)” (p. 61) [as a] ‘key condition’ [to ensure that] substantially all the Franco-
African financial gift does not leave any track (p.124). [These ‘gifts’] are the cash return [that] 
irrigate all the political parties of the [French] government (p.61). All the political parties continue 
to find their interest in this system, especially in funding their electoral campaign (p333).  
An African President confirmed this by telling a journalist that for him there is no left or right 
within the French political system and that he feeds them all to cover himself in all cases 
(Verschave, 1999). This is further supported by interviewees who recognise that it is in the 
interest of the leaders to maintain a weak and opaque accounting system to mask their 
transactions. But most interviewees do not see the direct involvement of the former colonial 
patron. Interestingly, in spite of the weak accounting system, still no information must be 
given out even that supposed to be publicly available by law. A senior official at the TAD in 
Benin acknowledged the situation: 
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I must recognise that there is some resistance to giving certain information out. Some information 
is not given out especially when it is about finances, financial operations and disbursements. 
[BP004] 
Interestingly, the weak and opaque accounting systems ensure the maintenance of a system of 
corruption for which French cooperation has significant responsibility, as uncovered by 
Verschave (1999: 73) “We measure the extent of corruption that plagues the French system 
of cooperation”. This is further confirmed by both Benquet (2010) and Pesnot (2011) in their 
documentary research into the relations beyond the ‘official ones’ between France and former 
French colonies in Africa under the term of ‘Françafrique’. 
 
7.3.3. Donor Community as a Group 
Donors contribute to governance development in Africa through conditionality. This is well 
appreciated by public officials and civil society organisations officials.  
They are simply important because when you go to negotiate a loan with them, it’s an opportunity 
for them to put certain things in place… via conditionality. [BCA01] 
Other interviewees nuance the extent of the effectiveness of the donors’ support toward good 
governance and point out that the opportunity that this support represents does not often 
materialise due to internal political forces. 
I think it is an opportunity for developing countries to be supported from time to time by donors. It 
is an opportunity… but it is also a misadventure for the populations, because the governments of 
these countries – at least those of UEMOA that I know – these supports end-up causing fatalities. 
The governments do not use these supports wisely for specific activities. Politics, as I use to say, 
always takes precedence over the reality, over good management, good governance! [BP013] 
It is also noticed that the lack of donors’ support resulting in material improvement in 
governance is in part due to the fact that there is less ‘push’ from donors towards the 
implementation of certain laws as part of a reform process underlying their loan/grant 
conditionality. 
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…sometimes they put pressure on government to pass certain laws. And so we have some laws 
that have been passed but they are not being implemented! Because they pass them just to satisfy 
the donors. So donors, they have their role but I think their involvement should be more profitable 
than this… But it’s not pressure enough for the government to implement those laws. [GNG03] 
According to some officials, donors are more interested in political governance than overall 
governance that ultimately supports the accountability of African political leaders. According 
to these officials, donor support toward governance elements such as elections far outweighs 
their interest in improvement in accountability. 
We are [an] independent institution like the electoral commission and what we do is of interest to 
all. If an election is [held] and the results are manipulated it creates confusion... So… when it 
comes to public accountability, when moneys are given or disbursed and cannot be well accounted 
for, it creates a lot of problems for the people. And every day on radio when Ghanaians are lashing 
[the] government it’s all to do with accountability. It’s all to do with accountability!... The 
electorate, as much as they want to have fair elections and have a government of their choice, they 
are equally interested in making sure that their leadership is well accountable to them. But the 
institution that provides assurance as whether these politicians can be trusted or are corrupt, that 
institution enjoys no support that the electoral commission enjoys… And for elections it’s done 
well in four years, but for accountability every day politicians are given money every year, every 
time politicians are disbursing, every time they are disbursing; so every minute there’s a need for 
accountability! And yet the institutions [that] are to provide such assurance are handicapped. So as 
we welcome the idea of support [to] the electoral commission, we equally say that if the support 
that donors are giving to electoral commission they [also] give [that support] to the Supreme Audit 
Institution they would better inform the electorate to make wise judgements as to who is elected in 
power!... Very often they [donors] would make statements but they would not materialise. 
[GA010] 
More explicitly: 
…the impetus or the encouragement for more emphasis on the political part of it [governance] 
which I would call ‘Electionary Democracy’ – [because] democracy should lead… to things being 
done in response to public or popular interests... –  so if you ask me… it’s because the Paymasters, 
those who fund our electoral commission, those who fund about 30% of our budget, they want 
elections as a benchmark… but they don’t put [an] equally considerable level of expectation on 
our accountability standards. Because if you look at it there are key issues there that should be 
spotted, scandalous issues – nobody addresses them. [GNG06] 
This ‘over-push’ for democratic elections, improvement in the business environment and in 
civility as part of political governance development is observed to be the political ‘tool’ of 
donors – the big countries – to secure and legitimate their economic interests.    
…the interests of the Paymasters, the Western Powers, they are interested in elections that lead to 
governance that has a semblance of democracy to the extent that they can do their business with 
us… [GNG06]  
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For example: 
Ghana has minerals, very rich minerals: gold, manganese, diamond, now oil. Apart from cocoa 
where we are involved and doing our own, all the rest have been privatised. They are all in foreign 
ownership. So all that we get is the tax component of whatever goes out. So as long as there is a 
semblance of civility, civil life, people are respecting the rules of contracts, business, it’s 
politically ok, our Paymasters are fine, they are ok. Everything is doing well, very good – no 
problem! That’s why I’m saying political economy. The international people they have interest in 
doing business when they come here. So as long as there is a need for them to be here, which is 
the economic dimension, which is there, they put money to support us through elections. [GNG06] 
It appears that less push for accountability though an effective accounting system or support 
towards a ‘semblance’ of accountability, aiming not to address the real issues facilitates the 
continuation of donors’ economic interests in a political system that ensures their legitimacy. 
They sponsor, or are at best accomplices of, a corrupt system maintained with weak 
accounting systems that enable them to keep their business going with confidence. 
All that I know is that at some point the donors too are accomplices… I think in reality the donors 
too [and] those who come on assessment missions are also corrupt. There’s no other name to call 
it. [BP013] 
 
 
7.3.4. Summary Discussion on the International Political and Economic 
Considerations 
In the area of external political and economic considerations, one of the main identified 
forces is the World Bank. It contributes to governance development in Africa via three 
mechanisms or instruments: ‘conditionality’, ‘internal advisers’, and use of ‘external 
consultants/experts’. With regard to conditionality in particular, various studies have reported 
the limited results achieved from its use (see for example Collier, 1999; Marchesi and Sabani, 
2007).  
This study extends these findings. It is found that the World Bank, in its lending activities, 
‘pushes’ more for the adoption of reforms than the actual implementation of these reforms. 
As such, reforms exist which have been adopted for years but which have been only partially 
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implemented; in some cases these reforms have not been implemented altogether. This 
attitude of the Bank was explained by its political considerations and the policy preferences 
of the ‘big countries’, i.e. the big shareholders of the Bank with political and economic 
interests in these countries. The implication of the findings for policy is that the World Bank 
needs to establish a balance between the interests of the ‘big countries’ and those of the 
recipient countries, in order to enhance reform outcomes if governance improvement is still a 
major element of the Bank’s development agenda in Africa. 
Another key external political and economic force is the ‘Colonial Patron’ (i.e. the former 
coloniser). Findings from the research show that former colonisers are still actively shaping 
governance development and accounting systems in the case study countries and in Africa in 
general. The democratic system in some countries are only ‘façade democracies’ where only 
those supported by the Colonial Patron are elected, thus diverting political accountability 
from the constituencies. The accounting systems have particularly been shaped due to their 
potential to track unofficial financial transactions, often from the African countries to the 
former colonial patron. This is particularly more pronounced in the French relationship with 
Africa than the British one. This relationship also affects the outcome of reform initiatives. 
The findings add to existing studies. For example, Stones’ (2004) study of IMF lending  in 
Africa finds among other things that “IMF program conditions are enforced less rigorously 
when the borrowing countries… belong to postcolonial international institutions that link 
them to France or Britain…” (p.590).  
The third and last force is the donor community as a group. The evidence gathered shows that 
the donor group is more interested in the political dimension of governance, and their support 
for this dimension far outweighs their support for other aspects of governance and 
specifically accountability. Furthermore, the donor group is also found to provide more 
support for the adoption of reform than its implementation. The adoption of such an approach 
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was explained by the fact that it facilitates the continuing fulfilment of their economic 
interests in a ‘façade’ political system that ensures the legitimacy of these economic interests. 
In the same way, Stones’ (2004) study concludes that: “IMF fails to enforce its conditions… 
because its principals, the major donor countries, interfere. Enforcing conditionality is, of 
course, in their long-term interests, but in particular cases they stand to gain more short term 
benefits by relaxing the pressure on particular borrowers” (p.590). “Pressure from powerful 
donors with geopolitical or commercial interests in the recipient country provides another 
potential explanation for lax enforcement of aid conditions” (Kilby, 2009: 51). 
The chapter that follows provides the overall concluding comments. 
 
7.4. Chapter Summary 
The existing studies of political economy of governance and accounting have tended to focus 
on one dimension of governance, such as corruption (see for example Riley, 1998; Rose-
Ackerman, 1997 and 2008) and transparency (Fung et al., 2003) or selected institutional 
reforms (see Robinson, 2006; Stone, 2004) with marginal emphasise on accounting. The 
political economy approach employed in this research takes a wider and integrated standpoint 
on governance and an exclusive focus on accounting systems. The analysis conducted 
revealed that the development of governance and accounting systems, and the marginalisation 
of accounting in governance initiatives, in the case study countries are the outcome of more 
complex interactions among various political and economic forces at work in these countries. 
This chapter has addressed the research question related to the development of governance 
and accounting using the lens of the political economy framework. The adoption of the 
framework to organise the findings was based on initial discussion with officials in the case 
study countries. Overall, research in Benin and Ghana found three main forces that shape the 
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state of governance and accounting systems in Africa. These are (1) internal political system 
and institutions forces; (2) internal economic interests/forces; and (3) international political 
economic forces and interests. 
More specifically, first, the research found that, in terms of internal political system and 
institutions, the constitution in the case study countries does not provide sufficient support for 
the adequate functioning of governance institutions and for accountability. This actually 
stems from the point of transition to democracy, which is characterised by limited preparation. 
The other internal political factors include pressure from interest groups, composed of 
political parties/groups and civil society organisations; the relationships between some 
accounting institutions and the government; cadre maintenance; electoral cycles; and 
excessive use of political power. Second, the research also found that the private economic 
interests of political leaders and supporters, and the economic interests of business 
organisations inhibit progress in governance and accounting systems. Finally, the research 
found three actors at the international political economic level that influence governance and 
accounting in the case-study countries. These include the World Bank, the former colonial 
‘patron’ and the donor community as a group. 
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8.1. Overview of the Research 
The thesis has examined the interplay between country governance and accounting systems 
considering the role of the World Bank and other donors in the development of governance 
and accounting in Africa. The purpose of the research was threefold. The first purpose was to 
assess the state of accounting systems in an English speaking country (Ghana) and a French 
speaking country (Benin) as illustrative cases. The second purpose was to examine the link 
between governance and accounting, and donors’ approach to the development of governance 
and accounting in Africa. The third purpose related to the examination, through the lens of 
political economy, of the factors that hamper the development of sound governance and 
accounting in Africa. 
The overall research is more problem centric than theory driven, though the literature and the 
political economy are used to guide the analysis conducted. Evidence to answer the research 
questions was collected through a case-study and cross-national design using four data 
collection methods: interview, observation, survey and documents. 
The starting point of the study was a succinct review of the current country governance and 
accounting literature. The focus of the literature review was twofold. The first focus was on 
governance. The second related to accounting systems with particular emphasis on the role of 
accounting in relation to key elements or requirements of governance. 
The thesis continued with the methodology and theoretical chapters. The methodology 
chapter presented the research design adopted for the study, that is, a case study and cross-
national design. Evidence collection methods were also considered in this chapter. The 
chapter finished with the data analysis procedures and instruments employed. The theoretical 
chapter briefly discussed the role of theory in research with the consideration of the research 
paradigm adopted for the research. It then presented the political economy framework used as 
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an organising framework to provide an understanding of the various factors hampering the 
development of sound governance and accounting systems in Africa. 
Three empirical chapters followed, each addressing specific aspects of the research questions. 
Firstly, a critical examination of the accounting systems in Benin and Ghana was conducted. 
This chapter provided a summary description of the accounting systems in each of the case 
study countries, as illustrations of Anglophone and Francophone systems in Africa. A critical 
examination of the institutions in charge of the functioning of the accounting systems in each 
country was conducted. The chapter also included a brief comparative analysis between the 
two accounting systems. 
Second, the link between governance and accounting, and donors’ approach to governance 
and accounting development were examined using interview data, and secondary data on 
governance and accounting. This chapter also provided a succinct critical examination of the 
state of governance in the studied countries. 
Lastly, an investigation of the factors hampering a sound development of governance and 
accounting in Africa was conducted according to the political economy framework using 
evidence from Benin and Ghana.  
 
8.2. Summary of Major Findings 
The literature review was divided into two parts as aforementioned. The main conclusions 
drawn from the first part were that: first, donors’ approach to governance reform in Africa 
has only achieved limited results; second, accounting was found to be marginalised in the 
approach to and measurement of governance; and third, the governance metrics have various 
limitations including construct and operationalization flaws. Concerning the second part, 
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despite the very dew studies on State accounting systems in relation to governance, this part 
of the literature review concluded that accounting has a potential role in four key governance 
dimensions: accountability, transparency, control of corruption and resource allocation.  
Empirically, the study found that accounting systems in Benin and Ghana are very weak 
despite the reform initiatives undertaken in the area. It further found that there is no 
significant difference between the two systems in terms of outcome or impact, except that in 
Ghana there is more information on the work of accountants (including auditors) than in 
Benin. Furthermore, the findings suggest that there is a potential causal relationship between 
accounting and governance.  
It is important, however, to draw attention to the limitations of these results. In fact, due to 
limited data, several independent variables (existing determinants of governance) are missing 
from the model.This could significantly affect the results and the conclusions drawn. In 
addition, there is limited data available on accounting system across the continent which has 
constrained the analysis. More extensive data is likely to provide more insight into the extent 
of the effect of the various variables on governance. In addition to these limitations, it is 
important to point out the difficulty in capturing comprehensively political factors in a 
regression analysis. 
Concerning the World Bank and other donors’ approach to governance and accounting 
development, it was found that the approach to governance and accounting reforms in Africa 
suffers from a lack of contextual and cultural fit. For example it was found that the current 
democratic system being ‘pushed’ throughout Africa does not accommodate local culture and 
stage of development, and is not in line with how democracy has evolved in the now 
developed countries. Similar findings were reported for accounting system reforms which are 
exacerbated by the high involvement of economists rather than accounting professionals with 
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local experience and understanding. Donors’ approach is further limited by the lack of their 
experts’ capacity to understand local reality in Africa, where in many cases the basic 
infrastructures and facilities are absent. In addition, absence of accurate feedback on reform 
outcomes from African leaders was noticed. 
Finally, three categories of political economy factors/forces were found to shape the 
development of governance and accounting on the continent. The first category is concerned 
with the internal political system and institutions. These include the transition to democracy, 
the Constitution, the electoral cycles, the interest groups (civil society and political groups), 
an internal political environment characterised by excessive use of political power, cadre 
maintenance, and the relation between government institutions. The second category of 
factors is related to internal economic interests, composed of the economic interests of 
political leaders and their supporters, and the economic interests of business organisations. 
The last category is about the external political and economic forces. These forces comprise 
the World Bank, the Colonial ‘Patron’ (former coloniser), and the donor community as a 
group. 
The main actors identified are the local political leaders and businessmen, external political 
leaders from the West and the officials in the major development agencies, especially the 
World Bank. With regard to the interest of the local political leaders and businessmen, this is 
to keep political power and extract public financial and economic resources. The interest of 
the external political leaders is twofold. The first is to maintain a political system in place in 
local countries, with a direct involvement in the design of legal and institutional framework 
and choice of political leaders, in order to facilitate their political actions and geopolitical 
interests in Africa. The second interest of the external political leaders relates to the 
‘exploitation’ of local resources (oil, minerals, forestry, etc.) and other economic interests. 
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A strong institutional and political system, i.e. sound governance, and a good accountability 
framework, of which accounting system is a major component, are unlikely to facilitate the 
fulfilment of these interests without political and possibly other consequences; thus, the 
interaction between these various actors to continuously maintain governance and accounting 
systems in a weak state. Particularly, a weak accounting system makes it difficult to track or 
trail all the ‘unofficial’ flows of financial and economic resources between African and 
Western political leaders and businessmen. 
The contribution to the accounting literature is significant as the study provides a new and a 
comprehensive explanation of how the design and use of macro level accounting systems in 
Africa, and potentially in other developing countries, are shaped by the political economy 
factors. This provides ground for further examination of the magnitude of the effect of each 
group of actors and each class of interests on the state of governance and government 
accounting systems in future research. 
 
8.3.  Contributions of the Study 
The research findings extend the current political economy framework. In fact, in the sphere 
of internal political factors, the research found in the case study countries an internal political 
environment characterised by ‘excessive use of political power’. Initially, this could be 
viewed as reflecting an unbalanced system of power. The difference, however, is that it is not 
necessarily related to the relation between the executive, the parliament and the judiciary. 
The difference is that excessive power is used against any institutions including civil society 
organisations. In the area of external political economic factors, the research revealed, in 
particular, the direct involvement of the colonial patrons in controlling governance and 
accounting development in the case study countries. Evidence related to this colonial patron 
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involvement was mostly provided by French officials who have been involved and played 
active roles in the process in both French and English Africa, though the involvement was 
more pronounced in French Africa than in English Africa. Additional evidence was also 
collected from donors’ officials. 
The research findings further provide new insight regarding the potential link between 
accounting and governance, and the significance of the role of accounting in governance 
development particularly in Africa. Moreover, the research found that the failure of 
governance and accounting system reforms in the case study countries is, to some extent, 
more caused by limited contextual and local cultural contents than by low capacity and 
increased corruption (as is often argued by donors). Donors’ reform approach fails to address 
system issues in environments where infrastructures are poor and cultural traits are different. 
In particular, corruption was argued to be the consequence of system weaknesses, not system 
weaknesses the consequence of corruption.  
In terms of policy implication, this study found that accounting systems in the case study 
countries are weak, and despite some reforms in the area not much improvement in terms of 
outcome or impact has been achieved. Related to this issue, are the flaws in donors’ approach. 
The implication of these findings for policy is that accounting systems, as a key part of the 
basic foundations (specifically in accountability) for a sound governance system, need greater 
focus. Specifically, capacity building in the area and accounting reforms should be built in 
context based on the reality prevailing in African countries. Also, efforts need to be made to 
avoid replication of ‘best practices’ without ensuring the existence of pre-conditions. 
The study also found that there is a strong association between accounting and governance, 
i.e. improved accounting systems are associated with improved governance, suggesting that 
there is a potential causal relationship between accounting and governance. Though an 
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improved accounting system is necessary, it is not sufficient in itself to improve governance. 
This means that improvements in accounting should be pursued in parallel with 
improvements in other governance dimensions if they are to result in a material impact on the 
overall quality of governance. A further policy implication is that accounting should be given 
at least equal weight in reforms and other governance initiatives in order to achieve increased 
impact and to sustain the improvements achieved. 
Other findings of the research related to donors’ approach to governance in Africa. In the area 
of democracy, it was found that the standard democratic system is not well adapted to the 
cultural context and stage of development in Africa. The implication for policy is that 
democracy should be accommodated with the prevailing contextual reality and based on the 
stage of development. For example, it might be advisable to only allow voting right to those 
with a minimum level of education, and possibly a minimum contribution to government 
budget in terms of tax payment (or some forms of equivalence). Such conditions will also 
evolve in line with the level of development. If a country achieves a level of development 
that enables it to sustain, for example, a free and compulsory minimum education system for 
everyone, then the voting right also could be extended to anyone of a certain age, say, 21 
years old or above. Also, the foundations for a sound democratic system should be the 
primary focus of governance initiatives in these countries.  These foundations include an 
effective accountability system, a strong legal system, and strong institutions. Such 
foundations ensure that elected leaders only do what is expected of them, and answer for the 
results of their actions and decisions. In the area of institutional reform, the reforms need to 
be context specific and adapted to the reality in place, and for this to happen, there is a need 
to use people with capabilities to understand local reality. Also, as aforementioned, efforts 
should be made to avoid replication of ‘best practices’. 
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The political economy findings highlighted the various forces at play in the case study 
countries and in Africa in general. These findings will enable policy-makers and policy-
advisers to gain insight into the interests of each group of players, how to accommodate some 
of these interests and what safeguards to put in place when designing reforms in order to 
ensure the maximum outcome possible. 
 
8.4. Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
It is important however to note the limitations of the study. The findings on the potential 
causal relationship between accounting and governance are limited by the relatively small 
sample size and number of observations. The accounting data used was only available for 22 
countries and only one observation was available per country over 3 years. However, the 
complementary evidence, including real case instances, from practitioners about the actual 
contribution of accounting to governance and the relationship between accounting and 
governance in practice help to mitigate this limitation. 
The coding analysis was relatively subjective, and is in line with the pragmatic approach of 
the research as explained in Chapter 3. It would, however, be wise to engage in a code-
checking exercise with an external party (a sort of peer-review exercise) in order to 
strengthen the consistency in the application of the codes. This was not possible because the 
researcher was not able to identify any research students undertaking similar research or 
applying similar frameworks. The exercise could still, however, be engaged with other 
academic members or research students, but owing to ethical constraints, given the sensitivity 
of the subject, the researcher decided not to engage in such an exercise. 
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Also, owing to the fact that no study has applied the political economy framework to 
governance as a whole and State accounting systems, to the knowledge of the researcher, 
there is a risk that the findings are limited by bias resulting from misapplication of the 
framework and misinterpretation of the results. However, this limitation is reduced by the 
fact that the researcher has presented the framework, the analysis process and the findings at 
a departmental seminar and at the U21 Conference at the University of Connecticut where he 
received constructive comments and feedback which helped him to review the initial analysis 
and presentation of the findings accordingly. 
On the other hand, there are components within the framework in which either there was 
limited evidence to allow for extensive analysis such as the relation between government 
agencies, or there were not enough qualified respondents available to compare responses, 
such as transition to democracy where only one respondent was identified to have taken part 
in the transition period in Benin. Concerning the latter in particular, an attempt was made to 
corroborate evidence from existing studies such as Iheriohanma and Oguoma (2010) and 
other documents which helped to some extent to reduce this limitation. 
With regard to the areas for future research, the examination of the state of accounting 
systems was based on one English speaking country and one French speaking country. Future 
research involving in-depth assessment of accounting systems could be conducted in other 
English and French speaking countries to enable more consistent comparative analysis 
between the two systems in Africa, and within each type of system.  
Further, given the time frame of the PhD, it was not feasible to conduct a proper experiment 
required to establish a complete causal relationship between accounting systems and 
governance. This could be the primary focus of future research. The scale and time frame of 
such research are expected to be significant given the nature of the subject matter. 
282 
 
The study highlighted the political economy forces and interests at work in Benin and Ghana 
specifically. Future research is needed to extend these findings to other African countries and 
to examine the magnitude of the impact of each category of players on governance and 
accounting development. This is also likely to involve an experiment design. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 2.1: Elements of governance and accounting integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the ‘other sets of variables’ encompass all the variables where we did not find any literature on the 
direct role of accounting systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accountability Public Office 
Corruption 
Political 
Corruption 
Government 
Transparency 
Resources 
Allocation 
Quality & 
Effectiveness of 
public & civil 
service 
Quality of policy 
formulation & 
implementation 
Decentralisation 
of structure 
 
Accountin
g 
Quality of Governance 
Other Sets of Variables Control of 
Corruption 
Government & Institutional 
Effectiveness and Accountability 
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Appendix 3.1: Interview Guide 
The interview guide provides indicative questions. However, the order of questions changes 
depending on the profile of respondent and the first responses provided. Also follow-up questions 
triggered by responses sometimes changed the structure of the interview. 
Question area 1: overall interplay between accounting and governance  
- What is your understanding of ‘governance’? 
- What do you think is/are the most important issue(s) in it in Africa? 
- What is your view about developing countries in Africa having the same common standards 
of governance with developed countries?  
- What are the most important issues that should be considered when addressing governance 
issues in Africa?  
- Do accounting (systems) play any important role in governance? 
- In the private sector, accounting is tied to the effectiveness of corporate governance. This 
suggests that there is a potential link between the quality of accounting and that of 
governance. How do you perceive this relationship at the country level – say the quality of 
the government accounting and the level of the quality of the country’s governance? 
- People comment in various ways on the quality of governance in Benin / Ghana, what is your 
appreciation of the country’s governance and the quality of its accountants? 
- In your experience, what are the factors that are hampering the development of sound 
governance / [accounting systems] in this country?  
- What is your view about the role of the World Bank / the development partners in the 
development of governance / [accounting system] in this country? 
 
Question area 2: Accounting and governance  
Financial Accounting 
- Governance involves transparency and disclosure to various interest groups: how do you see 
the role of accounting in government transparency? ...And what is your appreciation of how 
this works in the Beninese / Ghanaian context? 
- How do you assess the amount of disclosure conveyed by the financial report? 
- What is the form of recording system in place and how effective is it in terms of 
completeness and accuracy of recorded transactions and events? 
- When the latest financial reports were issued and which fiscal year did they relate to? 
- What is your assessment of the adequacy (quality and appropriateness) and sufficiency 
(size/quantity) of the resources (human, equipments, etc) at the disposal of the financial 
reporting department? 
- How do you appreciate the improvement, if any, in financial reporting since about 2000? 
And in which way such improvement can be seen? 
- How often officials and personnel of the financial reporting function are trained?  
- As accountant, are you bound to any professional code of values and conduct? And how do 
you perceive the effectiveness of such code in terms of implication of breach?  
285 
 
 
- Resources allocation is one of the key components of country governance: In your view, 
does (or can) accounting play any role in the government resources allocation? (If 
affirmative) how do you see this role? And how does it work in the Beninese / Ghanaian 
context? 
- Are interim financial reports issued within fiscal year? If affirmative, how often are they 
produced? Are these reports made available to decentralised departments/agencies for 
their use? 
- How do you evaluate the timeliness of the yearly financial reports? 
 
Audit 
- One of the national or supreme audit institution’s functions is to acts as ‘check’ on 
government in their management of public resources: how this function is fulfilled in the 
Beninese / Ghanaian context? 
- The objectivity of the accomplishment of this function and other ones is assured through an 
independent statute: 
- How do you perceive the legal source, if any, of the independence of the audit 
institution – including its officers and staff? 
- What’s about the institution’s organisational independence? 
- Its functional independence? (i.e. no interference in its audit activity – extent of 
discretion in discharging its functions) 
- Its financial independence? (i.e. sufficient funds to discharge its functions)? 
- How freely can auditors access to information and documents as and when needed from any 
government and state institutions? 
- To what extent audit recommendations are followed up by public officials, managers and 
staff? 
- How do you assess the timeliness of the audit report?  
- What is your assessment of the adequacy (quality and appropriateness) and sufficiency (size) 
of the resources (human, equipments, etc) at the disposal of the audit institution? 
- How often officials and personnel of the audit function are trained?  
- As auditor, are you bound to any professional code of values and conduct? And how do you 
perceive the effectiveness of such code in terms of implication of breach?  
- How do you see accounting [audit] in the effort to control the level of fraud and corruption 
in Benin / [Ghana]? 
 
Question area 3: World Bank and other donors 
- What are the reform priorities of the World Bank / [the development partner]? Why focus 
on these priorities? 
- In financial management reform, what is/are the main focus of the World Bank / 
[development partner]?  
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- In an institutional or policy reform where contractors are involved (experts, consultants, 
services supplier companies...), how are these people chosen?  
- What is the margin of manoeuvre of the aid agency vis-à-vis its political members 
represented (those contributing to the financial resources of the agency) regarding a typical 
reform implementation? 
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Appendix 3.2: Consent Form 
Purpose of the research 
The research is concerned with the interplay between governance and accounting systems 
development.  
Aim of the form 
Following your acceptance to take part in the study, this form is issued and requires your 
approval and signature. The main aim of the form is to protect you as research participant. 
The data and information you provide will only be used in the way you agree them to be used. 
The way your personal data will be protected is covered by the form. It also allows the 
researcher to justify that he is using your data in an appropriate way. 
Length of the interview 
The interview is designed to take approximately between 45 minutes and 1 hour. 
Recording of the interview 
For convenience and detailed analysis of the results, the interview will be recorded. If you do 
not wish such recording to take place or you do not want any part of the process being 
recorded, please let the researcher know before or during the interview process at any point 
you wish. 
Confidentiality 
All information collected is confidential. Your personal details will not be passed on to any 
other parties. Also none of the information you provide will be shared with any parties. The 
treatment of the data collected will not be carried out in public areas or public computers.  
Anonymity 
All information collected through the research process will be treated anonymously. Unless 
you give a written consent, no direct quote with your name will be done – all quotes will be 
anonymous. If you give the researcher a written permission to quote the information you 
provide with your name, he will, otherwise there will be no quote with your name associated 
to it.  
Protection of your data 
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The data you provide will be anonymised and kept secured for 10 years, as per the University 
of Birmingham code of practice, after which they will be destroyed.  
Withdrawal of respondent 
You, as research participant, have the right to withdraw yourself from the research process at 
any time you wish to without any consequence to you. In case you decide to withdraw 
yourself from the process, just let the researcher know by any means: email, telephone, letter, 
etc. 
If you withdraw from the research process at any point, your entire data will simply be 
deleted from the study as a result.  
Approval of transcript 
Once the transcript of the interview is completed, a copy will be sent to you to require your 
approval before further processing of the information in the research process.  
Feedback 
Research findings related to your participation may be sent to you by the researcher if you 
wish to after they have been published. 
Signature 
If you are happy with the content of the form, please sign below with the date. In case you are 
not happy with the content and want to suggest some modification, please return the form to 
the researcher with your suggested modification(s). 
Signature: 
Name: 
Date: 
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Appendix 3.3: Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is designed to collect opinion of diverse groups regarding the interplay between 
country governance and accounting systems. In the context of the survey, accounting is defined as 
composed of financial accounting, audit, and management accounting. The survey has no political 
underpinning and the information collected will only be used for academic purposes. The survey is 
confidential and anonymous and will take approximately between 10 and 15 minutes to complete. 
NB: Please, answer all the questions. Thanks! 
Question area 1: Governance 
Q1: How do you assess the overall governance performance (or governance quality) in Benin? 
 
 
Q2: How would you rate the following factors in influencing the development of governance in 
Beninese context? 
1. Power (the way power is exercised)......................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Traditions and cultures.............................................................................................................. 
 
 
3. Electoral systems (the manner in which public officials are elected)....................................... 
 
 
 
4. Legal systems: the formal and written systems (formally enshrined rules and code of conduct into 
law) 
 
 
5. Political accountability (how government and politicians account to the public and legislative 
body through establish interactions and dialogue).................................................................. 
Very strong Strong Fairly strong Balanced  Fairly weak Weak  Very weak  
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very good  
power exercise 
Good power 
exercise 
Fairly Good 
power exercise 
Balanced 
power exercise 
Fairly abused 
power exercise 
Abused power 
exercise 
Very abused 
power exercise 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very strong 
tradit. & cult. 
Strong tradit. 
& culture 
Fairly strong 
trad. & cult 
Balanced 
influence of 
trad. & cult. 
Fairly weak 
trad. & culture 
Weak trad. & 
culture 
Very weak 
trad. & culture 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very strong 
integrity of 
electoral syst. 
Strong 
integrity of 
electoral  syst. 
Fair integrity of 
electoral syst.  
Balanced 
integrity of 
electoral syst. 
Fairly weak 
integrity of  
electoral systems  
Weak integrity of 
electoral systems 
Very weak integrity 
of electoral systems 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very strong 
legal systems 1 
Strong legal 
systems 1 
Fairly strong 
legal systems 1 
Balanced legal 
systems 1 
Fairly weak 
legal systems 1 
Weak legal 
systems 1 
Very weak 
legal systems 1 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very strong 
political acc. 
Strong political 
accountability 
Fairly strong 
political acc. 
Balanced 
political acc. 
Fairly weak 
political acc. 
Weak political 
accountability 
Very weak 
political acc. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
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6. Financial accountability (how government account for the management of the country’s 
financial resources – extent of avoidance of misuse of the financial resources)..................... 
 
 
 
7. Economic development............................................................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
Q3: To what extent are you aware of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (these are a set of 
governance measures developed to assess the quality of governance across the world)? 
 
 
 
Q4: To what extent to you believe that the Worldwide Governance Indicators are used by donors? 
 
 
 
Q5:  To what extent are you aware of Ibrahim Index of African Governance (these are governance 
measures developed to assess the quality of governance across African countries)? 
 
 
Q6: To what extent to you believe that the Ibrahim Index of African Governance are used by donors? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Very strong 
financial acc. 
Strong 
financial acc. 
Fairly strong 
financial acc. 
Balanced 
financial acc. 
Fairly weak 
financial acc. 
Weak financial 
accountability 
Very weak 
financial acc. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very strong effort 
in economic 
development 
Strong effort in 
economic 
development 
Fairly strong 
effort in eco. 
development 
Balanced  
effort in eco. 
development 
Fairly weak 
effort in eco. 
development 
Weak effort in 
economic 
development 
Very weak effort 
in economic 
development 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very much aware Much aware 
 
Fairly much 
aware 
 
Balanced Fairly much unaware  Much unaware Very much 
unaware 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To a very great 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
 
To a fairly great 
extent 
 
Balanced To a fairly limited 
extent 
To a limited 
extent 
Very limited 
extent 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Very much aware Much aware 
 
Fairly much 
aware 
 
Balanced Fairly much unaware  Much unaware Very much 
unaware 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To a very great 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
 
To a fairly great 
extent 
 
Balanced To a fairly limited 
extent 
To a limited 
extent 
Very limited 
extent 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
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Question area 2: Governance and accounting (accounting is defined as composed of government 
financial reporting, government auditing, and government management accounting) 
Q7: How do you evaluate the role of accounting in country governance in Benin? 
 
 
Q8:  to what extent is there information about the work of State accountants in Benin? (State 
accountants include public accountants, auditors and controllers) 
 
 
 
Q9: To what extent do you think State accountants are proficient (skilful) in performing their work? 
 
 
Q10: To what extent do you think State accountants show good standards of integrity and 
professional behaviour in their work in the country? 
 
 
 
Q11: What is your overall comment on the link between accounting and governance?  
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
NB: Any information that you provide in this questionnaire is strictly anonymous and confidential 
and will not be discussed with or passed on to any other parties. 
 
 
 
 
Very strong role Strong role Fairly strong role Balanced role  Fairly weak role Weak role Very weak role 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To a very great 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
 
To a fairly great 
extent 
 
Balanced To a fairly limited 
extent 
To a limited 
extent 
Very limited 
extent 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To a very great 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
 
To a fairly great 
extent 
 
Balanced To a fairly limited 
extent 
To a limited 
extent 
Very limited 
extent 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
To a very great 
extent 
To a great 
extent 
 
To a fairly great 
extent 
 
Balanced To a fairly limited 
extent 
To a limited 
extent 
Very limited 
extent 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
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Appendix 3.4: List of Identified Countries 
Country 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina-Faso 
Burundi 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic  
Congo Republic 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
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Appendix 3.5: List of Selected Countries 
Country 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina-Faso 
Burundi 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic  
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Uganda 
Zambia 
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Appendix 6.1: Plots of dependent and independent variables 
 
Figure 6.2: Plots of IIAG and the Independent Variables 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Plots of WGI and the Independent Variables 
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Appendix 6.2: RE Regression Results with and without Language, and Time Dummies 
  Model 1 - IIAG (Obs=62) Model 2 - WGI (Obs=62) 
  RE RE RE RE 
Cons 0.7586*** 0.8472*** **0.6972 0.4539 
Std error 0.1418 0.1217 0.2729 0.3255 
t-stat/z-stat 5.35 6.96 2.55 1.39 
EcoDev -1.9125*** -2.1480*** ***-2.7398 *-1.9913 
Std error 0.4459 0.4241 0.7887 0.9906 
t-stat/z-stat -4.29 -5.07 -3.47 -2.01 
Obs 59 59 59 59 
Language   0.0249   -0.0328 
Std error   0.0389   0.0793 
t-stat   0.64   -0.41 
Obs   55   55 
Acc_Index 0.1296 0.0186 0.1777 0.3986 
Std error 0.1335 0.1381 0.2456 0.3200 
t-stat/z-stat 0.97 0.13 0.72 1.25 
Obs 62 62 62 62 
t1 -0.0083** 
 
0.0057   
Std error 0.0035 
 
0.0078   
t-stat/z-stat -2.37 
 
0.73   
Obs 66       
t2 -0.0046 
 
-0.0031   
Std error 0.0033 
 
0.0075   
t-stat/z-stat -1.39 
 
-0.41   
Obs         
(Adjusted) R2 0.7585 0.7505 0.6908 0.6709 
F Stat/Wald 
Chi2 
76.44*** 112.4*** ***90.39 ***50.11 
          
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
Appendix 7: Paper written for the African Development Bank 
Governance and Accountability in Africa: What do We Know? 
 
Executive Summary 
This paper surveys existing knowledge on governance and accountability in Africa. The 
review is particularly important given the central role that good governance and 
accountability plays in development or its lack plays in under-development. Governance and 
accountability from our view is broad and multifaceted cutting across several disciplines 
including politics, economics, finance, accounting, law, etc. This view is consistent with the 
various governance indexes which are used to rank countries (with the main ones being the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed 
by the World Bank).   These indexes include broad based measures of governance, for 
example the Ibrahim index has four pillars - safety and rule of law, participation and human 
rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development while the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators have six - voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Our approach is to 
adopt this broad conceptualisation of governance and accountability to assess the state of 
governance and accountability in Africa. We believe that most of the governance and 
accountability challenges facing the continent extend beyond finance hence the need to look 
at the subject from a broader perspective.  
 
Our review has highlighted a number of issues that would help us assess the state of 
governance and accountability in Africa. First, the review revealed that good governance and 
accountability is critical for Africa’s development. This was also highlighted by Kofi Annan 
in an address to the Heads of African States as: “…without good governance – without the 
rule of law, predictable administration, legitimate power and responsive regulation – no 
amount of funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity” (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2005a: II).  Unfortunately, the review of the literature revealed that 
governance and accountability in most of Africa is generally weak and this has in part 
contributed to the underdevelopment of the continent. A number of efforts have been made 
since the 1980s to implement reform initiatives to strengthen governance and accountability 
in some specific African countries but these reforms have largely not been successful. 
Governance and accountability reforms, similar to other types of reforms on the continent are 
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often engineered and implemented by international donors. Though there has been criticism 
of the lack of local ownership of these reforms the Bank in particular through its Strategy and 
the GAP has been making efforts to ensure that reforms are country-led, owned and 
controlled from within individual countries and as a result aligned with local conditions.  One 
example of such an initiative is the combination of traditional and modern systems popular 
tribunal in Rwanda “Gacha cha Rwanda”. 
 
Second, for governance and accountability to function effectively, there is the need for strong 
underpinning institutions. Our review has identified that in most cases these institutions are 
themselves weak hence contributing to the failure of most governance and accountability 
initiatives in Africa. Any reforms of governance and accountability need to be accompanied 
by institutional reforms, i.e. the political system, civil society, the judiciary, tax 
administration, audit, etc.   
 
Third, though existing governance indexes, namely the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
and the Worldwide Governance indicators which are widely used in assessing the state of 
governance in Africa have flaws, they remain important and influence donor decisions. We 
believe that there is a need for further empirical studies to refine and improve on these 
indexes and also to understand what measures countries can adopt to improve their 
governance ranking. For example, there is a need to compare countries that are the top of the 
ranking with those at the bottom. Research is also needed to understand how these rankings 
influence the behaviour of various people such as politicians, government officials, etc.  
 
Overall, we feel that the area of governance and accountability is extremely important but has 
received only minimal attention from researchers. There is the need for in-depth country level 
studies in order to have a better understanding of the state of governance and accountability 
in Africa. Apart from understanding the general state of governance and accountability in 
Africa, we also feel there is a need for research to understand the link between country level 
governance (macro level) and governance at firm level (corporate governance/micro level). In 
this paper we have focused mainly on country level governance but we believe that it will be 
interesting to examine how governance and accountability at the micro level shapes or is 
shaped by governance at the macro level. This will undoubtedly broaden our understanding 
of governance and accountability development in Africa.  
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The main lesson from our review is that a concerted effort is needed in order to improve the 
state of governance and accountability in Africa. This effort requires among other things, in-
depth country level studies to assess the actual state of governance and accountability and 
then the design of appropriate governance and accountability structures and processes that 
incorporate local conditions. These efforts must also be accompanied by appropriate 
institutional reforms.   Though the Bank has made a significant effort in this area, we feel that 
more country level studies will complement the Bank’s efforts. 
  
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. What is governance and why is it important? 
 
The literature on governance can generally be divided into two – corporate or micro level 
governance and country or macro level governance. The focus of this paper is on country 
level governance which is usually termed governance with no further specific qualifications 
(see for example, Kaufmann et al. 2009; Rotberg, 2004). The term ‘governance’ is therefore 
adopted throughout this paper to denote country level governance. Governance has gained 
increased attention as a result of the financial and economic woes of many governments in 
the developing world (many of these are in Africa) in the 1980s and 1990s. The general 
consensus is that, the underdevelopment in many developing countries, especially those in 
Africa can be explained in part, by the weak governance that has characterised these 
economies (The World Bank, 1989, 1992; Kemal, 2006).  
 
Broadly speaking, governance relates to the manner in which power is acquired and exercised, 
public resources are managed, and the relations between political officials, public institutions 
and the general public (Dallas, 2004; Rotberg, 2004). The World Bank’s definition of 
governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
economic and social resources for development” (The World Bank, 1992: 1), is particularly 
useful in understanding the role of the government in governance and development. This 
definition places emphasis on the expected outcome of governance, i.e. ‘development’, with 
the argument that good governments are those that achieve development. There is however a 
debate in the literature as to whether the form of governance matters or not, i.e. ‘the manner 
in which power is exercised’. In this respect, some researchers have identified two forms of 
governance - the market-enhancing governance and the growth-enhancing governance (see, 
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for instance Khan, 2007). According to the market-enhancing governance, if markets are 
efficient the private sector will drive economic development. The assumption therefore is that 
the private sector should play a dominant role in economic development. The mixed results 
under the private sector led development initiatives from some developing countries have 
called for the consideration of the growth-enhancing governance, which requires state 
intervention and critical government capacities to allocate resources irrespective of the 
market. There is however no consensus on the argument that high-democracy based 
governance results in better growth. In an earlier study, Helliwell (1994) concludes that “the 
general result of the growth analysis is that it is still not possible to identify any systematic 
net effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth” (p.225). In a more recent study, 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) find that though democracy has no direct effect on 
growth, it does affect growth through indirect channels suggesting some link between 
democratic governance and growth.  
 
Kaufmann et al. (2009: 5) are of the view that governance encompasses the: “…traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” Kaufmann and 
his colleagues placed emphasis on traditions in terms of social and cultural features as 
important determinants of the form and characteristics of governance in a country. These 
traditions together with the institutional arrangements within a country determine the quality 
of governance (La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Interestingly, there has been a growing interest in understanding the requirements of good 
governance. According to Wilson (2008: 200): “good governance involves making difficult 
trade-offs between highly desirable goals... by trying to make sure that those who make these 
trade-offs… are subject to accountability mechanisms that are sufficient to ensure that they 
make justifiable, even if contestable, choices.” Wilson recognises here the difficulty in 
choosing between alternatives on behalf of the public. The trade-offs involved in the process 
require choosing the options that satisfy, the most (or best), the interests of the citizens. Here, 
apart from proper accountability mechanisms, the notion of resource allocation appears to be 
relevant since choice requires deciding between alternative goals and how the available 
resources will be allocated between selected goals.  
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The World Bank (2000: i) suggests that “good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, 
and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive 
arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law.”  An important point to highlight here 
is that good governance also requires ‘transparency’ and as suggested by Dye and 
Stapenhurst (1998: 1) “good governance is accountable, participatory and transparent”. 
Furthermore “good governance is a strong antidote to ‘corruption and fraud’ (Dye, 2007: 7) 
since good governance requires the existence of mechanisms to prevent or at worst reduce the 
likelihood of corruption and fraud.  
 
These good governance requirements are well entrenched in the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) operations as the core key areas around which the Bank has begun to support 
governance development in Africa. More specifically the focus of the good governance 
agenda of the Bank is “on accountability, transparency, combating corruption, participatory 
governance and legal and judicial reforms” (African Development Bank, 1999: p.ii), with 
accountability being the overarching requirement. In the words of the Bank: 
The development of the Bank Group (The Bank) policy on good governance reflects the 
general consensus among African governments that, good governance is an essential 
ingredient for sound development. It is also in line with the Bank's vision for sustained 
African development into the 21st Century (p.1). 
 
Following this through to its logical conclusion, the AfDB’s vision considers Governance and 
accountability as a major priority in Africa with an emphasis on institutional strengthening 
and the role of civil society in order to give an impetus to the development of the 
continent. Such vision was first put forward by the President of the Bank in 2003 by asserting 
that: “good governance is not only a worthy goal per se but also a prerequisite for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction in the longer term” (Kabbaj, 2003: p.7) 
 
1.2. What is accountability and why is it important? 
 
Accountability which is a basic concept of good governance can be defined in terms of 
responsibility or answering for actions, particularly expenditure by people in authority such 
as those in government and those who hold public office (Moncrieffe, 1998). Accountability 
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involves both taking and accepting responsibility, willingly or by obligation, and accounting 
for actions undertaken within these responsibilities.  
 
As argued by O'Neill et al. (2007: 3): “accountability refers to the nature of a relationship 
between two parties. A relationship may be characterised as lacking in accountability or 
highly accountable. In a relationship between two parties, A is accountable to B, if A is 
obliged to explain and justify her actions to B, and B is able to sanction A if her conduct, or 
explanation for it, is found to be unsatisfactory.” Accountability is a two-way relationship. 
First, there is the requirement placed on the person taking a defined responsibility to be 
answerable to the person or party giving the responsibility. Second, there is the possibility of 
the latter to sanction (or reward) the first if he/she finds that the account or the explanation 
provided is unsatisfactory (or satisfactory). In a democratic system, this second dimension of 
the accountability relationship is fulfilled through the electoral process allowing the 
constituencies to reward (re-election) or sanction (replacement) of the elected officials. 
 
Accountability is central to the achievement of good governance and this has been reiterated 
by Malena and McNeil (2010: 1) as: “Accountability is the cornerstone of good governance. 
Unless public officials can be held to account, critical benefits associated with good 
governance – such as social justice, poverty reduction, and development – remain elusive”  
Similarly, Kluvers (2003: 57-58) notes that: 
The concept of accountability is a fundamental underpinning in liberal democratic thought. 
Accountability forms the basis of the trust we have in society’s institutions and organisations, 
so when accountability relationships are undermined our trust in society’s institutions is 
damaged... Without adequate accountability the management of resources can at best be 
wasteful and incompetent and at worst corrupt. Where there is inadequate accountability 
resources may be used inefficiently and ineffectively. 
 
Accountability is a fundamental principle in itself and not only driven by the quest to fight 
corruption and fraud. Even where corruption is absent or minimal, accountability is needed to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness of resources use and avoid wastes; and ultimately hold 
officials answerable to their constituencies. One concept of accountability discussed in the 
literature is political accountability (Persson et al., 1997), which has been suggested serves 
two practical purposes. As argued by Adibe (2010: 1250), “the first, which is political, is that 
political accountability gives effect to the principle of checks and balances as a bulwark 
against arbitrary government. The second, which is economic, is that it ensures efficiency in 
the operation of the business of government”. This notion of accountability emphasises both 
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the requirement of balance of power and the crucial need for efficiency in government in 
running businesses.  
 
It follows from this brief discussion that accountability is a two-way process: the government 
accounting to its constituencies and they in return reward the government with re-election, or 
sanction them by replacing the ruling government and public officials. 
 
 
Figure 1: The process of accountability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the heart of the accountability concept lays the principal-agent relationship. At macro or 
country level, this relationship is between (1) the citizens and elected public officials (or 
politicians), between (2) elected public officials and public managers or non-elected officials 
(Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003), and between (3) public managers and the citizens. In the 
first relationship, the citizens are the principal and elected officials are the agent; and this is 
the ultimate principal-agent relationship since it is the citizens who entrust the management 
of the nation’s resources and affairs to the elected officials through elections. In return, 
elected public officials account for their actions and decisions to the citizens via various 
mechanisms such as the Parliament, audit institutions, media, etc. These institutions also act 
as control mechanisms. Most public institutions and agencies are run by individuals who are 
not usually elected, but are rather appointed by the elected officials. As a result, they account 
to the elected officials who in turn account to the public.  However, where institutions or 
agencies have special or independent status, such as the Office of the Auditor General or the 
judiciary in most countries, the public officials running these institutions account presumably 
to the public via its representative, the Parliament and/or other arrangements. 
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2. Governance and Accountability in the African Context 
 
2.1. Background: Initiation of Governance and Accountability Reform in Africa 
and the Role of the World Bank 
 
The 1980s and 1990s had seen the emergence of political institutions for governance and 
economic and social development (World Bank, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2003). Improvements in 
governance are suggested to foster enhancement in economic and social conditions and 
poverty alleviations. In terms of citizen welfare, it has been argued that “good governance is 
a pre-requisite to sustained increases in living standards” (Knack, 2002: 1). Similarly, 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) find that an improvement of one standard deviation in governance is 
associated with an increase of between two and a half and four fold in per capita income.  
This potential link between governance quality and development has given impetus to the 
World Bank support to government institutions across the world (World Bank, 2003). 
 
Since the economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Africa has been part of this 
process and subjected to increased institutional reforms in order to improve governance 
across the continent (Jaspersen & Shariff, 1990; Dollar and Svensson, 2000; World Bank, 
2003; Economic Commission for Africa, 2005b). Structural adjustment programmes led by 
the World Bank had been the primary approaches used to achieve this purpose. With these 
programmes, “it is hoped that macro and institutional reforms will produce more efficient 
resource use and higher rates of economic growth” (Summers and Pritchett, 1993: 383). 
Hence, the central focus was on institutional improvement as emphasised by the World Bank 
(2003: 25): “we need to ensure our lending enhances institution-building (in addition to 
addressing relevant policy, physical investment, and resource transfer objectives)”. As a 
result, there has been a significant growth in adjustment and investment lending over the 
years.  
 
Prior evaluations of the adjustment programmes suggest that, in all, they fail to meet 
expectations. Having acknowledged that adjustment lending in the 1980s had somehow 
improved macroeconomic imbalances and growth, Summers and Pritchett (1993) recognise, 
however, that it did not solve the basic development problems. This is also supported by 
Easterly’s (2005: 20) assessment that “there were some successes, but also some big disasters” 
associated with the adjustment lending in the recipient countries. As a result, the adjustment 
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lending approaches had been amended by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s with new programmes whose primary objectives are defined to ensure improved public 
savings and efficient use of public resources, transparency of the use of public money, and 
monitoring and controls of expenditures, thus improving accountability (World Bank, 2003; 
Easterly, 2005).  
 
Despite the renewed approach to African governance development, there is a conviction that 
the continent needs to do more on the ground in terms of effective implementation of 
governance related policies and frameworks. In support of this, Banda (2002: 95) claims that 
“in theory, most of Africa has embraced the concept of good governance. In practice, this is 
not the case.”  
 
Interestingly, following the World Bank’s governance programmes in Africa, the AfDB has 
joined the initiatives with a vision to make governance and accountability a key priority in its 
lending and non-lending activities on the continent as aforementioned. To this purpose, the 
AfDB has developed the Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan (DAP) over the 
period 2008-2012 which serves as a framework for the Bank’s interventions in good 
governance in Africa. As such, the “(GAP) for 2008-2012 is the African Development 
Bank’s guide for [the Bank’s] support to regional member countries’ efforts to improve 
governance and fight corruption” (African Development Bank, 2008a: p.9) with the central 
objective to build capacity and strengthen transparency and accountability in the management 
of public resources. Specifically, the GAP is expected to “strengthen the implementation of 
the Bank’s governance work by providing the basis for greater strategic selectivity, defining 
guiding principles for delivering results and achieving impact” (p.13). This framework is 
formulated around three main levels of intervention: (1) country level, (2) sectorial level, and 
(3) regional level. A thorough evaluation of the GAP at the end of its term (i.e. 2012) is 
necessary to give an indication of the successes achieved.  
 
2.2. Snapshot of Governance and Accountability in Selected African Countries 
 
A brief overview of the state of governance and accountability is provided in this section 
based on the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009)
65
.  
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 Subject to the limitations discussed later in this paper 
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Table 1: Average WGIs for selected African Countries 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 
2003 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2009 
Score 
Change (%) 
comp. to 1996 
Score 
Change (%) 
comp. to 2003 
ALGERIA 18.3 10.6 14.6 23.4 25.5 38.9% 28.3 31.1 28.7 27.8 27.0 25.0 -1.8% 
BENIN 58.7 48.5 48.9 44.8 42.5 -27.6% 41.7 38.2 43.2 43.4 42.4 42.9 0.9% 
CAMEROON 12.2 15.7 19.7 17.6 21.2 74.0% 19.5 19.2 21.2 21.4 20.9 22.4 5.7% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.6 0.9 1.5 2.1 2.9 13.1% 3.3 3.1 3.7 4.3 4.7 3.7 28.0% 
GHANA 41.2 43.3 50.4 46.8 46.9 13.9% 46.5 51.5 55.7 54.9 55.3 55.6 18.5% 
KENYA 25.7 19.7 22.6 24.8 28.2 9.8% 29.2 27.0 29.1 28.5 28.4 25.6 -9.4% 
MALI 41.7 36.8 39.5 43.0 45.7 9.5% 46.0 46.9 43.1 43.3 40.2 36.7 -19.6% 
NIGERIA 8.2 13.9 15.1 11.5 12.6 54.1% 11.2 14.7 15.8 16.3 17.9 14.7 17.1% 
SENEGAL 40.8 45.9 48.8 51.9 47.6 16.7% 50.5 50.3 45.2 42.1 43.5 40.8 -14.2% 
SOUTH AFRICA 53.4 58.4 60.5 61.0 61.0 14.3% 64.6 64.4 65.6 63.7 62.4 59.9 -1.9% 
TANZANIA 32.5 32.9 33.3 35.2 35.3 8.5% 37.0 37.3 42.5 42.8 42.3 41.4 17.3% 
UGANDA 33.4 28.8 25.8 25.6 30.5 -8.6% 30.8 30.7 32.8 33.1 32.6 31.7 3.8% 
ZAMBIA 31.2 33.5 29.8 30.3 30.8 -1.1% 32.2 30.3 34.7 37.9 41.8 40.7 31.9% 
Source: Computed from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996 - 2009 – Available from 
www.worldbank.com  
 
Table 1 shows the average governance indicators from all six dimensions of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators
66
 (WGIs) for selected African countries. The year 2003 is the mid-
year between 1996 (the year when the first indicators were produced) and 2009 (the last year 
covered in this analysis). Except for South Africa with consistent average governance 
performance above 50% (which is the case for other few countries not covered in this 
analysis such as Botswana and Mauritius) all the other countries’ scores are well below the 
50% threshold, with a limited number marginally reaching this threshold at some points 
(examples include Benin in 1996; Senegal in 2002, 2004 and 2005; and Ghana in 2000 and 
from 2005 to 2009). 
 
A number of countries have achieved some noticeable improvement in 2003 compared to 
1996. Examples include Cameroon (74%), Nigeria (54%), and Algeria (39%) but these 
performances are due to their relatively low (or very low) initial average scores, and so small 
increase in absolute value term can turn to a big increase in percentage (see for example 
Nigeria which had only a 4.4 average score points increase). Few other countries have seen 
                                                          
66
 The six dimensions that compose the WGIs are Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
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their governance scores deteriorated in 2003 compared to 1996. The most visible one is 
Benin which recorded an above average governance score in 1996 but then had experienced a 
significant drop in its governance score by nearly 28% in 2003. In 2009 the governance 
quality of many countries have marginally (but not significantly) improved except for Zambia 
(32%) and Congo (28%) – in the case of Congo the absolute average score is so low that this 
increase in governance performance cannot be seen as any noticeable improvement. On the 
other hand, the governance quality of a significant number of countries had weakened in 
2009 compared to 2003, with Mali recording the highest rate of deterioration (nearly 20%). 
 
Figure 2: Average WGIs for Selected African Countries in 1996, 2003 and 2009 
 
Source: Based on WGIs 1996, 2003, 2009 
 
Figure 2 compares the average WGIs for 1996, 2003 and 2009 for selected African countries. 
Except for 1996 when Benin had achieved the highest governance score, South Africa 
recorded the highest average score in both 2003 and 2009 followed by Senegal in 2003 and 
Ghana in 2009. Ghana had actually made a steady improvement in its governance quality 
over the review period. Similarly Congo and Nigeria had also made continuing improvements 
despite having the lowest average scores in each year compared to the rest of the countries 
(Congo’s average scores being even lower than that of Nigeria in all cases). 
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Table 2: Voice & Accountability Indicators for Selected African Countries 
Country 1996 1998 2000 2002 
2003 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2009 
Score 
Change (%) 
comp. to 1996 
Score 
Change (%) 
comp. to 2003 
ALGERIA 12.0 10.1 13.0 18.3 18.3 52.7% 25.5 25.5 21.6 20.2 19.7 17.5 -4.0% 
BENIN 66.0 59.6 60.1 49.0 51.0 -22.8% 50.5 52.9 56.3 58.2 57.7 57.3 12.5% 
CAMEROON 13.4 14.9 16.3 16.8 16.8 25.6% 20.2 16.8 20.7 21.6 17.8 19.4 15.5% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6.2 2.4 2.4 3.4 6.3 0.5% 3.8 5.8 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.5 36.5% 
GHANA 39.7 37.0 50.0 47.6 52.9 33.2% 52.9 58.2 59.1 60.6 58.7 60.7 14.7% 
KENYA 25.4 22.6 24.5 27.9 39.4 55.5% 43.8 41.8 44.2 43.8 42.8 36.0 -8.6% 
MALI 66.5 49.0 48.1 55.3 57.2 -14.0% 57.2 60.6 56.7 55.3 55.3 54.0 -5.6% 
NIGERIA 3.8 12.5 28.8 28.8 26.9 603.4% 26.0 24.5 30.8 30.8 29.8 24.6 -8.5% 
SENEGAL 45.5 47.6 52.9 56.7 54.3 19.5% 55.3 55.3 51.4 45.2 43.3 38.4 -29.3% 
SOUTH AFRICA 74.6 73.6 69.2 67.3 69.2 -7.2% 70.7 70.7 71.2 68.3 67.8 66.4 -4.2% 
TANZANIA 28.7 34.1 36.5 40.4 38.9 35.6% 34.1 39.4 40.9 44.7 45.7 43.1 10.7% 
UGANDA 31.1 20.7 17.8 21.2 27.4 -11.9% 27.9 31.3 32.2 33.2 32.7 32.7 19.3% 
ZAMBIA 32.1 35.6 33.2 38.9 40.4 26.0% 36.5 32.7 37.5 39.4 43.8 39.3 -2.6% 
Source: Computed from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996- 2009 – Available from 
www.worldbank.com 
 
Table 2 shows the Voice and Accountability indicator for selected African countries from 
1996 to 2009 with 2003 the mid-year. Here again, South Africa maintained its voice and 
accountability score well above the 50% threshold over the review period. Similarly, Benin 
and Mali also maintained their score above 50% except for 2002 when it marginally dropped 
to 49% for Benin, and 1998 and 2000 when it dropped to 49% and 48% respectively for Mali. 
Although Ghana’s initial score was relatively low, it had reached and exceeded the 50% 
threshold in 8 out of the 11 review years. A number of countries (Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia) had never reached the 50% threshold.  
Some countries had, however, made some impressive improvement at the mid-year point 
(2003) (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya, and Algeria); Nigeria being the one with the most noticeable 
improvement (603%) – this is because its initial score was only 3.8 in 1996. Nevertheless, 
some countries have experienced deteriorations over the years (e.g. South Africa, Uganda, 
Mali and Benin). This deterioration is more observable in 2009 when more than half of the 
countries recorded some drop in their voice and accountability scores (e.g. of these countries: 
Senegal (-29%), Kenya (-8.6%), Nigeria (-8.5%), and Mali (-5.6)). 
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Figure 3: Trend of Voice & Accountability Indicators for Selected African  
 
Source: Based on WGIs 1996-2009 
 
Figure 3 shows the trend in the Voice and Accountability indicator for selected African 
countries from 1996 to 2009. Nigeria recorded a significant increase in its score in the early 
years to 2000. Tanzania and Senegal had experienced a similar trend up to 2002 but at a 
lower slope compared to Nigeria. The opposite trend can be observed for Mali and Uganda 
from 1996 to 2000 where their accountability score plummeted from 66.5 to 48.1 and 31.1 to 
17.8 respectively. Benin had also experienced a drop in its score from 66 in 1996 to 49 in 
2002. The overall accountability performance for most countries fluctuated significantly 
between 2002 and 2009 with a decline in trend for many of the countries in our sample (Mali, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and Algeria).  
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2.3. The State of Governance and Accountability in Africa – From Figures to 
Reality 
 
According to Diamond (2008: 138) “Governance in Africa is in a state of transition, or some 
would say, suspension… Of course, formal institutions… can coexist with the informal 
practices of clientelism, corruption, ethnic mobilization, and personal rule by largely 
unchecked presidents”. McNeil and Mumvuma (2006: 9) also summarised the state of 
accountability in Africa as:  
In Africa, historically almost all accountability has been directed upward toward donors and 
central governments, not downward to citizen users of services. Upward accountability is 
further balkanised when limited local resources are sapped by different donor requirements 
that demand the creation of parallel systems of accountability. As a result, mechanisms of 
participation, even when they exist, have often failed to provide the necessary accountability, 
especially in a decentralized environment. 
 
Although some progress has been made over the last two decades, especially from 1990, 
there are still significant improvements to be made to have adequate accountable and well 
governed States in Africa. There is the need to improve the balance of power which is key 
feature of ‘good’ governance and democracy which involves proper functioning of state 
institutions. In this balance of power, the role of formal rules in terms of actual compliance is 
significant (Posner and Young, 2007). The two main institutions with some good examples of 
balance of power in Africa are the ‘executive’ and the ‘Parliament’ or alike. Using the cases 
of Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria, Posner and Young (2007: 127) report that “across sub-
Saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are coming to matter much more than they used to, 
and have displaced violence as the primary source of constraints on executive behaviour”.  
 
Overall, the executive in many countries is observed to have an overwhelming power over 
the other ‘check’ and power institutions. For example, in a study of the state of governance in 
selected African countries, the African Development Bank (2005a) concludes that on political 
accountability, although Beninese Constitution has provided for the separation and balance of 
powers (legislature, executive and judiciary) with the definition of their respective missions, 
“collaboration and synergy between the different powers are in fact only apparent because the 
executive dominates the other powers” (p.vii). Similar conclusions, though to various degrees, 
were made for Chad in 2004, Gabon in 2005, and Mauritania in 2005 to name a few (African 
Development Bank, 2004; 2005b; 2005c). 
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One area that requires significant improvements is in the area of downward accountability 
(accountability from politicians to citizens). Adibe (2010: 1242) observed that: “African 
governments have demonstrated a remarkable degree of responsiveness or accountability in 
their external orientation toward the international community while remaining virtually 
unaccountable to their own citizens”. The basic framework for accountability for public 
funds is either lacking or very limited. Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010: 369) provided an 
example from Nigeria to support this assertion: 
Whereas in developed countries, the missions and values of the public sector are defined 
explicitly in policy framework, this is not quite the case in Nigeria where public sector values 
are in want. Besides, the authorizing environment which includes the budgetary processes and 
institutions do not function as intended in Nigeria. Checks and balances are lacking with the 
Auditor-General of the Federation also lacking the required independence. Recently, the 
Auditor-General of the Federation (Ejenavi) announced that Nigeria does not have a 
‘functioning Audit law.’ The various basic laws and rules such as the Auditing, Accounting 
and Financial Standards rules which regulate auditing in Nigeria are not comprehensive and 
harmonized enough to cater for Nigeria’s environment 
 
Efforts from the various stakeholders to improve accountability in Africa have thus 
largely not been successful. For example a recent study by Butler (2010) on political 
accountability in Kenya concludes that: 
…the push for accountability by the voting public, the media and other civil society groups, 
and international donors and actors has been a highly contested and evolving battle as 
entrenched politicians have abused power in order to avoid being held accountable, thus 
allowing them to engage in politics as usual (p.2) 
 
There has been a number of donor support reform programmes to improve governance and 
accountability in Africa. However such governance and accountability reforms must be 
accompanied by institutional reforms. Without adequate institutional change, expectations in 
terms of outcomes and impacts of governance and accountability reforms will not materialise 
and as de Renzio (2006) notes:    
…recent assessments of GBS (General Budget Support) programmes and Public Financial 
Management (PFM) reforms highlight a number of shortcomings which call into question the 
role of donors in supporting institutional change. Political economy factors are often 
overlooked. Moreover, in a number of countries, donors are deeply involved in core policy 
processes, undermining their capacity to play a more constructive role. As a consequence, the 
strengthening of domestic accountability remains an elusive objective (627) 
 
Based on the potential role of public financial governance in economic development, the 
AfDB has recently lunched the African Governance Outlook (AGO) with the objective that 
this will become the Bank’s flagship publication on financial governance. In fact: 
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The AGO intends to serve as an authoritative source of information on the state of financial 
governance in Africa based on three interrelated parts: (i) an assessment of financial 
governance baselines, trends and prospects for the region; (ii) a summary of country financial 
governance profiles, along with the contextual analysis of observed practices developed 
through national consultative processes; and (iii) a thematic chapter focusing on important 
financial governance issues (African Development Bank, 2012: p.7) 
 
At the conceptual level, the AGO outlines a number of governance factors that drive public 
finance reforms and improvements. These include: (1) an enabling legislative environment, 
(2) a strong political will and commitment, (3) a strong and vibrant civil society, (4) a strong 
and independent media, (5) a competitive politics and development of independent oversight 
institutions, (6) donor confidence and support, and (7) fiscal decentralization. 
 
While the preliminary findings of this initiative show that several African countries are 
making efforts to implement financial governance reforms and can demonstrate evidence of 
improvement, the same findings also suggest that there is “limited separation of powers 
[which] adversely impinges on the quality of financial governance” (p.18). Subsequent 
evaluations of the AGO initiative will help assess the impact on public finance management 
improvement in the profile countries over time. 
 
Besides the above, a major challenge that undermines governance development is conflict. 
Conflicts have detrimental impact on governance in terms of deteriorating infrastructures, 
high military expenses, shrinking economic growth which is exacerbated by high capital 
outflows due to lack of confidence of investors leaving the country with their capital, etc. The 
situation is well summarised by the AfDB in these terms: 
During war, governments tend to become desperate, and policy and governance deteriorate. 
The need for higher military spending collides with a decline in tax revenues as the formal 
economy contracts. Aid also declines and the government is shut out of international credit 
markets, while domestic credit markets dry up. In response, the government resorts to 
inflation tax, leaving the post-conflict economy with a legacy of high inflation and reduced 
confidence in the currency. Governments also often pursue a wide range of other 
unsustainable policies that sacrifice the future for the present (African Development Bank, 
2008b: p.xvi). 
 
3. Other Governance and Accountability Initiatives 
 
In terms of ‘good governance’ initiative in Africa, the African Peer Review Mechanism 
included in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is a significant 
innovation welcomed by both African elites and the international community at the time of its 
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launch. Akokpari (2003: 11) notes that “one remarkable point of departure of the AU67 from 
the OAU
68
, however, is its emphasis on interference, albeit minimal, in the internal affairs of 
states through the APR [African Peer Review] in sharp contrast to the old and discredited 
dictator-loved principle of non-interference”. This represents an excellent opportunity to 
strengthen ‘good governance’ and democratic institutions. However, evidence suggests that 
in practice the APR has failed to achieve its intended objectives and as Taylor (2010: 51) 
observes: “there have been significant problems facing NEPAD. These revolve around the 
actual extant political economy and dominant political cultures across Africa, which the 
technocratic neoliberal agenda of ‘good governance’ cannot deal with”. In a more recent 
study, Taylor further comments that “at the time, NEPAD was enthusiastically pushed by the 
G-8 and the United Nations and – for a time – it garnered some excitement. However, nearly 
ten years after its launch, most commentators would probably agree that it is dead in the 
water” (Taylor, 2011: 141). 
 
There are other initiatives which are concerned with governance quality measurements both 
from within and outside Africa. The first attempt from within Africa on governance quality 
measurement had been initiated by Mo Ibrahim Foundation that develops the ‘Ibrahim Index 
of African Governance’ (IIAG). The second attempt, which is from outside Africa, had been 
the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2005 with the 
development of the African Governance Indicators (AGIs) in the form of a project. The last 
attempt in this regard is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) which cover most of 
African countries. 
 
In spite of the inherent merits of these governance indicators being the first attempts in 
quantifying whole governance dimensions, these measures have been criticised. It has been 
argued that there is a wide variation in the main indicators and sub-measures. Furthermore, 
the method of computing the indexes also differs considerably from one index to another. It is 
also argued that the ‘control of corruption’ indicator within the WGIs for example measures 
different levels of corruption across countries, and as a result it makes cross country 
comparison controversial (Apaza, 2009). Moreover, the actual measured corruption in a 
particular country run the risk of limited scope coverage (Olken, 2009). Also, though 
corruption and rule of law are used to proxy for transparency, “corruption and lack of rule of 
                                                          
67
 African Union 
68
 Organisation of African Unity 
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law may make it difficult to achieve transparency,... they do not measure transparency per se” 
(Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 2001: 48). More interestingly, in a real case of policy decision 
regarding the 2005 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) programme, Kaufmann et al. 
(2005) – the authors of the WGIs – admitted to some of the limitations in making such policy 
decision regarding the concerned recipient countries.  
 
Focusing on the technical ground of the indexes, Thomas (2010) has challenged the overly 
reliance on the WGIs, in particular, in policy decisions by arguing that the methodology used 
in constructing the WGIs is seriously flawed. He begins by pointing out that Kaufmann and 
his associates claim to measure from 2006 perceptions rather than the actual dimensions 
being considered. On this ground, “there is substantial difference between measuring a thing 
and measuring perceptions of it... for example, perceptions of crime risk have been shown to 
be quite different from actual crime levels...; perceptions of corruption have been shown to 
differ from corruption levels...” (p.36). Surprisingly, despite the change in method of 
measurement, the authors still interpret changes in their data as reflecting changes in 
governance itself rather than changes in the perceptions of it.  
 
There are also issues regarding the operationalisation of the construct. For instance, while 
agreeing on the definition of the ‘government effectiveness’ construct, Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007) have doubt about its operationalization given the observation that certain measures 
included in the variables were extraneous to the definition. Thomas (2010) also expresses the 
same regarding ‘Voice and Accountability’ and ‘Control of Corruption’.  
 
4. Institutions that Underpin Governance and Accountability in Africa 
 
For governance and accountability to be effective in any country, it is important that the 
underlying institutions are themselves seen as effective. Here we discuss two of such 
important institutions – the political system and the civil society. While there are a number of 
these institutions, we have selected these two to highlight the need to understand governance 
and accountability in a much broader context.  
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4.1 Political System and the Balance of Power and Implications for Governance and 
Accountability in Africa 
 
The balance of power is key feature of ‘good’ governance and democracy which involves 
proper functioning of state institutions. In this balance of power, the role of formal rules in 
terms of actual compliance is significant (Posner and Young, 2007). The two main 
institutions with some good examples of balance of power in Africa are the ‘executive’ and 
the ‘Parliament’ or alike. Using the cases of Zambia, Malawi and Nigeria, Posner and Young 
(2007: 127) report that “across sub-Saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are coming to 
matter much more than they used to, and have displaced violence as the primary source of 
constraints on executive behaviour”. They observe that attempt by Chiluba to change 
constitutional provisions to abolish term limits fails not only because of opposition from civil 
society organisations, the opposition and some of his supporters but also because of the 
strong opposition of the Malawian Parliament. Similarly, Muluzi fails due to the opposition 
in the Parliament and the attempt only fell short of three to win the ‘necessary two-third 
majority’ required. The same opposition together with some supporters in Nigerian Senate 
block Mr Obasanjo from extending the term limit to bid for a third term. As a result of these 
cases, Posner and Young argue that power ‘now changes hands principally in accord with 
institutional’ (p.129) rather through coup d’état or violence. 
 
Similarly, Barkan (2008: 137) concludes his study of six African legislatures as the following:  
Although legislative performance is uneven across the African continent, the legislature is 
emerging as a “player” in some countries. It has begun to initiate and modify laws to a degree 
never seen during the era of neopatrimonial rule or even in the early years after the return of 
multiparty politics… It checks the executive branch. It sometimes exerts meaningful 
oversight of the executive. And in some countries (Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria)… it has 
blocked presidents from changing the constitution to repeal limits on presidential terms. 
 
However, scholars, including Joseph (2008), have challenged the above positive assessments 
as overly optimistic. Using the cases of Uganda (Museveni), Kenya (Kibaki – 2007 
‘calamitous’ elections (Diamond, 2008)), Senegal (Wade), and Nigeria (Obasanjo), Joseph 
(2008: 100) comments that “the struggle to cross the frontier from personal rule to rule-based 
governance is still far from over in much of Africa”, meaning that the rule of law is still very 
weak. Nevertheless the concern is not solemnly about weak institutions and rule of law, as 
evidenced in Kenya where the “political disorder… was not the result of a straightforward 
weakening of the state, as has been hitherto commonly assumed” (Branch and Cheeseman, 
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2009: 5). It is rather “the clear perversity of some state institutions which… have been 
subverted for corrupt and Machiavellian ends… and… by the illegitimacy, but tenacity, of 
corruption and state bias” (Lynch and Crawford, 2011: 285) 
 
The link between democracy and governance and accountability has been discussed in the 
literature. Although military coups are still prevalent according to Lynch and Crawford 
(2011), Lindberg and Clark (2008: 86) find that “democratic regimes are about 7.5 times less 
likely to be subjected to attempted military interventions than electoral authoritarian regimes 
and almost 18 times less likely to be victims of actual regime breakdown as a result of 
military coups”. It is generally argue that there is a ‘value inherent’ in holding elections even 
if they are not free and fair (Lindberg, 2006). Most African countries now have democratic 
elections as legal and recognised means to change governments and legislatures. As reported 
by Lynch and Crawford (2011: 279) many of these elections resulted in “a peaceful transfer 
of power, as occurred, for example, in Zambia and Cape Verde in 1991, Benin in 1991 and 
2006, South Africa in 1994, Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002, and Ghana in 2000 and 2008. 
Although it is worth noting that only five of these elections witnessed the unsuccessful 
candidature of an incumbent president”. However poor and manipulated successful elections 
in recent years provides contradictory evidence to what is generally seen as having an 
‘inherent value’ as termed by Lindberg (2006), leading to conflict and violence.  
 
A recent example of this is that of Cote d’Ivoire in 2010-2011 which had seen the incumbent 
President leaving office only after a long negotiation and military intervention, including the 
international community. The role of the international community is sometimes, and probably 
often, ambiguous and is often seen as “an international community that purports to promote 
democracy, but actually seems more interested in political stability and economic growth 
than democracy” (Lynch and Crawford, 2011: 281). 
  
The current state of elections and democracy in the development of governance in Africa is 
summarised by Abbink (2010) as follow: 
…countries often morphed into conflict arenas or ‘façade democracies’ that appropriated the 
discourse of political rights. They only allowed elections and freedoms under specific 
conditions. In some countries the nature of civic society was such that they were often not 
prepared to exercise the difficult game of parliamentary-democratic politics. In several cases 
this was because the incumbent regime had all but destroyed civil society organizations (trade 
unions, professional groups, religious associations, etc.). In other countries, elections came to 
gravely exacerbate antagonistic ‘ethnic or ethno-regional politics, based on patronage and 
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divide-and-rule tactics, thus subverting issue-politics and the shared national interest. This 
often led to harshly polarised and violent electoral campaigns… 
 
 
 
4.2 Civil Society and Implications for Governance and Accountability in Africa 
 
The role of civil society in strengthening governance, in its broadest sense, cannot be 
overstated. In Africa, “civil society has never been stronger, mass publics have never been so 
questioning and vigilant, and the impulse toward the reassertion of predatory personal rule 
has never faced so many constraints” (Diamond, 2008: 139). If we compare this to the early 
independence period, of course, no-one can deny that significant progress has been made on 
the continent. According to Lynch and Crawford (2011), Ghana is a particularly good 
example with constitutional provisions that facilitate the emergence and development of civil 
society organisations and free and ‘independent’ media. The authors point out South Africa, 
Nigeria and Kenya with the proliferation of vibrant civil society and media over the last two 
decades. Lynch and Crawford (2011) however cautioned that the mere existence of growing 
civil society and media does not automatically result in improved governance and democracy. 
For example, when civil society organisations become ethnicized or a media becomes 
partisan or involved in campaign of violence such as in Kenya and Rwanda, they can have 
dramatic consequences on governance and democracy. Moreover, corruption in the circle of 
civil society organisations and media together with their inability to challenge the 
government, due to political threat or ‘affiliation’, hamper their contribution to governance 
and accountability. 
 
McNeil and Mumvuma (2006: vi) summarised the role of civil society in governance and 
accountability as: 
Through the lessons of civic engagement, participation, and civic ownership, citizen groups in 
Africa are now beginning to hold a growing number of public officials and service providers 
accountable for their actions and behaviours. Such social accountability is working to bring about 
more efficient and equitable governance by reducing corruption and improving delivery of public 
services to the poor. 
 
A note from the World Bank on the role of civil society in francophone Africa concluded that: 
“francophone Africa has witnessed new demands for reforms on governance and anti-
corruption. Connected through networks of activists and experts in other parts of the 
continent, civil society in the francophone countries is becoming more engaged and is 
demanding better outcomes from governments. Activists and governments alike are 
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increasingly working across borders to find support and solutions that have worked in other 
parts of the developing world”69. There is however the need for empirical studies to examine 
how these civil society movements are actually impacting on governance and accountability 
in these countries.  
 
4.2.1 Some Evidence of Civil Society and Social Accountability in Africa 
 
Social accountability is defined by Malena and McNeil (2010: 1) as “the wide range of 
citizen actions to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, 
media, and other actors that promote or facilitate these efforts”. It is observed that civil 
society engagement and participation in government activities in most Africa are now 
beginning to bring about greater accountability especially in relation to the management of 
public resources and service delivery and impact. In fact, according to the World Bank “the 
impact of nonresponsive and unaccountable governments is perhaps most harshly felt by the 
poor in Africa, where corruption costs about $148 billion annually, or 25 percent of Africa’s 
official GNP, according to African Union estimates. Yet despite this clear gap in 
accountability between government and its citizens, when Africans are asked ‘What does 
‘democracy’ mean to you? – only one percent explicitly mention accountability. Only one in 
four agree that ‘government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses who control 
the government’ rather than: ‘people are like children, the government should take care of 
them like a parent’…”70 
 
Despite the above observation, it is undeniable that there is now a growing realisation on the 
part of citizens in a number of African countries that in order to curb corruption, improve 
public infrastructure and reduce poverty, there is the need for more active participation of 
citizens in monitoring government activities. This therefore makes the case for the growing 
involvement of civil society organisations in the budget process and government policy-
making and implementation across Africa. In fact McNeil and Mumvuma (2006: 7) report 
that: 
Over the past decade, many African countries have experienced a shift from the once 
ubiquitous system of authoritarian, single-party rule to multiparty rule coupled with a 
relaxation in the formerly restrictive economic and political rules of the game. As a result, a 
new breed of civil society organizations and actors has emerged that is demanding increased 
involvement in policy and budgetary decision making at national and local levels. 
 
One of the key initiatives in this respect is the creation of the Affiliated Network for Social 
Accountability (ANSA)-Africa in 2007, which at the time was portrayed as “a new network 
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 See http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/news/2010/11/10/african-conference-responsible-business-and-good-
governance [Accessed 08/02/2012] 
70
 See http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/stories/demanding-good-governance-lessons-social-accountability-
initiatives-africa [Accessed 08/02/2012] 
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designed to become the leading African institution for supporting citizen involvement in 
demand-side governance initiatives on the continent.  By building on existing African 
expertise, ANSA supports the engagement of citizens and civil society in building more 
effective states through social accountability approaches”71. 
 
In a study of social accountability initiatives from civil society in ten Anglophone African 
countries, McNeil and Mumvuma (2006) report that civil society advocating on specific 
issues have increased rapidly in the countries they studied. Examples include Malawi – with 
Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education, Malawi Health Equity Network and 
Malawi Economy Justice Network – and Zambia – with for example the Civil Society for 
Poverty Reduction Network whose main aims are to promote participatory governance and 
development, and a transparent, accountable and responsive system for service delivery to 
citizens. The authors find that efforts to increase social accountability are organised around 
four main significant developments on the continent. 
 
The first development relates to decentralisation and structural adjustment reforms. In this 
area most countries in Africa have embraced decentralisation but implementation varies 
considerably across countries. McNeil and Mumvuma (2006) provided an assessment of the 
adoption of this form of governance in Anglophone Africa as:  
 
…even in those countries where decentralization is considered advanced to moderate – 
there are few clear signs that public service delivery and local economic development 
have been enhanced. Consequently, social accountability in public policy can be viewed 
as a crucial missing component of successful government decentralization (p.8) 
 
In Francophone Africa, Ouedraogo (2003) studied decentralisation and accountability in 
Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mali. Senegal’s experience of decentralisation goes back to the 
colonial period. Although heavy central government oversight is still present in local 
governments, an improvement in terms of reduction in such central oversight has been 
observed in recent years. In Burkina Faso the decentralisation process has been rather 
complex and lengthy and is criticised as a failure with regard to the rural population – which 
constitutes the majority of the population – being deprived from the rights to manage their 
own affairs. A more recent study by Mathieu and Yilmaz (2010: 342) finds that “since the 
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/0,,contentMDK:21203587~pagePK:209023~piPK:335094~t
heSitePK:213799,00.html [Accessed 08/02/2012] 
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commitment to decentralization set forth in the Constitution of 1991, the pace of 
decentralization has been slow in Burkina Faso. About two decades after the beginning of the 
reforms, local governments’ discretionary powers are still very low in all domains, and 
downward accountability to citizens remains weak”.  
 
The involvement of civil society is rather limited leading to lack of social accountability as 
observed in the following context: 
 
In Burkina Faso, social accountability mechanisms are virtually inexistent. On one hand, 
budget information is not readily accessible to the public, which prevents strong citizen 
involvement in monitoring budgetary processes and tracking public expenditure. On the other 
hand, the civil society simply lacks the skills to scrutinize financial management processes. 
Though citizens are engaged in local planning and budgeting for the elaboration of the 
development plans, their involvement is limited to the expression of needs and priorities 
during the diagnosis phase. Such initial public consultation however does not suffice to hold 
local governments financially accountable to their constituencies beyond the preparation of 
the development plan (Mathieu and Yilmaz, 2003: 342). 
 
Concerning Mali, the experience of decentralisation is different as evidenced below: 
  
Unlike the other countries, where the decentralisation processes were predominantly initiated 
by the state, Mali represents a special situation where the dynamic of decentralisation was ‘a 
demand from the population’… The popular uprisings of March 1991 that toppled the regime 
of General Moussa Traore´ allowed the emergence of a very active civil society that, during 
the national conference, raised decentralisation as a priority requirement for the Malian 
democratic process (Ouedraogo, 2003: 100) 
 
This ‘push’ from the civil society has ultimately led to the establishment of local 
governments with “…relatively extensive responsibilities. For example, with respect to 
managing natural resources, each local unit was recognised to have an estate in land, a forest 
estate and a pastoral estate. The law also gives the territorial communities the competence to 
preserve the environment, to manage land and to organise agro-sylvan-pastoral activities” 
(Ouedraogo, 2003: 100). 
 
The second development relates to antipoverty strategies which have largely led to increase 
in social accountability. Examples of initiatives in this regard can be found in Ghana and 
Tanzania. In the course of the initiative to qualify for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) debt relief initiative, Ghana has emphasised active participation by the poor in 
poverty reduction polices related to its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) through a 
partnership which involves district assemblies and civil society organisations. “The Ghana 
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HIPC Watch was initiated in 2001 by the Social Enterprise Development (SEND) Foundation 
of West Africa in response to the civil society-government partnership advocated by the 
Ghana PRS. At the same time, the SEND Foundation played an active role in mobilizing 
other Ghanaian civil society organizations to take part in demanding transparent and 
equitable distribution of the HIPC fund, which was soon to follow” (McNeil and Mumvuma, 
2006: 9).  
 
McNeil and Mumvuma (2006) also provided example on Tanzania’s civil society and social 
accountability process using ActionAid’s initiative to monitor Tanzania’s PRS. Like the SEND 
Foundation’s Ghana HIPC Watch, ActionAid’s initiative owes its origins to the HIPC Debt Relief 
Initiative. The relief went to basic education under the Primary Education Development Plan, as 
performance in the sector was increasingly experiencing a downward spiral because of limited 
resources and poor governance, political commitment, transparency, and accountability. As with all 
other HIPC-related projects, civil society participation in monitoring implementation of the Primary 
Education Development Plan became mandatory. ActionAid seized this opportunity, and together 
with other civil society actors in the country have continued to participate in monitoring all parts of 
the program cycle, reinforcing commitment, accountability, and transparency on the part of the 
government as the main public service provider, policy maker, and planner (p.10). 
 
The third development is concerned with public service delivery and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In attempt to achieve the MDG of universal primary education 
by 2015, the education sector in most African countries has gone through reforms. For 
example “In Malawi, the Civil Society Coalition for Quality Basic Education (CSCQBE) was 
established to track expenditures and monitor programs in the country’s education sector” 
(McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006: 10). The coalition was set up to address the various 
challenges faced by the education sector including, the shortage of qualified teachers, 
classrooms, low teacher salaries, poor infrastructure, and lack of community support. Also 
the Performance Monitoring Initiative of the Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) 
in South Africa was set up in response to similar challenges that gave rise to the CSCQBE 
initiative in Malawi. According to McNeil and Mumvuma (2006: 10) “The South African 
social accountability initiative resulted from concerns about failed public service delivery, 
poor financial management, and weak accountability of the provincial government’s use of 
funds”. 
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The fourth and final development that is driving social accountability is the fight against 
corruption. There has been a significant increase in social accountability efforts driven by the 
desire of the civil society to fight corruption in Africa. For example in Ghana, following 
alleged misuse of funds and complaints about long delays in payments from the District 
Assemblies Common Fund (DAFC) to Ghana’s Metropolitan, Municipal and District 
Assemblies (MMDAs), “the African Development Programme began tracking DACF 
disbursements by comparing the fund’s budgetary allocations to actual amounts delivered to 
the MMDAs. The goal was to determine if allocated funds actually reached their intended 
beneficiaries and, if not, where blockages and leakages existed, thereby enabling policy 
makers to identify misuse where it existed and to take action to ensure that resources reach 
their intended service delivery points and beneficiaries” (McNeil and Mumvuma, 2006: 11). 
Similarly, following parents and guardians’ complaints that children were returned home for 
non-payments of school fees while the fees had already being paid, the “Zimbabwe’s Centre 
for Total Transformation began tracking school fee expenditures in response to allegations of 
rampant corruption and embezzlement of funds by school principals” (p.11). 
 
 
5. Some Case Study Evidence of Governance and Accountability 
 
Our initial idea in this section is to provide case evidence on governance and accountability 
in individual African countries. However, as we mentioned earlier in the paper, there is lack 
of in-depth country level studies on the subject matter. As a result, the analysis in this section 
is limited to two countries – Uganda and Tanzania. Uganda was identified as one of the 
leading good governance initiative countries in Africa attacking corruption, focusing on 
service delivery and results (Langseth et.al, 1997). Similarly, Tanzania had also undertaken a 
pronounced governance agenda “including multi-party elections, a relatively free press, the 
separation of party and state and an increased space for NGOs” (Kelsall, 2000: 534). The 
table below gives an illustrative summary of the World Bank-supported good governance 
reforms undertaken in both countries over the period 1989-2003 specifically in the areas of 
capacity building and strengthening institutions and participation. 
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Table 3: World Bank Governance-Supported Reforms and Actions in Uganda and 
Tanzania 
Year Uganda Tanzania 
1989 
Public Service Review and 
Reorganisation Commission 
Public Sector Reform as part of 
Economic and Social Adjustment 
Programme 
1991 Social Adjustment Programme   
1992 Civil Service Reform Programme   
1993 
Economic and Financial 
Management - Project 1 
Parastatal and Public Sector 
Reform Project (PPSRP) 
    Financial and Legal Reform Project 
1994 
Workshop on Ethics and 
Transparency 
  
  
Institutional Capacity Building 
Project 
  
1995   Service Delivery Survey 
1996   
End of 1st phase of PPSRP - 
Tanzanian Revenue Authority 
created 
1998   2nd phase of PPSRP 
1999 Public Sector Management Project   
  
Economic and Financial 
Management - Project II 
  
2000   
Launch of PSRP (2000–2011): 
Privatisation and Private Sector 
Reform Project 
2001 
Privatisation and Utility Sector 
Reform 
Accountability Transparency and 
Integrity Project 
  Public Expenditure Review Public Expenditure Review 
2002 
Capacity Building/Civil Service 
Reform: Capacity Building II 
  
2003 
Capacity and Performance 
Enhancement Programme 
  
  
Local Government Development 
Project II 
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Source: Adapted from: Harrison, G. (2005) The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political 
Action in Africa. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations. 7 (2): 240-260 (p.248) 
 
As shown in Table 3, Uganda and Tanzania have received significant amounts of support 
from the World Bank (and other donors) for various governance related programmes to 
promote structural changes in state institutions in order to enhance the processes of state 
action with the aim of improving service delivery and accountability, and reducing corruption. 
Some successes have been achieved. But these successes are quickly followed by some major 
failures. Table 3 above is not complete because of lack of comprehensive monitoring of the 
various reform measures (see for instance, Therkildsen, 2000). Thus, the reform programmes 
and efforts shown in the table are used as an indicative list of the various governance supports 
that these two countries have received from the World Bank. 
 
 
5.1. Uganda 
 
Governance reforms in Uganda can be traced back to the 1990s as part of the overall Civil 
Service Reform programme in the country. This reform was touted at the time as one of the 
most successful in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a level of public service sector of 320,000 in 
1992, the government succeeded in reducing this number by half by 1995-97 mostly through 
elimination of non-existent staff and those who had achieved retirement age. This reduction 
in size has been followed by progress in pay reform resulting in significant increase in salary. 
The military headcount also reduced from 90,000 to 50,000. The government has also 
achieved significant reduction in the number of ministries from 38 to 21 which helped 
improved control over state expenditure. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was also 
reformed with changes to its internal governance structure with a semi-autonomous status to 
provide the management with authority and independence in decision-making. The initial 
successes achieved by the URA reform were very impressive. For example, from only 2 per 
cent of GDP in 1986 revenues increased to over 12 per cent in 1996 and this ratio still 
hovered around 12 per cent in the late 1990s. In terms of anti-corruption reforms to improve 
accountability, the key successes lied in strengthening of the existing institutional 
mechanisms – such as the Office of the Auditor-General, the Department of Public 
Prosecution, the Inspectorate of Government, and the Criminal Investigation Department – 
together with the creation of new institutions with mandate to ensure probity and integrity in 
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the public sector.  One of the key new institutions created to address problems of corruption 
was the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI) with mandate to set policy and standards, 
monitor and coordinate across the accountability chain
72
.   
 
A study by Robinson (2006) summarised the initial success of governance reforms in Uganda 
as: 
Initial success was evident in a number of outcomes. Success in civil service reform resulted 
from downsizing and rationalising the bureaucracy, reflected in a reduction in the number of 
civil servants and ministries. In the case of the revenue authority the key achievement was 
increased tax revenues. The main result of anti-corruption efforts has been the creation of a 
series of institutions charged with responsibility for various aspects of this work, but with 
modest success in prosecuting civil servants found guilty of corrupt practices (p.8) 
 
However, these successes were not sustained, and had soon faded leaving room to significant 
failures caused by patronage, clientelism, and in brief, ‘neoptrimonial politics73’ similar to 
what pertains in most African countries (Hickey, 2003). The failure of reform efforts in 
Uganda is summarised by (Robinson, 2006: 8) as: 
And yet in each case the momentum of reform has not been sustained. The objective of a 
minimum living wage for civil servants is far from being realised and the bureaucracy is once 
again expanding, increasing the budgetary share of public administration. The rate of growth 
in tax revenues has flattened out and corruption in the tax authority has sharply increased. The 
institutions responsible for coordinating the government’s anti-corruption efforts lack 
resources and capacity, in turn undermining their effectiveness. The legitimacy of these 
institutions has come under question in the face of a low rate of level of prosecutions and the 
failure to check large-scale corruption by senior political figures.  
 
Concerning the URA reform, “despite early success, the URA has consistently failed to meet 
annual revenue targets set by the Ministry of Finance… [which] is partly explained by ‘the 
erosion of institutional autonomy on account of political interference and deficiencies in the 
URA’s governance and management structures” (Robinson, 2006: 23). These practices 
resulted in the resurfacing of corruption and organisational inefficiency. In terms of anti-
corruption reforms and efforts, it is observed that the Auditor-General Office for example has 
no independent board; it has no budgetary autonomy – its budget is submitted to the Minister 
in charge of Finance who then proposes an allocation endorsed by the executive. As 
                                                          
72
 Most of the discussion in this paragraph is drawn from Robinson (2006) 
73 “The neopatrimonial state… is characterised by three key features. The first is the personalisation of power, 
whereby all positions of political power are held by virtue of the ruler’s patronage, and based on ties of 
personal, nepotistic, ethnic or regional loyalty… Second, public office, and the access to resources that this 
affords, is treated as a means to personal and communal gain, rather than as a means of pursuing a broader 
public good. Third, power is extended throughout the territory via networks of ‘clientelism’, at every level. 
(Hickey, 2003: 32) 
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suggested by Robinson (2006: 27) “this provides a degree of political sanction and oversight 
that could be used to limit the powers of the AG. Its work is further impeded by a lack of 
suitably qualified staff, especially experienced accountants, and its inability to make 
decisions on staff recruitment and retention”.  
 
The Inspectorate of Government (IoG) which is an anti-corruption institution set up to 
improve governance and accountability was also strengthened in 2001 to fight corruption and 
ensure transparency and accountability. However this reform has also not been successful and 
as suggested by Robinson (2006): “…the reorganisation of the IoG and the strengthening of 
its powers through new legislation have not markedly improved the performance of the 
institution. Its record in identifying and prosecuting corruption cases remains poor and its 
legitimacy and effectiveness open to question” (p.28). Similarly, despite the ambitions of the 
DEI, it has suffered from various problems that made it almost inoperative. “Recruitment has 
been very problematic with only two out of six professional positions filled, with just a single 
lawyer in the legal unit. No permanent secretary has been in post for over two years” (p.30). 
 
A recent study summarises the current of state of governance in Uganda as:  
…governance in Uganda appears not to be progressing in line with increasing income. Some 
studies suggest that it has entered a phase of deteriorating governance and that risks are rising, 
although it may be too early to see a significant indicator trend (Gelb and Majerowicz, 2011: 
6) 
 
In fact there is still persistent weakening of institutions of accountability in Uganda which 
represented key elements of governance reforms and initiatives. For example, despite the 
significant resources and donor support for the URA reform to improve revenue collection 
and efficiency, it is reported that “bodies that provide public service, including revenue 
collectors, are notorious for holding their clients at ransom” (Global Integrity, 2009: 2). 
“Enforcement of tax laws is often not transparent due to the high levels of corruption in the 
tax agency… As a matter of fact, the Uganda Revenue Authority was, in October 2008, 
named… as the third most corrupt public institution in Uganda” (p.133).  
 
Another example is the Auditor-General Office which is still very under-resourced and not 
much has been done to implement auditor’s findings and recommendations (including 
corruption cases involving members of the executive and high ranked officials) (Global 
Integrity, 2009). Any effort to call for accountability in Uganda faces threats and 
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intimidations for those involved in such efforts. For example the 2012 additional funds to the 
Uganda MPs, despite the cash-flow problems of the Treasury, were quickly uncovered as 
bribes paid to the MPs on the account of February 2011 elections. The civil society members 
who undertook campaign to stop such bribery and return the money to the Treasury faced 
arrest and physical threat by the police and other government officials. The situation made 
Maria Burnett to object to such recurrent practices. 
Anti-corruption efforts should be welcomed, not suppressed. Civil society activists are 
protected in international law from reprisals for legitimate freedom of expression. They 
shouldn't be facing interrogations or accusations of partisanship when they speak out for 
transparency and accountability about state resources
74
 
 
There are some who believe that bilateral and multilateral donors need to do more to force the 
government in Uganda to improve its governance and accountability system (Mwenda, 2010). 
 
5.2.Tanzania 
 
Tanzania is one of the Sub-Saharan African countries with a fast growing economy but has 
not made any significant progress in reducing poverty due to the poor quality of its 
governance. As outlined in Table 3 above there have been a number of governance-related 
reforms in Tanzania but the outcomes of these reforms are mixed. Reforms that aimed at 
reducing the size of the civil services had led to impressive success (Therkildsen, 2000). 
There had been a reduction in the size of the civil service from 355,000 in 1992 to 270,000 in 
late 1990s notably by the elimination of ghost workers and lower-level staff. This had 
resulted in cost reduction and improved controls over wages. Similarly, there had been 25% 
reduction in the number of divisions.  
 
However, these initial reform successes failed dramatically to result in any substantial and 
sustainable expected outcomes (Therkildsen, 2000). Part of the reform failure is reported to be 
attributable to lack of coordination from public officials and excessive requirements from 
donors. Specifically, “… lack of coordination, duplication, and excessive reporting 
requirements themselves act as an obstacle to improving services. An indication is that the 
Tanzanian public service typically produces 2,400 quarterly reports a year for external donors, 
and is visited by 1,000 donor `missions” (Kelsall, 2002: 599).  
                                                          
74
 Maria Burnett, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch: 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/02/10/uganda-halt-pre-election-intimidation-campaign [Accessed 
28/01/2012] 
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Similar to the Uganda case, Tanzania has also reformed its revenue service – the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) responsible for tax collection. The aim of the reform is to improve 
efficiency and reduce corruption in the process by offering “high quality training and 
relatively high salaries to staff who are subject to an incentives regime in which they can be 
disciplined or dismissed with relative ease” (Kelsall, 2002: 601). Despite the success in 
achieving these results, the outcome in terms of reducing the level of corruption is still far 
from achieved. Fjeldstad (2003) finds that the resulted improvements in pay and working 
conditions did not yield the expected reduction in corruption, and concludes that “... even 
with relatively high wages and good working conditions, corruption may continue to thrive... 
Without extensive and effective monitoring, wage increases may produce not only a highly 
paid, but also a highly corrupt tax administration” (p.165). 
 
Regarding the reform of accountability institutions, Tanzania set in 2007 the Aid, governance 
and corruption control which has helped to uncover cases of corruption in both the public and 
private sector organisations. As part of the success, there has also been a gradual 
improvement in the performance of the National Audit Office (NAO) in terms of quality and 
timeliness of audit reports (Koch, 2011). But Koch also quickly report that: 
…even if progress has been made, the quality of audit reports remains inadequate. 
Interviewees mentioned that donors had checked audit findings and found that a number of 
supposedly ‘clean audits’ were not as clean as presented. While the interaction between the 
NAO and parliament has improved, interviewees claimed that more progress was required, 
pointing to the fact that it was donors rather than parliamentarians who checked audit reports 
and that the latter largely lacked the professional background and skills required to scrutinise 
the Auditor General’s reports. The follow-up of audit findings remains a major weakness… 
(p.8) 
 
The political system in Tanzania is characterised by a dominant executive and weak 
legislature and judiciary (Tripp, 2000; Koch, 2011) but there have been some improvements 
in the financial independence of the parliament following the establishment of the National 
Assembly Fund in 2007 (Sitta et al., 2008). In fact:  
The weak and inactive judiciary is an obstacle to the effectiveness of both the NAO and the 
PCCB. Even though initial steps are taken, most corruption cases are never properly 
investigated and prosecuted. In other words, the weak judiciary is a severe obstacle to the 
emergence of domestic accountability (Koch, 2011: 8). 
 
The above has caused the resurfacing of large scale corruption as reported by Sitta et al. 
(2008: 10) as: “…recent evidence of grand corruption on a scale not previously seen in 
Tanzania: the most notable examples are a state tender for emergency electricity generating 
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capacity – the Richmond Contract, and fraud at the central bank – the Bank of Tanzania 
scandal”. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This review paper sets out to explore the state of governance and accountability in Africa. 
The review is intended to ascertain what we know and what needs knowing in terms of 
governance and accountability in Africa. Our review was constrained by the lack of in-depth 
country studies on the topic. Nevertheless, we are able to draw some conclusions from the 
scant literature that we have reviewed.   
 
First, the literature has consistently identified the need for good governance and 
accountability for development. Good governance and accountability are essential at all 
levels to fight corruption, reduce poverty and promote development. However, the review has 
revealed a general state of weak governance and accountability in Africa and this has in part 
contributed to the underdevelopment of the continent. The general view is that Africa needs 
to do more on the ground in terms of effective implementation of governance related policies 
and frameworks. Reform efforts to strengthen governance and accountability have not usually 
been successful. Though a number of factors have contributed to the lack of success in these 
reform programmes, one noticeable factor is the fact that a significant number of reforms are 
have been engineered from outside by international donor institutions who have limited 
understanding of the local context. However as we have highlighted earlier the Bank (AfDB) 
has made strides by ensuring that there is local ownership of reforms. This is based on the 
recognition by the Bank that African countries need locally developed governance and 
accountability systems that will take account of local realities. The role that governance and 
accountability can play in the development of African economies would thus be more 
credible and effective if they emanate from within.  
 
Second, the review found that governance and accountability systems do not operate in 
isolation. These systems require that the necessary institutions such as the political, the 
judiciary, civil society, tax and audit institutions function effectively. Governance and 
accountability must be extended to all levels of the economy and there must be a concerted 
effort by all stakeholders to ensure the effectiveness of any implemented governance and 
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accountability system. For example, there is a clear role for civil society in ensuring that 
public officials are called to account through the process of social accountability. 
 
One of the challenges we encountered in the review as mentioned above is the lack of country 
level studies on the topic except for the ‘country governance profile’ reports on selected 
countries by the AfDB. There are studies on corporate governance but when it comes to 
country level governance, the literature is very scant. We are not sure of why there is 
generally less interest from researchers in the area but we can only speculate that this could 
be due to the political sensitive nature of the topic and the difficulty of access to data for such 
a study. This problem is exacerbated by the broad nature of the term governance and 
accountability hence making it difficult for researchers to operationalise this construct. But 
given that governance and accountability is so critical to the development of African 
countries, and the persistent criticisms of the state of governance and accountability systems 
in these countries, it is essential that more research efforts are directed at the area. Lessons of 
successful governance initiatives can be disseminated across the continent which should help 
us understand better what works and what doesn’t work. While it is possible that there are 
some locally initiated good governance and accountability initiatives, these are currently 
unknown due to the lack of research. It is therefore essential that researchers are encouraged 
to engage more with the field by conducting in-depth country level studies in order to 
contribute to our understanding of the state of governance and accountability in Africa.  
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